Steve Smith v. N. Murphy
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 0:11-cv-02395-JFA. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999703437]. [14-1918, 14-2208]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1918
STEVE RANDALL SMITH,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
N. C. MURPHY; CHARLES GRANT; T. J. MURPHY; ALEX UNDERWOOD,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
JAMIE MITCHELL; RICHARD SMITH,
Defendants.
No. 14-2208
STEVE RANDALL SMITH,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
N. C. MURPHY; CHARLES GRANT; T. J. MURPHY; ALEX UNDERWOOD,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Rock Hill.
Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (0:11-cv-02395-JFA)
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Submitted:
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September 30, 2015
Decided:
November 20, 2015
Before KING, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew F. Lindemann, Robert D. Garfield, Steven R. Spreeuwers,
DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellants/Cross-Appellees. J. Christopher Mills, J. CHRISTOPHER
MILLS, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee/CrossAppellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
These
consolidated
appeals
are
cross-appeals
from
the
partial grant of summary judgment in favor of Torrey Murphy,
Charles Grant, William Murphy, and Alex Underwood * (collectively,
“Defendants”).
In his complaint, Steve Randall Smith alleged
that Defendants falsely arrested him and used excessive force
against
him,
in
violation
appeal,
Defendants
of
contend
42
that
U.S.C.
the
§
1983
district
(2012).
court
On
erred
in
holding that they were not entitled to qualified immunity from
Smith’s
excessive
contends
that
the
judgment
against
force
claim.
district
his
In
court
false
his
cross-appeal,
erroneously
arrest
claim
granted
because
Smith
summary
Defendants
lacked probable cause to arrest him.
This court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012).
permit
an
appeal
from
an
order
that
A district court may
“involves
a
controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference
of
opinion”
and
from
which
immediate
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”
appeal
Id.
“may
This
court “may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be
taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
*
Underwood is the Sheriff of Chester County, and was sued
under South Carolina law in his official capacity.
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days after the entry of the order.”
Id.
discretion,
“applies
certified
this
to
court’s
the
court
jurisdiction
of
appeals,
and
In exercising its
is
to
not
the
tied
particular question formulated by the district court.”
order
to
the
Yamaha
Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996).
In
this
case,
at
Smith’s
request,
the
district
court
certified its summary judgment order for immediate appeal under
§
1292(b).
This
permission
to
cross-appeals,
court
granted
appeal.
we
have
Smith’s
timely
request
in
these
consolidated
over
“any
Therefore,
jurisdiction
included within the certified order.”
issue
for
fairly
Yamaha Motor Corp., 516
U.S. at 205.
Turning to the merits, we review the grant or denial of
summary
judgment
de
novo.
Cloaninger ex
rel.
Estate
Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
of
All
facts and reasonable inferences are viewed “in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.”
Dulaney v. Packaging Corp.
of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012).
Summary judgment is
only appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
allegations
evidence
in
do
not
suffice,
support
of
nor
[the
4
“Conclusory or speculative
does
a
non-moving
mere
scintilla
party’s]
of
case.”
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Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
First,
we
consider
Defendants’
claim
that
the
district
court should have granted summary judgment on Smith’s excessive
force
claim
immunity.
because
Defendants
Initially,
were
Defendants
entitled
claim
to
that
qualified
no
clearly
established right prevented them from exercising force to take
Smith to the ground, place him in handcuffs, or restrain him,
where he actively resisted arrest.
Qualified immunity protects all government officials except
those who violate a “statutory or constitutional right that was
clearly
established
at
the
time
of
the
challenged
Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350 (2014).
conduct.”
Determining
whether qualified immunity is appropriate is a two-step inquiry.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
First, courts consider
“whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the
facts alleged.”
right
was
Id. at 200.
clearly
Second, courts ask whether that
established
at
the
time
of
the
alleged
violation, such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Id. at 202.
Courts have the discretion to decide which of the
steps to address first, based on the facts and circumstances of
the
case
at
hand.
Pearson
v.
(2009).
5
Callahan,
555
U.S.
223,
236
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A
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right
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is
clearly
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established
only
if
“a
reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.”
Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 350. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
While “a case directly on point” is not required,
“existing
precedent
must
have
placed
constitutional question beyond debate.”
the
statutory
or
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011).
Relevant to this case, “[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibition
on
unreasonable
seizures
bars
police
officers
excessive force to seize a free citizen.”
325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003).
reasonable
officer
would
have
from
using
Jones v. Buchanan,
The question is whether a
determined
that
the
degree
of
force used was justified by the threat presented, an objective
inquiry
“‘requir[ing]
circumstances
in
careful
each
attention
particular
to
case,’”
the
facts
including
and
“‘the
severity of the crime at issue,’ whether the ‘suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,’ and
whether the suspect ‘is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight.’”
