Farhan Warfaa v. Yusuf Ali

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:05-cv-00701-LMB-JFA. [999745345]. [14-1810, 14-1934]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1810

FARHAN MOHAMOUD TANI WARFAA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
YUSUF ABDI ALI,
Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-1934

FARHAN MOHAMOUD TANI WARFAA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
YUSUF ABDI ALI,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:05-cv-00701-LMB-JFA)

Argued:

September 16, 2015

Decided:

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

February 1, 2016

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Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the majority
opinion, in which Judge Diaz joined.
Judge Gregory wrote a
separate opinion dissenting in part.

ARGUED:
Joseph
Peter
Drennan,
Alexandria,
Virginia,
for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Tara Melissa Lee, DLA PIPER LLP (US),
Reston, Virginia, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
ON BRIEF:
Joseph C. Davis, Reston, Virginia, Paul D. Schmitt, Mason
Hubbard, DLA PIPER LLP (US), Washington, D.C.; Laura Kathleen
Roberts, Nushin Sarkarati, Scott A. Gilmore, CENTER FOR JUSTICE
& ACCOUNTABILITY, San Francisco, California, for Appellee/CrossAppellant.

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AGEE, Circuit Judge:
Farhan Warfaa alleges that in 1987, a group of soldiers
kidnapped him from his home in northern Somalia.

Over the next

several months, Warfaa claims he was beaten, tortured, shot, and
ultimately

left

for

dead

at

the

direction

of

Yusuf

colonel in the Somali National Army at the time.

Ali,

a

Warfaa later

sued Ali under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”), Pub. L.
No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
note), alleging several violations of international law.
After

lifting

a

multi-year

stay,

the

district

court

dismissed Warfaa’s ATS claims, finding they did not sufficiently
“touch

and

concern”

the

United

States

so

as

to

establish

jurisdiction in United States courts under Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).

The district court

allowed Warfaa’s TVPA claims to proceed after holding that Ali
was not entitled to immunity as a foreign official.
and Ali appeal.

Both Warfaa

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

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I.
Throughout

the

political upheaval. 1
controlled

the

1980s,

Somalia

experienced

a

period

of

A military dictatorship led by Siad Barre

country’s

government,

and

Barre’s

dictatorship

employed violence and intimidation to maintain control and stay
in power.

Among other things, the Somali government targeted

members of certain opposition “clans” through killings, torture,
and

property

destruction.

Warfaa’s

clan,

the

Isaaq,

was

targeted.
Ali

supported

the

Barre

regime

and

commanded

the

Fifth

Battalion of the Somali National Army stationed in Gebiley, the
area where Warfaa lived.

Early one morning in December 1987,

two armed soldiers from the Fifth Battalion appeared at Warfaa’s
hut, rousted him from his sleep, and forced him to a nearby
collection point.
learned

that

they

There, Warfaa and several other local farmers
were

accused

of

supporting

an

opposition

organization, the Somali National Movement (“SNM”).

Soldiers

then forced the men to march to another village where an army
truck drove them to Fifth Battalion headquarters.

Some of the

other farmers were freed, but Warfaa, as a member of the Isaaq

1

Because this appeal stems from the grant of a motion to
dismiss, we accept as true all well-pled facts in Warfaa’s
complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to him.
United States v. Triple Canopy, 775 F.3d 628, 632 n.1 (4th Cir.
2015).
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clan, was detained and placed in a small, windowless cell with
ten other prisoners.
Warfaa alleges he was subjected to many acts of violence
during his detention at the direction of Ali.

For instance,

Warfaa claims that soldiers hit him with the butt of a gun, tied
him in a painful position, kicked him, and stripped him naked.
He was taken to Ali’s office, where Ali personally questioned
him

about

his

supposed

support

of

SNM

and

involvement in the theft of a water truck.

his

rumored

Later, soldiers

again stripped Warfaa naked, beat him to unconsciousness, woke
him with cold water, and then beat him again.

Once more, Ali

interrogated Warfaa after this torture, this time with Warfaa’s
hands and feet chained.
and

his

soldiers

During the early months of 1988, Ali

committed

similar

acts

of

torture

against

Warfaa at least nine times.
In

March

1988,

SNM

fighters

attacked

headquarters while Ali was interrogating Warfaa.

Fifth

Battalion

After ordering

his soldiers to defend the base, Ali shot Warfaa in the wrist
and leg, causing him to fall unconscious.

Ali thought he had

killed Warfaa and ordered his guards to bury the body.

When

Warfaa regained consciousness, however, he convinced the guards
to accept a bribe, and they released him.
in Somalia today.

