Brandon Raub v. Michael Campbell
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cv-00328-HEH-MHL. [999574060]. [14-1277]
Appeal: 14-1277
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1277
BRANDON RAUB,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL CAMPBELL,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
DANIEL LEE BOWEN; RUSSELL MORGAN GRANDERSON; LLOYD C.
CHASER; LATARSHA MASON; MICHAEL PARIS; TERRY GRANGER;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JOHN DOES 1−10,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:13-cv-00328-HEH-MHL)
Argued:
January 28, 2015
Before TRAXLER,
Judges.
Chief
Decided:
Judge,
and
DIAZ
and
April 29, 2015
THACKER,
Circuit
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in
which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Thacker joined.
ARGUED: William H. Hurd,
Virginia, for Appellant.
TROUTMAN
Stylian
SANDERS LLP, Richmond,
Paul Parthemos, COUNTY
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ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD, Chesterfield,
Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Stephen C. Piepgrass,
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Richmond, Virginia; John W. Whitehead,
Douglas R. McKusick, THE RUTHERFORD INSTITUTE, Charlottesville,
Virginia; Anthony F. Troy, Charles A. Zdebski, ECKERT SEAMANS
CHERIN & MELLOTT, LLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Jeffrey L. Mincks, Julie A.C. Seyfarth, COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
FOR THE COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD, Chesterfield, Virginia, for
Appellee.
2
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DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
In the summer of 2012, Brandon Raub composed a series of
ominous Facebook posts, which drew the attention of his former
fellow Marines.
They contacted the FBI expressing concern, and
the FBI--in coordination with local law enforcement--dispatched
a team to Raub’s Virginia home.
After speaking with Raub, and
on the recommendation of Michael Campbell, a local mental health
evaluator,
the
evaluation.
local
officers
detained
Raub
for
further
Campbell then interviewed Raub and, on the basis of
that interview and Raub’s Facebook posts, petitioned a state
magistrate
granted.
judge
for
a
temporary
detention
order,
which
was
Raub was subsequently hospitalized against his will
for seven days.
Raub filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages and
injunctive
Amendment
relief
and
against
First
Campbell
Amendment
for
rights.
violating
The
his
Fourth
district
court
granted summary judgment to Campbell on the basis of qualified
immunity,
concluding
recommending
Raub’s
that
seizure
Campbell
and
further
acted
reasonably
detention.
For
in
the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
In reviewing de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, we recite the facts and all reasonable inferences to
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be drawn from them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party--in this case, Raub.
Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531
(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
In August 2012, two Marine veterans who had served with
Raub during his deployment to Iraq contacted the FBI.
They were
concerned by Raub’s “increasingly threatening” Facebook posts.
J.A. 532.
In an email, one of the Marines, Howard Bullen,
provided specific examples of Raub’s posts:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
“This is revenge. Know that before you die.”
“Richmond is not yours. I’m about to shake some shit
up.”
“This is the start of you dying. Planned spittin with
heart of Lion.”
“Leader of the New School.
Bringing Back the Old
School. MY LIFE WILL BE A DOCUMENTARY.”
“I’m gunning whoever run the town.”
“W, you’re under arrest bitch.”
“The World will Find This.”
“I know ya’ll are reading this, and I truly wonder if
you know what’s about to happen.”
“W, you’ll be one of the first people dragged out of
your house and arrested.”
“And Daddy Bush, too.”
“The Revolution will come for me.
Men will be at my
door soon to pick me up to lead it ;)”
“You should understand that many of the things I have
said here are for the world to see.”
J.A. 532–33.
Although Bullen characterized Raub’s statements as
“typical extremist language,” he also told the FBI that Raub
“genuinely
believes
attention.”
in
Id. at 533.
“threatening
recent months.
and
this
and
is
not
simply
looking
for
Bullen expressed concern that Raub’s
action-oriented”
Id.
