Dave & Buster's, Inc. v. White Flint Mall, LLLP

Filing

UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:13-cv-03390-RWT Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999600171].. [14-1794]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1794

DAVE & BUSTER'S, INC.,
Plaintiff − Appellant,
v.
WHITE FLINT MALL, LLLP, f/k/a White Flint Limited Partnership,
Defendant − Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:13-cv-03390-RWT)

Argued:

May 12, 2015

Decided:

June 11, 2015

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion.
Judge Wilkinson wrote the
majority opinion, in which Judge Agee joined. Judge Wynn wrote
a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Edward Smith Scheideman, III, DLA PIPER LLP (US),
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Albert David Brault, BRAULT &
GRAHAM, LLC, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul
D. Schmitt, DLA PIPER LLP (US), Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
James M. Brault, BRAULT & GRAHAM, LLC, Rockville, Maryland, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
This case arises from a Landlord-Tenant dispute at White
Flint Mall in Montgomery County, Maryland. Landlord White Flint
Mall sought to terminate its lease agreement with Tenant Dave &
Buster’s in 2012 in light of a prior and ongoing violation of
the radius restriction clause, which prohibited Dave & Buster’s
from operating a competing facility within the nearby geographic
area. Dave & Buster’s sought a declaratory judgment that the
termination was time-barred by the statute of limitations and
equitable

relief

agreement

between

in

the

the

form

of

parties.

specific
The

performance

district

court

of

the

granted

summary judgment for White Flint, finding that Dave & Buster’s
had

violated

the

radius

restriction

clause

and

that

White

Flint’s termination was therefore lawful, and not time-barred or
waived. Dave & Buster’s now appeals raising numerous arguments.
Because

those

arguments

all

seek

to

overlook

the

agreement

between the parties, we now affirm.
I.
In 1995, Dave & Buster’s entered into a lease agreement
with White Flint to open an entertainment-recreation-amusement
complex in the White Flint Mall in Montgomery County, Maryland.
The Lease was to last for a term of twenty years, with a right
to extend for three successive periods of five years. Included
in

the

provisions

of

the

agreement
2

was

a

radius

restriction

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clause,

in

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which

Dave

&

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Buster’s

agreed

to

refrain

from

operating a competing facility under the Dave & Buster’s Trade
Name within a given radius area. See J.A. 52 (Section 11.3).
At some point prior to April 2006, however, Dave & Buster’s
acquired a former Jillian’s location, which it rebranded and
began operating as Dave & Buster’s Grand Sports Café in the
Arundel Mills Mall in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. On April
13, 2006, White Flint Mall notified Dave & Buster’s that its
operation

of

the

Arundel

Mills

Mall

location

rendered

it

in

violation of the radius restriction clause in the 1995 Lease.
Although the map of the geographic area covered by the radius
restriction clause is not included in the record before this
court,

neither

party

contests

that

the

Arundel

Mills

of

“deference

Mall

location is within the covered area.
White

Flint

longstanding,

noted

mutually

that

out

beneficial

relationship

to

the

between

the

parties,” the company had “elected not to formally place Dave &
Buster’s in default under the Lease” even though “the Arundel
Mills

situation

Lease.”

J.A.

constitute[d]

130.

The

a

company

significant
did,

violation

however,

include

of

the

in

the

letter that “the Landlord reserves all of its rights under the
Lease

and

at

law

to

enforce

the

terms

of

the

Lease.”

Id.

Following this letter, both parties continued to engage in the
usual course of business under the Lease.
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On

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September

5,

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2012,

however,

in

connection

with

redevelopment efforts at White Flint Mall, White Flint provided
Dave & Buster’s with formal notice demanding the company cure
the violation of the radius restriction clause within 30 days or
the

landlord

would

proceed

to

exercise

its

rights

under

the

contract. After the 30 day period had passed, on October 9, 2012
White Flint notified Dave & Buster’s that it had elected to
exercise its right to terminate the Lease under Section 18.1(c)
effective as of December 31, 2012. Id. at 134. Section 18.1(c)
allows the Landlord to terminate the Lease with 10 days’ notice
in the event that the Tenant was in default in the performance
of any of its covenants or agreements (other than payment of
rent) for a period of 30 days. Id. at 61.
Dave & Buster’s continued to operate and pay rent while the
parties attempted to negotiate a resolution to the dispute. The
discussions

did

not

result

in

a

satisfactory

outcome

and

on

October 17, 2013, White Flint sent a letter to Dave & Buster’s
stating that it was “no longer willing to refrain from enforcing
its right to possession of the Premises” and requesting Dave &
Buster’s vacate the property by the end of November. Id. at 139.
On
lawsuit

