In re: GNC Corp.
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:14-md-02491-JFM,1:14-cv-00120-JFM,1:14-cv-00122-JFM,1:14-cv-00123-JFM,1:14-cv-00002-JFM,1:14-cv-00033-JFM,1:14-cv-00465-JFM. [999605622]. [14-1724]
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1724
In re:
GNC CORPORATION; TRIFLEX PRODUCTS MARKETING AND
SALES PRACTICES LITIGATION (NO. II)
------------------YVONNE BROWN; SHAWN HOWARD, on hehalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated; MICHAEL LERMA, On Behalf of
Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated; JEREMY GAATZ,
On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated;
ROBERT TOBACK; ROBERT CALVERT; THOMAS FLOWERS; JOHN J.
GROSS; JUSTIN M. GEORGE; LOUIS LASTRES, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
GNC CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; GNC HOLDINGS, INC.;
RITE AID CORPORATION,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:14-md-02491-JFM)
Argued:
March 25, 2015
Decided:
June 19, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion.
Judge Floyd wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Niemeyer and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.
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ARGUED: Robert Jeffrey Berg, DENLEA & CARTON LLP, White Plains,
New York, for Appellants.
Joseph R. Palmore, MORRISON &
FOERSTER, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: E.
Duncan Getchell, Jr., Richmond, Virginia, Gordon W. Schmidt,
Courtney S. Schorr, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
for Appellees.
2
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FLOYD, Circuit Judge:
Appellants
supplements
are
consumers
produced
and
who
sold
by
purchased
GNC
and
joint
Rite
health
Aid.
The
supplements all contain glucosamine and chondroitin, and most
contain additional purportedly active ingredients.
allege
that
GNC
and
Rite
Aid
have
violated
Appellants
the
consumer
protection laws of various states by marketing these supplements
as promoting joint health, even though many scientific studies
have
shown
effective
that
than
osteoarthritis.
glucosamine
a
and
placebo
in
chondroitin
treating
are
the
no
more
symptoms
of
GNC and Rite Aid moved to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim, arguing that the complaint failed
to
adequately
marketing
plead
falsity
representations.
motion in full.
describe
the
the
The
of
the
allegedly
district
court
misleading
granted
the
Because marketing statements that accurately
findings
of
duly
qualified
and
reasonable
scientific experts are not literally false, we affirm.
I.
Michael Lerma, Jeremy Gaatz, Robert Toback, Robert Calvert,
Shawn
Howard,
Thomas
Flowers,
John
Gross,
and
Justin
George
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) purchased a variety of joint health
supplements produced by General Nutrition Corporation and GNC
Holdings,
Inc.
(collectively
“GNC”)
3
and
Rite
Aid
Corporation
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(“Rite Aid”).
in
several
In putative class actions filed in federal courts
states,
ineffective
as
Companies”)
deceptive
Pg: 4 of 26
they
marketed
violated
the
and
and
that
the
supplements
GNC
and
Rite
that
various
advertising,
misrepresenting
alleged
state
consumer
express
effectiveness
of
warranty
the
Aid
are
(“the
protection,
statutes
supplements. 1
by
The
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred three of
these actions (and two tag-along actions) to the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland for coordinated or
consolidated
established
pretrial
a
leadership
proceedings.
structure
Plaintiffs’
and
filed
a
Amended Complaint (CAC), at issue in this appeal. 2
counsel
Consolidated
Because this
case comes to us on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, we state the facts as alleged in the CAC and assume them
to be true.
Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d
597, 601 (4th Cir. 2015).
GNC manufactures, markets, distributes, and sells a line of
joint health dietary supplements under the brand name TriFlex:
1
The GNC plaintiffs (Lerma, Gaatz, Toback, Howard, and
Calvert) bring Counts I through VIII.
The Rite Aid plaintiffs
(Flowers, George, and Gross) bring Counts IX through XIII.
2
Although Brown v. GNC Corp., 13-05890 (N.D. Cal. filed
Dec. 19, 2013), was also transferred to the district court by
the Multidistrict Litigation Panel, the CAC does not include
Yvonne Brown (the plaintiff in that action) among the named
plaintiffs.
