Andrew Adams v. Anne Arundel County

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:11-cv-02876-MJG. [999601765]. [14-1608]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1608

ANDREW ADAMS,
Plaintiff − Appellant,
v.
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:11-cv-02876-MJG)

Argued:

May 13, 2015

Decided:

June 15, 2015

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion.
Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Floyd joined.

Joyce E. Smithey, RIFKIN, LIVINGSTON, LEVITAN & SILVER, LLC,
Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant.
Jay Creech, ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee.

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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Andrew Adams contends that the Board of Education of Anne
Arundel County violated his rights under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”) and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”). His allegations include interference with
his

medical

leaves,

retaliation

for

taking

those

leaves,

discrimination and retaliation on the basis of his disability,
and a failure to accommodate his condition. We find no merit to
these related claims and affirm the judgment of the district
court.
I.
A.
On January 19, 2010, Adams was involved in an incident with
a student in a hallway at MacArthur Middle School in Fort Meade,
Maryland, where he was an assistant principal. Although witness
accounts differed significantly, the student initially claimed
that Adams “grabbed [her] by the arms, shook her, and pinned her
against a wall.” J.A. 145. As a result of the incident, Child
Protective

Services

(“CPS”)

launched

a

child

abuse

investigation, and the matter was also referred to the school
Board’s Employee Case Management committee. CPS acts to prevent
and investigate incidences of child abuse under the auspices of
the Department of Social Services (“DSS”), whereas the Board’s
Employee

Case

Management

committee
2

has

as

its

focus

conduct

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detrimental

to

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the

proper

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functioning

of

the

school

system.

Adams was temporarily reassigned from MacArthur in the meantime.
On February 24, Adams met with Board investigators. Adams
contends that at that meeting he was shown a document stating he
was completely cleared of all charges. The Board denies Adams
was

shown

any

investigation,

such

document
focused

which

and
on

claims
school

its

independent

district

policy

violations, continued on a parallel track. In all events, the
Board transferred Adams back to MacArthur on February 25. That
same

day,

however,

recommendation

of

he

Dr.

went
Kim

on

medical

Bondurant,

an

leave
internal

upon

the

medicine

specialist, because he suffered from stress, anxiety, and high
blood pressure, presumably related to the January 19 incident
and the child abuse allegation. Adams returned to MacArthur on
March 3, but had a panic attack, during which he claims he was
berated

by

Principal

Reginald

Farrare.

Adams

took

a

second

medical leave, and Dr. Bondurant referred him to a psychiatrist,
Dr. Lawrence Adler. Adams claims that when he came back to work
on March 8, Farrare again berated him, this time in front of
other staff.
Two weeks later, Adams began his third and final medical
leave after Dr. Adler diagnosed him with acute stress disorder.
Dr.

Adler

informed

the

Board

that,

when

Adams

returned

from

leave, “he will require assignment to another school,” because
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being

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at

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MacArthur

could

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spur

“panic

attacks

and

other

manifestations of his illness.” J.A. 36. Dr. Adler later updated
the diagnosis to post-traumatic stress disorder, as reflected in
the

FMLA

paperwork

that

he

submitted

on

May

5.

The

Board

required Adams to attend three sessions during the summer with a
specialist of its choosing, psychologist Dr. Anthony Wolff. Dr.
Wolff cleared Adams to work on July 28.
The Board’s investigative process continued while Adams was
on that extended leave. The Board sent a letter to Adams on
April 12, notifying him that a pre-disciplinary conference had
been scheduled for May 6. The meeting was delayed by four days
so

that

Adams’s

conference,

attorney

Adams

could

received

a

attend.

letter

Two

from

weeks

the

after

Board

the

formally

reprimanding him for “engag[ing] in physical contact by using a
technique

that

escalated

a

situation

that

could

have

been

handled differently.” J.A. 584.
Adams

began

working

at

a

new

school,

J.