November
in

the

14,

2013,

district

of

Dave

&

Maryland

Buster’s

initiated

seeking

declaratory

this
and

injunctive relief. The Complaint pled three counts. It sought a
declaratory judgment on whether White Flint’s claim of breach of
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contract

was

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time-barred

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by

the

statute

of

limitations,

requested specific performance of the Lease and a preliminary
injunction to that effect, and asserted breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. White Flint in response
moved to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment.
Dave & Buster’s crossed moved for summary judgment only on the
issue of the statute of limitations.
The

district

court,

after

a

hearing,

granted

partial

summary judgment to White Flint on March 24, 2014 with regard to
Count One, finding the company’s breach of contract claim was
not precluded by the statute of limitations or any theory of
waiver and that the radius restriction clause was enforceable
and breached by Dave & Buster’s. It further dismissed Dave &
Buster’s request for a preliminary injunction that would enable
it to continue operation at White Flint Mall notwithstanding the
radius restriction clause. Further, the court rejected any claim
that White Flint had breached an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. On July 22, 2014, the court dismissed the
outstanding claims, finding the Lease properly terminated, and
ruled on a counterclaim for possession of the property filed by
White

Flint

in

answer

to

the

initial

Complaint,

awarding

possession of the premises to White Flint.
On July 29, 2014, Dave & Buster’s filed a Motion to Alter
or Amend a Judgment arguing that the district court erroneously
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stated that it had “abandoned any claim for damages arising out
of any violation of the express terms of the Lease between the
parties.” Id. at 418. The district court denied the motion on
August 8, 2014. Dave & Buster’s now appeals.
II.
A.
Dave & Buster’s primary contention is that the statute of
limitations

has

run

on

White

Flint’s

claim

for

breach

of

contract. The company argues that the district court erred when
it refused a declaratory judgment on the question and granted
summary judgment for White Flint. We disagree. Because Dave &
Buster’s actively continued to breach a contract that was still
valid and in effect, White Flint’s action did not run afoul of
the statute of limitations.
Under

Maryland

limitations

law,

question,

a

which

civil

governs

action

“shall

the
be

statute
filed

of

within

three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of
the Code provides a different period of time within which an
action shall be commenced.” MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5101.

Maryland

strictly.

See

courts
Murphy

construe
v.

the

Merzbacher,

statute
697

A.2d

of

limitations

861,

865

(Md.

1997). Traditionally, the statute of limitations for a claim of
breach of contract begins to run when the contract has been
breached and “the breach was or should have been discovered.”
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Jones

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v.

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Hyatt

Ins.

Agency,

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Inc.,

741

A.2d

1099,

1104

(Md.

1999); see also Mayor of Federalsburg v. Allied Contractors,
Inc., 338 A.2d 275, 280 (Md. 1975) (“In contract cases, the
general rule is that the period of limitations begins to run
from the date of the breach.”).
Here, there is no factual dispute surrounding the conduct
constituting the breach -– the opening of a Dave & Buster’s
facility in Arundel Mills Mall in violation of Section 11.3 of
the Lease – so the question of accrual is one of law that we
decide de novo. See Litz v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t., 76 A.3d 1076,
1086 (Md. 2013). Dave & Buster’s argues that the facts before us
amount

to

a

single

breach

based

on

the

acquisition

and

rebranding of the Arundel Mills location from which consequences
continued
involve

to
the

flow.

We

disagree.

“continuing

effects

The
of

situation

here

a

earlier

single

does

not

act.”

MacBride v. Pishvaian, 937 A.2d 233, 240 (Md. 2007), overruled
on other grounds by Litz, 76 A.3d at 1090 n.9.
The Lease between White Flint and Dave & Buster’s imposed a
continuing obligation on the latter not to operate any competing
facilities within the radius restriction area so long as the
contract continued to be valid and the parties continued to do
business under its terms. The Maryland Court of Appeals has long
accepted

that

certain

covenants

imposing

ongoing

negative

obligations are covenants de die in diem and can be breached
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continuously, or on a daily basis. Kaliopulus v. Lumm, 141 A.
440 (Md. 1928). Such is the case here and we find that an action
for breach of contract accrued for so long as Dave & Buster’s
was in violation of the radius restriction clause through the
operation

of

the

Arundel

Mills

location.

