Stephen Buzzell v. JP Morgan Chase Bank

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion--granting Motion to proceed in forma pauperis (FRAP 24) [999429988-2], [999450424-2] Originating case number: 3:13-cv-00668-JRS. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999542818]. [14-1785]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1785

STEPHEN F. BUZZELL; KIMBERLY B. BUZZELL,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE
CORPORATION,

BANK,

as

Trustee;

RESIDENTIAL

FUNDING

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cv-00668-JRS)

Submitted:

January 29, 2015

Decided:

March 10, 2015

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stephen F. Buzzell and Kimberly B. Buzzell, Appellants Pro Se.
Daniel Tennyson Berger, Andrew Brian Pittman, TROUTMAN SANDERS,
LLP,
Virginia
Beach,
Virginia;
Nicholas
Richard
Klaiber,
TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Stephen F. and Kimberly B. Buzzell filed a complaint
in the Circuit Court of Lancaster County, Virginia, against JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., and Residential Funding Corporation,
alleging breach of contract and constructive fraud arising out
of

the

foreclosure

Morgan

and

district

on

the

Residential

court.

Buzzells’

Funding

Residential

residence

removed
Funding

the

in

2008.

action

filed

a

to

JP
the

notice

of

bankruptcy and the action was stayed as to Residential Funding.
The district court dismissed the action against JP Morgan as
barred

by

res

judicata,

determining

that

a

prior

decision

entered by the state court addressed the same claims against the
same parties or their privies.

Having determined that the state

court

order,

order

was

not

a

final

we

vacate

the

district

court’s dismissal order and remand for further proceedings.
In a previous action filed in the Circuit Court of
Lancaster County, the Buzzells alleged that GMAC Mortgage, LLC,
Homecomings Financial, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc.,

and

Samuel

I.

White,

P.C.,

engaged

misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty.

in

fraud,

The state court

dismissed with prejudice the claims against all parties except
for one claim against Samuel I. White, which is still pending.
“Under Virginia law, to establish res judicata, the
defendants must show:

(1) that the prior judgment is a final
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and valid judgment; (2) that the parties are identical or are in
privity with each other; and (3) that the claim made in the
subsequent

lawsuit

arises

out

of

or

relates

to

the

same

occurrence, conduct, or transaction upon which the prior lawsuit
was based.”

Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. David N. Martin

Revocable Trust, 833 F. Supp. 2d 552, 558 (E.D. Va. 2011).
The

district

court

explained

that

Virginia’s

“severable interest rule” allows for the immediate appeal of an
interlocutory

order

that

addresses

a

collateral

issue,

and

appeal of which would not affect the outcome of the remaining
issues in the case.

Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Skate Am.,

Inc., 540 S.E.2d 123, 126 (Va. 2001).

Under this rule, an

appeal may be taken from the interlocutory order “either at the
time of its entry or when the trial court enters a final order
disposing of the remainder of the case.”
court

reasoned

that,

because

the

state

Id.
court’s

The district
interlocutory

order dismissing the claims against all parties except Samuel I.
White, could have been appealed and was not, it should be deemed
final.

The court concluded, “where an interlocutory order is

appealable

under

the

severable

interest

rule,

the

order

is

not

final

for

the

final.”
We

disagree.

“[A]

judgment

is

purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel when it is being
appealed or when the time limits fixed for perfecting the appeal
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have not expired.”
1992).

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Faison v. Hudson, 417 S.E.2d 302, 305 (Va.

Additionally, the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated

that “in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, a
judgment is not final for purposes of appeal if it is rendered
with regard to some but not all of the parties involved in the
case.”

Wells v. Whitaker, 151 S.E.2d 422, 432 (Va. 1966).
Here, the state court order determined by the district

court to be a final order dismissed some claims against some of
the parties.

The action is still proceeding on the Buzzells’

claim against Samuel I. White.

Thus, the order is not a final

order for res judicata purposes.

See Faison, 417 S.E.2d at 305.

Upon entry of judgment on the Buzzells’ claim against Samuel I.
White,

they

may

appeal

from

the

state

court’s

dismissing the other parties from the action.

earlier

order

Thus, the state

court’s prior order is not a final order for purposes of res
judicata

and

does

not

preclude

the

Buzzells’

present

action

against JP Morgan.
Because the district court mistakenly found that the
state

court’s

order

was

a

final

order

for

purposes

of

res

judicata, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, vacate
the

district

proceedings.

court’s

order,

and

remand

the

case

for

future

We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

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before

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this

court

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and

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argument

would

not

aid

the

decisional

process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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