Albert

Adams

Academy (“JAA”), on August 4. The Board had first informed Adams
in early June that it intended to transfer him to JAA. However,
Adams agrees that the transfer did not occur in practice until
August, as he was on leave until late July. In the spring, Dr.
Adler had recommended a transfer, and Dr. Wolff later agreed
that Adams “would best be assigned to a supportive, lower-stress
school environment.” J.A. 194. “Mr. Adams,” Dr. Wolff stated,
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“is

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not

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averse

to

the

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possibility

of

being

assigned

to

a

specialized program such as the J. Albert Adams Academy, which
has been mentioned as a possibility.” J.A. 194.
The student population of JAA, a specialized middle school
for children with behavioral issues, used to reach 120, but now
is capped at 80. In contrast, MacArthur has more than 1,000
students

and

a

less

favorable

staff-to-student

ratio.

In

accordance with a union contract, Adams’s salary remained the
same for two years and then was reduced by less than one percent
because of JAA’s smaller size. JAA employees are also ineligible
for certain discretionary bonuses available at other schools.
Adams

has

reportedly

excelled

at

JAA.

He

has

received

exceptional performance reviews, has served as acting principal
for a month, and has not been subject to any further discipline.
He has not requested a transfer from JAA.
B.
Adams filed this lawsuit in Maryland state court, and the
Board removed the case to federal court. Adams alleged various
violations of the FMLA, the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and Maryland state law. After allowing Adams to
amend his initial complaint, the district court dismissed all of
the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint for failure to
state

a

claim,

except

for

Adams’s

FMLA

interference

and

retaliation claims and his ADA discrimination and retaliation
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claims. See J.A. 61-126. After discovery, the district court
granted

the

Board’s

motion

for

summary

judgment

on

those

remaining claims. See J.A. 625-55.
On appeal, Adams presses his various FMLA and ADA claims,
all of which arise from the same set of operative facts. We
review de novo both the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim and the grant of a motion for summary judgment.
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 2013); E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 400
(4th Cir. 2011). Under our summary judgment standard, of course,
the facts are generally viewed in the light most favorable to
the

plaintiff.

Matsushita

Elec.

Indus.

Co.

v.

Zenith

Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); see Dennis v. Columbia Colleton
Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). Summary
judgment is appropriate only if there is “no genuine dispute as
to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For the following
reasons, we affirm the judgment.
II.
Adams contends that the Board both interfered with his FMLA
rights and retaliated against him for taking medical leave.
A.
The FMLA grants employees the prescriptive right to take up
“to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period”
when, inter alia, an employee is burdened with “a serious health
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condition that makes the employee unable to perform” his job. 29
U.S.C.

§ 2612(a)(1)(D).

employee

is

also

When

entitled

returning
to

be

from

restored

FMLA
to

leave,

his

an

previous

position or an equivalent position, so long as he would have
retained that position or an equivalent one absent the taking of
leave. Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 546-47
(4th Cir. 2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)). That is, there is
“no

absolute

position.”

right

Id.

at

to

549.

restoration

to

Nonetheless,

it

a
is

prior

employment

“unlawful

for

any

employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or
the attempt to exercise” an employee’s FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1).
To

make

out

an

“interference”

claim

under

the

FMLA,

an

employee must thus demonstrate that (1) he is entitled to an
FMLA benefit; (2) his employer interfered with the provision of
that

benefit;

and

(3)

that

interference

caused

harm.

See

Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)); Wonasue v. Univ. of Md. Alumni
Ass’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d 480, 495 (D. Md. 2013).
We begin by noting one salient fact: Adams was not denied
FMLA

leave.

In

fact,

he

took

three

separate

medical

leaves

totaling well over twelve weeks. The Supreme Court has observed
that the “purpose of [an interference claim] is to permit a
court to inquire into matters such as whether the employee would
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have exercised his or her FMLA rights in the absence of the
employer’s actions.” Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 91. Adams has not
suggested that the Board denied him any FMLA leave he requested.
On

the

contrary,

Adams

received

more

than

the

statutorily

guaranteed amount.
Nevertheless, Adams argues that the Board interfered with
his leave in a variety of ways that stopped short of actually
denying him leave. In particular, he asserts that the Board took
adverse employment actions against him, which interfered with
his FMLA rights by discouraging the taking of leave. See 29
C.F.R.