In

a

case

of

this

nature, the statute of limitations may indeed operate to bar
recovery

of

damages

incurred

more

than

three

years

prior

to

suit, but it does not render the present action for an equitable
remedy time-barred. See Singer Co., Link Simulation Sys. Div. v.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 558 A.2d 419, 425-26 (Md. 1989).
In Kaliopulus v. Lumm, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered a question quite similar to the one before us today.
See

141

A.

at

442.

Appellant

James

Kaliopulus

sold

his

Hagerstown restaurant to Mr. and Mrs. Charles E. Lumm on the
contractual condition that he would not “enter into, conduct, or
finance

any

restaurant

or

dining

room

business

within

the

corporate limits” of the city for a period of ten years. Id.
When

Kaliopulus

breached

this

contractual

obligation

by

financing a new restaurant on the very same street as the one he
sold, the Court found that the specific relief sought by the
buyers

was

not

subject

to

the

8

equitable

doctrine

of

laches

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despite the passage of five years time. 1 Id. at 445-46. Rather,
the Court explained that continued operation of the competing
restaurant constituted a breach de die in diem such that “each
successive breach in the course of the continuing or recurring
breaches was constantly creating fresh causes of action.” Id. at
445.
Appellant makes much of the fact that this case was decided
nearly a century ago and concerned the equitable doctrine of
laches rather that the statute of limitations, but we find that
of no moment. The case remains good law and demonstrates that
under

Maryland

law,

the

continued

operation

of

a

competing

enterprise can constitute a continuous breach of a contractual
obligation so long as the contract under which the obligation
arose is valid and in effect. Furthermore, in 1989, the Court of
Appeals

underscored

that

“where

a

contract

provides

for

continuing performance over a period of time, each successive
breach of that obligation begins the running of the statute of
limitations

anew,

continuously.”

with

the

result

Singer,

558

A.2d

being
at

that

426;

accrual

see

also

occurs
Indian

Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 120 P.2d 349, 352
(Okla. 1941) (“[T]he right to maintain an action for its breach

1

The sale was executed pursuant to a specialty contract
such that the applicable statute of limitations was twelve
years. Kaliopulus, 141 A. at 445.
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continues

so

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long

as

the

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breach

continues

and

plaintiff

is

damaged thereby. . . . The rule is that a breach of a continuing
covenant gives rise to a cause of action each day the breach
continues.”) (rationale adopted by Court of Appeals of Maryland
in Singer, 558 A.2d at 425).
It is not difficult to see why the resolution of the case
at bar comports with Maryland law. Dave & Buster’s was under a
continuing obligation, so long as the Lease was valid and the
parties continued to do business under its terms, to refrain
from

operating

any

competing

facilities

within

the

radius

restriction area. It was not merely the opening of the facility,
but its daily operation that constituted a continued breach of
the agreed-to contract.
Furthermore, this finding also mirrors what Maryland courts
have concluded in the tort context. The Court of Appeals has
rejected

a

continuing

tolling

the

statute

breach
of

theory

limitations

where

the

grounds

were

“ongoing

for

adverse

consequences” but not ongoing adverse conduct. Litz, 76 A.3d at
1089 (internal quotations omitted). What is at issue before this
court is not merely adverse effects allegedly suffered by White
Flint Mall but rather an adverse course of conduct that Dave &
Buster’s engaged in every day the competing facility was open
for business as a challenger to the White Flint location.

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We think it important to note, however, that Maryland’s
theory of continuing breach of contract is a limited one. Here,
the party to the contract that committed the breach was subject
to an ongoing obligation to refrain from certain conduct and
repeatedly or continuously engaged in that very conduct while
the contract remained in effect. We do not, however, read the
Court of Appeals of Maryland to be endorsing a wide-reaching
continuous

breach

exception

to

the

statute

of

limitations.

