Charles vonRosenberg v. Mark Lawrence
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:13-cv-00587-CWH. [999555928]. [14-1122]
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1122
THE RIGHT REVEREND CHARLES G. VONROSENBERG, individually
and in his capacity as Provisional Bishop of the Protestant
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
THE RIGHT REVEREND MARK J. LAWRENCE; JOHN DOES 1 - 10, being
fictitious defendants whose names presently are unknown to
Plaintiff and will be added by amendment when ascertained,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. C. Weston Houck, Senior District
Judge. (2:13-cv-00587-CWH)
Argued:
January 28, 2015
Decided:
March 31, 2015
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Wynn joined.
ARGUED: Thomas S. Tisdale, Jr., HELLMAN YATES & TISDALE,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Charles Alan Runyan,
SPEIGHTS & RUNYAN, Beaufort, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: Jason S. Smith, HELLMAN YATES & TISDALE, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant.
Andrew S. Platte, SPEIGHTS &
RUNYAN, Beaufort, South Carolina; Henrietta U. Golding, MCNAIR
LAW FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina; Charles H. Williams,
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WILLIAMS & WILLIAMS, Orangeburg, South Carolina; David Cox,
WOMBLE, CARLYLE, SANDRIDGE & RICE, LLP, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee The Right Reverend Mark J. Lawrence.
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DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
This appeal arises from a dispute between two clergymen.
Each believes himself to be the proper leader of The Protestant
Episcopal
Church
in
the
Diocese
of
South
Carolina.
Bishop
Charles G. vonRosenberg brought this action against Bishop Mark
J.
Lawrence,
declaratory
alleging
and
two
Lanham
nondeclaratory
Act
violations
relief.
In
and
seeking
response,
Bishop
Lawrence asked the district court to abstain in favor of pending
related
state
court
proceedings.
Relying
on
the
abstention
doctrine articulated in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of
America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942) and Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515
U.S. 277 (1995), which affords a federal court broad discretion
to stay declaratory judgment actions, the district court stayed
the
action.
Because
we
conclude
that
Colorado
River
Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976),
which permits a federal court to abstain only in “exceptional”
circumstances, properly governs the abstention decision in this
action seeking both declaratory and nondeclaratory relief, we
vacate the stay order and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Bishop
vonRosenberg
alleges
that
in
December
2012,
the
Disciplinary Board of The Protestant Episcopal Church in the
United States ousted Bishop Lawrence from his position as Bishop
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of the Diocese of South Carolina.
January
16,
installed
2013,
him
a
as
Convention
Bishop
He further alleges that on
of
the
Lawrence’s
Diocese
elected
replacement.
and
Bishop
vonRosenberg claims that Bishop Lawrence, after his ouster, has
improperly
continued
to
use
the
Church’s
service
marks
falsely advertised himself as the leader of the Church.
and
Bishop
Lawrence maintains that he was not removed from office.
He
contends that Bishop vonRosenberg serves only as leader of an
unincorporated
Diocese.
head,
and,
Episcopal
association
created
to
supplant
the
Each man views himself “as the Diocese’s veritable
thus,
the
rightful
user
of
its
service
marks.”
vonRosenberg v. Lawrence, No. 13-587, slip op. at 4 (D.S.C. Aug.
23, 2013) (“Abstention Order”).
On January 4, 2013 (prior to the filing of this action and
before the Convention assertedly installed Bishop vonRosenberg
as
Bishop
Lawrence’s
replacement),
a
faction
of
Bishop
Lawrence’s supporters filed suit in South Carolina state court
against the Episcopal Church.
That action alleges violations of
service mark infringement and improper use of names, styles, and
emblems -- all “arising exclusively under South Carolina law.”
Id.
The
state
court
issued
a
temporary
restraining
order
preventing anyone other than Bishop Lawrence and those under his
direction from using these service marks and names.
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On March 5, Bishop vonRosenberg filed the present action
against
Bishop
Lawrence
seeking
declaratory
and
injunctive
relief for two violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114
and § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
Bishop vonRosenberg alleges that
Bishop Lawrence violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a), by the unauthorized use of four service marks
belonging to the Diocese of South Carolina and by advertising
falsely that “he is the true Bishop and ecclesiastical authority
of
the
Diocese.”
district
court
On
to
March
dismiss
28,
this
Bishop
federal
Lawrence
action
asked
for
lack
the
of
standing or, in the alternative, asked the court to abstain and
stay this action pending resolution of the related state court
case.