4
rhetoric
had
worsened
in
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The FBI decided to interview Raub. 1
comprised
of
federal
and
local
law
Supported by a team
enforcement
officers,
Detective Michael Paris and FBI Agent Terry Granger approached
Raub at his home and questioned him about his Facebook posts.
Raub, wearing only a pair of white shorts and speaking to
the officers through the screen door of his home, admitted that
he wrote the posts.
Although he never threatened violence, Raub
refused to answer directly when asked if he intended to commit
violence.
At one point, he told Paris and Granger, “[W]e will
all see very soon what all of this means.”
J.A. 193.
Paris observed that Raub’s demeanor shifted wildly over the
course
of
the
conversation,
alternating
“extremely intense and emotional.”
and
Granger
about
their
knowledge
Id.
of
between
calm
and
Raub questioned Paris
government
conspiracy
theories--including Raub’s theories that the government launched
a missile into the Pentagon on 9/11 and that the government
exposes citizens to radioactive thorium--and wondered why the
officers
were
not
arresting
government
officials
for
these
crimes.
After interviewing Raub for nearly half an hour, Paris and
Granger discussed whether they should detain Raub for a mental
1
Agents had conferred with state and federal prosecutors,
who advised that Raub’s statements, by themselves, did not
provide sufficient grounds for criminal charges.
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health evaluation.
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To that end, Paris spoke by telephone with
Michael Campbell, a certified mental health “prescreener” with
the local emergency services agency.
Paris described Raub’s
Facebook posts and told Campbell that Raub appeared “preoccupied
and distracted” during the interview, with rapid mood swings and
roving, intermittent eye contact.
J.A. 574.
In addition, Paris
expressed concern about Raub’s military weapons training and his
potential access
to weapons. 2
Campbell, believing that Raub
might be psychotic, recommended that Paris detain Raub for an
evaluation.
Raub was placed in custody and transported to the local
jail. 3
There, he was handcuffed to a bench in the jail’s intake
room.
Because Raub was not allowed to retrieve his clothes
before being detained, he was both shirtless and shoeless when
Campbell arrived to speak with him.
the Facebook
posts,
as
well
as
Campbell asked Raub about
Raub’s
beliefs
conspiracies and an impending revolution.
in
government
Although Raub said
little in response--declining after twelve minutes to answer any
2
The record does not say why Paris thought Raub had access
to weapons.
3
Virginia law requires that a person seized for an
emergency detention be taken to an “appropriate location to
assess the need for hospitalization or treatment.”
Va. Code
Ann. § 37.2-808(G) (2011).
6
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further
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questions--when
following
through
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asked
whether
he
the
threats
that
with
felt
justified
had
caused
detention, Raub replied, “I certainly do, wouldn’t you?”
576.
in
his
J.A.
In addition, he told Campbell, “the revolution is coming,”
and “if you [k]new of what was coming[,] wouldn[’]t you try to
stop
it[?]”
J.A.
705.
When
asked
why
he
thought
the
authorities had approached him about his posts, Raub replied,
“because they know I am on to them.”
Campbell
distracted
also
and
noted
had
that
J.A. 523.
Raub
difficulty
appeared
answering
preoccupied
questions.
and
This
behavior, combined with Raub’s professed belief in an impending
revolution that he was destined to lead, prompted Campbell to
conclude that Raub might be paranoid and delusional, and that he
was “responding to some internal stimulus.”
After
speaking
with
Raub,
Bullen had sent to the FBI.
mother,
who
said
that
noticed
no
change
in
she
his
Campbell
J.A. 576.
read
the
email
that
Campbell also spoke with Raub’s
shared
her
behavior.
son’s
beliefs
Campbell
and
had
nonetheless
concluded that Raub met the statutory standard for involuntary
temporary
detention, 4
given
Raub’s
4
“recent
change
in . . .