5

Warfaa still resides

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The Barre regime collapsed in 1991, but Ali had departed
the country in advance of the fall and immigrated to Canada in
December 1990.

Canada deported Ali two years later for serious

human rights abuses, and he then came to the United States.

The

United States began deportation proceedings soon thereafter, but
Ali

voluntarily

left

the

country

in

1994.

For

reasons

not

explained in the record, Ali returned to the United States in
December 1996 and now resides in Alexandria, Virginia. 2
Warfaa,

identified

only

as

a

John

Doe,

and

a

Jane

Doe

originally filed suit against Ali in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in 2004.

Plaintiffs

voluntarily dismissed the complaint and refiled it in June 2005.
For most of its duration, this case has been stayed.

In

August 2005, the district court stayed the case until a party
could provide a declaration from the United States Department of
State indicating that the action would not interfere with U.S.
foreign policy.

In April 2012, after the case briefly resumed,

the district court granted a consent motion to further stay the

2

It is unclear from the record why Ali came to the United
States after deportation by Canada and why he remains in the
United States.
Ali was arrested in 1998 by agents of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, who indicated he was
responsible for “genocidal acts” that “led to the deaths of
thousands of people.”
See David Stout, Ex-Somali Army Officer
Arrested in Virginia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1998, at A4.
The
record contains no evidence explaining the disposition of these
claims.
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case pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel.

After the

Supreme

2013,

Court

issued

its

Kiobel

decision

in

April

the

district court again extended the stay and invited the State
Department to express its view as to whether the issues before
the court would affect United States foreign policy.

The State

Department “decline[d] to express views on the subject” and,
upon further request, explained that it was “not in a position
to present views to the Court concerning this matter at this
time.” 3

J.A. 17, 22.

On April 25, 2014, the district court lifted the stay and
ordered Warfaa to file an amended complaint.
complaint

contains

six

counts:

(1)

Warfaa’s amended

attempted

extrajudicial

killing; (2) torture; (3) cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or

punishment;

humanity;

and

(4)
(6)

arbitrary
war

detention;

crimes.

All

six

(5)

crimes

counts

against

allege

torts

purportedly committed in violation of international law, with
jurisdiction arising under the ATS.

In addition, the first two

counts -- attempted extrajudicial killing and torture -- are
alleged to violate the TVPA, which provides a jurisdictional
3

Requesting the State Department’s view is common in cases
that implicate foreign policy.
The Court “give[s] absolute
deference to the State Department’s position on status-based
immunity doctrines such as head-of-state immunity.
The State
Department’s determination regarding conduct-based immunity, by
contrast, is not controlling, but it carries substantial weight
in [the Court’s] analysis of the issue.”
Yousuf v. Samantar,
699 F.3d 763, 773 (4th Cir. 2012).
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basis separate from the ATS.

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See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note; Kiobel,

133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the TVPA
addresses “human rights abuses committed abroad”).
Ali
pursuant
12(b)(6).

filed
to

a

motion

Federal
Although

to

Rules
the

dismiss

of

the

Civil

motion

did

amended

Procedure
not

address

complaint

12(b)(1)

and

Kiobel,

the

district court subsequently ordered Warfaa to explain “at [a]
scheduled hearing” why his ATS claims were not barred by the
Supreme Court’s ruling.

See J.A. 56-57.

At the hearing on the

motion to dismiss, the district court stated that it was “going
to dismiss the ATS claims from this case” “on the basis of
Kiobel” because “[t]here is absolutely no connection between the
United States and [Ali]’s conduct in Somalia.”

J.A. 66.

It

further indicated that it was not inclined to dismiss the TVPA
claims.
In a subsequent written opinion, the district court granted
Ali’s motion to dismiss as to the ATS claims, but denied the
motion as to the TVPA claims.

The district court dismissed the

ATS claims because “such claims, generally speaking, must be
based on violations occurring on American soil.”

J.A. 78.

In

this case, however, “all the relevant conduct . . . occurred in
Somalia, carried out by a defendant who at the time was not a

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citizen or resident of the United States.”

Id. 4

court

the

rejected

Ali’s

motion

to

dismiss

The district
TVPA

counts,

concluding that Ali could not claim “official acts” immunity
because his alleged acts violated jus cogens norms. 5
Both parties timely appealed.

Ali appeals the district

court’s decision to “reject the Defendant’s plea of common law
immunity from suit.”

J.A. 101; see Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d

763, 768 n.1 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a foreign official
is entitled to lodge an immediate appeal from a pretrial order
denying him “common law” immunity).
final judgment on the ATS claims.

