Matthew Jenkins v. James Ward, Sr.

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cv-00192-RJC,3:12-bk-50413,3:12-ap-3233. [999571884]. [14-1385]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1385

In re:

MATTHEW ALAN JENKINS,
Debtor.

----------------------------------------------MATTHEW ALAN JENKINS, formerly doing business as Shephard
Service Company,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LINDA WRIGHT SIMPSON,
Appellee,
JAMES T. WARD, SR.,
Trustee - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:13-cv-00192-RJC)

Argued:

March 24, 2015

Decided:

April 27, 2015

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion.
Judge Motz wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Keenan and Judge Thacker joined.

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Beth Richardson, SOWELL, GRAY, STEPP, & LAFFITTE, LLC, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant.
Linda Wright Simpson, UNITED
STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT, Charlotte, North Carolina; A. Cotten
Wright, GRIER FURR & CRISP, PA, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellees.

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DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
After Matthew Alan Jenkins filed a voluntary petition for
relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee and
the Bankruptcy Administrator (collectively, “the Trustee”) filed
a complaint objecting to Jenkins’s discharge and then moved for
summary judgment.
entered

an

affirmed.

order

The bankruptcy court granted the motion and
denying

the

discharge.

district

court

Jenkins appeals, arguing that the Trustee’s complaint

should have been dismissed as untimely.
follow,

The

we

agree

and

so

reverse

and

For the reasons that
remand

for

further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.
On April 11, 2012, acting pro se, Jenkins filed a petition
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief.

In his Statement of Financial

Affairs, filed with the bankruptcy court on April 24, Jenkins
disclosed receipt of more than $235,000 in lawsuit proceeds in
the two years preceding the filing of his petition, but offered
no information as to the current status of those funds.

On May

14, the Trustee convened a meeting of the creditors at which
Jenkins testified that the proceeds from the lawsuits had been
deposited into his wife’s bank account, an account to which he
admitted he had access, but of which he claimed not to be an
owner.
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Citing Jenkins’s failure to provide necessary information,
as well as his general lack of cooperation, counsel for the
Trustee

requested

an

extension

of

the

deadline

complaint objecting to Jenkins’s discharge.
permits

a

trustee

§ 727(c)(1),

but

to

absent

file

such

judicial

a

to

file

a

The Bankruptcy Code

complaint,

permission,

the

11

U.S.C.

Bankruptcy

Rules require that it be filed within 60 days after the first
date set for the creditors’ meeting.
The

bankruptcy

court

here

granted

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(a).
the

Trustee’s

request

and

extended the deadline to “sixty days beyond . . . whenever the
341 [creditors’] meeting is concluded.”

J.A. 91. 1

The creditors’ meeting was then scheduled to reconvene on
July 11.

Jenkins, however, neither responded to the Trustee’s

emails regarding the continuation date, nor attended the July 11
meeting.
contempt.

As a result, the bankruptcy court found Jenkins in
At the rescheduled creditors’ meeting on July 19,

Jenkins appeared by telephone and thus purged the contempt.

1

But

References to J.A. refer to the Joint Appendix filed by
the parties in this appeal.
The bankruptcy court followed its
oral grant of the motion with a text order that reiterated the
deadline had been extended, but set the new date at “sixty (60)
days after the meeting of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341
has been adjourned,” rather than concluded. J.A. 117 (emphasis
added).
However, the parties agree that the bankruptcy court
erred in using the word “adjourned,” and that the court intended
the deadline to be sixty days beyond the meeting’s conclusion,
in accordance with the court’s oral announcement.
See
Appellant’s Br. 3 n.1; Appellee’s Br. 14 n.16; Reply Br. 8 n.6.
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he had still failed to provide the Trustee with some necessary
information by that date, and so, before ending the telephonic
meeting, counsel for the Trustee announced that she was “not
going

to

conclude

the

meeting

today.”

J.A.

471.

Counsel

explained, “I am going to talk with the trustee and, if he
determines

that

we

can

adjourn

the

meeting,

we

will

file

notice of that, but officially the meeting is continued.”
471.

a

J.A.