The statute authorizing temporary detention requires a
finding that (1) a person has a mental illness; (2) “there
exists a substantial likelihood that, as a result of [that]
mental illness, the person will” harm himself or others; (3) the
person needs hospitalization or treatment; and (4) the person
(Continued)
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behavior[] and more severe posts about revolution with plans for
action,” as reflected in the email.
Consequently,
Campbell
J.A. 705.
petitioned
for
and
received
temporary detention order from a magistrate judge.
taken
to
agreed
a
hospital,
that
Raub
staff thereafter
where
exhibited
petitioned
a
psychologist
symptoms
the
of
state
involuntary admission for treatment.
Raub was
examined
psychosis.
court
for
a
him
and
Hospital
an
order
of
After a hearing, held four
days after Raub was detained, the court ordered that Raub be
admitted for thirty days; however, just three days later, the
court ordered Raub released from the hospital, concluding that
“the petition [was] . . . devoid of any factual allegations.”
J.A. 879. 5
Raub subsequently filed suit against multiple defendants,
alleging claims under state and federal law.
complaint
claims
twice,
under
Campbell.
42
with
the
U.S.C.
Second
§ 1983
Amended
against
He amended his
Complaint
only
one
alleging
defendant--
In addition to damages, Raub also sought to enjoin
Campbell from seizing Raub in the future or retaliating against
will not volunteer for hospitalization or treatment.
Ann. § 37.2-809(B) (2010).
5
The
conclusion.
court
provided
no
8
further
explanation
Va. Code
for
its
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him based on the exercise of his constitutional rights.
The
district court granted Campbell’s motion for summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity and denied Raub’s request for
injunctive relief.
Raub appeals, pressing three arguments.
First, he contends
that Campbell violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizures by recommending that Raub be taken
into custody for a mental health evaluation and by petitioning
the state court for a temporary detention order.
Second, Raub
avers that Campbell violated his First Amendment right of free
speech
by
basing
his
conclusion
that
Raub
was
delusional
on
Raub’s Facebook posts and his responses to Campbell’s questions.
Finally, Raub contends that, even if his constitutional claims
fail, he is still entitled to injunctive relief.
We address
each argument in turn.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s decision to grant
Campbell summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
West v. Murphy, 771 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2014).
Generally,
qualified immunity operates to protect law enforcement and other
government officials from civil damages liability for alleged
constitutional
functions.
violations
stemming
from
their
discretionary
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987).
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The protection extends to “all but the plainly incompetent or
those who knowingly violate the law.”
U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
Malley v. Briggs, 475
Indeed, as we have emphasized repeatedly,
“[o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they
are liable for transgressing bright lines.”
S.P. v. City of
Takoma Park, Md., 134 F.3d 260, 266 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992)).
The defense of qualified immunity is broader than a mere
defense to liability.
Rather, intended to “spare individual
officials the burdens and uncertainties of standing trial,” it
provides for immunity from suit where a state actor’s conduct is
objectively
reasonable
under
the
circumstances.
Gooden
v.
Howard Cnty., Md., 954 F.2d 960, 965 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc);
see
also
Mitchell
(plurality
opinion)
v.
Forsyth,
(noting
472
that
U.S.
511,
qualified
526
(1985)
immunity
is
“effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to
trial”).
be
We therefore prefer questions of qualified immunity to
decided
“at
the
earliest
possible
stage
in
litigation.”
Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d
324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)).
And we have recognized that, on
a defense of qualified immunity, once a state actor’s conduct is
established beyond dispute, the question of whether that conduct
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was reasonable is one of law for the court to decide.
Id. at
333.
Our
qualified
inquiries:
(1)
immunity
whether
the
analysis
typically
plaintiff
has
involves
two
established
the
violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right
was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
West, 771 F.3d at 213 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 232 (2009)).
analysis.
these
However, we need not reach both prongs of the
See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242.
two
questions
in
“the
Rather, we may address
order . . .
that
will
best
facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case.”
Id.
III.
