Jeffrey Hodges v. Federal-Mogul Corporation

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:12-cv-00362-MFU-RSB Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999616726].. [14-1333]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1333

JEFFREY S. HODGES; TOMMY LEE BONDS; JOHN PAUL SPANGLER,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
FEDERAL-MOGUL CORPORATION; Q-TECH EQUIPMENT & SERVICES OF
THE CAROLINAS, L.L.C.; CARRINGTON ENGINEERING SALES CO.;
CARRINGTON ENGINEERING SALES; DUSTEX CORPORATION; THE KIRK
& BLUM MANUFACTURING COMPANY; K&B DUCT,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
CARRINGTON
ENGINEERING
ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION,

SALES

COMPANY,

LLC;

CECO

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Michael F. Urbanski, District
Judge. (7:12-cv-00362-MFU-RSB)

Argued:

May 12, 2015

Decided:

July 8, 2015

Before MOTZ, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Edward Kyle McNew, MICHIEHAMLETT, PLLC, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellants.
Monica Taylor Monday, GENTRY, LOCKE,

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RAKES & MOORE LLP, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
Neal Stanley Johnson, JOHNSON LAW PLC, Roanoke, Virginia; Peter
Brent Brown, BROWN & JENNINGS PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellants. Guy M. Harbert III, James J. O’Keeffe IV, Daniel R.
Sullivan, GENTRY LOCKE RAKES & MOORE LLP, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellee Federal-Mogul Corporation; David Drake Hudgins, HUDGINS
LAW FIRM, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee Dustex Corporation;
Bevin Ray Alexander, Jr., James Barrett Lucy, FREEMAN, DUNN,
ALEXANDER, GAY, LUCY & COATES, P.C., Lynchburg, Virginia, for
Appellees Q-Tech Equipment & Services of the Carolinas, L.L.C.
and Carrington Engineering Sales Co.; Donald Edward Morris, LAW
OFFICES OF ANTONY K. JONES, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees
The Kirk & Blum Manufacturing Company and K&B Duct.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jeffrey S. Hodges, Tommy Lee Bonds, and John Paul Spangler
(the “plaintiffs”) sustained serious injuries on December 31,
2010,

from

aluminum

a

fire

dust

Virginia.

that

occurred

a

production

from

while

they

facility

were
in

cleaning

Blacksburg,

The plaintiffs commenced this civil action in the

Western

District

of

Virginia

recover

damages

on

claims

dangerous

safety

defendants

—

equipment

including

on

August

that
had

6,

2012,

defective

caused

appellees

and

their

seeking

unreasonably

injuries.

Federal-Mogul

to

The

Corporation

(“Federal-Mogul”); Q-Tech Equipment & Services of the Carolinas,
L.L.C.

and

Carrington

“Carrington”);
Blum

Dustex

Manufacturing

Engineering

Corporation

Company

and

Sales

Co.

(“Dustex”);
K&B

Duct

and

(together,
The

(together,

Kirk

&

“K&B”)

(collectively, the “defendants”) — played various roles in the
design, manufacture, installation, and maintenance of the safety
equipment.

Following discovery, the defendants moved to exclude

the opinions of the plaintiffs’ proposed experts under Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and
for summary judgment. 1

For reasons set forth in its Memorandum

1

When the summary judgment and Daubert motions were filed,
two additional named defendants — Carrington Engineering Sales
Company, LLC and CECO Environmental Corporation — had already
been dismissed.
The plaintiffs do not challenge those
dismissals.

3

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Opinion of March 7, 2014, the district court granted the Daubert
motions and awarded summary judgment to the defendants.

See

Hodges v. Federal-Mogul Corp., No. 7:12-cv-00362 (W.D. Va. Mar.
7, 2014), ECF No. 149 (the “Opinion”). 2
plaintiffs

contest

solely

the

summary

In this appeal, the
judgment

awards.

As

explained below, we vacate and remand.

I.
A.
The
production

fire

underlying

facility

Federal-Mogul
bearings. 3

in

(the

this

civil

“facility”)

Blacksburg,

where

it

action
owned

occurred
and

in

operated

manufactures

a
by

automotive

In 2002 and 2003, Federal-Mogul added an aluminum

bonding line that involved sanding and brushing aluminum and
steel strip.

