Sundersingh Bala v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dept

Filing

UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:12-cv-00748-HEH. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999609143]. [14-1362]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1362

SUNDERSINGH BALA,
Plaintiff − Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH
RECREATION,

OF

VIRGINIA

DEPARTMENT

OF

CONSERVATION

AND

Defendant − Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:12-cv-00748-HEH)

Argued:

May 13, 2015

Decided:

June 25, 2015

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion.
Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler joined. Judge Floyd wrote
a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Scott Gregory Crowley, Sr., CROWLEY & CROWLEY, Glen
Allen, Virginia, for Appellant. Gregory Clayton Fleming, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of
Virginia, Rhodes B. Ritenour, Deputy Attorney General, Ronald N.
Regnery, Senior Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Sundersingh Bala brought a Title VII claim for retaliatory
discharge

against

the

Commonwealth

of

Virginia

Department

of

Conservation and Recreation (“DCR”). The district court granted
summary judgment to the DCR because Bala released this claim in
a

July

7,

court’s

2011,

holding

Settlement
that

the

Agreement.

Settlement

We

affirm

Agreement

the

trial

included

the

retaliatory discharge claim. Having obtained the benefit of his
bargain, Bala cannot now seek a remedy from the courts after
knowingly and voluntarily relinquishing the underlying claim.
I.
Bala is a naturalized United States citizen of East Indian
origin who joined the DCR’s accounting department in 1985. Since
that time, he has filed numerous employee grievances with the
Department

of

Employee

Dispute

Resolution

(“EDR”)

alleging,

among other things, that the DCR refused to promote him for
discriminatory

reasons.

Most

recently,

he

filed

two

related

grievances: one in May 2009, alleging that the DCR failed to
select him for the DCR’s Accounts Payable Supervisor position
owing to discrimination against his age and national origin; and
another

in

October

2009,

alleging

termination

(effective

December

Department

of

Resource

policies,

Human

discriminated

against
3

31,

that

his

2009)

Management
him

because

September

violated
(“DHRM”)
of

his

2009

internal
layoff
age

and

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national

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origin,

and

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retaliated

against

his

prior

protected

allegations of discrimination. J.A. 370.
Bala’s termination was part of a series of layoffs pursuant
to an overall budget reduction for state agencies. Bala did not
volunteer

for

early

retirement

and

was

not

suggested

for

termination by his supervisors, but was nevertheless included on
a

list

of

employees

under

consideration

for

termination

and

eventually selected to be laid off. He alleged in his grievance,
and later in his complaint, that he was selected for involuntary
termination

in

retaliation

for

his

numerous

complaints

of

discrimination in grievances and court proceedings.
Employees of Virginia’s state agencies who have employment
complaints file grievances with the EDR as part of a statutorily
created

dispute

resolution

process.

The

grievances

are

first

reviewed by management in a three-step internal review process.
Employees
grievances

who

are

after

dissatisfied
this

with

process

may

the

resolution

request

a

of

hearing

their

with

a

neutral arbiter. The hearing officer’s decision is appealable to
Virginia

state

circuit

court

if

the

employee

believes

the

decision is contrary to law. Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3006.
The initial three-step review of Bala’s May and October
2009

grievances,

consolidated

at

his

request,

J.A.

290-293,

found that DCR had not discriminated, retaliated, or failed to
follow the DHRM policy governing layoffs. Displeased with this
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result,

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Bala

requested

and

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was

granted

a

hearing.

The

administrative review of his grievances on February 1, 2011,
found that the DCR had violated the DHRM’s policies (without
reversing the other findings), and the hearing officer directed
DCR to reinstate Bala to his former position. J.A. 372-374.
Meanwhile, Bala had already resumed work with the DCR as an
hourly

employee

starting

in

February

2010,

and

had

been

receiving early retirement benefits since his termination. Both
his hourly wages and the early retirement benefits would have
been offset against any back pay he was due upon reinstatement.
So

instead

of

pursuing

reinstatement,

Bala

and

the

DCR

“concluded that it would be in their best interests to resolve
this situation by agreement,” and they consequently negotiated a
settlement agreement on July 7, 2011. J.A. 46.
Under the terms of the agreement, the agency agreed to not
seek

revocation

of

Bala’s

enhanced

retirement

and

related

benefits, and to maintain his hourly position for at least three
years as long as his job performance was satisfactory. J.A. 47.
In return, Bala agreed to “waive any rights accorded to him
pursuant to the hearing officer’s decision of February 1, 2011,
including his reinstatement to his former salaried position.”
Id. The agreement applied to “the grievance dated October, 2009
and/or

case

#

9295

Hearing

officer

final

decision

issued

on

February 1, 2011.” Id. The parties declared that each had an
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opportunity