Statutes of limitations “represent a public policy about the
privilege

to

litigate”

and

“find

their

justification

in

necessity and convenience . . . [in order to] spare the courts
from litigation of stale claims.” Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson,
325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). Here, the facts do not present a
single, isolated breach. Every day that Dave & Buster’s operated
the Arundel Mills Mall facility in direct competition with the
White Flint Mall location constituted a breach of the ongoing
contract between the parties such that accrual of the statute of
limitations began anew. Thus, we do not find the action for
termination of the Lease by White Flint Mall to be time-barred
by the statute of limitations.
B.
Dave & Buster’s next contends that White Flint waived its
right

to

termination

of

the

Lease

by

continuing

performance

under the contract after learning of the breach. However, in its
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April 2006 letter, White Flint notified Dave & Buster’s that it
believed

the

“constitute[d]
“clearly

operation
a

of

the

Arundel

significant

advise[d]

violation

[Dave

Buster’s]

&

of

Mills
the

that

location

Lease”
the

and

Landlord

reserve[d] all of its rights under the Lease and at law to
enforce the terms of the Lease.” J.A. 130. In addition, the
Lease

agreement

contains

an

express

non-waiver

provision.

Because White Flint clearly and explicitly reserved its rights
under the Lease, we find that there was no waiver and summary
judgment was properly granted on this issue.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland defines waiver as “the
intentional relinquishment of a known right, or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right.” Food
Fair Stores, Inc. v. Blumberg, 200 A.2d 166, 172 (Md. 1964).
Waiver “may result from an express agreement or be inferred from
circumstances.” Id.; see also John B. Robeson Assocs., Inc. v.
Gardens of Faith, Inc., 172 A.2d 529, 533 (Md. 1961) (“There are
few principles of contract law better established . . . than
that a party to an executory bilateral contract, who keeps the
same in existence after a known breach by the other party and
accepts further performance from the party who has committed the
breach, waives the breach.”).
However, as the Court of Appeals has made clear, waiver is
not always mandated in a situation where the parties continue to
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business.

To

“avoid

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waiver,

a

party

must

assert[]

his

intention to retain the rights accruing to him as a result of
said breach.” Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp., LLC v. Annapolis Towne
Centre at Parole, LLC, 25 A.3d 967, 980 n.17 (Md. 2011) (citing
Pumphrey

v.

Pelton,

245

A.2d

301,

304

(Md.

1968))

(internal

quotations omitted) (brackets in original). The intent to waive
a contractual provision “must be clearly established and will
not

be

inferred

from

equivocal

acts

or

language.”

Myers

v.

Kayhoe, 892 A.2d 520, 531 (Md. 2006). Here, for the reasons
noted above, the record is clear. In light of the undisputed
material facts before us, no rational factfinder could find that
White Flint intended to waive its right to enforce the terms of
the Lease, including the non-waiver provision and the radius
restriction clause.
Dave & Buster’s argues that the continued performance under
the contract constitutes a waiver of White Flint’s rights to
terminate

the

Lease

for

violation

of

the

radius

restriction

clause. The continued acceptance of rent after the breach of a
covenant may, in some cases, be considered evidence of intent to
waive
Corp.,

a

breach
371

A.2d

of

contract

124,

127

claim.

(Md.

See

1977).

Chertkof
However,

v.
it

Southland
“does

not

establish waiver as a matter of law.” Id. Maryland law “treat[s]
the question of waiver of a breach by the acceptance of rent as

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matter

of

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intent,

which

Pg: 14 of 29

necessarily

turns

on

the

factual

circumstances” of the case. Id.
In

considering

the

factual

circumstances

here,

it

is

important to reemphasize that the Lease agreement between White
Flint

and

Dave

&

Buster’s

contains

an

express

non-waiver

provision. Section 20.3 of the contract states that “[f]ailure
of either party to complain of any act or omission on the part
of the other party, no matter how long the same may continue,
shall not be deemed to be a waiver of said party of any of its
rights hereunder.” J.A. 66. As with any provision, “waiver of
[the non-waiver] clause may be implied from the very actions
which imply waiver of the condition precedent.” Hovnanian, 25
A.3d

at

985.

However,

to

defeat

summary

judgment,

Dave

&

Buster’s would have had to produce evidence that White Flint
intended

to

waive

Section

20.3

in

addition

to

the

radius

restriction clause. This it cannot do.
The evidence here is clear that White Flint intended to
reserve
Although

its

right

White

to

Flint

enforce

the

continued

to

radius
accept

restriction
rent

from

clause.
Dave

&

Buster’s location at White Flint Mall, it plainly explained in
the April 2006 letter that it was choosing not to pursue its
remedies under the Lease at that time only out of “deference to
the longstanding, mutually beneficial relationship between the
parties.” J.A. 130. It “clearly advise[d] [Dave & Buster’s] that
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the Landlord reserve[d] all of its rights under the Lease and at
law

to

enforce

the

terms

of

the

Lease.”

