Rebecca Groves v. Comm Workers of America

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:12-cv-03329-TMC. [999771531]. [14-1854]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1854

REBECCA GROVES; JONATHAN HADDEN,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA, Communication Workers of
America District 3; COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL
3702,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
AT&T MOBILITY LLC,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson.
Timothy M. Cain, District Judge.
(8:12−cv−03329−TMC)

Argued:

October 27, 2015

Decided:

March 10, 2016

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Keenan and Judge Wynn joined.

ARGUED: Jeffrey Parker Dunlaevy, STEPHENSON & MURPHY, LLC,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellants.
Tessa Addie-Lee
Warren, QUINN, CONNOR, WEAVER, DAVIES & ROUCO, LLP, Decatur,

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Georgia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Nancy Jo Thomason, Anderson,
South Carolina, for Appellees.

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DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
Section

301

of

the

Labor

Management

Relations

Act,

29

U.S.C. § 185, allows litigants to bring “[s]uits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization” in
federal district court.
his

employer

for

a

Usually, an employee who wants to sue
violation

of

a

collective

bargaining

agreement must first exhaust the contractual remedies in that
agreement.
(1965).

Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53
“The reasoning behind this rule is simple.

Federal

labor law policy favors adjustment by the parties of disputes
arising under a collective bargaining agreement.”

Amburgey v.

Consolidation Coal Co., 923 F.2d 27, 29 (4th Cir. 1991).
However, in a so-called hybrid § 301 action, an employee
may

forego

breached
employer

its

exhaustion
duty

violated

of
the

by

showing

fair

“both

representation

collective

1) that

the

and

2) that

bargaining

union
his

agreement.”

Thompson v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 276 F.3d 651, 656 (4th Cir.
2002). *
actions

A union breaches its duty of fair representation “if its
are

either

‘arbitrary,

*

discriminatory,

or

in

bad

While the employee must satisfy both prongs, he need not
sue both his employer and his union. DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983) (“The employee may, if he
chooses, sue one defendant and not the other; but the case he
must prove is the same whether he sues one, the other, or
both.”).

3

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faith.’”

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Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65,

67 (1991) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)).
Rebecca

Groves

and

Jonathan

Hadden

(collectively,

“Plaintiffs”) sued their employer, AT&T Mobility (“AT&T”); their
union, Communications Workers of America, District 3 (“CWA”);
and CWA’s local affiliate, Local 3702, under § 301.

Plaintiffs

alleged that AT&T breached their collective bargaining agreement
by wrongfully terminating Plaintiffs’ employment, and that CWA
and Local 3702 breached their duty of fair representation by
failing

to

inform

termination.

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs

and

of

a

AT&T

settlement
settled,

offer

and

for

the

that

district

court granted CWA and Local 3702’s motion for summary judgment.
Because we find that Plaintiffs’ allegations cannot form the
basis of a hybrid § 301 suit, we affirm.

I.
A.
Plaintiffs

began

working

for

AT&T

as

retail

consultants in Anderson, South Carolina, in December 2008.
became

members

“Union”).

of

CWA

and

Local

3702

(collectively,

sales
Both
the

On March 27, 2010, CWA, as the exclusive bargaining

representative

for

Plaintiffs,

entered

into

a

collective

bargaining agreement with AT&T that was effective until February
7, 2014.
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Article 7 of the agreement set out the required grievance
procedure

for

allegations

“that

an

employee

has

been

discharged . . . or otherwise disciplined without just cause.”
J.A. 35.

Any grievance not resolved or addressed “informally

with the first level of [m]anagement” had to be submitted by the
Union to AT&T in writing within forty-five days of “the action
complained

of.”

Id.

The

agreement

also

provided

that

“[f]ailure to submit or pursue a grievance under the conditions
and within the time and manner stated above shall be construed
to be a waiver by the employee and the Union of the formal
grievance.”

J.A. 36.