Raub’s Fourth Amendment argument is based on the claim that
Campbell acted without probable cause in recommending that Raub
be taken into custody for a mental health evaluation, and when
he petitioned the state court for a temporary detention order.
We
choose,
Campbell’s
Rather,
we
however,
conduct
hold
not
to
amounted
that
reach
the
to
constitutional
because
11
a
question
Campbell’s
of
conduct
whether
violation.
was
not
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proscribed by clearly established law, summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity was proper. 6
In
this
“inquiry
prong
turns
on
of
the
the
qualified
objective
immunity
the
reasonableness
legal
analysis,
of
[Campbell’s] action, assessed in light of the legal rules that
were clearly established at the time it was taken.”
555
U.S.
at
244
(internal
quotation
marks
Pearson,
omitted).
As
a
result, we look not to whether the right allegedly violated was
established “as a broad general proposition” but whether “it
would be clear to a reasonable official that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001), as modified by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223;
see
also
established
S.P.,
134
contours
F.3d
of
at
266
probable
(4th
cause
Cir.
1998)
[must
have
(“[T]he
been]
sufficiently clear at the time of the seizure such that the
6
We reject Campbell’s argument that he cannot be held
liable under § 1983 because he was not directly responsible
either for Raub’s initial seizure or his temporary detention
under the magistrate’s order.
Section 1983 “imposes liability
not only for conduct that directly violates a right but for
conduct that is the effective cause of another’s direct
infliction of the constitutional injury.”
Sales v. Grant, 158
F.3d 768, 776 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 344
n.7 (explaining that § 1983 liability extends to the natural
consequences of a person’s actions).
Thus, because Raub’s
seizure and detention were based, at least in part, on
Campbell’s recommendation, Campbell is liable under § 1983
unless he is entitled to qualified immunity.
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unlawfulness of the officers’ actions would have been apparent
to reasonable officers.”).
Raub points to three general reasons why Campbell’s conduct
was
unconstitutional.
mental
health
First,
professional
he
would
contends
not
have
that
a
relied
reasonable
solely
on
Detective Paris’s report, but rather would have spoken to Raub
prior to recommending his initial seizure.
that
no
reasonable
mental
health
Second, he argues
professional
would
have
interviewed Raub in a jail intake room, while he was shirtless,
shoeless, and handcuffed to a bench.
Finally, Raub asserts that
no reasonable mental health professional would have concluded on
these
facts--Raub’s
Facebook
posts,
conflicting
reports
about
Raub’s behavioral changes, and Raub’s statements and behavior
during his interview with Campbell--that Raub should be detained
for a mental health evaluation.
Our
previous
decisions
concerning
seizures
for
mental
health evaluations have indeed emphasized a “general right to be
free from seizure” absent a finding of probable cause.
954 F.2d at 968.
of
clarity
in
evaluations,”
Gooden,
However, we have also noted a distinct “lack
the
law
compared
governing
with
the
seizures
for
“painstaking[]”
probable cause in the criminal arrest context.
S.P., 134 F.3d at 266.
psychological
definition
of
Id.; see also
Although our cases and the governing
statutes provide some guidance as to the standards for probable
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cause to seize someone for a mental health evaluation, we are
aware of no case clearly proscribing Campbell’s conduct, or even
conduct similar to it.
Rather,
all
of
our
decisions
involving
mental
health
seizures have involved circumstances in which law enforcement
officers
seized
an
individual
because
they
feared
he
or
she
might be a danger to him- or herself.
In most of these cases,
we
seizing
granted
qualified
immunity
to
the
officers.
For
example, in Gooden, officers were twice called to an apartment
complex
on
apartments.
officers
reports
of
screams
954 F.2d at 962.
personally
heard
emanating
from
one
of
the
On the second occasion, the
“blood-chilling”
strange noises coming from the apartment.
screams
Id.
and
other
However, when
the officers spoke with the woman who lived in the apartment,
she denied hearing or making any such noises (although she did
admit to “yelping” once because she had burned herself on an
iron).