Id.

Following

this

letter, Dave & Buster’s was on notice that at any point in the
future White Flint might seek to enforce the radius restriction
clause

with

regard

to

the

Arundel

Mills

location.

Dave

&

Buster’s took no action to conform its behavior to the terms of
the

contract

for

seven

years,

instead

choosing

to

enjoy

the

benefits of operating both facilities. However, it also assumed
the risks associated with that business decision, namely that
White

Flint

could

still

elect

to

pursue

its

bargained-for

remedies under the Lease.
In 2012, when White Flint did choose to terminate the Lease
and

resume

possession

of

the

property,

the

downside

of

Plaintiff’s business decision came to pass. But that does not
permit the courts to confer on Dave & Buster’s a benefit that
the contract did not provide. On the record here, there is no
issue of triable fact such that a reasonable jury could conclude
that the evidence “amount[s] to an understanding between the
parties that the [radius restriction] condition would no longer
be

enforceable.”

Hovnanian,

25

A.3d

at

984.

Thus,

summary

judgment was properly granted on the question of waiver. 2

2

Our colleague in dissent argues that the facts here could
amount to waiver, relying on asserted similarities between the
facts at bar and those in Chertkof v. Southland Corp., 371 A.2d
(Continued)
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III.
A.
Dave

&

Buster’s

primary

contentions

in

this

action

are

procedural, namely that the statute of limitations bars White
Flint’s

ability

alternative,
waived.

On

to

that
the

terminate

any

claim

merits,

the

for

Dave

&

the

contract
breach

Buster’s

also

and,

of

in

the

contract

was

challenges

the

district court’s grant of summary judgment for White Flint on
the

question

of

whether

the

radius

restriction

clause

was

enforceable and breached by Dave & Buster’s.
The

district

court

did

not

err

when

it

granted

summary

judgment in White Flint’s favor on the issue. We review a grant
of summary judgment de novo. Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234,
236 (4th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is proper where “there is
no genuine dispute as to [any] issue of material fact.” Id. at
236-37; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The radius restriction
clause at issue in this case is a straightforward restrictive

124 (Md. 1977). The Maryland Court of Appeals noted in Chertkof,
however, one important difference between our case and theirs:
the unilateral nature of the reservation of rights. It explained
that “the inference of intent to waive, arising from the
acceptance of rent, [can be] rebutted by the express agreement
between the parties.” Chertkof at 128. Such is the case here.
The previously agreed-to express non-waiver clause combined with
the express reservation of rights at the time of the breach
provides clear and indisputable evidence that White Flint did
not intend to waive the breach.
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covenant of a kind often enforced by Maryland courts where there
is a “significant economic purpose” to the covenant. See, e.g.,
Diamond Point Plaza Ltd. P’ship v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 929
A.2d 932, 952 n.7 (Md. 2007) (noting that radius restriction
clauses

are

“in

the

nature

of

restraints

on

trade

and

competition, which are to be narrowly construed” but are often
upheld).
The

language

of

the

provision

here

is

clear

and

unambiguous. Dave & Buster’s was obligated “not to operate a
restaurant-bar-entertainment-recreation-amusement

complex

under

the Dave & Buster’s Trade Name within the radius area.” J.A. 52.
It is undisputed that the Arundel Mills Dave & Buster’s location
was within the radius restriction area, and thus in violation of
the

provision.

Furthermore,

the

language

at

issue

is

very

similar to that which the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld in
Diamond Point Plaza. See 929 A.2d at 950. As the Court observed,
“it would seem clear that the purpose of the radius restriction
was

to

protect

the

percentage

rent

by

precluding

competing

operations within the same market area that might siphon sales.”
Id. at 952 n.7.
Both

Dave

&

Buster’s

and

White

Flint

are

sophisticated

business entities and radius restriction clauses are common in
commercial
evident

leases.

here.

The

The

significant

Lease

is

for
17

economic

the

purpose

operation

of

is
a

self-

Dave

&

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Buster’s facility in the White Flint Mall and provides White
Flint with a percentage of the operation’s sales. It does not
require

expert

testimony

to

determine

that

another

Dave

&

Buster’s, which is a unique entertainment experience, operating
nearby would affect the number of customers visiting the White
Flint Mall location.
Dave & Buster’s argues on appeal that the provision was
unenforceable,
support

such

but
an

failed

to

the

“[T]here

allegation.

brief

is

necessary
no

issue

facts
for

to

trial

unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party
for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 447 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); see also Celotex
Corp.

v.