A byproduct of those operations is aluminum dust,

which is highly combustible.

Federal-Mogul installed a dust

collection system to safely remove and dispose of the aluminum
dust (the “dust collection system”).

The dust collection system

2

The district court’s unpublished Opinion is found at J.A.
4160-93.
(Citations herein to “J.A. __” refer to the contents
of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.)
3

We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, as the nonmoving parties.
See Covol Fuels No. 4,
LLC v. Pinnacle Mining Co., LLC, 785 F.3d 104, 106 n.2 (4th Cir.
2015).

4

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utilized

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fans

to

capture

the

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dust

and

transport

ductwork located along the facility’s ceiling.

it

through

The ductwork

extended through an exterior wall, turned at a right angle, and
ultimately

disposed

of

the

dust

in

a

structure

facility that was called a “baghouse.”

outside

the

Also connected to the

ductwork was a rectangular damper box (the “back-blast damper”)
that was mounted to the facility’s exterior wall.

Inside the

back-blast damper was a damper door, which was hinged at the
top.

If the explosive dust in the baghouse ignited, the back-

blast damper was supposed to prevent the fire from entering the
facility through the ductwork.
In 2010, Federal-Mogul initiated “a dust mitigation effort
in its plants worldwide,” and hired LCM Corporation (“LCM”) to
inspect and remediate the Blacksburg facility.
On

December

30,

2010,

LCM

employees

—

See J.A. 116.

including

plaintiffs

Hodges and Bonds — performed an inspection of the facility and
discovered that three to five inches of dust had accumulated in
the ductwork above the aluminum bonding line.

The following

day, Hodges and Bonds returned to the facility with plaintiff
Spangler to clean that ductwork.

Unaware that the dust was

combustible, the plaintiffs wore flammable Tyvek suits.
Hodges

and

Bonds

mounted

a

scissor

lift

to

reach

the

ductwork, approximately twenty to thirty feet from the ground.
They extracted the dust with a vacuum hose connected to a truck
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located just outside of the facility.

Spangler operated the

truck, which ran idly and controlled the power of the vacuum
hose.

After cleaning the portion of the ductwork that faced

inside the facility, Hodges and Bonds turned around and began
cleaning the portion of the ductwork facing the baghouse.

They

were then approximately twenty feet from the exterior wall, and
Hodges held both a flashlight and the vacuum hose, while Bonds
stood behind Hodges and helped him control the hose.
Using

the

flashlight,

toward the baghouse.

Hodges

looked

into

the

ductwork,

He saw several inches of accumulated dust

that “kind of varied” in height “and went all the way back out
to outside the building.”

See J.A. 2312.

Hodges was able to

see into the back-blast damper and past the damper door, which
was partially propped open by dust.
the

second

manipulating

section

of

the

and

hose

the

As Hodges and Bonds cleaned

ductwork,

reaching

shocks of static electricity.

the

they
dust,

had
and

trouble

also

felt

As a result, Hodges and Bonds

duct-taped a PVC extension to the hose to lengthen and stabilize
it.

In order to reduce the static electricity, Hodges asked

Spangler to go outside to the vacuum truck and decrease its
power.

Spangler obliged and began walking to an exit door that

was propped open, heading toward the direction of the baghouse.
At that time, an explosion occurred and fire spread through
the ductwork.

Hodges saw “a flash of a fireball” emanate from
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outside the facility beyond the back-blast damper, coming toward
him.

See J.A. 2312.

Spangler, having nearly reached the exit,

saw a “bright white light” that “came at [him] from the front.”
Id. at 2675.
the

The baghouse exploded, and flames spewed out of

ductwork.

promptly

The

caught

Tyvek

fire,

as

suits
did

donned

by

Spangler’s

Hodges
hat.

and

Bonds

All

three

plaintiffs sustained serious injuries.
B.
1.
After commencing this civil action in the Western District
of

Virginia

on

August

6,

2012,

the

plaintiffs

operative Amended Complaint on December 26, 2012.

filed

their

The Amended

Complaint alleges seven causes of action:
•

Count I is brought against Federal-Mogul, alleging
that the company was negligent in numerous respects,
including its role in the design and installation of
the dust collection system.
In addition, Count I
asserts that Federal-Mogul negligently failed to
perform routine maintenance on the system.