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to

seek

counsel,

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and

that

the

terms

had

been

carefully read, fully understood, and agreed to voluntarily. Id.
On October 23, 2012, however, Bala initiated this civil
action alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of

1964,

as

amended,

42

U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2

and

-3,

for

discrimination and retaliation based on his race and national
origin. The complaint contained a count of discrimination and a
count

of

retaliation

interview

Bala

involuntarily
district

for

against
a

grants

terminating

court

counts. Bala

granted

v.

him

a

the

DCR

both

manager

position

in

layoffs

the

12(b)(6)

Commonwealth

for

of

motion

Va.

to

Dep’t

refusing
in

in

2011

and

2009.

The

dismiss

of

to

on

all

Conservation

&

Recreation, No. 3:12CV748, 2013 WL 53744, at *1-2 (E.D. Va. Jan.
3,

2013).

On

discrimination

appeal,
claim

for

we

upheld

Bala’s

the

layoff,

dismissal
but

of

reversed

the

on

the

other three counts for “consider[ing] DCR’s proffered legitimate
nondiscriminatory
within

the

reasons

context

of

at
a

a

procedurally

Rule

12(b)(6)

improper

motion.”

time,

Bala

v.

Commonwealth of Va. Dep’t of Conservation & Recreation, 532 F.
App’x 332, 335 (4th Cir. 2013).
On remand, Bala amended his complaint to allege only the
retaliatory

discharge

retaliation

for

his

claim.

He

numerous

claimed

grievances

his
and

layoff
court

was

in

filings

“complaining of race, national origin and age discrimination” -6

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in particular his May 2009 grievance for failing to interview
him for an Accounts Payable Supervisor position. J.A. 11-2, 16.
After oral argument and supplemental briefing on the Settlement
Agreement, the district court granted DCR’s motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the Settlement Agreement precluded
Bala from bringing the claim. Bala v. Commonwealth of Va. Dep’t
of Conservation & Recreation, No. 3:12CV748, 2014 WL 1281235, at
*1, *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 27, 2014). We now affirm the judgment.
II.
Title

VII

of

the

Civil

Rights

Act

of

1964

protects

employees from harms caused by an employer’s discriminatory or
retaliatory actions. While litigation of such claims remains the
ultimate option, the statute itself selected “[c]ooperation and
voluntary compliance” as the “preferred means” for eliminating
unlawful

discrimination.

Alexander

v.

Gardner-Denver

Co.,

415

U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
To

that

Opportunity

end,

Congress

Commission

created

(“EEOC”)

as

a

the

Equal

mechanism

Employment
“to

settle

disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before
the

aggrieved

party

was

permitted

to

file

a

lawsuit.”

Id.

Consistent with that purpose, the EEOC maintains a preference
for “voluntary and expeditious resolution of disputes” between
employers
Allowing

and
for

employees
Waivers

through

Under

the
7

settlement.
ADEA,

50

Admin.

Fed.

Exemption

Reg.

40,870,

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40,870-40,871 (proposed Oct. 7, 1985) (comparing ADEA and Title
VII

claims).

therefore,

Waiver

is

of

Title

authorized,

VII

claims

provided

through

the

settlement,

waiver

is

knowing,

voluntary, and part of a bargain that resolves the underlying
employment discrimination dispute. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 52
& n.15; Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1990).
We

must

Settlement
claim.

therefore

Agreement

“Settlement

determine

effected

agreements

a

whether
waiver

operate

Bala

of

on

and

the

DCR’s

Bala’s

retaliation

contract

principles,

and thus the preclusive effect of a settlement agreement ‘should
be measured by the intent of the parties.’” Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 211 (4th Cir. 2009);
see

also

First

Sec.

Fed.

Sav.