Catrett,

477

U.S.

317,

322

(1986)

(finding

summary

judgment proper against “a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case”).

Here, Dave & Buster’s cannot point to any

genuine issues of fact that exist to support a finding that the
clause lacked significant economic purpose, or was overly broad,
or

unduly

burdensome.

Thus,

summary

judgment

was

properly

granted for White Flint.
B.
Dave & Buster’s further argues that summary judgment was
improperly granted because the parties had not been allowed to
undertake

discovery

and

relatedly,
18

that

the

district

court

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abused its discretion in not granting Dave & Buster’s Rule 56(d)
request for discovery, which it filed as part of its motion for
reconsideration. We address these two interconnected arguments
in turn.
As a general matter, of course, summary judgment is to be
“refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity
to discover information that is essential to his opposition.”
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244
(4th

Cir.

2002)

(quoting

Anderson,

447

U.S.

at

250

n.5).

However, the party opposing summary judgment “cannot complain
that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that
party ha[s] made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds
that

more

time

was

needed

for

discovery

.

.

.

before

the

district court ruled.” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co.,
80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996).
Generally such an attempt is made through the filing of a
Rule 56(d) affidavit that outlines the need for discovery and
what

additional

facts

litigants

hope

to

uncover

through

discovery to properly defeat summary judgment. See id. Although
this court has found that filing an affidavit is not a necessary
condition of obtaining discovery prior to summary judgment, we
have repeatedly “warned litigants that we ‘place great weight on
the [Rule 56] affidavit’” and that “’the failure to file an
affidavit under [Rule 56] is itself sufficient grounds to reject
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a claim that the opportunity for discovery was inadequate.’”
Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 244 (quoting Evans, 80 F.3d at 961).
Dave & Buster’s failed to make the case for why discovery was
necessary prior to a grant of summary judgment. Dave & Buster’s
did not file a Rule 56(d) affidavit until April 4, 2014, almost
two weeks after the district court granted summary judgment in
White Flint’s favor. J.A. 308-11.
In
party’s

Harrods,

this

objections

functional

court

before

equivalent,”

a

found

where

“the

district

the

that

court

served

Rule

56(d)

affidavit

nonmoving

may

as

the

not

be

necessary. Id. at 244-45 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
First Chicago Int’l v. United Exch. Co. Ltd., 836 F.2d 1375,
1380

(D.C.

nothing

more

memorandum
“further

Cir.

1988)).

than

in

a

here,

conclusory

opposition

factual

But

to

development

Dave

statement

summary
of

the

&

Buster’s

at

the

end

included
of

its

judgment

arguing

that

record

regarding

the

reasonableness of the radius restriction” was needed. J.A. 172.
This is not the equivalent of a Rule 56(d) affidavit, nor
does it provide reasonable “notification and explanation” for
why more time for discovery was necessary or what the parties
intended to discover that was not yet in the record. Evans, 80
F.3d

at

961;

see

also

Harrods

Ltd.,

302

F.3d

at

244

(“[R]eference to [Rule 56] and the need for additional discovery
in a memorandum of law in opposition to a motion for summary
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judgment

is

Filed: 06/11/2015

not

affidavit.”).

an

As

adequate

explained

Pg: 21 of 29

substitute

above,

the

for

court

a

[Rule

properly

56(d)]
granted

summary judgment on the enforceability of the radius restriction
clause given the record before it. Only after the court granted
summary judgment for White Flint did Dave & Buster’s file its
Rule

56(d)

affidavit.

J.A.

308-11.

This

was

too

little,

too

abused

its

late.
Secondly,

we

do

not

find

the

district

court

discretion in denying Dave & Buster’s request for discovery as
part of its motion for reconsideration of the grant of summary
judgment. It is within the district court’s discretion to deny
such a request for discovery where “the information sought would
not by itself create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient
for

the

nonmovant

to

survive

summary

judgment.”

Strach, 743 F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 2014).
sought

to

prove

speculative

as

to

through
any

additional

specific

facts

Pisano

v.