•

Counts II and III are against Carrington, the
company that sold and installed the dust collection
system to Federal-Mogul.
Count II alleges that
Carrington breached several warranties by supplying
Federal-Mogul with a blast-back damper that was
defective and not fit for its particular purpose.
Count III raises a negligence claim, asserting that
Carrington negligently designed and installed the
dust collection system so that the airflow in the
system
was
too
weak
to
prevent
dust
from
accumulating in the ductwork and back-blast damper.

•

Counts
claims

IV and V
against

allege warranty
Dustex,
which
7

and negligence
designed
and

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manufactured the baghouse. Those counts assert that
Dustex designed the baghouse in an unsafe manner,
without sufficient venting to prevent an explosion
in the baghouse from entering the facility.
•

Counts VI and VII name K&B, which designed and
manufactured the back-blast damper.
Those counts
raise warranty and negligence claims, respectively,
alleging that the damper door failed to prevent the
fire from passing through the back-blast damper and
into
Federal-Mogul’s
facility,
and
that
K&B
negligently designed the back-blast damper.

Following the completion of discovery, the defendants filed
their Daubert motions as well as the summary judgment motions at
issue in this appeal.

The plaintiffs maintained that the fire

originated in the baghouse and travelled through the ductwork
and into the facility, passing through the back-blast damper.
To

show

that

the

fire

started

outside

of

the

facility

and

travelled into it, the plaintiffs relied heavily on Hodges’s
deposition

evidence

that

he

personally

observed

emanate toward him from outside the facility.

the

fireball

That evidence,

the plaintiffs maintained, was corroborated by other evidence of
record, including, inter alia:

Spangler’s deposition testimony

that he saw a bright flash and felt a blast coming from the
direction

of

the

baghouse;

surveillance

video

footage

that

showed changes in lighting and shadows as the events unfolded;
and pictures of the ductwork and the baghouse taken following
the fire.

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In addition, the plaintiffs relied on their two experts,
Patrick McGinley and Martin Schloss, who offered opinions on
three issues.
exothermic
baghouse

First, both opined that the fire was caused by an

reaction

(or,

resulting

a

from

spontaneous
aluminum

combustion)

dust

condensation (the “causation opinions”).

in

interacting

the
with

Second, both McGinley

and Schloss — relying on Hodges’s deposition evidence — opined
that the fire originated in the baghouse and then spread through
the

back-blast

damper

“origin opinions”).

and

into

the

facility’s

ductwork

(the

Third, Schloss opined that defects in the

dust collection system permitted the fire to enter the facility,
thus causing the plaintiffs’ injuries (the “defect opinion”).
According to Schloss’s defect opinion, the baghouse was designed
and manufactured with insufficient venting, failing the safety
standards

established

Association (the “NFPA”). 4

by

the

National

Fire

Protection

As a result, if a combustion occurred

in the baghouse, the structure could not release the pressure in
a controlled manner.

The defect opinion further concluded that

the back-blast damper was defectively designed and constructed,
failing the NFPA standards because it was improperly welded and

4

The NFPA is a private, professional organization that
“among other things, publishes product standards and codes
related to fire protection.”
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.
Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495 (1988).

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made from the wrong gauge of steel.

As a result, the back-blast

damper was unable to withstand the expected pressures.
In

support

of

defendants

pursued

plaintiffs

could

that

the

their
several

not

theory

prove

contributory

Relevant

plaintiffs’

judgment

contentions,

sufficiently

plaintiffs’

recovery.

summary

here,

of

the

how

motions,

including
proximate

negligence

where

the

that

the

cause,

and

barred

any

disputed

defendants

and

the

the

fire

started.

Specifically, they maintained that the fire was caused by the
static

electricity

that

the

plaintiffs

encountered

manipulating the vacuum hose in the ductwork.

when

That is, the

defendants posited that the fire originated inside the facility
and then spread through the ductwork in both directions — to
where Hodges and Bonds were standing and also outside to the
baghouse,

which

was

destroyed.

In

that

scenario,

the

dust

collection system did not malfunction or contribute in any way
to the plaintiffs’ injuries.
In arguing that the plaintiffs could not show a genuine
dispute of material fact, the defendants maintained that certain
of the plaintiffs’ evidence should be rejected.
the

defendants

McGinley’s
asserted

and

that

deposition

relied

on

Schloss’s
no

their

opinions.

consideration

testimony

that

Daubert

the
10

The

motions

To that end,
to

exclude

defendants

further

should

be

given

fire

began

to

outside

Hodges’s
of

the

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Hodges had testified that he recalled the damper door

being hinged “from the center,” allowing him to “see over the
top

of

it

from

the

center

up.”