Id.
Nevertheless,
the
woman
appeared
to
have
been
crying, and the officers were concerned that she was “mentally
disordered” and might pose a danger to herself.
Id. at 963.
As
a result, they took her to a nearby hospital for evaluation.
Id. at 964.
In our en banc reversal of the panel’s decision to affirm
the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, we held that
the officers’ conduct was reasonable, as they acted on the basis
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multiple
Filed: 04/29/2015
complaints,
investigations.
Pg: 15 of 23
personal
Id. at 966.
observations,
and
their
own
We also found relevant the fact
that the officers acted pursuant to a Maryland law authorizing
mental health seizures.
Id.
We came to a similar conclusion in S.P.
There, officers
responded to an emergency dispatch and found the plaintiff at
her home, crying and distraught.
that
she
had
had
a
“painful
134 F.3d at 264.
argument”
with
her
denied having thoughts of suicide or depression.
267.
not
She admitted
husband
but
Id. at 264,
At the same time, however, she told the officers that, if
for
her
children,
suicide.”
Id. at 267.
officers’
concern
“she
that
would
have
considered
committing
Because of the woman’s demeanor and the
she
may
cause
harm
to
herself,
officers took her to a nearby hospital for evaluation.
the
Id.
Again, we concluded that because the officers “had ample
opportunity to observe and interview” the plaintiff, “did not
decide to detain [her] in haste,” and acted pursuant to state
law authorizing mental health seizures, they acted reasonably in
detaining the plaintiff.
Id. at 267-68.
Moreover, we noted
that, just as in Gooden, even though the plaintiff “exhibited no
signs of physical abuse and denied any psychiatric problems,”
the officers acted reasonably in relying on their perceptions of
the plaintiff as “evasive and uncooperative.”
15
Id. at 268.
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In contrast, in Bailey v. Kennedy--notably, the only case
in which we have denied qualified immunity for seizures in the
mental
health
context--law
enforcement
officers
detained
the
plaintiff based solely on a 911 report that he was intoxicated,
depressed, and suicidal.
349 F.3d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 2003).
There, the officers responded to the plaintiff’s home, where
they found him sitting at his dining room table eating lunch.
He denied thoughts of suicide, declined to give the officers
permission to search the house, and asked them to leave.
Id.
The officers did not see weapons or other indicia of a potential
suicide in the house.
After
leaving,
the
officers
decided
they
something” and returned to knock on the door.
“ha[d]
to
Id. at 735.
do
When
the plaintiff told them the suicide report was “crazy” and that
the officers needed to leave, the officers instead entered his
home
and
subdued
him
by
handcuffing
multiple times in the face.
report,
viewed
together
with
Id.
the
him
and
striking
him
We concluded that “the 911
events
after
the
police
officers arrived, was insufficient to establish probable cause
to detain [the plaintiff] for an emergency mental evaluation.”
Id. at 741.
When confronted with a similar situation in Cloaninger, we
distinguished that case from Bailey on the ground that the law
enforcement officers had more information than the “mere 911
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call in Bailey.”
summoned
seeking
to
555 F.3d at 333.
Cloaninger’s
medical
enforcement
help,
officials
Id. at 328.
“Cloaninger
Pg: 17 of 23
home
and
that
a
There, police officers were
after
he
police
called
a
dispatcher
Cloaninger
had
VA
hospital
informed
threatened
law
suicide.
In addition, one of the officers was aware that
had
previously
made
suicide
threats”
believed that he “had firearms in the house.”
and
also
Id. at 332.
When officers arrived at Cloaninger’s home to check on him,
he refused to respond “to their concerns for his well-being.”
Id.
The officers then called a VA hospital nurse, who confirmed
that Cloaninger “had a history of threatening suicide.”
