Hernan Hernandez-Zavala v. Eric Holder, Jr.

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: A205-208-520. [999703269]. [14-1878]

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 1 of 19

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1878

HERNAN HERNANDEZ-ZAVALA, a/k/a Herman Hernandez,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.

Argued:

September 15, 2015

Decided:

November 20, 2015

Before DUNCAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Petition for review denied by published opinion.
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Floyd and
Hamilton joined.

Judge Duncan
Senior Judge

ARGUED: William Robinson Heroy, GOODMAN, CARR PLLC, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Petitioner.
Briena Lorraine Strippoli,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent.
ON BRIEF: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, Blair T. O’Connor, Assistant
Director, Edward C. Durant, Office of Immigration Litigation,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent.

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 2 of 19

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Hernan Hernandez-Zavala petitions for review of the Board
of

Immigration

Appeal’s

(“BIA’s”)

order

affirming

the

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) pretermission of Hernandez-Zavala’s
application for cancellation of removal.
substantial

evidence

in

the

record

The BIA concluded that

indicated

that

Hernandez-

Zavala had committed a “crime of domestic violence” as defined
under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
found

that

cancellation
§ 1229b(b).

Hernandez-Zavala
of

removal

was

under

Given this, the BIA

statutorily
INA

§

ineligible

240A(b),

8

for

U.S.C.

For the reasons set forth below, we deny Hernandez-

Zavala’s petition.

I.
On March 8, 2012, Hernandez-Zavala, a native and citizen of
Mexico,

was

charged

North Carolina law.

with

several

misdemeanor

offenses

under

On March 21, 2012, he pleaded guilty in the

District Court of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, to the
offense of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(1).

That statute provides as follows:

Unless the conduct is covered under some other
provision of law providing greater punishment, any
person who commits any assault, assault and battery,
or affray is guilty of a Class A1 misdemeanor if, in
the course of the assault, assault and battery, or
2

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 3 of 19

affray, he or she: (1) Inflicts serious injury upon
another person or uses a deadly weapon . . . .

N.C.

Gen.

Stat.

§

14-33(c)(1).

This

offense

covers

general

assault and battery; it does not specifically cover incidents of
domestic violence or require proof of a domestic relationship.
In this case, it is undisputed that the victim of the assault
was

a

woman

“partner,”

Hernandez-Zavala
with

whom

described

he

resides

the

in

and

Department

his

brief

shares

as

a

his

child.

Petitioner’s Br. at 4.
On
(“DHS”)

March

9,

served

2012,

Hernandez-Zavala

with

of
a

Homeland
Notice

to

Security
Appear.

Because Hernandez-Zavala had been neither admitted nor paroled
when

he

entered

the

removability
8 U.S.C.

United

States,

under

DHS

INA

1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

charged

him

with

§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i),

Hernandez-Zavala

conceded

removability and applied for cancellation of removal. 1
On

February

4,

2013,

DHS

moved

to

pretermit

Hernandez-

Zavala’s application, asserting that he had been convicted of a

1

Pursuant to the INA, “[t]he Attorney General may cancel
removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible
or deportable from the United States if the alien” satisfies
certain criteria.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
One such criterion
is that the noncitizen must not have been convicted of any of
the criminal offenses enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). See
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).

3

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 4 of 19

“crime of domestic violence” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
Under

this

provision,

“[a]ny

alien

who

at

any

time

after

admission is convicted of a crime of domestic violence . . . is
deportable.”

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

The same provision

defines a “crime of domestic violence” as
any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of
title 18) against a person committed by a current or
former spouse of the person, by an individual with
whom the person shares a child in common, by an
individual who is cohabiting with or has cohabited
with the person as a spouse, by an individual
similarly situated to a spouse of the person under the
domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction
where the offense occurs, or by any other individual
against
a
person
who
is
protected
from
that
individual’s
acts under
the
domestic
or
family
violence laws of the United States or any State,
Indian tribal government, or unit of local government.

Id.

Asserting that Hernandez-Zavala had committed such a crime,

DHS argued that he was therefore ineligible for cancellation of
removal

under

8

U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(C).

Hernandez-Zavala

contested this assertion, claiming that his assault conviction
does not constitute a “crime of domestic violence.”
On March 18, 2013, the IJ granted DHS’s motion to pretermit
Hernandez-Zavala’s

application

for

cancellation

of

removal.

Applying 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), the IJ first determined
that the offense for which Hernandez-Zavala was convicted was
categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, a
finding that Hernandez-Zavala does not challenge on appeal.