See

J.A.

2373.

It

is

undisputed, however, that the damper door actually hinged at the
top, which means that Hodges would have been unable to see “over
the top of it.”

Id.

Thus, the defendants urged that Hodges’s

evidence was necessarily inaccurate.

The defendants maintained

that, absent their expert opinions or Hodges’s evidence, the
plaintiffs could not show a genuine dispute of material fact,
and thus could not survive summary judgment.
2.
In

its

March

7,

2014

Opinion,

the

district

court

first

addressed the Daubert challenges to the causation and origin
opinions, finding each set of opinions insufficiently reliable.
The causation opinions were rejected because the court found
that

they

were

based

on

nothing

more

than

“conjecture

that

conditions conducive” to an exothermic reaction were present.
See Opinion 11.
observed

that

With respect to the origin opinions, the court
both

McGinley

and

Schloss

relied

heavily

on

Hodges’s deposition testimony, which — as is further explained
below

—

testimony.”

the

court

Id. at 22.

deemed

to

be

“physically

impossible

The court concluded that the experts’

misplaced reliance on Hodges indicated that the origin opinions
were

premised

on

“advocacy”
11

rather

than

“on

scientific

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methodology.”

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Id.

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The court failed to address Schloss’s defect

opinion or directly assess the Daubert motions as they related
thereto.

The court, however, ruled that “[t]he opinions offered

by plaintiffs’ experts . . . are . . . inadmissible under Rule
702,” excluding the expert opinions in their entirety.

Id. at

34.
Next, the district court turned to the summary judgment
motions,

applying

Virginia’s

substantive

law.

The

court

observed that the viability of the plaintiffs’ claims depended
on whether they could show that the fire originated outside of
the facility.
by

the

See Opinion 26.

plaintiffs,

the

Assessing the evidence relied on

court

first

considered

Hodges’s

deposition testimony that he was able to see the fireball enter
the facility from beyond the damper door.

The court scrutinized

his statement that “I could see over the top of [the damper
door]

from

the

center

up,”

see

J.A.

2373,

in

light

of

parties’ agreement that the damper door hinged at the top.

the
The

court then determined that Hodges’s testimony was “physically
impossible,” and therefore “does not provide any basis for a
jury to do anything but speculate” that the fire began outside
of

the

facility.

See

Opinion

discredited Hodges’s testimony.

27.

Accordingly,

court

Id. (citing Feliciano v. City

of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013)).

12

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to

the

remainder

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of

the

plaintiffs’

—

evidence

Spangler’s deposition testimony, the surveillance footage, and
the post-accident pictures — the district court concluded that
none of it provided a nonspeculative basis to find that the fire
originated

outside

of

the

facility.

Overall,

the

court

determined that, “[a]t most, plaintiffs’ evidence taken together
and viewed in the light most favorable to them, leaves the jury
completely at sea as to the cause and origin of the fire and
explosion in this case.”

See Opinion 29.

court,

not

the

plaintiffs

had

satisfied

According to the

their

burden,

under

Virginia law, to establish their claims “beyond the realm of
‘conjecture, guess, or random judgment upon mere supposition.’”
Id. at 30 (quoting Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Whitlow, 51 S.E.
182,

184

(Va.

defendants
alleging

were

design

1905)).

Thus,

entitled
and

to

the

court

summary

manufacturing

determined

judgment

defects

in

on
the

that

each

the

claim

back-blast

damper and baghouse.
Finally, the district court addressed the plaintiffs’ sole
non-product-defect theory of liability:

that Federal-Mogul was

negligent by failing to protect the plaintiffs from the known
dangers

of

aluminum

dust.

The

court

determined

that,

as

a

matter of law, Federal-Mogul acted reasonably in seeking out
LCM, an expert in hazardous waste removal, and “in assuming LCM
and the plaintiffs, as hazardous waste removal experts, would
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determine

both

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the

substance

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they

proper method for removing it.”

were

dealing

with

See Opinion 33.

and

the

The court

accordingly concluded that Federal-Mogul was entitled to summary
judgment on all theories of negligence.
The

plaintiffs

have

timely

noticed

this

appeal,

and

we

possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.
We

review

judgment.

de

novo

a

district

court’s

award

of

summary

See Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC, 630

F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 2011).