That
same
day,
Bishop
vonRosenberg’s
followers
filed
answers and counterclaims in the state case, including trademark
infringement claims.
On April 3, the vonRosenberg followers
removed the state action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a).
Six weeks later, the district court remanded that
case to state court.
On
August
23,
2013,
the
district
court
granted
Bishop
Lawrence’s motion to abstain and stayed the present action.
The
district court held that Bishop vonRosenberg had constitutional
and prudential standing to assert individual injuries against
Bishop
Lawrence
for
trademark
5
infringement
and
false
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advertising.
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Nevertheless, invoking its “broad discretion to
. . . decline to grant[] declaratory relief” under Brillhart and
Wilton, the district court granted Bishop Lawrence’s motion to
abstain.
Abstention Order at 12 (quoting Wilton, 515 U.S. at
Bishop vonRosenberg timely noted this appeal. 1
281).
II.
We
“review
the
district
court’s
jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.”
decision
to
surrender
New Beckley Mining Corp.
v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers, 946 F.2d 1072, 1074 (4th
Cir.
1991).
requirements
But
of
“[w]hether
abstention”
subject to de novo review.”
a
case
constitutes
satisfies
“a
legal
the
basic
question
Myles Lumber Co. v. CNA Fin. Corp.,
233 F.3d 821, 823 (4th Cir. 2000).
Bishop
vonRosenberg
contends
that
the
district
court
applied the wrong criteria in determining to abstain in this
case.
He maintains that the principles set forth in Colorado
River, rather than those in Brillhart and Wilton, should have
guided
the
abstention
inquiry
in
this
action
seeking
both
declaratory and nondeclaratory relief.
1
On February 3, 2015, the state trial court issued a
judgment and final order in favor of Bishop Lawrence’s
followers. Bishop vonRosenberg’s followers have noted an appeal
of that order.
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In Colorado River, the Supreme Court held that a federal
court
may
abstain
from
deciding
non-frivolous,
nondeclaratory
claims in favor of a parallel state suit for reasons of “wise
judicial
administration”
circumstances.
–-
but
424 U.S. at 818.
only
in
“exceptional”
The Court explained that a
federal court’s “virtually unflagging obligation” to decide such
federal claims rendered its authority to stay a federal action
for these administrative reasons “considerably more limited than
the
circumstances
appropriate
abstention standards. 2
for
abstention”
under
other
Id. at 817-18; see also Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983).
Thus,
a
court
must
“parsimoniously.”
apply
Chase
Colorado
Brexton
Health
Maryland, 411 F.3d 457, 463 (4th Cir. 2005).
River
Servs.,
abstention
Inc.
v.
Even if a parallel
state court suit exists, in deciding whether to abstain for that
reason, a court must balance several factors, “with the balance
heavily
weighted
jurisdiction.”
in
favor
of
the
exercise
of
[federal]
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 16.
We
have identified six factors a court must consider in making this
decision.
See Chase Brexton, 411 F.3d at 463-64.
2
The parties do not contend on appeal that any abstention
standard other than that set forth in Colorado River or
Brillhart/Wilton governs this case.
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The district court did not consider any of these factors,
rather
it
simply
found
Brillhart/Wilton standard.
abstention
have
broad
judgment
discretion
actions
under way.
when
proper
under
the
Those cases recognize that courts
to
abstain
concurrent
from
state
deciding
court
declaratory
proceedings
are
This wide latitude arises out of “federal courts[’]
unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare
the rights of litigants.”
We
have
never
Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286.
expressly
held
which
abstention
standard
applies to a federal complaint, like the one at hand, which
asserts claims for both declaratory and nondeclaratory relief.
See VRCompliance LLC v. HomeAway, Inc., 715 F.3d 570, 571-72
(4th Cir. 2013).
But, although we have recognized that some
circuits have taken other approaches to these mixed cases, we
have
held
that
nondeclaratory
when
a
it
claim,
court
is
is
“not
“required
at
entertaining the declaratory claims.”
Gross,
468
F.3d
199,
210
(4th
Cir.
to
liberty
entertain”
to
abstain
a
from
Great Am. Ins. Co. v.
2006).
Thus,
“when
a
plaintiff seeks relief in addition to a declaratory judgment,
such as damages or injunctive relief, both of which a court must
address,
then
the
entire
benefit
derived
from
exercising
discretion not to grant declaratory relief is frustrated, and a
stay would not save any judicial resources.”
F.3d at 466 (emphasis in original).