4
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GNC TriFlex; GNC TriFlex Fast-Acting; GNC TriFlex Sport; and GNC
TriFlex
Complete
compounds
glucosamine
(“glucosamine
ingredients
(HA).
Vitapak.
and
All
of
hydrochloride
chondroitin”).
Fast-Acting
and
products
and
They
methylsulfonyl-methane
TriFlex
the
(MSM)
TriFlex
contain
chondroitin
also
all
and
sulfate
contain
hyaluronic
Sport
also
the
the
acid
contain
a
variety of purportedly beneficial herbs, including white willow
bark
extract,
extract.
hops
cones
extract,
and
Chinese
skullcap
root
Finally, TriFlex Complete Vitapak contains tablets of
TriFlex Fast-Acting along with separate fish oil, willow bark,
and MSM supplements.
The TriFlex product labels represent that the supplements
“promote[] joint mobility & flexibility,” “protect[] joints from
wear and tear of exercise,” “rebuild[] cartilage and lubricate[]
joints,” and provide “[m]aximum strength joint comfort.”
J.A.
30, 189–93.
also
The
product
label
for
TriFlex
Fast-Acting
represents that the product was “[c]linically studied” by means
of
a
“12-week
multi-center,
randomized,
double-blind,
placebo
controlled study of 60 adults . . . taking 250 mg/day of the GNC
TriFlex
Fast-Acting
Blend”
comfort and function.”
and
J.A. 193.
was
“shown
to
improve
joint
The TriFlex Fast-Acting label
includes a chart representing that TriFlex Fast-Acting provides
a 20% improvement in joint function and 25-30% improvement in
joint flexibility.
Id.
5
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Rite Aid markets, distributes, and sells a line of housebrand
joint
health
dietary
Glucosamine/Chondroitin;
Rite
Glucosamine/Chondroitin;
Rite
Advanced
Aid
Complex;
supplements:
Rite
Rite
Aid
Aid
Natural
Glucosamine
Glucosamine
Aid
Chondroitin
Chondroitin,
Triple
Strength + MSM; Rite Aid Glucosamine Chondroitin + MSM; and Rite
Aid Glucosamine Chondroitin Advanced Complex with HA.
The Rite
Aid products are manufactured by GNC, and GNC is contractually
obligated to indemnify Rite Aid for the claims at issue here.
All
of
the
Rite
chondroitin.
Aid
All
products
of
the
Glucosamine/Chondroitin
Glucosamine/Chondroitin
purportedly
except
Rite
contain
HA,
Natural
and
various
All
represent
either
that
Chinese
Aid
extract, black catechu, and boswellia serrata gum extract.
products
including
Rite
Aid
MSM,
and
root
the
herbs
glucosamine
skullcap
of
beneficial
products
and
also
contain
they
“promote[]
joint
health” or that they “help[] rebuild cartilage and lubricate
joints.”
J.A. 195–205.
The named plaintiffs purchased several of the GNC and Rite
Aid products in a number of states.
No plaintiff alleges that
he or she was harmed by consuming the products, or that the
products
did
not
contain
glucosamine and chondroitin.
the
advertised
quantities
of
Rather, Plaintiffs allege that the
products are incapable of providing the advertised joint health
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benefits, and that they would not have purchased the products
but for the Companies’ false advertising.
They therefore bring
suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated purchasers
under the consumer protection laws of their states.
Lerma, a California resident, purchased TriFlex Fast-Acting
in California and brings Counts II and III under California’s
Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.,
and Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.
Gaatz, an Illinois resident, purchased TriFlex Sport in Illinois
and
brings
Count
IV
under
Illinois’s
Consumer
Fraud
and
Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1 et
seq.
Toback, a Florida resident, purchased TriFlex Complete
Vitapak
in
Florida
and
brings
Count
V
under
the
Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201
et
seq.
Acting
Calvert,
in
warranty
Ohio
under
an
and
Ohio
resident,
brings
Ohio’s
Count
UCC,
Ohio
purchased
VIII
for
Rev.
TriFlex
breach
Code
Ann.
of
Fast-
express
§ 1302.26.
Howard, a New York resident, purchased TriFlex Fast-Acting in
New York and brings Counts VI and VII under New York’s deceptive
business practices statute, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, and false
advertising
statute,
N.Y.