4

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Next,

Filed: 11/20/2015

the

IJ

Pg: 5 of 19

considered

whether

the

North

Carolina

conviction was a “crime of domestic violence” under the INA.
The

IJ

considered

the

offense

of

conviction

as

well

as

the

underlying evidence and found that Hernandez-Zavala’s conviction
constituted a “crime of domestic violence” under both a modified
categorical approach and a circumstance-specific approach.
IJ

thus

concluded

that

Hernandez-Zavala

was

The

statutorily

ineligible for cancellation of removal.
On

April

decision

to

8,

the

2013,
BIA,

Hernandez-Zavala

arguing

that

the

appealed
IJ

the

should

IJ’s

not

have

considered any underlying evidence and that his conviction was
not

categorically

§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

a

disqualifying

offense

under

He did not contest the IJ’s finding with

respect to his domestic relationship with his victim.

The BIA,

adopting the circumstance-specific approach, concluded that the
IJ properly found that Hernandez-Zavala’s conviction constituted
a

“crime

ineligible

of
for

domestic

violence,”

cancellation

of

rendering
removal.

him

statutorily

Hernandez-Zavala

subsequently filed a petition for review with this court.

II.
The question presented in this case is a purely legal one:
whether a conviction under a state law that does not have a
domestic

relationship

as

an

element
5

of

the

offense

can

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

constitute

Filed: 11/20/2015

a

“crime

§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

of

Pg: 6 of 19

domestic

violence”

under

8

U.S.C.

This is a matter of first impression in

this circuit.
On appeal from the BIA, this court reviews legal questions
de novo.

Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2011).

Where, as here, “the BIA and the immigration judge both issue
decisions

in

a

case,

we

review

both

decisions

upon

appeal.”

Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 239-40 (4th Cir. 2009).

This

court has jurisdiction over this petition for review pursuant to
INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).

A.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), a “crime of domestic
violence” has two requirements: it must be a “crime of violence”
as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16, and the crime must have been
committed by an individual who was in a domestic relationship
with the victim.
There is no dispute in this case that Hernandez-Zavala’s
North

Carolina

assault

conviction

constitutes

a

“crime

of

violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 2 or that Hernandez-Zavala was in a

2

A “crime of violence” is “an offense that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another,” or “any other
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or
(Continued)
6

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 7 of 19

domestic relationship with his victim.
whether

the

must be

an

domestic
element

relationship
of

the

The only question is

requirement

underlying

offense

in
of

the

statute

conviction,

triggering the categorical approach, or if it must merely be an
attendant circumstance of the underlying conviction, triggering
the circumstance-specific approach.
Hernandez-Zavala

argues

that

the

categorical

approach

should apply, while DHS argues that the circumstance-specific
approach should apply.
only

look

to

the

Under the categorical approach, one need

statutory

definition

of

the

North

Carolina

offense to see if it contains the necessary elements of a “crime
of domestic violence” under the INA.

If the elements do not

correspond, the inquiry stops there.

Under the “circumstance-

specific”

approach,

evidence

of

the

the

court

conviction

may
to

also

consider

determine

if

underlying
a

domestic

relationship existed between Hernandez-Zavala and his victim.

B.
To determine which approach should apply, we first consider
the previous uses of, and the rationales behind, the categorical
approach

and

the

circumstance-specific

approach.

We

then

property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16.
7

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 8 of 19

address the specific “crime of domestic violence” provision at
issue in this petition.

We conclude that when assessing whether

an underlying state conviction qualifies as a crime of domestic
violence under the INA, the use of the circumstance-specific
approach is proper in determining whether the requisite domestic
relationship

existed.

Accordingly,

we

find

that

Hernandez-

Zavala’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon against a
woman

with

constitutes

whom
a

he

“crime

was

in

of

a

domestic

domestic

relationship

violence,”

indeed

rendering

him

ineligible for cancellation of removal.
1.
Although the categorical approach had its beginnings in the
criminal context, it has “a long pedigree” in immigration law.
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1685 (2013).

It is

“[r]ooted in Congress’ specification of conviction, not conduct,
as

the

trigger

for

immigration

consequences.”

Mellouli

v.

Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1986 (2015).
Under the categorical approach, “we look not to the facts
of the particular prior case, but instead to whether the state
statute
within

defining
the

crime.

‘generic’

crime

of

federal

conviction
definition

categorically
of

a

fits

corresponding”

Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684 (quoting Gonzales v.

Duenas-Alvarez,
omitted).

the

549

U.S.