Warfaa appeals from the

This Court has jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

4

We have omitted internal quotation marks, alterations, and
citations here and throughout this opinion, unless otherwise
noted.
5 The district court also concluded that (1) the complaint
alleged sufficient facts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), (2) the TVPA’s statute of limitations did not justify
dismissal, (3) the case did not present a non-justiciable
political question and (4) Ali could not seek protection under
the act-of-state doctrine.
Ali does not meaningfully challenge
those portions of the district court’s decision.
As to those
issues, his only argument consists of one sentence: “Perforce,
Ali further urges that the fact that the subject matter of the
instant litigation also presents a non-justiciable political
question and an act of state confer further reasons for reversal
of the subject Order appealed from.”
Ali’s Opening Br. 10.
Because Ali “does not develop the[se] argument[s] or offer any
explanation for or analysis of his position in his initial
brief,” the Court need not consider them, and we do not. United
States ex rel. Ubl v. IIF Data Solutions, 650 F.3d 445, 457 (4th
Cir. 2011) (finding that a single sentence raising an argument
did not preserve it).
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II.
Whether

the

ATS

bars

claims

related

to

extraterritorial

conduct presents an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Al
Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir.
2014),

which

the

Court

considers

de

novo.

Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 2015).

Johnson

v.

Am.

Likewise, the

district court’s denial of foreign official immunity presents a
question of law that the Court must decide de novo.

See Smith

v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (reviewing a district
court’s decision to deny qualified immunity de novo); Wye Oak
Tech., Inc. v. Repub. of Iraq, 666 F.3d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 2011)
(considering a question of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act de novo).

III.
The ATS “does not expressly provide any causes of action.”
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.

Rather, it grants district courts

“original jurisdiction” over “any civil action by an alien for a
tort . . . committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 1350.

“Passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS was
invoked twice in the late 18th century, but then only once more
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over the next 167 years.”

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Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.

After

1980, ATS claims became more common, often relying on the Second
Circuit’s decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980).

In that case, the Second Circuit applied the ATS to

a

torture

claim

of

committed

involving foreign nationals.
the

door

to

litigation,”

more

Perry

ATS
S.

abroad,

with

Id. at 878, 889.
claims

Bechky,

and

Homage

all

the

acts

Filártiga opened

“launched
to

of

modern

Filártiga,

33

ATS
Rev.

Litig. 333, 336 (2014), but recent Supreme Court decisions have
significantly limited, if not rejected, the applicability of the
Filártiga rationale.

See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (holding

that ATS includes implicit geographic limits); Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (holding federal courts cannot
recognize claims brought via the ATS unless plaintiffs premise
those

claims

on

“specific,

universal,

and

obligatory”

international norms). 6

6

Warfaa’s citation to Filártiga as contrary authority is
without merit after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel. As
commentators have noted, “[t]he Kiobel Court all but annulled
the subject-matter jurisdiction granted by the Alien Tort
Statute for the very cases for which Filártiga had made it
matter, cases in which the alleged tort occurs within the
territorial borders or waters of a foreign sovereign.”
Louise
Weinberg, What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About
Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 Cornell
L. Rev. 1471, 1496 (2014). This Court has cited Filártiga once,
in Al Shimari, and we did so only as a passing reference without
any discussion of the Second Circuit’s analysis in the context
of
Kiobel.
Whatever
lingering
value
in
a
particular
(Continued)
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Alien plaintiffs, like Warfaa, have sought to invoke the
ATS as a means to seek relief for alleged international humanrights violations.
the

reach

of

the

The Supreme Court has explained, however,
ATS

is

narrow

and

strictly

circumscribed.

Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
In

Kiobel,

the

Supreme

Court

considered

whether

an

ATS

claim “may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign
sovereign.”
Supreme

Id.

The answer, for the most part, is “no,” as the

Court

has

applied

a

extraterritorial application.”

Id.

that

no

when

a

statute

extraterritorial

gives

application,

it

“presumption

against

The presumption “provides
clear

has

indication

none,

and

of

an

reflects

the

presumption that United States law governs domestically but does
not

rule

the

world.”

Id.

A

court

that

applies

the

ATS

extraterritorially risks interference in United States foreign
policy.

Id.

at

1664-65

(“[T]he

principles

underlying

the

[presumption] similarly constrain courts considering causes of
action that may be brought under the ATS.”).

Accordingly, in

Kiobel, the “petitioners’ case seeking relief for violations of
the law of nations occurring outside the United States [wa]s

circumstance Filártiga may have, if any, would not apply in a
case like Warfaa’s, where the only pled event to “touch and
concern” the United States is the defendant’s post-conduct
residency in the United States.
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barred.”
ATS

Id. at 1669.

can

“touch
force

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create
and

to

displace

application.”