Gen.
Bus.
Law
§ 350.
Flowers,
a
California resident, purchased unspecified Rite Aid products in
California and brings Counts X and XI under California’s Unfair
Competition Law and Consumers Legal Remedies Act.
7
Gross, a New
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Jersey resident, purchased unspecified Rite Aid products in New
Jersey and brings Count XII under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud
Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 et seq.
Pennsylvania
resident,
Glucosamine/Chondroitin
under
purchased
in
Pennsylvania’s
And finally, George, a
Rite
Pennsylvania
Unfair
Trade
and
Aid
brings
Practices
Natural
Count
and
XIII
Consumer
Protection Law, 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-1 et seq.
In
essence,
representations
Plaintiffs
made
on
allege
the
that
products’
the
various
packaging
health
are
false
because “the vast weight of competent and reliable scientific
evidence”
indicates
that
glucosamine
provide the promised health benefits.
this
conclusion,
Plaintiffs
cite
a
and
chondroitin
J.A. 33.
number
of
do
not
In support of
peer-reviewed
published studies that collectively show that “glucosamine and
chondroitin[]
are
ineffective
at
treating
the
symptoms
of
osteoarthritis, whether taken alone or in combination with each
other.”
J.A. 23.
Plaintiffs note that while the cited studies
were performed on patients with arthritis, “experts in the field
deem
these
clinical
studies
to
be
appropriate
proxies
for
whether [glucosamine and chondroitin] are effective for . . .
both
arthritic
ingredients.”
and
Id. n.5.
non-arthritic
users
of
these
Plaintiffs cite at least nine studies
that are claimed to show that glucosamine, chondroitin, or both
are no more effective than a placebo in relieving the symptoms
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Plaintiffs also cite two studies that purportedly
show that MSM is no more effective than a placebo in relieving
the symptoms of knee arthritis.
allegations
found
in
about
the
the
The CAC does not include any
effectiveness
products,
or
cite
of
any
the
herbal
studies
compounds
regarding
the
effectiveness of any of these herbal compounds at relieving the
symptoms of arthritis.
The Companies moved to dismiss the CAC for failure to state
a
claim
under
Procedure.
Rule
12(b)(6)
of
the
Federal
Rules
of
The district court granted the motion in full.
Civil
The
court found that the plaintiffs had failed to plead that “any
reasonable
expert
would
conclude
from
the
cited
[scientific]
studies that glucosamine and chondroitin are ineffective in nonarthritic consumers,” and concluded that under all of the state
consumer protection laws at issue in this case, “[i]f there are
experts
who
support
advertisements,
the
misleading . . . .”
court
held
that
a
what
[the
Companies]
advertisements
J.A. 248.
are
say
not
in
false
their
and
In other words, the district
manufacturer
cannot
be
liable
for
false
advertising so long as at least one qualified expert opines that
the representations made are truthful, even if the overwhelming
weight of scientific evidence is to the contrary.
The district court dismissed the CAC without prejudice and
expressly granted the plaintiffs leave to re-file if they could
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plead (in accordance with Rule 11) that “any reasonable expert
would
conclude
chondroitin
from
do
consumers.”
not
J.A.
the
cited
improve
249.
studies
joint
that
health
Plaintiffs
glucosamine
in
declined
and
non-arthritic
the
court’s
invitation to amend the CAC and instead timely filed a notice of
appeal.
We
have
jurisdiction
over
final
judgments
of
the
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3
After
filing
their
appeal,
Plaintiffs
moved
for
reconsideration by the district court under Rule 60(b)(1) of the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure,
arguing
that
court’s initial order rested upon a mistake of law. 4
the
district
Although we
3
Under the final order doctrine, we may take jurisdiction
over a case dismissed for failure to state a claim only if “the
grounds for dismissal clearly indicate that ‘no amendment in the
complaint could cure the defects in the plaintiff's case.’”
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d
1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1993) (brackets omitted).
Dismissals
without prejudice are generally not appealable final orders.
De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 523 n.2 (4th Cir. 2013). But
if, as here, a plaintiff declines the district court’s offer to
amend and chooses to stand on his or her complaint, the
plaintiff “waive[s] the right to later amend unless we determine
that the interests of justice require amendment.”