No notice of a continued meeting was ever filed, nor did

the meeting ever reconvene.
On September 26, 2012, sixty-nine days after the July 19
creditors’ meeting, the Trustee filed a complaint, objecting to
Jenkins’s discharge in bankruptcy.
that

the

statute

of

Trustee’s

complaint

limitations.”

Jenkins responded, asserting

was

J.A.

“barred

161.

by

The

the

applicable

Trustee

summary judgment, which the bankruptcy court granted.
found

the

Trustee’s

complaint

timely

and

denied

moved

for

The court
Jenkins

a

discharge.
Jenkins appealed to the district court, contending there,
as he does before us, that the bankruptcy court erred in finding
the

Trustee’s

complaint

timely

filed.

The

district

court

disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court.
Jenkins

timely

noted

this

appeal,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).
from

a

bankruptcy

proceeding,

we
5

and

we

have

jurisdiction

When considering “an appeal
apply

the

same

standard

of

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review

that

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the

district

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court

applied

when

it

reviewed

the

bankruptcy court’s decision.”

In re Nieves, 648 F.3d 232, 237

(4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Thus, “[t]he legal conclusions of

both the district court and the bankruptcy court are reviewed de
novo

and

the

factual

findings

reviewed for clear error.”

of

the

bankruptcy

court

are

Id. 2

II.
The Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court “shall
grant [a qualifying] debtor a discharge” of his debts, thereby
extinguishing creditors’ claims.
added).

11 U.S.C. §

727(a) (emphasis

By “free[ing] the debtor from all debts existing at the

commencement

of

the

bankruptcy

proceedings”

except

those

exempted by statute, Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447 (2004),
discharge provides the fresh start that is the hallmark of our
bankruptcy system.
Not all debtors qualify for such relief, however.

Indeed,

the Code supplies “ample authority to deny the dishonest debtor
a discharge.”

Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1198 (2014)

(citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2)-(6)).
creditor,

or

the

United

States

2

Thus, “[t]he trustee, a

trustee

may

object

to

the

Though Jenkins represented himself before both the
bankruptcy court and the district court, we appointed counsel to
represent him before this court, a duty his appointed counsel
discharged ably.
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granting

of

bankruptcy

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a

discharge”

court.

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by

U.S.C.

filing

a

complaint

§ 727(c)(1);

see

with

also

Fed.

the
R.

Bankr. P. 4004 (outlining procedure for objecting to discharge).
Ordinarily, such a complaint must “be filed no later than 60
days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under
§ 341(a).”

Id. at 4004(a).

But “the court may,” as it did

here, “for cause extend the time to object” on motion of “any
party in interest.”
The
severe.

Id. at 4004(b).

consequence

of

missing

the

deadline

to

object

is

With respect to a Chapter 7 debtor, “on expiration of

the time[] fixed for objecting to discharge . . . the court
shall forthwith grant the discharge,” subject only to limited
exceptions
Accordingly,

not

applicable

because

here.

Jenkins

challenges

Id.
the

at

4004(c)(1).

denial

of

his

discharge on timeliness grounds only, a great deal hinges on the
resolution of that issue. 3

We must decide whether the Trustee

filed a timely objection; in doing so, we necessarily determine

3

The Trustee’s contention that Jenkins waived his
timeliness argument by failing to raise it before the bankruptcy
court is meritless.
In Jenkins’s response to the Trustee’s
complaint, he averred that the complaint was “barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.”
J.A. 161.
Proceeding pro
se, Jenkins was entitled to a liberal construction of his
pleadings. See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir.
2014).
Under such a construction, Jenkins certainly preserved
the timeliness defense he now advances.
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whether

the

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claims

of

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Jenkins’s

creditors

survive

or

are

extinguished.
But

first,

because

the

bankruptcy

court

established

a

deadline of sixty days beyond the conclusion of the creditors’
meeting,

we

concluded.

must

determine

when

the

creditors’

meeting

Unfortunately, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the

Bankruptcy Rules expressly address this question.

The Code, 11

U.S.C. § 341, mandates a creditors’ meeting and directs both its
content

and

its

attendees.