§ 825.220(b)

(“‘Interfering

with’

the

exercise

of

an

employee’s rights would include, for example, not only refusing
to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using
such leave.”).
Adams first objects that the Board required him to submit
to three unnecessary examinations by a Board-chosen specialist.
But

the

FMLA

and

the

applicable

regulation

explicitly

allow

employers to seek a second opinion and even a third, if the
first two opinions conflict. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c), (d); 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.307(b), (c). Such medical opinions allow an employer to
verify the claimed medical condition, to assess how long the
employee

might

be

out

of

work,

and

to

fashion

the

best

environment for the employee upon his return to the workplace.

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The regulation concerning the “authenticity” of the initial
certification by a medical professional, 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(a),
is not applicable here. Employers may order a second or third
medical

evaluation

out

of

concern

that

the

original

certification of a serious medical condition is invalid, not
that

it

is

inauthentic.

See

29

U.S.C.

§ 2613(c)

(allowing

a

second evaluation where “the employer has reason to doubt the
validity of the certification”). Employers are entitled to seek
a second opinion regardless of whether the certification notice
proffered by the employee is real or not. In requiring Adams to
attend the sessions with Dr. Wolff, the Board simply exercised
its

statutory

right

to

seek

another

professional

medical

opinion.
Second,

Adams

argues

that

the

Board’s

pre-disciplinary

conference interfered with his leave by forcing him to “work.”
Appellant’s
meetings

Br.

may

at

32.

unlawfully

In

certain

interrupt

an

circumstances
employee’s

required

leave.

Here,

however, the one-time conference was a legitimate piece of an
ongoing investigation into the January 19 incident between Adams
and

the

student.

continued

Adams

disciplinary

argues

more

broadly

investigation

ran

that

the

contrary

Board’s
to

the

understanding reached at the February 24 meeting with school
officials,

during

which

they

allegedly

indicated

the

entire

matter had been wrapped up. He also submits several deposition
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statements

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from

MacArthur

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staff

to

the

effect

that

his

reinstatement at MacArthur indicated everything was fine. See
J.A. 481 (statement of Reginald Farrare) (“When he returned to
school it signified to me that he had been cleared of those
allegations. . . . [S]omeone
cleared

of

the

informed

me

allegations . . . .”);

that

J.A.

592

he

had

been

(statement

of

Deanna Natarian) (“[U]pon his return I assumed everything was
fine.

He

wouldn’t

have

returned

if

it

wasn’t.”).

The

staff

members had not been at the February 24 meeting and relayed
general

information

apparently

conveyed

by

unspecified

other

persons.
For several reasons, we do not believe Adams’s proffers
suffice to create an issue of triable fact as to the events
surrounding the February 24 meeting, or in a larger sense the
Board’s continuation of its own investigation. See Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (finding summary judgment
proper,

“after

against

a

adequate

party

who

time

fails

for

to

discovery

make

a

and

showing

upon

motion,

sufficient

to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case”). Although the DSS committee by early February had cleared
Adams in its child abuse investigation, there is little evidence
that the Board in some way closed and then reopened its own
investigation into whether Adams had violated school district

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policies, much less that its actions had anything to do with
Adams’s FMLA leave.
Indeed, the evidence overwhelmingly points to the contrary
conclusion that the Board’s separate investigation into school
district policy violations was continuous. The only document in
the

record

exculpatory

that

resembles

resolution

of

what
the

Adams
January

claims
19

was

a

incident

fully

is

the

February 4 decision by a five-member committee of the DSS to
“rule[]
contrast,

out”
the

the

child

Employee

abuse
Case

allegation.

Management

log

J.A. 604-05.
shows

that

By
the

Board’s own investigation report was not completed on February
24, the date on which Adams claims the investigation was closed.
In

fact,

the

school

district’s

interview

of

Adams

about

the

incident was not even scheduled until that same day, because DSS
had just completed and finalized its investigation of the child
abuse allegations and the school district investigation could
thereafter proceed unfettered. The draft report was not finished
until March 23, and the report was not finalized until April 8.
The Board then notified Adams of the pre-disciplinary conference
by letter. The conference was postponed for several days so that
Adams’s counsel could attend.
It is surely true that the investigative processes of any
institution are open to abuse, but the record here points to a
standard

procedure

during

which
11

due

process

was

accorded

to

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Adams every step along the way. Adams does not dispute that the
Board was entitled to conduct its own investigation into the
January 19 incident. Indeed, school districts must often engage
in investigations like this one or else face accusations and
lawsuits for not looking promptly into allegations of improper
teacher contact with students or violations of school district
policies.