Chao v.
Rivendell Woods, Inc., 415 F.3d 342, 345 (4th Cir. 2005).
Because of Plaintiffs’ waiver, we treat this case as if it had
been dismissed with prejudice and therefore have jurisdiction
over this appeal.
4
The Rule reads, in relevant part: “On motion and just
terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect[.]”
Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(1).
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held in United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 313 (4th Cir.
1982), that Rule 60 does not authorize motions for correction of
a mistake of law, the district court elected not to deny the
motion on this ground and instead responded to the substance of
the motion.
court
In its order (“the September Order”), the district
reiterated
the
reasons
stated
in
its
initial
order
dismissing the CAC and added one additional reason: It is unfair
to consumers who wish to gamble that glucosamine and chondroitin
may be effective if lay juries can effectively ban the sale of
glucosamine and chondroitin simply because the evidence of their
effectiveness
is
inconclusive.
Plaintiffs
did
not
file
a
separate notice of appeal with respect to the September Order.
However, they now purport to appeal both the initial order and
the September Order.
II.
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether we have
jurisdiction
September
to
Order.
consider
Rule
Plaintiffs’
3
of
the
purported
Federal
appeal
Rules
of
of
the
Appellate
Procedure requires would-be appellants to timely file a notice
of appeal with the Court “designat[ing] the judgment, order, or
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part thereof being appealed.” 5
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Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B).
In a
civil case in which the federal government is not a party, a
notice of appeal is timely if filed within 30 days after entry
of judgment.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).
Plaintiffs timely filed
a notice of appeal following the district court’s dismissal of
the CAC, but did not file an amended notice of appeal or a new
notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the September
Order.
They
now
contend—without
the
benefit
of
authority,
binding or otherwise—that it would be unfair for this Court to
require the filing of a separate notice of appeal following the
denial of a post-judgment motion.
Plaintiffs are apparently unaware of the generous tolling
provisions
of
Rule
4
of
the
Federal
Rules
of
Appellate
Procedure, which provides a clear road map for appellants who
wish
to
file
a
post-judgment
before taking their appeal.
motion
with
the
district
court
Appellants who file a motion for
reconsideration within 28 days following the district court’s
entry of judgment may wait to file their notice of appeal until
after the disposition of the Rule 60 motion, because the timely
5
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is not merely a
matter of clerical convenience.
Rather, it is “an event of
jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court
of appeals and divests the district court of its control over
those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.”
Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per
curiam).
12
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filing
of
appeal.
the
Filed: 06/19/2015
Rule
60
motion
Pg: 13 of 26
tolls
the
time
for
filing
an
Appellants who miss this 28-day deadline can still file
separate notices of appeal within 30 days of each challenged
order
and
then
consolidate
the
appeals.
Fed.
R.
App.
P.
4(a)(4)(A)(vi)&(B); see also Fobian v. Storage Tech. Co., 164
F.3d 887, 891 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that “any appeal from the
denial” of a Rule 60 motion “can be consolidated with the appeal
from the underlying order”); 16A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3950.4 (4th ed.
2008).
Plaintiffs filed their Rule 60 motion 35 days after the
entry of judgment, too late to take advantage of Rule 4 tolling.
They also failed to file a separate notice of appeal from the
September Order.
We therefore grant the Companies’ motion to
dismiss the appeal of the September Order for want of appellate
jurisdiction.
III.
A.
“We
dismissal,
review
de
novo
accepting
the
an
appeal
complaint
from
as
a
Rule
true
reasonable inferences in the [plaintiffs’] favor.”
and
12(b)(6)
drawing
Summers v.
Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
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complaint
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contain
Pg: 14 of 26
“a
plain
short
and
statement
of
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
P. 8(a)(2).
the
claim
Fed. R. Civ.
“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not
require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than
an
unadorned,
accusation.”
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
Ashcroft
v.
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
662,
678
(2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” a
plaintiff must “plead factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”
Id.
B.
In order to state a plausible claim for relief under all of
the state consumer protection statutes specified in the CAC,
Plaintiffs must plead facts from which we might infer that the
representations
deceptive,
or
made
on
the
misleading. 6
products’
The
6
packaging
district
court
were
held
false,
that
Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 490
(2d Cir. 2014)(“To state a claim under [New York] GBL § 349, a
plaintiff ‘must prove three elements: first, that the challenged
act or practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was
misleading in a material way; and third, that the plaintiff
suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.’”