And

Rule

2003

supplies

procedures by which such a meeting must progress.

the

But neither

instructs a trustee as to how to conclude a meeting, nor points
to

any

circumstances

concluded.

under

which

a

meeting

must

be

deemed

The parties offer competing contentions as to these

questions -- and thus as to the date when the sixty-day clock
began to run in this case.
On the one hand, the Trustee argues that “[t]he key date”
is not the date of the meeting’s conclusion at all, but rather
“the date that all parties to whom the Extension Order applied
received

notice

that

the

creditors’

Appellee’s Br. 18 (emphasis added).

meeting

had

concluded.”

“Only then,” he argues,

“would the clock start ticking on the 60-day extended deadline
for

discharge

complaints.”

Id.

The

Trustee

waffles

in

pinpointing this date, suggesting it might be either August 7,
2012, when the bankruptcy court entered a text order indicating
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Jenkins had purged his contempt charge, or May 9, 2013, when the
Trustee himself filed a Notice of Conclusion.

Id. at 19-20.

Either way, the Trustee maintains, he filed a complaint prior to
expiration of the 60-day period.
On the other hand, Jenkins maintains that the creditors’
meeting concluded on July 19, 2012, when the Trustee failed to
adjourn

the

meeting

to

Appellant’s Br. 18.
adjourned

to

a

a

stated

later

date

and

He contends that a meeting not properly

stated

date

and

time,

as

specified

2003(e), must “[l]ogically” be concluded.

Id.

Jenkins

should

argues,

time.

the

Trustee’s

complaint

in

Rule

Accordingly,
have

been

dismissed as untimely.

III.
We agree with Jenkins and hold that the creditors’ meeting
concluded

on

July

19,

2012,

and

thus

that

the

Trustee’s

objection to discharge was not timely.
We recognize of course that the Trustee did not intend to
conclude the meeting on July 19.

To be sure, the Trustee’s

counsel could not have been more clear on that point.
471

(“I

am

not

going

to

conclude

the

[O]fficially the meeting is continued.”).

meeting

See J.A.

today.

.

.

.

Moreover, the Trustee

was entitled to adjourn the meeting to a later date and time.
See

Fed.

R.

Bankr.

P.

2003(e)
9

(providing

that

a

creditors’

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meeting

may

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be

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“adjourned,”

meaning

continued).

But

the

Bankruptcy Rules supply clear procedures on how to do so, none
of which were followed here.
Rule 2003(e) provides, in its entirety:

“The meeting may

be adjourned from time to time by announcement at the meeting of
the

adjourned

date

and

time.

The

presiding

official

shall

promptly file a statement specifying the date and time to which
the meeting is adjourned.”
neither

announced

an

The presiding official in this case

adjourned

statement specifying as much.
rectify

this

creditors’

omission

meeting

and

after

date

and

time,

nor

filed

a

And the Trustee never sought to

never
July

attempted
19.

The

to

reconvene

meeting

the

therefore

concluded on that date.
Arguing to the contrary, the Trustee asks us to consider
only

whether

creditors’

“the

meeting

trustee’s
[were]

actions

reasonable

move [the] case forward.”

in

and

continuing

necessary

Appellee’s Br. 34-35.

to

[the]
timely

Under such an

approach, the Trustee would have us weigh several factors to
determine

if

his

“delay

in

creditors” was justifiable.
this

formulation

premise

--

i.e.,

fatally
that

concluding

delayed beyond July 19, 2012.

meeting

of

Id. at 34 (emphasis added).

relies

the

the

on

the

meeting’s

validity

conclusion

of
was

its

the
But
own

somehow

Accepting this formulation would

require us first to accept that the meeting was successfully
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continued on that date rather than concluded.

Thus, we cannot

even apply the Trustee’s proposed inquiry unless we agree that a
creditors’
“[w]ith

meeting

no

meeting.”

day

may

be

being

continued

assigned

or

. . .

adjourned
for

sine

resumption

See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

die,
of

a

Neither

the text of Rule 2003 nor the relevant case law supports such a
conclusion.
The

history

of

the

Rule

offers

some

critical

guidance.