Where such waiver occurred, the Union

could only grieve by “appeal[ing] to arbitration and ask[ing]
the arbitrator to decide the timeliness issue before addressing
the merits.”

J.A. 47.

New employees received copies of the collective bargaining
agreement and were informed of their right to file grievances at
their orientations.

Both Plaintiffs attended an orientation.

Groves received a copy of the agreement, while Hadden does not
recall if he did.
Hadden and Groves were fired on May 31, and June 2, 2012,
respectively, for failing to meet sales goals after receiving
previous

disciplinary

warnings.

Neither

Hadden

nor

Groves

contacted the Union about the earlier warnings or about their
terminations

and

neither

filed
5

a

grievance.

AT&T

does

not

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notify the Union that it has fired a Union member; generally,
the

Union

learns

of

a

termination

only

when

the

employee

requests that the Union file a grievance.
On August 22, 2012, Steve Frost, the executive director of
labor relations at AT&T, emailed Betty Witte, CWA administrative
director, to explain that AT&T had discovered in July that the
reports from April and May 2012 that had led to the termination
of sixteen employees, including Plaintiffs, were flawed.

Frost

asked Witte to reach out to the affected employees to let them
know that AT&T was offering them a settlement of either $2,500
and reinstatement, or $5,000 without reinstatement.

He asked

for a response by August 31.
Witte

forwarded

representative

for

this

CWA.

email
On

to

August

Gerald
24,

Souder,

Souder

a

staff

forwarded

the

email to Les Powell, the president of Local 3702, asking him to
contact Plaintiffs, and noting “[t]here may or may not be . . .
a grievance filed.”

J.A. 115.

Souder emailed Powell again on

September 19 because he had received no response.
Local 3702 had membership cards for Plaintiffs with their
contact information, but Powell admits that he made no attempt
to contact Plaintiffs because they had not filed grievances or
otherwise communicated with the Union.

Souder attested that he

was “under the impression Local 3702 had been unable to contact

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Plaintiffs,”

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J.A.

45,

but

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Powell

stated

that

he

never

told

Souder that he could not locate Plaintiffs.
Groves later learned of the settlement offers independently
and informed Hadden.
only

the

table.

$5,000

Both contacted Souder, who told them that

offer

without

reinstatement

remained

on

the

Plaintiffs each expressed a preference for reinstatement

and a desire to file a grievance.

Souder responded that there

was no provision for filing a grievance beyond the forty-fiveday limit.
B.
Plaintiffs sued AT&T and the Union under § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, alleging that AT&T
breached the collective bargaining agreement by firing them on
the basis of faulty data, and that the Union breached the duty
of

fair

representation

settlement offers.

by

failing

to

inform

them

of

the

Plaintiffs settled with AT&T, and they were

reinstated to their former positions in March 2013.
Plaintiffs

moved

for

partial

summary

judgment

liability, and the Union moved for summary judgment.
hearing,

the

district

court

granted the Union’s motion.

denied

Plaintiffs’

as

to

After a

motion

and

The court held that a threshold

requirement for a § 301 action was to establish that the Union
“breached [its] duty so as to prevent Plaintiffs from exhausting
their claims under the [collective bargaining agreement] against
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AT&T.”

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Groves v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 8:12-3329-TMC, 2014 WL

3809665,

at

*

3

(D.S.C.

Aug.

1,

2014).

Because

Plaintiffs

“argue[d] only that the Union[] failed to timely notify them of
the

settlement

breached

a

before

duty

it

of

fair

expired”—and

not

representation

that

in

“the

regard

grievances”—Plaintiffs failed to meet that threshold.

Union

to

any

Id.

This appeal followed.

II.
The central question raised by this appeal is whether a
hybrid
conduct

§ 301

suit

that,

can

though

properly

obstructive,

be

used

did

to

not

challenge

contribute

union
to

the

employees’ failure to exhaust their contractual remedies for the
employer’s conduct.