(quoting
Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 95 N.Y.2d 24, 29 (2000))); Virgilio v.
Ryland Grp., Inc., 680 F.3d 1329, 1338 n.25 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A
consumer claim for damages under [Florida’s] FDUTPA has three
(Continued)
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Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this minimal pleading burden.
For the reasons that follow, we agree.
1.
The district court held that “[i]f there are experts who
support what [the Companies] say in their advertisements, the
elements: (1) a deceptive act or unfair practice; (2) causation;
and (3) actual damages.”); McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744 F. Supp.
2d 733, 753 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“To state a claim for breach of
warranty under the [Ohio] UCC, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the
existence of a warranty; (2) the product failed to perform as
warranted; (3) the plaintiff provided the defendant with
reasonable notice of the defect; and (4) the plaintiff suffered
an injury as a result of the defect.”); Engel v. Novex Biotech
LLC, No. 14-cv-03457-MEJ, 2014 WL 5794608, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
6, 2014) (“In an action for false advertising under the
[California] UCL and CLRA, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving
the
defendant’s
advertising
claim
is
false
or
misleading.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); De Bouse v.
Bayer AG, 235 Ill. 2d 544, 550, (2009) (“A[n Illinois] Consumer
Fraud Act claim requires (1) a deceptive act or practice by the
defendant, (2) the defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on
the deception, (3) the occurrence of the deception in a course
of conduct involving trade or commerce, and (4) actual damage to
the plaintiff that is (5) a result of the deception.”);
Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 122 (2014) (“An
unlawful
practice
under
the
[New
Jersey]
CFA
requires
‘fraudulent, deceptive or other similar kind of selling or
advertising practices.’” (quoting Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas
Co., 77 N.J. 267, 271 (1978))); Koch v. Acker, Merrall & Condit
Co., 18 N.Y.3d 940, 941 (2012) (per curiam) (“To successfully
assert a claim under [New York] General Business Law § 349(h) or
§ 350, ‘a plaintiff must allege that a defendant has engaged in
(1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading
and that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the
allegedly deceptive act or practice.’” (quoting City of N.Y. v.
Smokes-Spirits.Com, Inc., 12 N.Y.3d 616, 621 (2009))).
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advertisements are not false and misleading . . . .”
J.A. 248.
The district court clarified that Plaintiffs should not amend
the CAC unless they can plead that “any reasonable expert would
conclude from the cited studies that glucosamine and chondroitin
do not improve joint health in non-arthritic consumers.”
249.
J.A.
The district court’s test—while incorrect in its specific
formulation—accurately summarizes the law of false advertising. 7
The federal Lanham Act creates a private right of action
for corporate victims of “false or misleading” descriptions or
representations.
as
Plaintiffs)
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
cannot
invoke
the
Although consumers (such
protections
of
the
Lanham
Act, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134
S.
Ct.
1377,
1390
(2014),
the
considerable
body
of
federal
common law construing the Act is instructive in construing the
state laws at issue here.
Courts uniformly interpret “false or
7
The district court’s reference to the specific studies
cited in the CAC is error.
Under Twombly and Iqbal, “a
plaintiff need not ‘forecast’ evidence sufficient to prove the
elements of the claim.”
Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439
(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate
Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2012)).
While the studies
cited in the CAC are statements of fact that may collectively
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, they do not comprise the full body of evidence
that the factfinder would ultimately consult to determine
liability. As will be developed below, the question of falsity
hinges on the existence (or not) of scientific consensus and not
on the conclusions that hypothetical scientists might draw from
those studies referenced in the CAC.
16
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misleading” as creating two different theories of recovery in a
false advertising claim: A plaintiff must allege either (i) that
the challenged representation is literally false or (ii) that it
is
literally
true
but
nevertheless
misleading.