The Supreme Court emphasized that the

jurisdiction

concern”

United
the

Pg: 13 of 30

for

such

States

claims

territory

presumption

against

only

where

“with

they

sufficient

extraterritorial

Id.

This Court has applied Kiobel only once, in Al Shimari v.
CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 529 (4th Cir. 2014).

In

that case, four plaintiffs sued an American military contractor
and several of its employees who were alleged to be American
citizens

directly

responsible

for

abusive

torture at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

mistreatment
Id. at 520-21.

and
We

recognized that “the clear implication of the [Supreme] Court’s
‘touch and concern’ language is that courts should not assume
that the presumption categorically bars cases that manifest a
close connection to United States territory.”

Id. at 528.

To

find that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies,
“it

is

not

sufficient

merely

to

injuries were inflicted abroad.”
conduct a “fact-based analysis.”

say
Id.

that

.

.

.

the

actual

Instead, courts should

Id.

Applying this analytical framework, we found that the Al
Shimari

plaintiffs

alleged

“extensive

‘relevant

conduct’

in

United States territory,” which distinguished their case from
Kiobel.

Id.

Based on that “extensive relevant conduct,” the

plaintiffs’ claims sufficiently “touch[ed] and concern[ed]” the
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United States to establish jurisdiction under the ATS. 7

Id. at

529.
Al Shimari thus is best read to note that the presumption
against ATS extraterritorial application is not irrefutable.
plaintiff

may

rebut

the

presumption

in

certain,

A

narrow

circumstances: when extensive United States contacts are present
and

the

alleged

conduct

bears

such

a

strong

and

direct

connection to the United States that it falls within Kiobel’s
limited “touch and concern” language.
present

the

strong

and

direct

The usual case will not

“touches”

we

recognized

in

Al

Shimari.
An ATS claim premised on no relevant conduct in the United
States

will

fit

within

the

heartland

extraterritoriality presumption applies.
7

of

cases

to

which

the

Doe v. Drummond Co.,

In Al Shimari, the Court cited five significant points of
contact with the United States: the defendant-contractor’s
“status as a United States corporation”; the “United States
citizenship of [the contractor]’s employees, upon whose conduct
the ATS claims are based”; the fact that the contractor’s
“contract to perform interrogation services in Iraq was issued
in the United States by the United States Department of the
Interior, and that the contract required [the contractor]’s
employees to obtain security clearances from the United States
Department of Defense”; “allegations that [the contractor]’s
managers in the United States gave tacit approval to the acts of
torture committed by [the contractor]’s employees . . .,
attempted to ‘cover up’ the misconduct, and ‘implicitly, if not
expressly, encouraged’ it”; and congressional intent “to provide
aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of
the United States accountable for acts of torture committed
abroad.”
Id. at 530-31.
There are no such contacts, or
anything close to them, in Warfaa’s case.
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782

Doc: 46

F.3d

Filed: 02/01/2016

576,

592

n.23

(11th

Pg: 15 of 30

Cir.

2015)

(“[I]f

no

relevant

aspects of an ATS claim occur within the United States, the
presumption

against

extraterritoriality

prevents

jurisdiction[.]”); Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 592
(9th

Cir.

2014)

(“The

allegations

that

form

the

basis

of

Plaintiffs’ claims exclusively concern conduct that occurred in
Colombia.”);

Chowdhury

v.

Worldtel

Bangl.

Holding,

Ltd.,

746

F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A]ll the relevant conduct set
forth

in

plaintiff’s

complaint

occurred

in

Bangladesh,

and

therefore plaintiff’s claim brought under the ATS is barred.”);
Cardona

v.

Chiquita

Brands

Int’l,

Inc.,

760

F.3d

1185,

1191

(11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the presumption applied because
the

alleged

torture

“occurred

outside

the

territorial

jurisdiction of the United States”); Balintulo v. Daimler AG,
727

F.3d

174,

189

(2d

Cir.

2013)

(“Kiobel

forecloses

the

plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs have failed to allege
that any relevant conduct occurred in the United States.”).
Warfaa’s cross-appeal asks the Court to apply Kiobel and Al
Shimari to permit a claim against a U.S. resident, Ali, arising
out of conduct that occurred solely abroad.
claim

by

beginning

with

Kiobel’s

strong

We analyze that

presumption

against

extraterritorial application of the ATS, recognizing Al Shimari
is the rare case to rebut the presumption.