Id. at 527 (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
In
viewing
this
the
case,
facts
the
in
the
district
light
court
most
properly
favorable
to
held
that,
Smith,
an
objectively reasonable officer could conclude that Defendants’
conduct constituted excessive force.
6
Regarding the first Graham
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factor, Defendants had, at most, reason to suspect that Smith
might be guilty of misdemeanor assault.
§ 16-3-600(E)(1)
(2014)
another person”).
(requiring
See S.C. Code Ann.
only
“attempt
to
injure
The second Graham factor likewise weighs in
favor of Smith, as Defendants had no reason to believe that
Smith would react violently or incite a riot if confronted by
officers.
As for the third Graham factor, resistance from Smith
could
characterized
be
concluded
resistance.
that
such
as
instinctive,
reactions
do
and
not
we
have
twice
constitute
active
See Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 103 (4th Cir. 2015)
(citing Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Altogether, viewed in the light most favorable to Smith, the
facts could support a finding of excessive force.
Even so, Defendants contend, the fact that Smith suffered
only de minimis injuries absolves them from liability under the
clearly established law at the time of the incident.
Prior to
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010), this court “consistently
held that a plaintiff could not prevail on an excessive force
claim [under the Eighth Amendment] absent the most extraordinary
circumstances, if he had not suffered more than a de minimis
injury.”
Hill
v.
Crum,
727
F.3d
(internal quotation marks omitted).
312,
318
(4th
Cir.
The same rule applied to
Fourteenth Amendment claims made by pretrial detainees.
7
2013)
Orem v.
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Rephann,
523
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F.3d
442,
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447-48
(4th
Cir.
2008),
abrogated
by
Wilkins, 559 U.S. 39.
For Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, however, the
severity of injury resulting from the force used has always been
but
one
“consideration
excessive.”
th[e]
in
determining
Jones, 325 F.3d at 530.
established
reasonableness
fourth
when
dealing
amendment
with
whether
force
was
“Faithful adherence to
standard
claims
of
of
objective
excessive
force
during arrest will not make police officers subject to § 1983
liability . . . for every push and shove they make.”
Martin v.
Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 869 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Nor, however, does it absolve police officers
of liability so long as their conduct, however unreasonable,
only results in de minimis injuries.
See Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985) (explaining that the question is “whether
the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort
of search or seizure”).
The cases cited by Defendants do not suggest otherwise.
All but one of the cases involves either prisoners or pretrial
detainees, therefore implicating either the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment,
rather
than
the
Fourth
Amendment.
And
Carter
v.
Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 219 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999), the free citizen
case,
does
not
demonstrate
that
the
de
minimis
injury
rule
applies to Fourth Amendment claims; rather, it merely suggests,
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passing,
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that
the
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plaintiff’s
claim
offered “minimal evidence” to support it.
Finding
only
no
de
support
minimis
for
Defendants’
injuries
bars
failed
she
164 F.3d at 219 n.3.
contention
one
because
from
that
suffering
asserting
a
Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim, we conclude that the district
court
appropriately
denied
Defendants’
motion
for
summary
judgment as to this claim.
In his cross-appeal, Smith argues that the district court
erroneously granted summary judgment on his federal and state
false arrest claims.
To demonstrate false arrest under either
federal or state law, a plaintiff must show that he was arrested
without probable cause.
See Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362,
367-68 (4th Cir. 2002); Law v. S. Carolina Dep’t of Corr., 368
S.C. 424, 441 (2006).
need
only
be
enough
“[F]or probable cause to exist, there
evidence
reasonable
officer
that
an
committed;
evidence
to
sufficient
warrant
offense
to
has
convict
the
been
is
belief
of
or
being
not
is
a
required.”
Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted).
See also Law, 368 S.C.
at 441 (defining probable cause as “as a good faith belief that
a person is guilty of a crime when this belief rests on such
grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man,
under the circumstances, to believe likewise”).
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In South Carolina, one commits assault if he “unlawfully
injures another person, or offers or attempts to injure another
person with the present ability to do so.”
§ 16-3-600(E)(1).
“While
words
alone
do
S.C. Code Ann.
not
constitute
an
assault, if by words and conduct a person intentionally creates
a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, it is an assault.”
State v. Sutton, 532 S.E.2d 283, 285 (S.C. 2000).
Even viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to Smith, we find that the
district court correctly held that Defendants had probable cause
to arrest Smith for misdemeanor assault.
that
the
district
court
did
not
err
Therefore, we conclude
in
granting
Defendants’
court’s
order.
motion for summary judgment on this claim.
Accordingly,
dispense
with
contentions
are
we
oral
affirm
the
argument
adequately
district
because
presented
in
the
the
facts
We
and
legal
materials
before
this court and judgment would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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