See,
e.g., Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134,
1139 (9th Cir. 1997); BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., 41
F.3d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1994); Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,
987 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1993); see also 44 Am. Jur. Proof of
Facts
3d
1,
plaintiff
§ 8
(2015)
arguing
that
(collecting
a
cases).
representation
is
A
Lanham
misleading
Act
must
produce extrinsic evidence of actual consumer confusion—it is
not
enough
for
a
representation
consumers.
court
to
determine
could
have
after
fact
misled
that
a
hypothetical
See Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264,
272–73 (4th Cir. 2002).
However, a plaintiff arguing literal
falsity need not produce such evidence. Id.
is
the
false,
we
assume
as
a
matter
of
If a representation
law
that
it
is
also
misleading.
In construing the diverse state statutes at issue here, we
apply
this
broadly
shared
understanding
of
the
difference
between false and misleading representations.
Every statute at
issue
representations.
here
Although
imposes
each
state
liability
supplies
for
its
17
misleading
own
test
for
determining
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whether
true
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statements
are
Pg: 18 of 26
misleading, 8
statements
that
are
literally false are necessarily misleading within the meaning of
all of the statutes.
Crucially, Plaintiffs have consistently
argued below and on appeal that the challenged representations
are false and that the challenged products are ineffective.
The
CAC nowhere alleges, and Plaintiffs have at no time argued, that
any of the representations are literally true but misleading.
Because
Plaintiffs
elected
to
plead
that
the
Companies’
representations are false rather than true but misleading, we
must determine whether the CAC states facts showing that the
representations are literally false.
case
is
products
show
a
improve
that
health
syllogism:
joint
glucosamine
more
than
a
(i)
the
health;
and
Plaintiffs’ theory of the
Companies
(ii)
scientific
chondroitin
placebo
represent
would;
do
not
(iii)
that
evidence
improve
therefore,
the
will
joint
the
representations must be false because the products do not and
cannot improve joint health.
However, the CAC does not allege
8
See, e.g., Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill.2d 134, 155
(2002) (“[A] plaintiff must allege that he was, in some manner,
deceived.”); Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57, 69
(1985) (asking “whether the ad itself is misleading to the
average consumer”); Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268,
272–73 (1977) (“In weighing a statement's capacity, tendency or
effect in deceiving or misleading customers, we do not look to
the average customer but to the vast multitude which the
statutes were enacted to safeguard including the ignorant, the
unthinking and the credulous . . . .”).
18
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that all scientists agree that glucosamine and chondroitin are
ineffective
at
providing
the
promised
joint
health
benefits.
Rather, it alleges that “the vast weight of competent clinical
evidence,”
J.A.
33,
and
the
“overwhelming
weight
of
high
quality, credible and reliable studies,” J.A. 35, support this
finding.
Plaintiffs thereby concede that, although most duly
qualified
scientific
chondroitin
are
experts
may
agree
ineffective,
some
that
glucosamine
reasonable
experts
and
disagree
and believe that glucosamine and chondroitin can provide the
symptom
relief
promised
by
the
Companies.
In
other
words,
contrary to the second prong of Plaintiffs’ own syllogism, the
CAC alleges that the scientific evidence regarding the efficacy
of glucosamine and chondroitin is equivocal.
Plaintiffs have
therefore failed to allege that the challenged representations
are literally false.
Plaintiffs urge that it is inappropriate for the court to
resolve a “battle of the experts” on the pleadings.
However, we
need not resolve any “battle of the experts” in order to decide
whether the CAC states a claim for false advertising.
litigants
scientific
concede
experts
that
agree
some
reasonable
with
a
and
scientific
duly
When
qualified
proposition,
they
cannot also argue that the proposition is “literally false.”
Either the experts supporting the Companies are unreasonable and
unqualified
(in
which
case,
there
19
is
no
real
battle
of
the
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experts to begin with) or they reflect a reasonable difference
of
scientific
opinion
representations
cannot
characterizing
the
Plaintiffs
highlight
(in
case
said
be
which
to
literally
dispute
the
as
a
CAC’s
be
battle
concession
difference
of
scientific
opinion
glucosamine
and
chondroitin
can
the
false).
of
the
that
a
exists
provide
challenged
the
as
By
experts,
reasonable
to
whether
advertised
joint
health benefits.
Plaintiffs also object that our holding today would “permit
a manufacturer of the most dubious product to engage an ‘expert’
and then contend it was immune from a consumer fraud action.”