183,

186

(2007))(quotation

marks

The Court clarified that “[b]y ‘generic,’ we mean the
8

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 9 of 19

offenses must be viewed in the abstract, to see whether the
state

statute

shares

the

nature

serves as a point of comparison.”

of

the

federal

offense

that

Id.

A generic federal offense and a state offense categorically
match “only if a conviction of the state offense ‘necessarily’
involved . . . facts
offense].”
24

Id.

equating

to

[the]

generic

[federal

(quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13,

(2005))(quotation

marks

omitted)(alterations

in

original).

Consequently, we make no factual inquiry into the particular
circumstances of the conviction. 3
This

approach

judicial

and

is

a

practical

administrative

Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1986.
one,

designed

efficiency

by

to

“promote[]

precluding

the

relitigation of past convictions in minitrials conducted long
after the fact.”

Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1690.

3

At times, the statute under which the defendant was
convicted may be “divisible”--that is, it may “set[] out one or
more elements of the offense in the alternative.”
Descamps v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).
Under those
circumstances, the sentencing court or the immigration judge may
“consult a limited class of documents, such as indictments and
jury instructions, to determine which alternative formed the
basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” Id. The sentencing
court or the IJ then proceeds to the traditional categorical
approach, and “compare[s] the elements of the crime of
conviction (including the alternative element used in the case)
with the elements of the generic crime.” Id.
Because “the dispute here does not concern any list of
alternative elements,” but rather concerns the total absence of
an element from the state offense, the modified categorical
approach “has no role to play in this case.” Id. at 2285.
9

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 10 of 19

2.
When

the

federal

statute

does

not

describe

a

generic

offense, but instead “refer[s] to the specific acts in which an
offender

engaged

on

a

specific

occasion,”

specific approach is appropriate.
29, 34 (2009).

the

circumstance-

Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S.

Under this approach, while the congruence of the

elements of the underlying offense and the offense described in
the

federal

statute

approach,

courts

necessary

must

may

attendant

be

assessed

consider

other

circumstances

using

the

evidence

existed.

to

categorical
see

the

e.g.,

See,

if

id.

at 38, 42-43.
In Nijhawan v. Holder, the Supreme Court for the first time
applied

the

context.

circumstance-specific

approach

in

the

immigration

There, the Court considered another criminal offense

enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), that, like the one here,
renders an individual ineligible for cancellation of removal.
An

“aggravated

includes
which

“an

the

felony,”

offense

loss

to

defined

that . . . involves

the

victim

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).
that

definition’s

referring

to

a

elsewhere

loss

or

fraud

victims

the
or

statute,
deceit

exceeds

in

$10,000.”

The issue in Nijhawan was whether

requirement

generic

in

crime,

should

be

triggering

interpreted
the

as

categorical

approach, or whether it should be interpreted as “referring to
the specific way in which an offender committed the crime on a
10

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 11 of 19

specific

occasion,”

triggering

approach.

the

“circumstance-specific”

Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 34.

The Court found that the provision in question triggered
the

circumstance-specific

phrasing

and

in

part

approach

in

because

“to

part

because

apply

a

of

its

categorical

approach . . . would leave [the provision] with little, if any,
meaningful application.”

Id. at 39.

The Court emphasized that

it had “found no widely applicable federal fraud statute that
contains a relevant monetary loss threshold.”

Id.

Further, at

the time the law was passed, only eight states had statutes that
would have had a relevant threshold if subparagraph (M)(i) were
interpreted under the categorical approach.
Concluding

that

Congress

would

Id. at 40.
not

have

designed

subparagraph (M)(i) “to apply in so limited and so haphazard a
manner,”

the

Court

held

that

the

meant to be applied categorically.
“to

the

specific

circumstances

monetary

threshold

was

not

Instead, courts must look
surrounding

an

offender’s

commission of a fraud and deceit crime on a specific occasion.”
Id.
In Moncrieffe, the Court provided additional guidance for
when courts could deviate from the categorical approach and use
the circumstance-specific approach outlined in Nijhawan.

The

Court noted that the monetary threshold at issue in Nijhawan was
“a

limitation,

written

into

the
11

INA

itself.”

Moncrieffe,

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

133 S. Ct. at 1691.
proper,”
facts

Congress

found

in

Pg: 12 of 19

By “[l]ocating this exception in the INA

indicated
immigration

“an

intent

to

have

proceedings.”

the

Id.

relevant

The

Court

contrasted this with situations in which “the INA incorporates
other

criminal

refer

to

applies.”

statutes

generic
Id.

wholesale,”

crimes,’

to

which

in

which

the

case

“it

categorical

‘must

approach

(quoting Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 37).