Bank,

Inc.

v.

McQuilken,

480

S.E.2d 485, 487 (Va. 1997). Where the parties’ intent is clear
from

the

unambiguous

terms

of

the

contract,

construed

as

a

whole, we need not and cannot resort to extrinsic evidence of
intent. See Goodman v. Resolution Trust Corp., 7 F.3d 1123, 1126
(4th Cir. 1993); W.D. Nelson & Co. v. Taylor Heights Dev. Corp.,
150 S.E.2d 142, 145 (Va. 1966).
The Settlement Agreement stated plainly that “the parties
have

concluded

that

it

would

be

in

their

best

interests

to

resolve this situation by agreement.” J.A. 46. The “situation”
referenced in that provision is described immediately before it
-- Bala was laid off, filed the October 2009 grievance, and
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pursued administrative review until he was awarded reinstatement
by

a

hearing

officer.

Id.

Furthermore,

the

Agreement

stated

clearly that it applied to the October 2009 grievance and/or the
hearing officer’s final decision on February 1, 2011. J.A. 47.
These documents, therefore, were incorporated by reference as if
included in the contract itself. See W.D. Nelson & Co., 150
S.E.2d at 146 (“Writings referred to in a contract are construed
as

a

part

of

the

contract

for

the

purpose

and

extent

indicated.”). Finally, Bala explicitly waived any rights related
to or flowing from that February 1, 2011, decision, specifically
including the right to reinstatement to his former position.
J.A. 47.
There

can

be

no

doubt

that

this

Settlement

Agreement

addressed and resolved the matter now alleged in Bala’s Title
VII

retaliation

claim.

By

its

plain

language,

the

Agreement

covered “the grievance dated October, 2009 and/or case # 9295
Hearing officer final decision issued on February 1, 2011.” J.A.
47. The October 2009 grievance alleged misapplication of the
agency’s

layoff

policies,

discrimination,

and

retaliation

for

prior charges and grievances, resulting in Bala’s termination.
J.A. 370. That the hearing officer only reversed the claim of
violating

agency

policy

does

not

magically

remove

the

other

claims from the proceedings. The agency’s alleged retaliation,
in

the

form

of

laying

him

off,
9

is

the

crux

of

Bala’s

only

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remaining claim in his Title VII complaint. See J.A. 16-17. The
complaint

clearly

describes

the

same

“situation”

that

both

parties thought best to resolve by agreement. By so agreeing,
Bala waived the right to resurrect his retaliation claim and
reinstatement remedy in later litigation.
Bala cannot obtain through litigation what he voluntarily
relinquished in the Settlement Agreement for good consideration.
The

relief

sought

in

the

grievance

was

reinstatement

to

his

former position, with back pay and benefits. J.A. 370. He was
granted this relief in the administrative review, and chose to
negotiate away that specific remedy in order to retain his early
retirement benefits and secure his hourly job for the next three
years.

J.A.

action

the

46-47.
same

Now

remedy

he

seeks

that

he

to

obtain

voluntarily

through
forfeited

judicial
in

the

Settlement Agreement. J.A. 17. He could have expressly reserved
the right to bring the retaliation claim at a later time, but
declined to do so. See Keith, 900 F.2d at 741. Bala negotiated
his terms and obtained the benefit of his bargain. He cannot now
claim what he earlier relinquished.
We thus hold that the Title VII claim for retaliation was
unambiguously

included

in

Bala’s

July

7,

2011,

Settlement

Agreement with the DCR, and that therefore he is precluded from

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bringing that claim now in order to achieve a second bite at the
apple.
AFFIRMED

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FLOYD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
This appeal presents a straightforward question regarding
the scope of the parties’ release.

In the governing agreement,

Bala agreed “to waive any rights accorded to him pursuant to the
hearing officer’s decision of February 1, 2011.”

J.A. 47.

is

Bala

undisputed

that

the

only

“right”

awarded

to

in

It
the

February 2011 decision was reinstatement to his former position
at the DCR.

And the hearing officer granted Bala this right

only because the DCR failed to follow its own internal layoff
policies; the officer did not address Bala’s additional claims
under Title VII.
Yet, the majority concludes that the release also precludes
Bala from pursuing his Title VII retaliation claim in federal
court.
Bala

This result would be correct if the release stated that
agreed

to

waive

“any

employment” with the DCR.

and

all

claims

related

to

his

But that is not what the Agreement--

drafted by the DCR--says.