Appellants’ Br. at 18.
no
reasonable
However, plaintiffs who believe that
scientist
would
agree
with
the
challenged
representations remain free to make that allegation.
Having
done the due diligence required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of
Civil
Procedure,
they
need
not
fear
that
the
defendant’s
subsequent production of a surprise expert whose opinion is not
reflected in the published scientific literature would expose
them to Rule 11 sanctions. 9
See Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc.,
9
The label of TriFlex Fast-Acting references such a private
study.
Although Plaintiffs were free to allege that the study
cannot have been conducted in a reasonable or reliable way
(because
all
reasonable
experts
support
the
opposite
conclusion), they failed to do so.
We decline to speculate as
to why, if the evidence is as clear and univocal as they claim,
Plaintiffs exhibited such hesitation.
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448 F.3d 268, 278 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that Rule 11(b) is
violated
only
when
a
party
has
allegation in a signed pleading).
no
factual
basis
for
an
Moreover, plaintiffs remain
protected from dubious experts by the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which “ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not
only relevant, but reliable.”
Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993)).
Our holding today should not be interpreted as insulating
manufacturers
of
consumer fraud.
nutritional
supplements
from
liability
for
A manufacturer may not hold out the opinion of
a minority of scientists as if it reflected broad scientific
consensus.
of
the
Nevertheless, we need not decide today whether any
representations
misleading,
because
made
on
Plaintiffs
the
chose
Companies’
not
to
products
include
are
such
allegations in the CAC.
In sum, we hold that in order to state a false advertising
claim on a theory that representations have been proven to be
false, plaintiffs must allege that all reasonable experts in the
field agree that the representations are false.
If plaintiffs
cannot do so because the scientific evidence is equivocal, they
have
failed
to
plead
that
the
representations
disputed scientific evidence are false.
21
based
on
this
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2.
The CAC is also defective because it fails to allege that
all of the ingredients contained in the products are incapable
of providing the represented benefits.
This defect presents an
alternate ground for affirming the district court.
The
CAC
glucosamine
alleges
and
that
chondroitin,
according
MSM,
and
to
HA
most
do
not
benefits represented on the products’ packaging.
of
the
products
ingredients.
cited
in
the
complaint
scientists,
provide
the
However, most
contain
additional
All of the GNC products allegedly purchased by the
named plaintiffs contain ingredients not referenced in the CAC,
including white willow bark extract, hops cones extract, Chinese
skullcap
root
extract,
and
fish
oil.
All
of
the
Rite
Aid
products allegedly purchased by named plaintiffs except for Rite
Aid
Natural
ingredients.
Glucosamine/Chondroitin
also
contain
additional
Plaintiffs conceded before the district court that
the CAC does not “specifically address” what they refer to as
the “minor ingredients” in the products. 10
10
J.A. 125.
Despite this earlier concession, Plaintiffs represented
to this Court that “[t]he CAC . . . alleges that all of the
ingredients in Defendants’ products have been proven . . . to be
ineffective” and that “the cited studies . . . include all of
the ingredients in Defendants’ products.” Appellants’ Reply Br.
(Continued)
22
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Most of the challenged representations—including “supports
improved joint health,” “protects joints,” “joint comfort,” and
“rebuilds cartilage”—refer to the products as a whole. 11
The
products, except for Rite Aid Natural Glucosamine/Chondroitin,
contain
herbal
compounds
health and comfort.
that
ostensibly
contribute
to
joint
To the extent that Plaintiffs failed to
allege that all of the purportedly active ingredients in each
product are ineffective at promoting joint comfort, health, and
flexibility, they have failed to adequately plead falsity of the
representations regarding the products as a whole.
See Toback
v. GNC Holdings, Inc., No. 13-80526-CIV, 2013 WL 5206103, at *5
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2013) (“Plaintiff’s allegations regarding
the inefficacy of glucosamine and chondroitin simply fail to
address
the
efficacy
of
the
TriFlex
Vitapak’s
multifarious
1, 8 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ counsel is reminded “that a
lawyer’s duty of candor to the court must always prevail in any
conflict with the duty of zealous advocacy.”
U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Mgmt. of Va.,
Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 925 (4th Cir. 1995).