In United States v. Hayes, the Court considered a criminal
statute with nearly identical statutory text to the provision
before us.

555 U.S. 415 (2009).

There, the Court interpreted

the definition of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” for
the purposes of a firearm possession ban in the Gun Control Act
of

1968,

18

U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(9).

This

term

is

defined

in

18 U.S.C. § 921 as an offense that
has, as an element, the use or attempted use of
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly
weapon, committed by a current or former spouse,
parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person
who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the
victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or
guardian of the victim.

18

U.S.C.

§

921(a)(33)(A)(ii).

Although

Hayes

arose

in

the

criminal context rather than in the immigration context, we find
its reasoning instructive.

12

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 13 of 19

The Court considered whether, for the conviction to trigger
the possession ban, the underlying conviction must include as an
element the existence of a domestic relationship between the
victim and the aggressor.
ultimately

concluded

Hayes, 555 U.S. at 418.

that

the

relationship

denominated an element of the predicate offense.”

The Court

“need

not

be

Id. at 426.

Again, the Court looked to the language Congress used and
to the purpose of the law.

It reasoned that because Congress

had used the singular form of the word “element” in the text,
this “suggest[ed] that Congress intended to describe only one
required element.”
manner

in

Id. at 421.

which

relationship

the

with

The Court found that “[t]he

offender

the

acts,

victim,

are

and

the

offender’s

conceptually

distinct

attributes.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
term

“element”

immediately

precedes

the

use

The

of

force

requirement, not the domestic relationship requirement.

Thus,

the Court ultimately concluded that, “[h]ad Congress meant to
make

the

latter

predicate

as

offense,
it

well
it

as

the

likely

‘elements,’

as

has

provisions.”

done

former

would
in

an

have

element
used

other

the

of

the

plural

offense-defining

Id. at 421-22.

Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that at the time the
statute
criminal

was

passed,

statutes

“only

about

that

specifically
13

one-third

of

the

proscribed

States

had

domestic

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

violence.”
states

Filed: 11/20/2015

Id. at 427.

that

did

Pg: 14 of 19

The Court further found that even in

have

laws

specifically

against

domestic

violence, “domestic abuses were (and are) routinely prosecuted
under

generally

applicable

assault

or

battery

laws.”

Id.

Therefore, to hold that the categorical approach should apply
would “would frustrate Congress’ manifest purpose.”

Id.

C.
Because

of

the

statutory

structure,

the

Supreme

Court’s

holding in Hayes, and practical considerations, we conclude that
the circumstance-specific approach should apply in this case.
First,
Nijhawan

was

Moncrieffe,
relationship

just
“a
133

as

the

monetary

limitation[]
S.

Ct.

component

at

threshold

written
1691,

here.

so

This

requirement

in

into

the

INA

itself,”

too

is

the

domestic

provision

of

the

INA

incorporated by reference the definition of the generic “crime
of

violence”

“wholesale.”

under
Id.

18

U.S.C.

§

16,

but

it

did

not

do

so

Rather, it limited deportation consequences

to a certain class of offenders.

Under this provision, a crime

of violence is a deportable offense only when “committed by”
someone in a domestic relationship with the victim.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

Further,

as

the

Court

has

8 U.S.C.
previously

remarked, when Congress “[l]ocat[es] [an] exception in the INA
proper,” it indicates its “intent to have the relevant facts

14

Appeal: 14-1878

found

Doc: 35

in

Filed: 11/20/2015

immigration

Pg: 15 of 19

proceedings.”

Moncrieffe,

133

S.

Ct.

at 1691.
Second, we find the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
nearly

identical

statutory

text

in

Hayes

to

be

instructive.

Hernandez-Zavala primarily relies on one distinction between the
statute at issue in Hayes and the relevant statute in his case:
“the use of the word ‘element.’” Petitioner’s Br. at 16.
He argues that the conclusion in Hayes hinged on Congress’s
use of the singular form of “element.”

Therefore, in his view,

the absence of the word “element” from § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) should
result in the opposite conclusion here.
does

appear

reference
18

U.S.C.

offense

in

in
§

that

the
16
has

§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i):

it

is

of

“crime

of

“crime

of

definition
(defining
as

an

But the word “element”

element

the

incorporated
violence.”

violence”
use,

to

See

mean

attempted

by

use,

“an
or

threatened use of physical force against the person or property
of another” (emphasis added)).