The
nurse
also
indicated
that,
under
the
Id.
circumstances,
emergency commitment order would be appropriate.
an
Id. at 333.
We held that “the initial VA call, coupled with knowledge of
Cloaninger’s
prior
suicide
threats
and
the
belief
that
he
possessed firearms,” constituted probable cause that Cloaninger
was a danger to himself.
Id. at 334.
While these cases outline the standard for probable cause
in
situations
where
law
enforcement
officials
must
decide
whether to detain an individual on the belief that he might be a
danger to himself, they provide less guidance here.
Indeed,
none of the cases delineates the appropriate standard where a
mental
health
evaluator
must
decide
whether
to
recommend
a
temporary detention on the belief that an individual might be a
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danger to others.
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They certainly do not speak to the necessity,
length, and substance of a psychological evaluation, nor to the
evidence
needed
to
support
probable
cause
in
such
a
circumstance.
Nonetheless, to the extent the cases should have informed
Campbell’s
reasonably
Bailey,
conduct,
under
they
our
Campbell’s
support
prevailing
the
legal
recommendation
initial
observations
of
law
that
standards.
that
supported by far more than a 911 call.
the
view
Raub
be
he
acted
Unlike
detained
in
was
Rather, it was based on
enforcement
officers,
the
content of Raub’s Facebook posts, the information provided by
Raub’s
former
colleagues,
and--later--on
evaluation and observations of Raub.
Campbell’s
own
Indeed, the quantum of
evidence here is greater than that in Cloaninger--where we found
probable cause based only on an initial hospital call, a history
of
suicide
reports,
and
a
belief
that
Cloaninger
possessed
firearms--and is more like the circumstances in Gooden and S.P.-where officers based their seizure on both prior reports of
distress and their personal observations of individuals at the
scene.
In sum, we think it doubtful that Campbell violated Raub’s
Fourth Amendment rights based on our existing precedent.
We
need not, however, pass on that question because we hold that
Campbell is entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that
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unlawfulness
(if
any)
of
Pg: 19 of 23
his
conduct
was
not
clearly
established at the time he recommended Raub’s seizure. 7
See
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241 (cautioning against deciding “questions
of
constitutionality . . .
unavoidable”)
(internal
unless
quotation
such
marks
adjudication
omitted);
see
is
also
Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 168 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating
that
avoiding
the
Fourth
Amendment
question
in
qualified
immunity analysis is appropriate where the “inquiry involves a
reasonableness
question
which
is
highly
idiosyncratic
and
heavily dependent on the facts”). 8
7
The report of Raub’s psychological expert, Dr. Catherine
Martin, does not change our conclusion.
Although Dr. Martin
questions whether Campbell’s probable cause determination was
ultimately correct, we need not resolve that issue under this
stage of our analysis. Our inquiry here is “not whether another
reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can
be constructed . . . years after the fact,” Hunter, 502 U.S. at
228 (1991), but whether Campbell’s conduct was reasonable under
then prevailing law.
8
We also reject Raub’s argument that Campbell is not
entitled to qualified immunity because he negligently omitted
from his petition for a temporary detention order the statement
of Raub’s mother, who told Campbell she had noticed no changes
in Raub’s behavior.
In the arrest context, a law enforcement
officer’s omission of material facts from a warrant affidavit
deprives him of qualified immunity only if the omission was made
intentionally or with a “reckless disregard for the truth.”
Miller v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171
(1978)).
Allegations of negligence or mistake are not enough.
Id. at 627–28.
To the extent Raub contends Campbell
intentionally or recklessly misled the magistrate judge, he
failed to properly raise this issue below. Thus, we decline to
(Continued)
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IV.
We turn next to Raub’s contention that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment on his First Amendment claim.
Raub’s
argument
is
based
on
his
allegation
that
Campbell
recommended Raub be detained for an evaluation based on Raub’s
“unorthodox
political
statements.”
Appellant’s
Br.
at
50.