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Warfaa’s claims fall squarely within the ambit of Kiobel’s
broad presumption
ATS. 8

against

extraterritorial

application

the

As with Kiobel, in this case, “all of the relevant conduct

took place outside the United States,” in Somalia.
S. Ct. at 1669.
the

of

U.S.

States.
launched,

Kiobel, 133

Nothing in this case involved U.S. citizens,

government,

U.S.

entities,

or

events

in

the

The alleged campaign of torture and intimidation was
managed

and

controlled

by

the

Somali

army.

inflicted all the injuries against Warfaa in Somalia.
ultimate

United

escape

--

thus

ending

the

violation

--

Ali

Warfaa’s

occurred

in

Somalia, as well.
The only purported “touch” in this case is the happenstance
of

Ali’s

after-acquired

residence

8

in

the

United

States

long

The dissent suggests that Kiobel applies only to corporate
defendants, not natural persons like Ali.
Nothing in Kiobel
lends support to that argument.
Instead, the Supreme Court
painted with broad strokes when discussing the scope and
purposes of the presumption against extraterritorial application
of the ATS, purposes which apply with equal force when it comes
to natural person defendants.
Further, the dissent correctly
recognizes that post-Kiobel no Circuit Court has permitted an
ATS claim premised on individual liability to proceed in the
absence of any cognizable “touches” within the United States.
Dissenting Op. 21.
Nonetheless, the dissent relies on Sexual
Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass.
2013), for the proposition that citizenship status distinguishes
this case from Kiobel.
Ali, however, is not a United States
citizen, and the facts alleged in Lively have no correlation to
the allegations pled in this case. For example, in Lively, “the
Amended Complaint allege[d] that the tortious acts committed by
Defendant took place to a substantial degree within the United
States, over many years, with only infrequent actual visits to
Uganda.” Id. at 321.
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the

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alleged

events

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abuse. 9

of

Mere

happenstance

of

residency, lacking any connection to the relevant conduct, is
not a cognizable consideration in the ATS context.

See Kiobel,

133 S. Ct. at 1669 (indicating the defendant’s “mere . . .
presence” in the United States does not afford jurisdiction).
“Kiobel’s resort to the presumption against extraterritoriality
extinguishes . . . ATS cases [with foreign parties and conduct],
at least where all of the relevant conduct occurs outside the
United

States,

United States.”
In

sum,

even

when

the

perpetrator

later

moves

to

the

which

“touches

and

Bechky, supra, at 343. 10
Warfaa

has

pled

no

claim

concerns” the United States to support ATS jurisdiction.

The

district court thus did not err in granting Ali’s motion to
dismiss

the

ATS

counts

in

the

complaint

for

lack

of

jurisdiction. 11

9

The dissent’s representation that Ali has sought “safe
haven”
here,
Dissenting
Op.
21,
28,
is
the
dissent’s
characterization alone, and is not reflected in Warfaa’s
pleadings or the record in this case.
10 The dissent implies some sort of military aid by the
United States to Ali.
Dissenting Op. 26-27.
Such a claim was
never pled, briefed or argued by Warfaa, and derives only from a
factual reference in Ali’s brief.
Ali’s Opening Br. 8.
The
record is devoid of any connection between Ali’s alleged conduct
in Somalia and some U.S. Military contact.
The dissent’s
comments in this regard are pure speculation.
11 To the extent the district court’s opinion reads Kiobel
as creating a categorical rule barring the ATS’ application to
conduct solely outside the United States, that reading is
overbroad.
Al Shimari makes clear that extensive and direct
(Continued)
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IV.
The

district

court

allowed

Warfaa’s

TVPA

claims

to

go

forward, finding Ali lacked foreign official immunity for jus
cogens violations under Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 777
(4th Cir. 2012).

In Samantar, we held that foreign official

immunity could not be claimed “for jus cogens violations, even
if

the

acts

capacity.”

Id.

were

performed

in

the

defendant’s

official

Ali does not contest that the misdeeds alleged

in the complaint violate jus cogens norms; he concedes that they
do.

Rather, his challenge is a simple one: Samantar was wrongly

decided, and jus cogens violations deserve immunity.
Ali

would

have

us

course is not open to us.

overrule

Samantar

entirely,

but

that

One panel’s “decision is binding, not

only upon the district court, but also upon another panel of
this court -- unless and until it is reconsidered en banc.”

Doe

v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642 (4th Cir.
1975); see also, e.g., United States v. Spinks, 770 F.3d 285,
289-90 (4th Cir. 2014).

True, the Court has the “statutory and

constitutional power” to reconsider its own decisions.