By holding otherwise, the majority

transforms the narrow, specific release at issue into a general
release broadly precluding all claims brought in the October
2009 grievance.

The parties were certainly free to negotiate

and agree to such a release.
of

the

Agreement

suggests

But nothing in the plain language
they

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

12

actually

did

so

here.

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I.
It is well-settled that an employee may release a cause of
action under Title VII if the employee’s consent to settlement
is “voluntary and knowing.”

Alexander v. Gardner–Denver Co.,

415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974).
assessment

of

voluntariness

But circuits diverge on what an
and

knowledge

entails:

some

look

solely to principles of contract interpretation, while others
evaluate

the

totality

purported release.

of

the

circumstances

surrounding

a

See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe

Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 562, 570 (7th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases).
Under

either

approach,

however,

waiver’s language is significant.

the

clarity

of

a

purported

Compare O’Shea v. Commercial

Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 1991) (considering
this

split

analyze

and

waivers

determining
of

ADEA

that

the

claims

“better

under

approach

ordinary

is

to

contract

principles”), superseded by statute, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f), with
Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633, 635 (11th Cir. 1995)
(listing

factors

relevant

in

assessing

the

totality

of

circumstances, including “the clarity of the agreement”).

the
And

although the Fourth Circuit lacks binding precedent on which
approach governs releases of Title VII claims, see Randolph v.
Caruso Homes, Inc., No. RWT–13–2069, 2014 WL 4661985, at *4 n.6
(D. Md. Sept. 16, 2014), we need not decide that issue, as the

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Agreement’s

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plain

language

Pg: 14 of 18

compels

one

result

under

either

approach.
Here,

the

plain

language

of

the

Agreement

unambiguously

demonstrates that the parties agreed only to a limited release
that did not include Bala’s Title VII claim.
derive

the

parties’

intent

from

the

Although we must

instrument

viewed

as

a

whole, Atalla v. Abdul–Baki, 976 F.2d 189, 193 (4th Cir. 1992),
Section 4 of the Agreement is the only section that defines the
scope of the release.

That section limits Bala’s release to

“any rights accorded to [Bala] pursuant to the hearing officer’s
decision of February 1, 2011, including his reinstatement to his
former salaried position.” *

J.A. 47.

Significantly, the only

right accorded to Bala pursuant to the February 1 decision was
*

This language stands in stark contrast to the broad
language typically used in general releases of Title VII claims.
See, e.g., Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 441-42 (5th
Cir. 2002) (finding Title VII claims clearly waived by an
employee’s agreement “to release [the employer] of any and all
employment related claims”); Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co.,
884 F.2d 458, 460-61 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding clear waiver of
Title VII claims based on a provision stating that the
agreement’s “terms represent a full and final settlement of any
and all claims arising out of [the employee’s] employment with
[his employer]”; Pilon v. Univ. of Minn., 710 F.2d 466, 467-68
(8th Cir. 1983) (finding clear waiver of a Title VII claim in a
provision in which a graduate student released the university
“from any and all manner of action . . . which [the plaintiff]
ever had”); Anderson v. Garbage Disposal Serv., No. 3:00CV294MU, 2000 WL 33912330, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 18, 2000) (finding
clear waiver of a Title VII claim in a provision in which the
plaintiff “released and forever discharged [the employer] of and
from any and all actions related to Plaintiff’s employment”
(brackets omitted)).
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the “specific remedy,” Maj. Op. at 10, of reinstatement to his
former (or a similar) position.

