Michael A. Watt v. Ray Mabu

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cv-00128-LO-JFA Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999575999].. [14-1592]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1592

MICHAEL A. WATT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
RAY MABUS, Secretary, Department of the Navy,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:12-cv-00128-LO-JFA)

Submitted:

April 27, 2015

Decided:

May 1, 2015

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas F. Hennessy, VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT AND FAMILY LAW OFFICE,
Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Dennis C. Barghaan, Jr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Michael A. Watt appeals the district court’s order granting
the

Secretary

Watt’s
claims.

Title

of

the

VII ∗

Navy’s

motion

employment

for

summary

discrimination

and

judgment

on

retaliation

We affirm.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, “viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Smith v.

Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a).
Title

VII

prohibits

an

employer

from

“discriminat[ing]

against any of [its] employees . . . because [the employee] has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
[Title VII].”

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).

Because Watt did

not present direct evidence of retaliation, the district court
analyzed

his

retaliation

shifting

framework

claim

established

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

in

under

the

McDonnell

familiar
Douglas

burdenCorp.

v.

Under this framework, a plaintiff

∗

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).

2

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establishes a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating
“(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and
the employment action.”

Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626

F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010).
showing,

“the

burden

shifts

If the plaintiff makes such a

to

the

employer

to

establish

legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the action.”
Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004).

a

Price v.

If the employer

does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to “show that
the

employer’s

proffered

reasons

are

pretextual.”

Id.

Throughout this process, the employee bears the ultimate burden
of

establishing

cause

of

the

that

alleged

motivating factor.

his

protected

adverse

activity

action

and

was

was

a

not

“but-for”
merely

a

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133

S. Ct. 2517, 2532-34 (2013).

We have reviewed the record in

this case and find no reversible error in the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on Watt’s retaliation claim.
We next turn to Watt’s claim that the district court erred
in holding that his claims of a hostile work environment and
constructive discharge were barred by Watt’s failure to exhaust
his

claims

exceptional

through

the

circumstances,

administrative
this

Court

process.
generally

consider claims raised for the first time on appeal.
Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014).
3

Absent
does

not

See In re

Watt offers no

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explanation,

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exceptional

or

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otherwise,

for

his

failure

to

address the issue of exhaustion either in his brief in response
to the motion for summary judgment or upon questioning by the
district court at the hearing on the motion.

Accordingly, we

decline to address the issue on appeal.
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

materials

legal
before

We dispense with
contentions
this

Court

are
and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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