In so doing, “we are required to

view the facts and all justifiable inferences arising therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in order to
determine whether there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 312-13 (4th Cir.
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A fact is material if

it “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law.’”

Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 548 (4th Cir. 2011) (en

banc) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986)).

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III.
A.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the district court
erred in concluding that they had not shown a genuine factual
dispute regarding the fire’s origin, and thus improperly awarded
summary judgment to the defendants.

To prevail on their claims,

the plaintiffs must establish that the fire originated outside
of the facility — only then could the alleged defects in the
dust collection system have caused their injuries.

See Br. of

Appellants 13 (“If [the fire] started inside [the facility],
then the Plaintiffs lose.”); see also Logan v. Montgomery Ward &
Co, Inc., 219 S.E.2d 685, 687-88 (Va. 1975) (explaining that, in
product

liability

actions

involving

negligence

and

warranty

claims, Virginia law requires plaintiff to show that defendant’s
breach of duty to plaintiff was proximate cause of plaintiff’s
injuries).

It

is

undisputed

that

Hodges’s

testimony

—

if

credited — could support a reasonable inference that the fire
began

outside

of

the

facility.

It

is

also

undisputed

that

Hodges’s testimony recalling that “it looked like [the damper
door] pivoted from the center,” allowing him to “see over the
top of [the door] from the center up,” see J.A. 2373, was not
physically possible, as the damper door hinged from the top.
Where

a

witness’s

deposition

testimony

“is

blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
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believe it,” an alleged factual dispute created by the testimony
need not be credited and “will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment.”

Scott v. Harris, 550

U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

On

this record, however, we are satisfied that Hodges’s evidence
regarding the fire’s origin was not physically impossible and
thus should have been credited for summary judgment purposes.
Importantly, Hodges wavered and qualified his description
of the damper door’s configuration.

Although the district court

focused on Hodges’s statement that he saw “over the top of” the
door,

the

record

reveals

that

Hodges

was

actually

quite

uncertain:
Q

[Did the damper door have] a hinge at the top?

A I don’t know. I know that I could see the [damper
door] that was in there and to me it looked like it
pivoted from the center, but I don’t know.
Q That’s what I’m trying to find out. Where you saw
that could you see a gap on the side, the top or the
bottom?
A

I could see over the top of it from the center up.
***

Q
So, [the damper door] looked like to you that it
hinged on the top and opened up at the bottom?
A It hinged. I don’t know for sure if it was the top
or the side, but it . . . hinged somewhere inside the
pipe.
J.A. 2373, 2391 (emphasis added).

Hodges’s testimony was thus

inconsistent about where the damper door was hinged.
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the facts in the plaintiffs’ favor, Hodges was most assuredly
unsure about the damper door’s configuration, and his testimony
could not be rejected as a matter of law.
Additionally,

the

record

does

not

blatantly

contradict

Hodges’s testimony that he saw through the propped-open damper
door and observed the fire emanate from outside the facility.
The damper door was circular in shape and held open by several
inches of dust.

Openings would have formed from the base of the

ductwork and up along both sides of the damper door.

Other

openings could also have existed underneath the damper door,
given that the dust was not uniform in height.

Hodges could

well have seen through those openings around the damper door.
In fact, Hodges described — correctly — a bend in the section
of ductwork connecting the back-blast damper to the baghouse,
see J.A. 2313, supporting the plaintiffs’ position that Hodges
could see past the damper door.
view
would

the

ductwork

have

past

the

been

able

to

“fireball”

enter

into

the

ductwork.

Id.

description

of

Given that Hodges was able to

black-blast
observe

the

facility

in

damper,
bright
the

he

certainly

“flash”

dark

and

of

a

dusty

Therefore, even if Hodges was mistaken in his
the

damper

door’s

configuration,

it

was

not

physically impossible for him to have seen the fire emanate from
beyond the back-blast damper.