The

investigatory
adequately

pre-disciplinary
and

linked

conference

disciplinary
to

his

process,

ample

FMLA

was

leaves,

of

the

Adams

which

part

has

not

seeking

the

and

participation of Adams and his attorney in that process did not
constitute

an

impermissible

interference

with

Adams’s

FMLA

leave. And Adams never objected or sought a continuance he did
not get.
Third,
“attacks”

Adams
and

the

asserts
written

that

Farrare’s

reprimand

alleged

constituted

verbal
adverse

employment actions. Appellant’s Br. at 11. But however bad the
relationship between Adams and Farrare, Adams cannot demonstrate
that these verbal and written reprimands in fact discouraged him
from taking FMLA leave. Indeed, Adams began his second medical
leave the same day as the first alleged verbal attack. Nor did
the written reprimand inhibit Adams’s final medical leave -- he
did not return to work until more than two months after the
reprimand was issued.

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Regardless, neither the written nor the verbal reprimands
qualify as adverse employment actions, because they did not lead
to further discipline. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec.
Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1996); Jeffers v. Thompson,
264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 330 (D. Md. 2003). The written reprimand,
in

particular,

was

the

final

step

in

the

Board’s

legitimate

ongoing investigation. These incidents were what the Board said
they were -- reprimands, not signposts on a predetermined path
to a true adverse employment action. In fact, Adams has received
excellent reviews of his performance since returning from the
third and final FMLA leave.
B.
Adams also contends that the Board retaliated against him
for

exercising

his

FMLA

rights.

See

29

U.S.C.

§ 2615(a)(2)

(making it “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing
any practice made unlawful by” the FMLA); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.220(c) (noting that “employers cannot use the taking of
FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions”).
Retaliation claims brought under the FMLA are analogous to
those brought under Title VII. Laing v. Federal Express Corp.,
703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013); Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 550-51.
Plaintiff must prove three elements to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation: (1) “she engaged in a protected activity”;
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(2)

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“her

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employer

took

an

Pg: 14 of 25

adverse

employment

action

against

her”; and (3) “there was a causal link between the two events.”
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. 13-1473, slip op. at
36 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). If the
defendant

advances

retaliatory

a

action,

lawful

the

explanation

plaintiff

must

for

the

alleged

demonstrate

that

the

defendant’s reason for taking the adverse employment action was
pretextual. See Laing, 703 F.3d at 717, 719 (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).
Many

of

the

retaliatory.

As

Board’s
noted

actions

above,

here

the

were

simply

Board’s

not

disciplinary

investigation into Adams’s conduct was never concluded, and thus
it could not have been reopened in order to retaliate against
Adams.

The

conference

Board’s
and

review,

the

written

including
reprimand,

the

pre-disciplinary

observed

due

process

requirements. Other Board decisions fail to qualify as adverse
employment

actions.

investigation
affect

Adams’s

--

The

the

eventual

reprimand

employment

result

letter

position

or

of

the

Board’s

--

did

not

adversely

his

pay

and

benefits.

Similarly, Farrare’s verbal reprimands did not adversely affect
Adams’s

employment.

Although

the

Board

required

the

medical

examinations in reaction to Adams’s taking of FMLA leave, such a
request for a second medical opinion is expressly allowed under
the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.
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was

Adams’s

Pg: 15 of 25

transfer

from

MacArthur

to

JAA

in

retaliation for his exercise of FMLA rights. Crucially, both Dr.
Adler and Dr. Wolff recommended that Adams be transferred to a
different and less stressful school, and Adams reportedly was
“not averse to the possibility of being assigned to” JAA. J.A.
194.