Because such use would extend the hybrid

§ 301 suit beyond its logical scope, we hold that it cannot.
A.
We review a district court’s grant or denial of summary
judgment de novo.
395

(4th

Cir.

Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 789 F.3d 389,

2015),

cert.

denied

136

S.

Ct.

897

(2016).

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, id., “there is no
genuine

dispute

as

to

any

material

fact

and

the

movant

is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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B.
The hybrid § 301 action exists to avoid the “unacceptable
injustice”
exhaust

that

his

would

occur

contractual

if

an

remedies

employee
even

were

though

required
“the

to

union

representing the employee in the grievance/arbitration procedure
act[ed]

in

such

perfunctory

a

discriminatory,

fashion

representation.”

as

to

dishonest,

breach

its

arbitrary,
duty

of

or
fair

DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462

U.S. 151, 164 (1983).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly framed the hybrid § 301
action as a solution to that specific injustice: an employee
unable to exhaust contractual remedies because of his union’s
breach of the duty of fair representation.
Sipes,

the

Court

held

that

an

“employee

Thus, in Vaca v.
may

seek

judicial

enforcement of his contractual rights” where “the union has sole
power under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the
grievance

procedure,

and

if . . . the

employee-plaintiff

has

been prevented from exhausting his contractual remedies by the
union’s wrongful refusal to process the grievance.”
185.

386 U.S. at

Similarly, in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., the

Court explained that because the contractual remedies for an
employer’s mistreatment of an individual employee are “at least
in their final stages controlled by union and employer,” the
hybrid

§ 301

action

provides

an
9

alternative

remedy

in

cases

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where the union “refuse[s] to utilize [the contractual remedies]
or,

if

it

does

[utilize

them],

discriminatorily or in bad faith.”
Our

sister

circuits

have

assertedly

[does]

so

424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976).
placed

express

and

implied

limitations on the use of the hybrid § 301 action that align
with that understanding of its purpose.
and

Sixth

Circuits

both

hybrid § 301 claims.
F.3d

211,

221

have

causal

For example, the First
nexus

requirements

for

See Blesedell v. Chillicothe Tel. Co., 811

(6th

Cir.

2016)

(“In

addition

to

proving

arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad-faith conduct, a hybrid-claim
plaintiff must prove that a union’s actions or omissions ‘more
than likely affected’ the outcome of the grievance procedure.”
(quoting Dushaw v. Roadway Express, Inc., 66 F.3d 129, 132 (6th
Cir. 1995))); Mulvihill v. Top-Flite Golf Co., 335 F.3d 15, 20
(1st Cir. 2003) (“To reach this [hybrid § 301] safe harbor, the
claimant must prove an erroneous discharge, a breach of duty on
the union’s part, and a causal nexus between the two, that is,
‘that [the] union’s breach of its duty “seriously undermine[d]
the

integrity

of

the

[grievance]

process.”’”

(alterations

in

original) (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451
U.S. 56, 61 (1981))).
hybrid
breached

§ 301
its

actions
duty

of

The Second Circuit has repeatedly defined
as
fair

involving

claims

representation

in

employee’s] grievance against the employer.”
10

“that

the

redressing

union
[the

White v. White

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Rose Food, 128 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1997); see also McKee v.
Transco Prods., Inc., 874 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1989) (“A hybrid
[§ 301] case is one in which the employee has a cause of action
against both the employer and the union. . . . The claim against
the

union

is

that

the

union

did

not

properly

represent

the

employee in pressing his grievance against the employer.”).
C.
Consistent with these cases, we hold that a hybrid § 301
claim requires an allegation that the union’s breach of its duty
of

fair

representation

played

some

role

in

failure to exhaust his contractual remedies.

the

employee’s

This understanding

of the hybrid § 301 claim best accords with the Supreme Court’s
articulation of the claim’s purpose, and our sister circuits’
limitations on the claim.