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Overall, the issue raised by Hodges’s testimony that he saw
over the top of the damper door is an issue of credibility, and
the district court erred by assessing Hodges’s credibility and
rejecting
Anderson

his
v.

evidence

Liberty

at

the

Lobby,

summary

Inc.,

477

judgment
U.S.

stage.

242,

255

See
(1986)

(“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, [when] he is ruling on a motion
for summary judgment . . . .”).

Rather, the inconsistencies and

possible errors in Hodges’s testimony should be considered and
resolved by a jury.
535

(4th

faculties
eyewitness

Cir.
of

1993)

See United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532,
(“[J]urors

observation

identification,

can

using
judge

common
the

especially

sense

and

credibility

since

their
of

an

deficiencies

or

inconsistencies in an eyewitness’s testimony can be brought out
with

skillful

cross-examination.”).

Viewing

the

evidence

of

record in the plaintiffs’ favor — as we must — we are satisfied
that Hodges’s testimony creates a genuine issue of whether the
fire originated outside of the facility. 5

5

Because Hodges’s evidence is sufficient to create a
genuine issue on whether the fire started outside of the
facility, we need not analyze whether Spangler’s testimony or
the surveillance video would similarly create a genuine issue.
The plaintiffs primarily rely on that evidence to corroborate
Hodges.
See Br. of Appellants 18-19 (arguing that Spangler’s
(Continued)
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B.
The next issue is whether, as the defendants argue, the
district court’s summary judgment awards should be affirmed on
an alternative ground.

See Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

376 F.3d 226, 232 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that we are
“entitled

to

alternative
district

ground”

court

specifically,
erred

affirm

and

and

the

the

district

that
is

was

Hodges’s

raised

apparent

defendants
testimony

court’s
by

from

assert
is

judgment

the
the

that,

sufficient

on

parties

[an]

in

record).

even

if

the

to

show

the
More

court

the

fire

started outside of the facility, the plaintiffs have not proven
a genuine factual issue concerning whether the alleged defects
in the dust collection system proximately caused the plaintiffs’
injuries.
Notably,
ruled

on

court

made

the

parties

proximate
such

a

dispute

cause.

The

ruling

when

whether

defendants
it

the

district

maintain

concluded

that

court

that

the

there

was

“simply no proof of a defect in the baghouse or damper that
caused

plaintiff’s

injuries

beyond

the

realm

of

guess, or random judgment upon mere supposition.”
30 (internal quotation marks omitted).

conjecture,
See Opinion

But that statement of

testimony and video evidence “buttress[]” and are “corroborative
of Hodges’s testimony”).

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the court followed — and was explicitly made “[i]n light of” —
its

conclusion

that

the

plaintiffs

had

produced

no

showing that the fire started outside the facility.

evidence

See id. at

29.
The Opinion therefore does not assess whether the sum of
the plaintiffs’ evidence — including Hodges’s testimony — could
lead a reasonable jury to conclude that any one or more of the
defendants

proximately

caused

the

plaintiffs’

injuries.

In

these circumstances, we decline to resolve that issue in this
appeal,

in

appellate
below.”

light
court

of

“the

general

rule

does

not

consider

an

. . .
issue

that
not

a

federal

passed

upon

Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). 6

The

proximate cause analysis is highly complex, and given that it
was

not

thoroughly

briefed

on

appeal,

the

district

court

better suited to address that issue in the first instance.

is
See

Goldfarb v. Mayor of Balt., __ F.3d __, __ (4th Cir. 2015) (“The
6

We also decline to affirm the summary judgment awards on
an alternative ground because of two aspects of the district
court’s rulings on the Daubert motions. First, the scope of the
court’s rulings is unclear because it failed to address
Schloss’s defect opinion.
Nevertheless, the court broadly
purported to exclude the entirety of the expert opinions.
Second, and perhaps more important, the court determined that
the origin opinions were unreliable in part because both
McGinley and Schloss relied on Hodges’s evidence.
In light of
our
conclusion
that
Hodges’s
evidence
was
erroneously
discredited and not viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, the court’s exclusion of the origin opinions may
well warrant a full reassessment.

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district court is in a better position to consider the parties’
arguments

in

the

first

instance,

which

can

be

presented

at

length rather than being discussed in appellate briefs centered
on the issues the district court did decide.”).

IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the summary judgment
awards and remand for such other and further proceedings as may
be appropriate.
VACATED AND REMANDED

21