Prior to 2011, Rule 2003(e) provided only that “[t]he meeting
may

be

adjourned

from

time

to

time

by

announcement

at

the

meeting of the adjourned date and time without further written
notice.”
But

the

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2003(e) (2010) (emphasis added).
Rule

was

amended

in

2011

to

eliminate

the

phrase

“without further written notice,” and to add the requirement
that “[t]he presiding official shall promptly file a statement
specifying the date and time to which the meeting is adjourned.”
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2003(e) (current version).
The Rule now speaks in terms that are plainly mandatory -“the presiding official shall promptly file a statement.”
(emphasis

added).

This

adjournment sine die.

language

prohibits

the

practice

Id.
of

As one leading treatise has noted, the

provision added by the 2011 amendment “is designed to prevent
indefinite adjournment.”

9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 2003.05 n.3

(Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014); see
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also id. ¶ 2003.05 (“The trustee may not indefinitely continue a
meeting of creditors.”).

To follow the Trustee’s approach would

require us to ignore this prohibition and hold that the Trustee
could do precisely what the Rule seeks to prevent.
Nor, contrary to the Trustee’s contention, does precedent
compel his conclusion.

In fact, except in the case at hand, it

appears that no court has both ordered that the deadline for a
creditor’s objection to discharge run from the conclusion of the
creditors’ meeting and then considered whether a complaint met
that deadline.
That being said, we are not entirely without guidance from
case law.

Just as the Bankruptcy Rules limit the time in which

objections to discharge may be filed, so too do they limit the
time in which a “party in interest” may object to the “list of
property

that

§ 522(l).

the

debtor

claims

as

exempt”

under

11

U.S.C.

But unlike objections to discharge, for which the

limitations period ordinarily runs from the beginning of the
meeting, objections to exemptions must be filed “within 30 days
after the meeting of creditors . . . is concluded.”
Bankr.

P.

4003(b)(1)

(emphasis

added).

Thus,

Fed. R.

because

the

Bankruptcy Judge in this case extended the filing of objections
to

discharge

to

60

days

after

the

creditors’

meeting

was

concluded, the conclusion of the creditors’ meeting starts the
clock for objections to discharge here just as it starts the
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clock for filing objections to exemptions in the normal course
under Rule 4003(b)(1).

And a few trial courts, along with two

of our sister circuits, have considered -- in evaluating the
timeliness of an objection to exemptions -- when a creditors’
meeting is concluded.
(5th

Cir.

2008)

Compare In re Peres, 530 F.3d 375, 378

(meeting

adjourned

sine

die

not

necessarily

concluded), with In re Smith, 235 F.3d 472, 476-77 (9th Cir.
2000) (meeting concluded unless adjourned to a stated date and
time); see also In re Newman, 428 B.R. 257, 264 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.
2010) (declining to decide between Ninth and Fifth Circuits’
approaches); In re Dutkiewicz, 408 B.R. 103, 110 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 2009) (same).

It is from this body of case law that the

Trustee mines his approach.
Specifically, the Trustee leans heavily on the methodology
outlined

in

“continued

In

re

without

continuation”

and

debtors’ objection.
the failure

to

Peres,
a

where

formal

reconvened

the

announcement
eleven

530 F.3d at 376.

announce

a

creditors’

continued

meant the meeting had been concluded.

as

months

to

meeting
the

later

was

date
over

of
the

The debtors argued that
date

within

Id. at 377.

thirty

days

The Fifth

Circuit rejected that argument, holding instead “that § 341(a)
creditors’

meetings

adjourned

indefinitely

are

not

concluded,

and therefore do not trigger the thirty day deadline” under Rule
4003(b)(1).

Id. at 377-78.

The court adopted a “case-by-case
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approach,” under which it looked to four factors to “determine
whether any delay in reconvening the meeting was reasonable.”
Id. at 378. 4

The Trustee argues that we should adopt In re Peres

as the blueprint for determining when the creditors’ meeting was
concluded

here.

We

see

two

difficulties

with

adopting

this

approach.
First, in In re Peres, the trustee reconvened the meeting
after the adjournment sine die.