The

Board

effectuated

the

transfer

promptly

--

Adams’s

first day at JAA came merely a week after Dr. Wolff had cleared
him as fit to work. Adams’s salary remained at the same level
for two years before being reduced by less than one percent, and
as

a

JAA

employee

he

was

no

longer

eligible

for

some

discretionary bonuses. The salary reduction was mandated by the
union contract because JAA has a much smaller student population
than MacArthur.
Although

JAA

is

a

school

for

children

with

behavioral

issues, it has no more than ten percent the number of students
as

MacArthur

and

also

has

a

more

favorable

staff-to-student

ratio. Moreover, Adams seems to have done well at JAA. He has
received superb reviews and has not requested a transfer from
JAA, despite having the opportunity to do so.
There

simply

transferring

is

Adams

no
to

retaliatory

animus

JAA

timely

in

a

at

work

manner,

here.

By

on

the

recommendations of both Dr. Adler and Dr. Wolff, to a school
with

fewer

students

and

more

staff

per

student,

the

Board

essentially fashioned an accommodation for his disability. See
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infra Section III.B. Such reasonable accommodations under the
ADA are not likely to be retaliatory under the FMLA, and they
were plainly not under the circumstances presented here.
III.
Adams mounts a separate set of claims under the ADA. He
asserts that the Board discriminated and retaliated against him
based

on

his

disability

and

also

failed

to

accommodate

his

condition.
A.
The
persons
also

ADA

forbids

with

bars

seeking

employers

disabilities.

employers

these

from

statutory

42

from

U.S.C.

discriminating
§ 12112(a)-(b).

retaliating

against

protections.

Id.

against
The

Act

employees

for

§ 12203(a)-(b).

Congress passed the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals
“clear,

with

strong,

disabilities,”
consistent,

id.

§ 12101(b)(1),

enforceable

through

standards,”

id.

§ 12101(b)(2). A “qualified individual” with a disability under
the

ADA

is

someone

“who,

with

or

without

reasonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of the job.
Id. § 12111(8). The Act contains a “detailed description of the
practices that would constitute the prohibited discrimination,”
and it “speaks in clear and direct terms to the question of

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retaliation.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct.
2517, 2531 (2013).
In

Adams’s

included

Principal

continued
written

view,

Board’s

Farrare’s

investigation

reprimand,

the

and

of
the

alleged

verbal

the

“attacks,”

student

mandated

ADA

hallway

medical

violations
the

Board’s

incident,

examinations.

the
In

addition, Adams argues that the Board retaliated against him for
requesting a disability accommodation. The Board’s retaliatory
measures,

he

asserts,

included

the

written

reprimand,

the

medical examinations, and the reduced pay at JAA.
Adams’s discrimination and retaliation claims at this stage
are subject to similar though not identical legal standards.
Compare Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 702
(4th Cir. 2001) (discrimination), with A Soc’y Without a Name v.
Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (retaliation). These
two tests share a common element, however: the plaintiff must
have suffered an adverse employment action of some kind. See
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173-74 (2011);
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63-64
(2006).
The requirement of an adverse employment action seeks to
differentiate those harms that work a “significant” detriment on
employees
“trivial.”

from

those

White,

548

that
U.S.

are
at

relatively

17

68.

As

the

insubstantial
Supreme

Court

or
has

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explained in the analogous Title VII context: “The substantive
[discrimination]
individuals

provision

based

on

who

seeks
they

to

are,

prevent

i.e.,

their

injury

to

status.

The

antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals
based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.” Id. at 63 (emphasis
added). Pointedly, the antiretaliation provision “covers those
(and

only

those)

employer

actions

that

would

have

been

materially adverse to a reasonable employee.” Id. at 57. The
analysis depends on the particular circumstances of the case.
Id. at 71. All the tests, however, require that there be an
adverse employment action, which denotes some direct or indirect
impact

on

an

individual’s

employment

as

opposed

to

harms

immaterially related to it. See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 173-74;
White, 548 U.S. at 63-64.
Many of the harms alleged by Adams do not rise to the level
of an adverse employment action. It is surely true that Farrare
and the Board did things that Adams personally did not like. But
dislike of or disagreement with an employer’s decisions does not
invariably

make

those

decisions

ones

that

adversely

affected

some aspect of employment.
Moreover, reprimands and poor performance evaluations occur
with some frequency in the workplace. While the analysis of them
is necessarily dependent on the circumstances, see White, 548
U.S.