McMellon

v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 334 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

“touches” involving the United States may rebut the presumption
in some cases. Warfaa simply has none.
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But we have decided collectively not to exercise that power as a
“matter of prudence” outside the en banc context.
district

court

properly

concluded

Samantar

Id.

The

forecloses

Ali’s

district

court

claim to foreign official immunity.

V.
For

the

correctly
nexus

with

held
the

those claims.
claim

of

reasons
that

described

Warfaa’s

United

States

ATS
to

above,
claims

the

lacked

establish

a

sufficient

jurisdiction

over

The district court also correctly rejected Ali’s

foreign

official

immunity.

The

district

court’s

judgment is therefore
AFFIRMED.

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GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring
part:

in

part

and

dissenting

in

I write separately to dissent from Part III of the majority
opinion, as I would hold that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013),
does not foreclose the possibility of relief under the Alien
Tort Statute (“ATS”) here.

I.
In Kiobel, a group of Nigerian political asylees brought
suit against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, Shell Transport and
Trading

Company,

and

their

joint

subsidiary,

Shell

Petroleum

Development Company of Nigeria, alleging that these companies
aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing human
rights

abuses

against

them.

133

S.

Ct.

at

1662-63.

The

defendants’ only contacts with the United States were “listings
on the New York Stock Exchange and an affiliation with a public
relations office in New York.”

Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d

580, 591 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662-63;
id. at 1677-78 (Breyer, J., concurring)).

The Court explained

that “[c]orporations are often present in many countries, and it
would

reach

suffices”

too

far

to

extraterritoriality.

to

say

displace

that
the

mere

corporate

presumption

Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.

20

presence
against

The Court,

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however,

was

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“careful

to

Pg: 21 of 30

leave

open

a

number

of

significant

questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien
Tort Statute.”

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Following
considered

Kiobel,

and

corporations

a

number

rejected

and

ATS

their

of

our

claims

corporate

sister

circuits

have

against

U.S.

brought

officers

for

aiding

abetting foreign actors who commit human rights abuses.

and
See

Maj. Op. 14-15 (citing Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 601
(11th

Cir.

2015);

Chowdhury

v.

Worldtel

Bangladesh

Holding,

Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2014); Cardona v. Chiquita Brands
Int’l Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2014); Mujica, 771
F.3d at 596; Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir.
2013)).

But no circuit court has decided a post-Kiobel ATS case

premised on principal liability brought against an individual
defendant who has sought safe haven in the United States, a key
difference

the

majority

does

not

address.

This

is

not

to

suggest that Kiobel applies only to corporate defendants, see
Maj.

Op.

16

considerations

n.
may

8,

but

differ

that
where

the
the

analysis
defendant

and
is

relevant
a

natural

person.
Several cases brought prior to Kiobel considered situations
involving individual, natural-person defendants—facts more akin
to those presented here.
876,

878

(2d

Cir.

1980),

In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
two

Paraguayan
21

citizens

brought

an

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action against Pena-Irala (“Pena”), a Paraguayan police officer,
for the torture and death of a relative.

Pena had come to the

United

visa,

States,

overstayed

his

visitor’s

and

had

been

residing in the United States for over nine months when one of
the plaintiffs served him with a summons and civil complaint.
Id. at 878-79.

While acknowledging that “the Alien Tort Statute

ha[d] rarely been the basis for jurisdiction during its long
history,”

the

Second

Circuit

found

“little

action was properly in federal court.

doubt”

Id. at 887.

that

the

“This is

undeniably an action by an alien, for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations.”
the ATS was proper.

Id.

Thus, jurisdiction under

Id. at 889; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70

F.3d 232, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding jurisdiction for ATS
claims

brought

by

Croat

and

Muslim

citizens

of

Bosnia-

Herzegovina against Bosnian-Serb leader for violations of the
law of nations committed during the Bosnian civil war); In re
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493,
503 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding jurisdiction for ATS claim brought
by

Philippine

citizen

against

former

Philippine

official

for

violations of the law of nations committed abroad).
The majority states that “recent Supreme Court decisions
have significantly limited, if not rejected, the applicability
of the Filartiga rationale.”

Maj. Op. 11 (citing Kiobel, 133 S.

Ct. at 1664; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
22

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Nothing

in

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those

opinions,

Filartiga or its progeny.

Pg: 23 of 30

however,

explicitly

overrules

In fact, the Supreme Court in Sosa

“referred to [Filartiga and Marcos] with approval, suggesting
that the ATS allowed a claim for relief in such circumstances.”
Kiobel,
Sosa,

133

542

S.

U.S.

Ct.
at

at

1675

732).

(Breyer,

Even

J.,

Congress

concurring)
has

Filartiga was “met with general approval.”