It is thus even more clear in

the INA than in the statute at issue in Hayes that the term
“element” applies only to the use of force requirement.
Finally,

the

practical

considerations

described

in

Hayes

support the conclusion that Congress did not intend to require
the

domestic

underlying

relationship

offense.

component

Congress

to

passed

be
the

an

element

INA’s

of

“crime

the
of

domestic violence” provision in 1996, the same year it passed
15

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 16 of 19

§ 922(g)(9), the statute at issue in Hayes.

Just as in Hayes,

to construe this statute as requiring the domestic relationship
to

be

an

element

of

the

underlying

offense

“would

frustrate

Congress’ manifest purpose,” given that the law “would have been
‘a dead letter’ in some two-thirds of the States from the very
moment of its enactment.”
The

practical

Hayes, 555 U.S. at 427.

considerations

listed

by

this

court

in

Prudencio v. Holder also weigh in favor of the circumstancespecific approach.

669 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 2012).

In Prudencio,

which concerned the applicability of the circumstance-specific
approach to the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude,” we
observed

that

the

monetary

threshold

Nijhawan is an “objective” one.

criterion

at

issue

in

The determination of amount of

loss “requires no interpretation whatsoever,” with an inquiry
“involv[ing] only the inspection of a single threshold fact.”
Prudencio, 669 F.3d at 483.
turpitude,”

however,

The phrase “crime involving moral

involves

a

determination

that

“could

require evaluation of all the evidence in an underlying criminal
case

by

an

proceedings.”

adjudicator
Id.

Thus,

wholly
while

unfamiliar
the

with

those

circumstance-specific

approach was appropriate in Nijhawan, it was not appropriate in
Prudencio.
Our

“very

real

evidentiary

concerns”

in

Prudencio

surrounding such “unbridled evaluation” are not present in this
16

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

case.

Id.

noncitizen
domestic

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 17 of 19

The inquiry that must be made here--whether the
and

the

victim

of

the

relationship--involves

threshold

fact.

straightforward
adjudicator
conclusion.

will

This
and
have

the

conduct

offense

inspection

determination

objective,
to

prior

reducing
a

were

of

a

in

a

single

will

often

be

fears

that

the

“minitrial”

to

reach

a

As the Court noted in Hayes, “generally . . . it

would entail no elaborate factfinding process . . . to determine
whether the victim of a violent assault was the perpetrator’s
‘current or former spouse’ or bore one of the other domestic
relationships.”

555 U.S. at 427 n.9 (citations omitted).

Our reasoning is in accord with our only sister circuit to
have addressed this issue after the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Hayes and Nijhawan.

In Bianco v. Holder, the Fifth Circuit

similarly concluded that the domestic relationship component in
the INA’s definition of a “crime of domestic violence” did not
need to be an element of the underlying offense.

624 F.3d 265,

272 (5th Cir. 2010).
Although the Fifth Circuit gave “respectful consideration”
to the Ninth Circuit’s 2004 interpretation of this statute in
Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2004), the court
concluded that it must “view that court’s analysis in light of
two subsequent Supreme Court decisions that arguably opened the
door to a new ‘circumstance-specific’ approach.”
17

Id. at 270.

Appeal: 14-1878

Doc: 35

We agree.

Filed: 11/20/2015

Pg: 18 of 19

Although the Ninth Circuit has continued to favorably

cite Tokatly following Hayes and Nijhawan, see, e.g., OlivasMotta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2013), we do not
find Tokatly’s reasoning persuasive given the Supreme Court’s
subsequent holdings.
Our conclusion today does not conflict with our previous
assessment

that

Nijhawan

does

not

“permit[]

an

unrestricted

circumstance-specific inquiry in the absence of express guidance
from

Congress.”

relationship
which

Prudencio,

requirement

“Congress

669

falls

modified

F.3d

within

the

at

483.

the

generic

The

narrow

domestic

category

in

crime . . . with

a

qualifying phrase that requires a fact-specific review.”

Id.

As the Fifth Circuit concluded in Bianco, “the categorical and
modified categorical approaches remain the analysis in the areas
of

their

traditional

application,

including

a

court’s

application of those approaches to identifying the elements of
offenses

for

which

Section 1227(a)(2).”

aliens

may

be

removed

under

624 F.3d at 273.

III.
In conclusion, we affirm the BIA’s decision because we find
that

Hernandez-Zavala’s

conviction

for

assault

with

a

deadly

weapon, committed against someone with whom he had a domestic
relationship, renders him ineligible for cancellation of removal
18

Appeal: 14-1878

under

Doc: 35

8

U.S.C.

Filed: 11/20/2015

§ 1229b(b).

Pg: 19 of 19

For

the

reasons

stated

above,

Hernandez-Zavala’s petition for review is
DENIED.

19