at

69,

they

are

much

less
18

likely

to

involve

adverse

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employment actions than the transfers, discharges, or failures
to

promote

whose

impact

on

the

terms

and

conditions

of

employment is immediate and apparent. Here, Adams has failed to
link

such

matters

as

the

upbraiding

by

Farrare,

the

Board’s

pursuit of its obligation to investigate the hallway incident,
and

the

statutorily

permitted

medical

examinations

to

some

material change in the conditions of his employment. See James
v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 375 (4th Cir.
2004).

Even

assuming

the

unlikely

presence

of

an

unlawful

discriminatory intent for any of the above actions, they did not
cross the threshold that courts have traditionally required for
a personnel matter to be actionable. See, e.g., Cepada v. Bd. of
Educ., 974 F. Supp. 2d 772, 788 & n.51 (D. Md. 2013) (yelling by
an assistant principal at a teacher insufficient); Jeffers v.
Thompson, 264 F. Supp. 2d 314, 330 (D. Md. 2003) (an oral or
written

reprimand,

without

some

actual

injury,

does

not

qualify); Settle v. Balt. Cnty., 34 F. Supp. 2d 969, 992 (D. Md.
1999) (“inconvenience” or “emotional anxiety” resulting from “a
disciplinary
articulable

investigation
facts

[that]

justifying

such

is

reasonably
an

rooted

investigation”

in
not

sufficient), aff’d sub nom. Harris v. Earp, 203 F.3d 820 (4th
Cir. 2000), and Settle v. Balt. Cnty. Police Dep’t, 203 F.3d 822
(4th Cir. 2000).

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B.
The transfer of Adams from MacArthur to JAA belongs in a
rather different category from that of the actions discussed
above. Adams claims here that the Board failed to provide a
reasonable accommodation for his disability. In particular, he
contends that the Board “made no effort” to reassign him “to a
less stressful school where he would not suffer a reduction in
pay,” and that the Board did not transfer him until four months
after he had initially requested an accommodation. Appellant’s
Br. at 46.
The ADA forbids an employer from discriminating against an
individual

with

accommodation,

can

a

disability

perform

the

who,

with

essential

“reasonable

functions”

of

the

position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002); Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 387 n.11
(4th

Cir.

2001).

An

employer

that

fails

to

make

“reasonable

accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability” has engaged in
impermissible discrimination, unless the employer can show that
the

accommodation

operations.
accommodation”

42
may

imposed
U.S.C.
include

an

“undue

hardship”

§ 12112(b)(5)(A).
“job

A

restructuring,

upon

its

“reasonable
part-time

or

modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,” and
other appropriate changes. Id. § 12111(9)(B).
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Here, the Board did not outright deny Adams’s requests to
accommodate his disability. Rather, Adams questions the adequacy
of

the

Board’s

efforts.

accommodations

were

We

think,

plainly

however,

that

reasonable.

the

Many

Board’s
of

the

justifications are similar to those already touched upon in our
discussion of Adams’s FMLA claims. See supra Part II.
First,

Adams’s

transfer

to

JAA

was

consistent

with

the

recommendations of the doctors who had examined him. Adams’s
psychiatrist,
reassigned

Dr.

to

Adler,

another

emphasized

location,”

that

away

Adams

from

the

“must

be

“site

of

psychological trauma.” J.A. 38-39. The Board’s psychologist, Dr.
Wolff,

agreed

supportive,

that

Adams

lower-stress

“would

school

best

be

environment.”

assigned
J.A.

to

194.

a
Dr.