Thus, the chronology facing the

court included (1) a creditors’ meeting continued without an
adjournment

date,

followed

by

(2)

an

eleven-month

followed by (3) another creditors’ meeting.
was

to

decide

which

of

those

two

The court’s task

meeting

dates

official conclusion of the creditor’s meeting.
11-month

hiatus

was

reasonable

conclude until the latter date.

and

that

the

Id. at 378.

break,

marked

the

It held that an
meeting

did

not

Here, by contrast,

the creditors’ meeting never reconvened following the attempted
adjournment on July 19.
in

reconvening

the

We cannot “determine whether any delay

meeting

meeting was never reconvened.

was

reasonable,”

id.,

when

the

There seems to us a significant

difference in holding that a creditors’ meeting concluded on the

4

The four factors governing this approach are:
“(1) the
length of the delay; (2) the complexity of the estate; (3) the
cooperativeness of the debtor; and (4) the existence of any
ambiguity regarding whether the trustee continued or concluded
the meeting.” In re Peres, 530 F.3d at 378.
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final

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date

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the

trustee

Pg: 15 of 19

convened

the

creditors,

as

in

In

re

Peres, and holding, as the Trustee would have us do here, that
the meeting concluded at some point after that date, when no
meeting was scheduled and no creditors were convened. 5
The second, and perhaps even more striking, problem with
following

the

interpreted

In

the

re

Peres

pre-2011

approach

version

is

of

that

Rule

the

court

2003(e).

there

In

the

absence of the clear prohibition the amendment imposed, the In
re

Peres

court

sought

merely

to

“restrain[]”

the

trustee’s

“ability to indefinitely postpone a meeting of the creditors”
through

its

four-factor

(emphasis added).

balancing

test.

support

that

“decisions

application

F.3d

at

378

In 2011, the Rules Committee went further:

it eliminated that ability altogether.
claims

530

of

since
the

the

Although the Trustee

amendment

case-by-case

to

Rule

approach,”

2003(e)

Appellee’s

Br. 31, in fact he can cite only one post-2011 case that stops
short of explicitly rejecting the approach followed in In re
Peres.

See In re PMC Mktg. Corp., 482 B.R. 74, 80 (Bankr.

5

Perhaps in recognition of this problem, the Trustee
maintains that the focus of the case-by-case approach is whether
a delay in concluding, rather than in reconvening, a meeting was
reasonable.
See Appellee’s Br. 34.
But this slight pivot
constitutes an attempt to mask a fundamental difference in the
analysis. By asking us to consider whether he was reasonable in
delaying the meeting’s conclusion beyond July 19, the Trustee
suggests that a creditors’ meeting may conclude at some point
other than when the meeting’s attendees are convened.
That is
not a possibility the Fifth Circuit considered in In re Peres.
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D.P.R. 2012) (applying both the case-by-case approach and the
alternative

bright-line

approach,

to

identical

effect).

And

even that case recognizes that the amendment “required trustee’s
[sic.] to take formal steps to effectuate a continuance[,] . . .
thereby

eliminating

the

use

of

the

term

sine

die.”

Id.

Moreover, we note that the only other court squarely to consider
the

issue

since

Rule

2003(e)

was

rejected the case-by-case approach.

amended

has

unambiguously

See In re Vierstra, 490

B.R. 146, 151 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013) (amendment to Rule 2003(e)
“inexorably leads” to conclusion that case-by-case approach no
longer valid).
In sum, the Trustee asks us to ignore what was undeniably a
violation of Rule 2003(e).
creditors’

meeting

on

July

Though he attempted to adjourn the
19,

2012,

he

failed

either

to

announce the date and time of the adjourned meeting or to file a
statement thereafter containing that information.

Because Rule

2003(e) unambiguously requires these actions to effectuate an
adjournment, the meeting was never adjourned.

And because the

meeting was never adjourned, we hold it was concluded.

IV.
Though we rule in Jenkins’s favor today, we stop short of
adopting the “bright-line approach” that he espouses and that
has emerged as an alternative to the case-by-case approach.
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bright-line approach dictates that “[t]he result of the failure
to adjourn a creditors’ meeting pursuant to Rule 2003(e) is the
[per se] conclusion of the creditors’ meeting.”

Appellant’s Br.