11
GNC TriFlex Complete Vitapak represents on the side of
the package and in small print that “[g]lucosamine and
chondroitin help preserve joint function and rebuild cartilage.”
J.A. 189. GNC TriFlex Fast-Acting represents, in small print on
the side of the package, that “[s]cientific research has shown
that these building block compounds [i.e., glucosamine and
chondroitin] help to support the body’s natural ability to
regenerate cartilage and lubricate joints thus supporting joint
health integrity and function.” J.A. 193.
23
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composition in promoting joint health, and thus fail to raise
Plaintiff’s claim, that the Vitapak as a whole does not function
as
advertised,
above
the
added)); McCrary
v.
(OPx),
6402217,
2013
(dismissing
supplement
WL
claims
when
speculative
Elations
at
regarding
plaintiff
Co.,
*5
LLC,
(C.D.
the
level.”
No.
Cal.
overall
provided
EDCV
no
(emphasis
13–0242
Apr.
24,
2013)
formulation
scientific
JGB
of
a
studies
regarding several of the purportedly active ingredients).
We therefore affirm the dismissal of all claims regarding
the
overall
formulation
of
all
products
except
for
Rite
Aid
Natural Glucosamine/Chondroitin on the alternate ground that the
CAC
does
not
allege
that
the
products’
ingredients
are
ineffective as marketed.
3.
The Companies also argue that the studies cited in the CAC
are
not
specific
enough
to
raise
any
plausible
inferences
regarding the efficacy of the challenged products.
We find this
line
with
of
reasoning
unpersuasive
and
inconsistent
notice
pleading under Twombly and Iqbal.
First,
the
Companies
argue
that
because
the
scientific
studies cited in the CAC concerned patients with osteoarthritis,
their findings are inapplicable to people without arthritis who
experience joint pain and stiffness.
24
Plaintiffs respond that we
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must take as true the CAC’s allegation that “experts in the
field deem [clinical studies conducted on arthritic patients] to
be appropriate proxies for whether the ingredients are effective
. . . for both arthritic and non-arthritic users.”
J.A. 23 n.5.
Plaintiffs further note that the symptoms of arthritis assessed
in
the
studies—joint
stiffness,
pain,
and
discomfort—are
precisely the symptoms that the products purport to remedy.
example,
the
CAC
cites
one
study
that
concluded
For
that
“glucosamine and chondroitin, alone or in combination, did not
reduce joint pain . . . compared with a placebo,” and another
that found that “glucosamine and chondroitin did not rebuild
cartilage.”
J.A. 37–38.
It may well be that glucosamine and
chondroitin work differently in people with arthritis than in
people
without
arthritis,
but
such
a
factual
dispute
is
not
susceptible to resolution at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Second,
the
Companies
argue
that
the
scientific
studies
cited in the CAC are insufficient evidence of falsity because
they
did
products
not
or
ingredients.
assess
the
the
specific
synergistic
They
argue
formulations
effects
that
the
between
studies
used
the
are
in
the
products’
inapplicable
because they considered different amounts and combinations of
glucosamine and chondroitin.
Again, however, our inquiry at
this stage is limited to the plausibility of the CAC and not the
ultimate truth of its allegations: The applicability of a study
25
Appeal: 14-1724
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regarding
products
Filed: 06/19/2015
different
at
issue
motion-to-dismiss
dosages
is
not
stage.
Pg: 26 of 26
of
the
same
susceptible
See
Quinn
to
v.
ingredients
to
the
resolution
at
the
Walgreen
Co.,
958
F.
Supp. 2d 533, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Pearson v. Target Corp., No.
11 CV 7972, 2012 WL 7761986, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2012)
(“[W]hether or not the proffered studies are applicable to Up &
Up Triple Strength is a question of fact that I do not decide at
this stage.
The fact that these studies looked at products that
shared the same active ingredients-Glucosamine, Chondroitin, and
MSM-makes
Plaintiff's
also
v.
Jovel
i-Health,
claim
facially
Inc.,
No.
plausible.”);
12-CV-5614
5437065, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013).
(JG),
2013
see
WL
We therefore decline
to adopt these grounds for affirming the district court’s order.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the CAC fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The judgment of
the district court is therefore
AFFIRMED.
26
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