Wolff noted that Adams was “not averse to the possibility of
being assigned to a specialized program such as the J. Albert
Adams Academy, which has been mentioned as a possibility.” J.A.
194. The professional advice of both doctors, in short, supports
the basic reasonableness of the Board’s reassignment decision.
Second,

the

Board

acted

on

Adams’s

request

in

a

timely

manner. Adams requested an accommodation in late March. He gave
the Board a note from Dr. Adler stating that he “require[d]
temporary medical leave,” and that, “[w]hen he is stabilized, he
will require reassignment to another school.” J.A. 36 (emphasis
added). The Board informed Adams of the reassignment to JAA on
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June 2, and after his extended leave ended on July 28, he began
work there on August 4. The Board addressed this task during his
leave and executed the reassignment within a week of his return.
Under the circumstances, that seems a quite reasonable interval.
Third, in light of Adams’s disability, the Board sensibly
sought

a

“less

stressful

environment”

for

him.

J.A.

202.

Regardless of whether comparable positions at other schools were
available at the time, the Board’s reassignment decision was
based not only on the advice of medical professionals, but also
on

the

particular

characteristics

of

JAA,

after

consultation

with Adams. As noted earlier, the Board moved him to a school
with a far smaller student population (by a factor of ten), a
more

favorable

staff.

The

conjunction
history

of

staff-to-student

Board
with

appears
the

to

fact

behavioral

ratio,

have

that

weighed

many

problems.

and

a

those

students

An

sizable

array

at
of

support

features
JAA

have

in
a

legitimate

considerations entered into what frankly was for the Board a
judgment call. As Dr. Wolff observed, “It is difficult to define
what may constitute a lower-stress school environment, given the
unpredictable nature of student behavior.” J.A. 194.
Fourth, Adams did not object to his reassignment to JAA at
the time, and he has not requested a transfer since then. The
Board has posted openings for other schools during the interim,
but Adams has not asked to leave his position at JAA to work
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elsewhere.

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Indeed,

as

noted,

Pg: 23 of 25

he

has

thrived

there:

he

has

received ratings of “outstanding” on his annual evaluations and
briefly served as acting principal. Adams does allege that JAA
students

have

threatened

transfer.

Although

such

him

on

two

behaviors

are

occasions

his

troubling,

always

since

they

must be considered in context. Aside from his own affidavit and
deposition, Adams has not offered any evidence to bolster his
argument

that

environment

JAA

than

is

an

MacArthur.

equally
The

or

record

more
does

stressful
not

work

specifically

indicate what else the Board could have done or where else he
would

prefer

to

work.

Indeed,

Adams

has

never

requested

a

transfer or had any further work-related medical problems.
Fifth, the eventual decrease in Adams’s salary stemmed from
a

systemwide

collective-bargaining

agreement.

The

agreement

between the teachers’ union and the Board determines salaries on
the

basis

students

of
than

schools’

populations,

MacArthur.

The

and

JAA

resulting

has
$1,031

far

fewer

decrease

constituted less than one percent of his salary. Moreover, Adams
held the same position, assistant principal, at the two schools.
For his first two years at JAA, Adams in fact earned the same
salary as he had at MacArthur, as stipulated in his transfer
letter. It is true that Adams did become ineligible for certain
discretionary

bonuses

awarded

at

other

schools.

The

fact

remains, however, that less stressful jobs may on occasion be
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less remunerative. That tradeoff does not invalidate the Board’s
action in these circumstances.
In sum, there is nothing in this entire sequence of events
to indicate that the Board’s efforts to accommodate Adams were
anything but reasonable.
IV.
The

FMLA

and

the

ADA

impose

important

obligations

on

educational, and indeed all, covered employers. What they do not
impose,

however,

are

extra

statutory

obstacles

to

the

investigation of what in other cases might be serious instances
of

child

abuse.

Schools

have

an

obligation

to

safeguard

the

safety and welfare of those students in their charge. A proper
reading of the FMLA and ADA does not impair the ability of
school systems to responsibly exercise this duty.
The Board of Education faced a further predicament here.
Had it failed or refused to reassign Adams from his positon at
MacArthur, its inaction would have courted ADA litigation. That
statute, moreover, requires a “reasonable” accommodation, not a
perfect one. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8)-(9), 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B).
Hindsight must not underestimate hard choices that employers, in
consultation

with

their

employees

and

medical

professionals,

confront at the time. The record before us plainly indicates
that the Board did what it could to alleviate an unfortunate
situation. It should not incur liability for its efforts.
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V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.

25