8
Chase Brexton, 411
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To
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apply
the
complaint
seeking
otherwise
be
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Brillhart/Wilton
injunctive
governed
by
or
the
standard
monetary
Colorado
to
relief,
a
federal
would
standard,
River
which
would
ignore the very different justifications for the two abstention
standards.
the
rare
Colorado River permits a court to abstain only in
circumstance
administration
otherwise
are
so
“virtually
in
which
pressing
the
as
unflagging
to
817
(emphasis
added).
of
supersede
obligation”
jurisdiction over that federal action.
at
needs
to
judicial
the
court’s
exercise
its
Colorado River, 424 U.S.
Brillhart/Wilton,
by
contrast,
naturally flows from the broad discretion afforded courts to
entertain
actions
Declaratory
and
Judgment
award
Act.
declaratory
The
relief
under
Brillhart/Wilton
the
standard
therefore provides a poor fit for causes of action over which a
federal court generally must exercise jurisdiction -- namely,
claims for nondeclaratory relief.
For those claims, “[o]nly the
clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal” in favor of
concurrent state court proceedings.
We
have
previously
taken
Id. at 819.
note
of
these
differences
and
related considerations, including a federal court’s “unflagging
obligation”
to
adjudicate
federal
claims
for
monetary relief over which it has jurisdiction.
F.3d
at
210;
Chase
Brexton,
411
F.3d
at
466.
injunctive
or
See Gross, 468
We
now
join
several of our sister circuits in holding that Colorado River,
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not Brillhart/Wilton, must guide a court’s decision to abstain
from
adjudicating
mixed
complaints
alleging
claims
for
both
declaratory and nondeclaratory relief.
See New England Ins. Co.
v.
Cir.
Barnett,
561
F.3d
392,
396
(5th
2009);
Village
of
Westfield v. Welch’s, 170 F.3d 116, 124 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999).
Cf., United States v. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170, 1180-82
(10th Cir. 2002).
A contrary approach would deprive a plaintiff of access to
a federal forum simply because he sought declaratory relief in
addition to an injunction or money damages.
Such a penalty for
requesting a declaration seems especially unwarranted given that
nearly all claims, including those for damages or injunctive
relief, effectively ask a court to declare the rights of the
parties to the suit.
available
relief,
declaratory
monetary
To ensure that they have asked for all
plaintiffs
relief
in
relief.
We
commonly
add
a
request
addition
to
requests
for
decline
to
adopt
rule
a
for
equitable
that
or
would
transform that thoroughness into a handicap.
The Colorado River standard applies to all mixed claims -even when the “claims for coercive relief are merely ‘ancillary’
to [a party’s] request for declaratory relief.”
Ltd.
v.
2000).
rule
United
Heritage
Corp.,
204
F.3d
647,
Black Sea Inv.,
652
(5th
Cir.
Indeed, “the only potential exception to this general
arises
when
a
party’s
request
10
for
injunctive
relief
is
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either frivolous or is made solely to avoid application of the
Id. 3
Brillhart standard.”
indicates
that
relief
frivolous
is
Brillhart/Wilton
Bishop
or
Nothing in the record in this case
vonRosenberg’s
designed
standard.
to
request
avoid
Accordingly,
for
injunctive
application
the
Colorado
of
the
River
standard governs the abstention question here.
III.
In considering whether to abstain in mixed cases, where a
plaintiff seeks both declaratory and nondeclaratory relief, a
federal court’s task “is not to find some substantial reason for
the exercise of federal jurisdiction [but] . . . to ascertain
whether there exist ‘exceptional’ circumstances . . . to justify
the surrender of that jurisdiction.”
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp.,
460 U.S. at 25-26 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813).
Because
standard,
the
we
district
must
court
vacate
did
its
not
stay
3
apply
order
this
and
abstention
remand
for
a
Riley v. Dozier Internet Law, P.C., 371 F. App’x 399 (4th
Cir. 2010), an unpublished and therefore non-precedential
opinion on which Bishop Lawrence nevertheless heavily relies, is
such a case. There we concluded that “the perfunctory inclusion
of nondeclaratory requests for relief does not suffice to remove
a plaintiff from the ambit of the Brillhart/Wilton rule.”
Id.
at 404 n.2. For a declaratory judgment plaintiff may not obtain
the benefit of “nearly mandatory jurisdiction under Colorado
River[]
simply
by
tossing
in
dependent
or
boilerplate
nondeclaratory requests.” Id.
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determination
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whether
present in this case.
such
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“exceptional”
circumstances
are
We express no view on that issue.
VACATED AND REMANDED
12
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