What Dave & Buster’s

discovery
that

was

might

largely

support

a

finding that the radius restriction clause was unenforceable. It
was

not

an

conclusions

abuse
regarding

of

discretion

summary

to

judgment

refuse
on

the

to

reconsider

basis

of

only

“vague assertions” about what possible facts might be discovered
to support Dave & Buster’s claim. Nguyen, 44 F.3d at 242.

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IV.
In addition to its request for additional discovery, Dave &
Buster’s

also

included

in

its

motion

for

reconsideration

an

argument that it had a right to cure under Section 18.1 of the
Lease.

It

now

argues

that

the

district

court

erred

when

it

denied the opportunity to cure and found the Lease was validly
terminated. We disagree.
Section 18.1 of the Lease provides in relevant part that in
the event of a default by Dave & Buster’s in the performance of
its covenants or agreements (other than payment of rent), the
company would have thirty days after notice in writing of the
default to cure. J.A. 61-62. In addition, where “there is a bona
fide dispute . . . [Dave & Buster’s would be able to] cure any
default at any time prior to final adjudication by a court of
competent

jurisdiction,”

through

the

payment

of

monetary

damages. Id. at 62-63.
The district court did not err in denying Dave & Buster’s
the

opportunity

to

cure.

Dave

&

Buster’s

chose

not

to

cure

following initial notice of default in 2006 or after subsequent
notice that White Flint intended to pursue its bargained-for
remedies under the Lease in 2012. By the time the company made
the argument that it had a right to cure, the parties were
months

into

litigation.

White

Flint

had

already

elected

to

terminate the Lease, a decision which the district court upheld.
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Furthermore, the language of the Lease itself makes clear
that only where there is a “bona fide dispute” could Tenant cure
at a point later than 30 days after notice of default. Here,
however, the parties agree that the Arundel Mills location was
in fact a violation of the terms of the Lease. In addition, the
district judge had upheld the radius restriction clause as valid
and found Dave & Buster’s had defaulted on its obligation when
it opened the Arundel Mills location. We do not think the mere
fact of litigation is what the parties intended by “bona fide
dispute.” As such, we cannot find that the district court erred
in refusing to allow Dave & Buster’s to cure at the eleventh
hour of litigation a violation that was over seven years in the
making.
V.
We have reviewed the various claims pressed by Plaintiff
and find no merit in them. 3 Dave & Buster’s violated the radius
restriction clause in its agreement with White Flint Mall and
made the business decision that it was worth the risk to operate
both

facilities

elected

to

for

pursue

as
its

long

as

possible.

properly-reserved

3

When
rights

White
under

Flint
the

We do not think the district court abused its discretion
in denying Dave & Buster’s Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment and we affirm its ruling that Dave & Buster’s has
abandoned any claim for damages arising out of a violation of
the express terms of the Lease.
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contract, the district court enforced the contract’s terms as
written. For the foregoing reasons, its judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I

agree

with

the

majority’s

conclusion

that

the

radius

restriction is enforceable and that Dave & Buster’s breached it.
But I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “no rational
factfinder could find that White Flint intended to waive its
right to enforce the terms of the Lease.”

Ante at 13.

I

believe that a rational factfinder viewing all of the facts in
the light most favorable to Dave & Buster’s could determine that
White

Flint

waived

waiver clause.

both

the

radius

restriction

and

the

non-

I therefore respectfully dissent.

I.
To survive summary judgment, Dave & Buster’s needed only to
marshal evidence that would allow a rational factfinder to find
that White Flint waived both the radius restriction and the nonwaiver clause.

See Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp., LLC v. Annapolis

Towne Ctr. at Parole, LLC, 25 A.3d 967, 987 (Md. 2011); see also
Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 256 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting
that we view the facts at summary judgment in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party).
the

opposite

conclusion,

the

This it did.

majority

opinion

In reaching
oversimplifies

Maryland’s waiver inquiry by granting outsized importance to the
fact that White Flint reserved its rights under the Lease and by
failing

to

articulate

why

the

same

25

facts

that

could

support

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waiver

of

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the

radius

Pg: 26 of 29

restriction

clause

cannot

also

support

waiver of the non-waiver clause.
A.
Under
rent

Maryland

constitutes

intent.
1977).

a

law,

whether

waiver

is

a

the

continued

acceptance

of

question

of

fact-intensive

See Chertkof v. Southland Corp., 371 A.2d 124, 127 (Md.
The continued acceptance of rent does not constitute a

waiver as a matter of law.
reservation

of

rights

Id.

In a similar vein, a unilateral

under

a

enforceable as a matter of law.

lease

is

not

necessarily

See id. at 127–8.