Under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the
district
court
concluded
that
Raub
failed
to
advance
facts
sufficient to support a First Amendment claim, and we agree.
A plaintiff seeking to assert a § 1983 claim on the ground
that
he
experienced
Amendment-protected
government
speech
must
retaliation
establish
for
three
his
First
elements:
(1)
his speech was protected, (2) the “alleged retaliatory action
adversely
affected”
his
protected
speech,
and
(3)
a
causal
relationship between the protected speech and the retaliation.
Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685–86 (4th Cir.
2000).
Of note, our causal requirement is “rigorous.”
Huang v.
Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C., 902 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th
Cir. 1990).
“[I]t is not enough that the protected expression
played a role or was a motivating factor in the retaliation;
claimant must show that ‘but for’ the protected expression the
consider it.
See Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560
F.3d 235, 242 (4th Cir. 2009).
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actor]
action.”
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would
not
have
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taken
the
alleged
retaliatory
Id.
Raub’s evidence falls far short of this requirement.
Raub
contends that Campbell recommended his detention based on his
“political”
statements
concerning
9/11
impending
revolution.
Assuming
protected
by
Amendment,
Raub
Campbell’s
recommendation
other
facts
the
on
First
which
these
conspiracies
statements
ignores
are
the
and
indeed
numerous
was
based,
including the nature of Raub’s Facebook posts, both Campbell’s
and
Paris’s
observations
of
Raub’s
demeanor,
the
information
contained in Bullen’s email about the recent increase in the
seemingly
threatening
should
be
taken
speech
contributed
posts,
seriously.
to
and
Thus,
Campbell’s
Bullen’s
even
belief
if
decision
Raub’s
to
that
Raub
protected
recommend
his
detention, it was not dispositive.
As a result, we agree with the district court that Raub did
not make out a First Amendment violation, and that Campbell is
therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
V.
Finally, we reject Raub’s claim for injunctive relief.
the
district
court
noted,
a
finding
of
qualified
extends only to Campbell’s liability for damages.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 n.34 (1982).
21
As
immunity
See Harlow v.
Nevertheless, the
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district court concluded that Raub did not meet the standard for
injunctive relief because, among other reasons, he could not
demonstrate the “immediate threat of future injury,” required
for the equitable remedy.
540 (E.D. Va. 2014).
Raub v. Campbell, 3 F. Supp. 3d 526,
We review a denial of injunctive relief
for abuse of discretion.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Bradley, 756 F.2d 1048, 1055 (4th Cir. 1985).
We agree with the district court that injunctive relief is
not appropriate on this record.
First, we have recognized that
“federal injunctive relief is an extreme remedy.”
Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1382 (4th Cir. 1995).
Simmons v.
To obtain such an
injunction, a plaintiff must show (1) irreparable injury, (2)
remedies at law “are inadequate to compensate for that injury,”
(3)
“the
balance
of
hardships
between
the
plaintiff
and
defendant” warrants a remedy, and (4) an injunction would not
disserve the public interest.
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed
Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010).
Where a § 1983 plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief, it
will not be granted absent the plaintiff’s showing that there is
a
“real
or
again . . .
(quoting
(1983)).
immediate
in
City
a
of
threat
similar
Los
that
way.”
Angeles
[he]
will
be
wronged
Simmons,
v.
47
F.3d
at
Lyons,
461
U.S.
95,
1382
111
Even assuming Raub could make out a violation of his
constitutional rights, “past wrongs do not in themselves amount
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to that real and immediate threat of injury.”
at 1382 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103).
Simmons, 47 F.3d
Consequently, Raub’s
claim that he will in the future be subject to “unreasonable
seizures
and
Appellant’s
retaliation
Br.
at
58,
because
is
of
merely
his
political
speculative,
beliefs,”
such
that
cannot make out “this prerequisite of equitable relief.”
he
See
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.
VI.
For
the
reasons
given,
we
affirm
the
district
court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED
23
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