(citing

recognized

that

H.R. Rep. No. 102-

367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991); S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 4 (1991).
Therefore, Filartiga is still good law, and its reasoning is
instructive here.

II.
This case involves “allegations of serious violations of
international law” committed by a natural person who has sought
safe haven within our borders and includes claims that are not
covered by the Torture Victim Protection Act nor “the reasoning
and holding” of Kiobel.
Thus,

the

“proper

extraterritorial

Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

implementation

application”

elaboration and explanation.”

in
Id.

of
this

the

presumption

case

requires

against
“further

Blithely relying on the fact

that the human rights abuses occurred abroad ignores the myriad
ways in which this claim touches and concerns the territory of
the United States.

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As the majority correctly states, “claims” are cognizable
under the ATS where they “touch and concern the territory of the
United

States

. . .

with

sufficient

force

to

displace

presumption against extraterritorial application.”
(citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669).
“claim”—rather
which

the

than

conduct—to

presumption

may

be

the

Maj. Op. 13

The Supreme Court’s use of

describe

the

displaced,

circumstances

however,

in

“suggest[s]

that courts must consider all the facts that give rise to ATS
claims, including the parties’ identities and their relationship
to the causes of action.”

Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech.,

Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 527 (4th Cir. 2014).
If we consider, as we must, a “broader range of facts than
the

location

where

the

plaintiff[]

actually

sustained

[his]

injuries,” there are three facts that distinguish this case from
Kiobel.

Id. at 529.

First, Ali’s status as a lawful permanent

resident alone distinguishes this case from Kiobel, where the
corporate defendant was merely “present.”
1669.

Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at

This Court found a defendant’s citizenship status to be a

relevant

“touch”

in

Al

Shimari,

where

we

observed

that

such

“case[s] do[] not present any potential problems associated with
bringing foreign nationals into United States courts to answer
for

conduct

committed

abroad,

United States citizens.”

given

that

the

defendants

are

Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530 (citing

Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322 (D.
24

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Mass. 2013) (holding that Kiobel did not bar ATS claims against
an American citizen, in part because “[t]his is not a case where
a foreign national is being hailed into an unfamiliar court to
defend himself”)).

To the extent that we rely on citizenship

status as a factor, we do so in the good company of our dear
colleagues sitting on this very Court.

See Maj. Op. 16, n. 8.

As a legal permanent resident, Ali “has a binding tie to the
United States and its court system.”

Yousuf v. Samantar, 699

F.3d 763, 778 (4th Cir. 2012); see also id. at 767 (finding
relevant the fact that U.S. residents “who enjoy the protections
of U.S. law ordinarily should be subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts”).
Second, Ali’s “after-acquired residence” in this country is
not mere “happenstance.”

Maj. Op. 16.

Ali was in the United

States when he “realiz[ed] that the Barre regime was about to
fall.”

Decl. of Ali ¶ 15, Br. in Supp. of Def.’s Renewed Mot.

to Dismiss at 1, Warfaa v. Ali, 33 F. Supp. 3d 653 (2014) (No.
1:05-cv-701), ECF No. 91.
Canada.

Id. at ¶ 15.

He initially sought refugee status in

Canada deported Ali back to the United

States for gross human rights abuses committed in Somalia.
at ¶ 18; J.A. 74.

Id.

When confronted with deportation proceedings

upon entering the United States, he voluntarily departed, only
to return two years later on a spousal visa.

Decl. of Ali ¶ 22.

In 1997, Ali was confronted with deportation proceedings yet
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again but prevailed at trial to have proceedings terminated.
Id. at ¶ 23.

The government did not appeal.

Id.

He has been

living here as a lawful permanent resident, availing himself of
the benefits and privileges of U.S. residency since 1996.
Lastly, when the alleged acts of torture took place, Ali
was serving as a commander in the Somali National Army.
same

capacity,

he

received

extensive

military

numerous occasions, in the United States.

In that

training,

on

The details of these

contacts, which took place prior to and following the alleged
acts,

are

laid

out

district court. 1

by

Ali

himself

in

a

declaration

to

the

In 1984, Ali received special military training

with the Officers’ Advanced Military Course at Fort Benning,
Georgia.