Chertkof is

instructive in this regard.
Chertkof involved a commercial lease with a percentage-rent
clause that guaranteed the lessor a certain percentage of the
lessee’s gross sales.

371 A.2d at 125.

The lease also included

a provision that required the original lessee to receive written
approval before subleasing or assigning the lease to another
party.
first

Id.

The lessee subleased and assigned the lease without

receiving

written

consent.

Id.

at

125–26.

When

the

lessor discovered the assignment, it declared the lease “null
and void and cancelled” due to the breach of the lease terms.
Id. at 126.

The lessor’s agent also wrote a letter specifying

that continued acceptance of rent should not be construed as a
waiver.

Id.

26

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The trial court held that the lessee breached the lease
provision requiring written consent.
found,

despite

the

lessor’s

Id. at 126.

relatively

speedy

But it also
filing

of

an

ejectment action and its express statement disavowing waiver,
that the lessor had waived its “right to a forfeiture of the
estate granted by the lease.”

Id. at 127.

The Maryland Court

of Appeals affirmed based on the acceptance of rent and monthslong negotiations for a new lease.
The facts of this case bear a more-than-passing resemblance
to the Chertkof facts: (1) The Lease included a percentage rent
clause, which gave White Flint an economic interest in Dave &
Buster’s performance, J.A. 33; (2) Dave & Buster’s breached a
lease

provision

designed

to

protect

White

Flint’s

economic

interest; (3) White Flint promptly notified Dave & Buster’s of
the breach and unilaterally reserved its rights under the lease; *
(4) White Flint continued to accept rent; and (5) White Flint
engaged in months-long negotiations (October 2012–October 2013)
with Dave & Buster’s before threatening to take legal action
unless Dave & Buster’s vacated the premises.

Indeed, the main

difference between this case and Chertkof is the length of time
*

White Flint’s April 2006 letter was a unilateral
reservation of its rights under the lease, and this reservation
is quite distinct from the (waivable) non-waiver clause
discussed below.
“Had the reservation been the subject of
express agreement, a different result might have obtained.”
Chertkof, 371 A.2d at 128.
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between the initial notice of breach and the threat of legal
action; instead of waiting months, White Flint waited more than
six years.

It is difficult to square Chertkof with the majority

opinion’s holding that no rational factfinder could find that
White Flint waived the radius restriction.
B.
To survive summary judgment, Dave & Buster’s must also show
that White Flint waived the non-waiver clause.
majority, “This it cannot do.”
Maryland

law

provides

Ante at 14.

that

the

According to the

Again, I disagree.

waiver

of

a

non-waiver

clause “may be implied from the very actions which imply waiver
of the condition precedent.”
at 985.

Hovnanian Land Inv. Grp., 25 A.3d

The non-waiver clause states that “[f]ailure of either

party to complain of any act or omission on the part of the
other party, no matter how long the same may continue, shall not
be deemed to be a waiver of said party of any of its rights
hereunder.”

J.A. 66.

To demonstrate waiver of this non-waiver

clause, Dave & Buster’s need only put forward facts showing that
White Flint waived some right by failing to complain.

This it

can do.
As the majority opinion observed, The Court of Appeals of
Maryland defines waiver as “the intentional relinquishment of a
known right, or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment

of

such

right.”
28

Food

Fair

Stores,

Inc.

v.

Appeal: 14-1794

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Blumberg,

Filed: 06/11/2015

200

A.2d

166,

172

Pg: 29 of 29

(Md.

1964).

This

precisely

describes White Flint’s (in)action when it chose not to complain
about

the

radius

restriction

for

more

than

six

years.

Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that no rational
factfinder could find waiver of the non-waiver provision.

II.
Both
decisions.

Dave

&

Buster’s

and

White

Flint

made

business

Dave & Buster’s made the business decision to breach

the radius restriction.

White Flint made the business decision

to not enforce the radius restriction for more than six years.
To be sure, these business decisions are subject to contractual
agreement.

But

Maryland law.

that

contractual

agreement

is

subject

to

If, for example, White Flint had not waited so

long to enforce the radius restriction, perhaps my conclusion
would be different.
light

most

favorable

But because these facts, when taken in a
to

Dave

&

Buster’s,

could

support

a

rational factfinder’s determination that White Flint waived both
the radius restriction and the non-waiver clause, I respectfully
dissent.

29