To hold otherwise would transform the

hybrid § 301 suit from a safeguard for wronged employees whose
unions fail to assert the employees’ rights, to a tool to bypass
the normal exhaustion rule for claims against an employer, any
time

employees

also

have

some

unrelated

claim

against

their

union.
Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that the Union’s conduct
prevented

them

from

grieving

their

collective bargaining agreement.

terminations

under

the

And because Plaintiffs did not

file a grievance with the Union, the Union did not know that
Plaintiffs

were

terminated—and
11

therefore

did

not

have

an

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opportunity to discover that AT&T’s data was flawed—until after
the contractual period for filing a grievance had passed.

The

Union’s failure to contact Plaintiffs regarding the settlement
offers

was

irresponsible

at

best,

and

certainly

prevented

Plaintiffs from accepting AT&T’s original reinstatement offer.
However, having waived their right to grieve, Plaintiffs were
not

entitled

to

that

offer

under

the

collective

bargaining

agreement, and the Union’s conduct therefore had nothing to do
with

their

failure

to

vindicate

their

rights

through

the

contractually designated procedures.
Plaintiffs contend that because they told the Union they
wanted to file grievances as soon as they learned about the
faulty

data,

contractual

they

“were

remedies

as

Appellants’ Br. at 16.
terms

of

the

as

diligent

in

pursuing

they

possibly

could

their

have

been.”

This is, at base, a complaint about the

collective

bargaining

agreement,

which

requires

grievances to be filed within forty-five days “of the action
complained

of,”

and

does

not

have

any

provision

for

tolling

where the underlying facts were unknown or undiscoverable.

J.A.

35.

Plaintiffs do not allege the Union breached its duty of

fair

representation

in

negotiating

the

collective

bargaining

agreement, and they thus are bound by its terms.
We do not decide today that an employee must always have
attempted to grieve before he can bring a hybrid § 301 claim.
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In a case where an employee’s failure to invoke the grievance
process was caused by the union’s breach of the duty of fair
representation, a hybrid § 301 claim might well be viable.
simply

hold

union’s

that

breach

there

must

be

its

duty

of

of

some

causal

fair

nexus

We

between

representation

and

a
an

employee’s failure to exhaust contractual remedies.
Our

holding

is

consistent

with

those

cases

that

have

allowed a hybrid § 301 claim involving a union’s breach of the
duty of fair representation in its negotiation or amendment of
the collective bargaining agreement.

See Lewis v. Tuscan Dairy

Farms, Inc., 25 F.3d 1138 (2d Cir. 1994); Adkins v. Int’l Union
of Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers, 769 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1985).
In such cases, the employees are not attacking specific actions
by the employers as inconsistent with the collective bargaining
agreement, but rather the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement itself and the union’s role in crafting it.

Where

that occurs, the union’s breach would be causally connected to
the

employee’s

failure

to

exhaust,

because

requiring

the

employee to exhaust the allegedly flawed contract’s remedies,
controlled

by

the

allegedly

“unacceptable injustice.”

breaching

union,

would

be

an

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164.

We hasten to add that our decision does not leave employees
without

a

remedy

on

these

facts,

as

Plaintiffs

could

have

brought a stand-alone breach of the duty of fair representation
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claim against the Union.

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See O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 67 (“[T]he

rule announced in [Vaca]—that a union breaches its duty of fair
representation

if

discriminatory,

or

activity . . . .”

its
in

actions
bad

(quoting

are

either

faith’—applies

386

U.S.

at

190));

‘arbitrary,

to

all

union

Breininger

v.

Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67,
86-87

(1989)

independently

(“The
from

duty
the

of

grant

fair

representation . . .

under . . .

the

[National

arises
Labor

Relations Act] . . . of the union’s exclusive power to represent
all employees in a particular bargaining unit.

It serves as a

‘bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals
stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of
federal labor law.’” (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182)).

III.
Because the undisputed facts make it clear that any breach
of the Union’s duty of fair representation did not contribute to
Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their contractual remedies, we
affirm the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED

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