22; see also In re Smith, 235 F.3d at 477.
We

agree

result,

but

possible

that

we

Rule

particularly

the

hesitate
2003(e)

prudent

Trustee’s
to

failure

impose

such

violations.

given

that

here
a

penalty

This

neither

yields

the

for

all

us

as

strikes
Code

that

nor

the

Bankruptcy Rules attach consequences to the failure to properly
adjourn a meeting.
replete

with

And because both the Code and the Rules are

explicit

consequences,

congressional silence to be intentional.

we

presume

this

See, e.g., Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 4004(c)(1) (consequence for the “expiration of the
times fixed for objecting to discharge” is the “grant[ing of]
the discharge”); 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (consequence of failure to
object

to

property

listed

as

exempt

is

declaration

of

the

property as exempt).
Moreover,

administering

Rule

2003(e)

in

the

bright-line

fashion Jenkins suggests may lead to draconian -- and, we think,
unwise -- results.

One can imagine, for instance, a trustee

failing to announce at the initial meeting the adjourned date
and time, but promptly thereafter filing written notice setting
forth that information.

Though not in strict accordance with

Rule 2003(e)’s twin requirements, such action may not warrant an
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automatic declaration of the meeting’s conclusion as of the date
of

the

improperly

adjourned

meeting.

We

see

no

upside

to

hamstringing future courts that may reasonably find a trustee
substantially complied with Rule 2003(e). 6
Nothing, however, dissuades us from our holding that this
is not such a case.

The Trustee made no attempt to comply with

any part of Rule 2003(e), and made no effort to reconvene the
meeting he claims he merely adjourned.
asks

us

to

hold

that

the

meeting

Instead, the Trustee

concluded

not

when

the

meeting’s attendees were last convened, but at some later point
marked only by a docket entry.

Such a holding would stretch the

language of Rule 2003(e) too far.
The Trustee had ample tools to avoid this result.

He could

have properly adjourned the meeting on July 19, or he could have
timely filed the complaint a mere nine days earlier.
this is a case of failure to meet a deadline.
especially

in

bankruptcy,

deadlines

may

At base,

And although,

produce

“unwelcome

results,” they also “produce finality” by “prompt[ing] parties
6

In addition, bankruptcy courts of course retain “equitable
powers” that may “be exercised within the confines of the
Bankruptcy Code.”
Siegel, 134 S. Ct. at 1194 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Given this latitude, a
bankruptcy
court
may
also
conclude
that
extraordinary
circumstances excuse a failure to comply with Rule 2003(e), thus
precluding a declaration of the meeting’s conclusion.
Such
instances will be rare, however, given that compliance with Rule
2003(e) requires very little and is entirely within the
trustee’s control.
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to act.”

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Pg: 19 of 19

Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992).

When parties fail to heed the warnings inherent in deadlines,
their interests must often yield, as the Trustee’s do here, to
the virtue of such finality. 7

V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court

is

reversed

and

the

case

is

remanded

for

further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

7

The Trustee contends that even if his complaint was not
timely, we should “sua sponte deny entry of discharge.”
Appellee’s Br. 39. The Bankruptcy Rules, however, provide that,
“[i]n a chapter 7 case, on expiration of the times fixed for
objecting to discharge . . . the court shall forthwith grant the
discharge.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(c)(1) (emphasis added). To
be sure, exceptions to this automatic discharge exist, see Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 4004(c)(1)(A)-(L), but the Trustee does not argue
that any of these exceptions apply here.
Rather, he asserts
that Rule 4004(c)(1) conflicts with the Bankruptcy Code, a clash
in which “the Bankruptcy Code prevails.”
Appellee’s Br. 40.
But, in fact, Rule 4004(c)(1) entirely accords with the Code.
In 11 U.S.C. § 727(a), the Code provides a number of scenarios
under which a debtor is ineligible for discharge, and in
§ 727(c)(1), empowers the trustee to object to discharge on
those grounds. Rule 4004(c)(1) reflects the judgment that once
the trustee’s opportunity to object has passed, the discharge
will be granted even if a timely objection might have been
successful. The Trustee argues that this notion offends “[t]he
frequently cited purpose of bankruptcy . . . to afford [only]
the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a fresh start.”
Appellee’s Br. 40 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Not
so.
Rather, this result balances such worthy aims against the
equally critical need for efficiency and finality in the
administration of bankruptcy estates.
19