And that right was based only

on his having proved his claim that the DCR “did not comply with
the terms and conditions of the Commonwealth of Virginia Layoff
Policy
believe

and

Procedure

the

release

Number

1.30.”

clearly

applies

J.A.
only

373-74.
to

Thus,

Bala’s

right

I
to

reinstatement for the violation of administrative policy, and I
would reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

II.
Rather

than

conduct

a

straightforward

analysis,

the

majority contorts the Agreement and errs in four main respects.
First,

the

majority

erroneously

declares

that

“Bala

explicitly waived any rights related to or flowing from” the
hearing officer’s February 1 decision.
that

Bala

waived

his

limited

right

Maj. Op. at 9.
to

I agree

reinstatement--flowing

from or “accorded” by that decision--but I cannot find where the
Agreement

explicitly

says

“related to” the decision.

that

he

also

waived

any

rights

If such language existed, perhaps we

could interpret the waiver provision to capture the Title VII
claims as “related” (albeit distantly) to the final decision.
See Related Definition, Merriam–Webster Dictionary, www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/related (defining “related” as “connected
by reason of an established or discoverable relation”).
15

But in

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actuality, such language is wholly absent, and the majority errs
by reading it into the Agreement.
Second, the majority relies on Section 5 of the Agreement,
which the majority says incorporates by reference Bala’s October
2009 grievance and the February 1 decision.
majority,

merely

incorporating

these

According to the

documents

by

reference

somehow expands the scope of the release to include all claims
at issue in the October 2009 grievance.

I disagree.

Unlike

Section 4, Section 5 does not define the scope of the waiver.
Indeed, it says nothing about waiver at all.
that

the

Agreement

only

applies

to

the

Rather, it states
grievance

and

the

resulting final decision; not that the “waiver” itself applies
to all claims raised in the grievance or adjudicated prior to
the February 1 decision.
majority

simply

conflates

In reading Section 5 as it does, the
Section

5

with

the

actual

waiver

language in Section 4.
Third,

the

majority

relies

on

the

Agreement’s

recitals,

which describe the procedural posture of Bala’s grievance and
state

that

situation.”

the

Agreement’s

J.A. 46.

purpose

was

to

“resolve

this

The majority concludes that the amorphous

reference to a “situation” must mean all of Bala’s claims, and
thus expands the limited release into a general waiver.
I do not believe this is correct.

Again,

As an initial matter, I do

not read “situation” to unambiguously refer to all of Bala’s
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claims, as the majority does.

Rather, it may just as easily

refer to Bala’s right to reinstatement based on the favorable
February 1 decision.

Thus, at best for the DCR’s case, the

recitals create an ambiguity about the scope of Bala’s release.
But even if there is an ambiguity, based on the inclusion of a
vague general expression of intent, “no rational court could say
that a general expression of intent trumps the specific terms
that it introduces.”
Contract
Bank/Nat’l
rules

of

Drafting
v.

Kenneth A. Adams, A Manual of Style for

32

Best,

(3d

223

construction,

ed.

Va.
if

2013);

112,

the

115

see

also

(1982)

prefatory

or

United

(“Under
recital

Va.

settled
language

conflicts with the obligatory provisions of the contract, then
the

obligatory

recitals

provisions

somehow

suffice

must
to

prevail.”).
create

an

And

even

ambiguity

if
in

the
the

Agreement, we should construe it (at least for the purposes of
the DCR’s summary-judgment motion) against the drafter, the DCR.
Sys. Research & Applications Corp. v. Rohde & Schwarz Fed. Sys.,
Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 935, 945 (E.D. Va. 2012) (citing Martin &
Martin, Inc. v. Bradley Enters., Inc., 256 Va. 288, 291 (1998)).
Finally,

validating

such

vagueness

as

sufficient

to

constitute waiver poses a real threat to employees’ ability to
pursue their rights under Title VII.

Essentially, the majority

equates the mere existence of a waiver provision to a full,
exhaustive release of an employee’s right to bring any pending
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claims.
I

am

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If the Agreement at issue suffices for such a release,

hard

inadequate.

pressed

to

imagine

what

the

majority

would

find

Indeed, as the majority opinion hypothesizes, the

burden is now on employees to insist on language reserving any
such rights, Maj. Op. at 10, even where an agreement does not
reference Title VII claims and even where a waiver provision is
otherwise narrow.

In placing such a burden on employees, the

majority simply disregards the basic tenet that “[w]aivers of
federal remedial rights . . . are not lightly to be inferred.”
Torrez v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., Inc., 908 F.2d 687, 689 (10th
Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530
F.2d 1159, 1172 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also Pierce v. Atchison
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 110 F.3d 431, 438 (7th Cir. 1997);
Lyght v. Ford Motor Co., 643 F.2d 435, 441 (6th Cir. 1981).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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