Decl. of Ali ¶ 8, Br. in Supp. of Def.’s Renewed Mot.

to Dismiss at 1, Warfaa v. Ali, 33 F. Supp. 3d 653 (2014) (No.
1:05-cv-701), ECF No. 91.
Benning

where

training.

he

Id.

representative

Later that year, he returned to Fort

completed
at

of

¶

the

10.

six

months

of

intensive

In

1985,

he

was

Defense

Intelligence

military

invited

Agency

to

by

a

pursue

further military training at Fort Leavenworth, where he spent a
1

Ali’s military training in the United States is a relevant
“touch” and the fact that it was brought to the Court’s
attention solely by Ali himself does not insulate it from our
consideration.
Cf. United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 793
(4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen a requirement goes to subject-matter
jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues
that the parties have disclaimed or have not presented.”
(quoting Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012)).
26

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before

returning

to

Pg: 27 of 30

Somalia

in

July

of

1986.

Id.

Finally, he received training in management studies with the
U.S. Air Force at Keesler Air Force Base a mere two years after
the acts alleged against him in this case.

Id. at ¶ 10.

This

is not to suggest that the U.S. government condoned or endorsed
defendant’s conduct, but these contacts are clearly relevant to
a test that requires us to consider whether a claim “touch[es]
and concern[s] the territory of the United States.” 2
S. Ct. at 1669.
Ali

did

not

Kiobel, 133

When pressed at oral argument, even counsel for

deny

that

a

“prior

relationship,”

such

as

the

military training at issue here, would “perhaps” be something to
consider

as

part

of

the

touch

and

concern

inquiry.

Oral

Argument at 34:44.
Whatever the extent of the relationship between Ali and the
U.S.

military,

purported

it

‘touch’

cannot
in

this

be

fairly

case

is

said

the

that

“[t]he

happenstance

of

only
Ali’s

after-acquired residence in the United States long after the
alleged events of abuse.”

Maj. Op. 16-17.

2

See George James, Somalia’s Overthrown Dictator, Mohammed
Siad Barre, Is Dead, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1995, at C41 (“Somalia
received military and economic aid from the United States for a
promise of American use of the port of Berbera on the Gulf of
Aden.
But aid declined drastically as allegations of human
rights abuses rose.”).
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III.
The

majority

today

allows

a

U.S.

resident

to

avoid

the

process of civil justice for allegedly “commit[ting] acts abroad
that would clearly be crimes if committed at home.”
States

v.

Bollinger,

798

F.3d

201,

219

(4th

United

Cir.

2015)

(upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) under
the Foreign Commerce Clause).
holding

“could

standing

in

undoubtedly

the

world,

The precedential effect of this
have

broad

potentially

even commercial relationships.”

ramifications

our

diplomatic

disrupting

on

and

Id.

It is not the extraterritorial application of the ATS in
the

instant

foreign

case

policy,”

that
but

“risks

interference

rather,

providing

in

United
haven

safe

States
to

an

individual who allegedly committed numerous atrocities abroad.
Maj. Op. 12.
“[t]he

individual

States.”
Partial

This was the case in Filartiga, where, as here,

Suppl.
Supp.

of

torturer
Br.

for

was

found

United

Affirmance

at

residing

States
4,

as

Kiobel

in

the

Amicus
v.

Curiae

Royal

Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).

United
in

Dutch

These are

“circumstances that could give rise to the prospect that this
country

would

be

perceived

as

harboring

the

perpetrator,”

thereby “seriously damag[ing] the credibility of our nation’s
commitment

to

the

protection

of

human

rights.”

Id.

at

19

(citing Mem. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-23,
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Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. 1979) (No. 79-6090)).
Such concerns are precisely what led the United States, writing
as amicus in Kiobel, to conclude that “allowing suits based on
conduct

occurring

in

a

foreign

country

in

the

circumstances

presented in Filartiga is consistent with the foreign relations
interests

of

the

United

respect for human rights.”
Partial

Supp.

of

States,

including

the

promotion

of

Suppl. Br. for the United States in

Affirmance

at

4-5,

Kiobel,

133

S. Ct.

1659

(2013) (No. 10-1491).
The ATS has not been completely abrogated by Kiobel.
still a statute, and Congress meant something by it.

It is

The fact

that the alleged torts occurred outside our borders cannot be
the end of the story; what we are dealing with, after all, is
the Alien Tort Statute.
Ali is alleged to have committed gross human rights abuses,
for which he was deported from Canada, and is now a lawful
permanent resident.

The United States is the sole forum in

which he is amenable to suit.

The atrocious nature of these

allegations, the extensive contacts with the United States, and
the context of those contacts renders jurisdiction proper under
the ATS.

I would reverse the district court’s summary dismissal

of the ATS claims and find that Warfaa has pleaded sufficient
facts showing that his claim touches and concerns the territory

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of

the

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United

Filed: 02/01/2016

States.

I

Pg: 30 of 30

respectfully

majority’s holding on this issue.

30

dissent

from

the