Route 231, LLC, John D. Carr v. Commissioner of IRS

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 013216-10. [999732311]. [14-1983]

Appeal: 14-1983

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1983

ROUTE 231, LLC, JOHN D. CARR, TAX MATTERS PARTNER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Tax Court.
(Tax Ct. No. 013216-10)

Argued:

October 28, 2015

Before AGEE and
Circuit Judge.

WYNN,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

January 8, 2016

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Wynn and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.

ARGUED: Timothy Lee Jacobs, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant.
Richard Farber, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: William
L.S. Rowe, Richmond, Virginia, Richard E. May, Hilary B. Lefko,
Matthew S. Paolillo, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellant.
Caroline D. Ciraolo, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Regina S. Moriarty, Tax Division, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

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AGEE, Circuit Judge:
Route

231,

LLC,

a

Virginia

limited

liability

company,

(“Route 231”) reported capital contributions of $8,416,000 on
its 2005 federal tax return. 1

This number reflected, in relevant

part, $3,816,000 it received from one of its members, Virginia
Conservation Tax Credit FD LLLP (“Virginia Conservation”).

Upon

audit, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service issued a
Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (“FPAA”) indicating
that Route 231 should have reported the $3,816,000 received as
gross

income

and

not

a

capital

contribution.

Route

231

challenged the FPAA by petition to the United States Tax Court.
After a trial, the Tax Court determined that the transaction was
a “sale” and reportable as gross income in 2005.
appeals,

asserting

that

the

Tax

Court

erred

Route 231 now
in

finding

the

transfer was not a capital contribution or, alternatively, that
any income was not reportable until 2006.

For the reasons set

forth below, we disagree with Route 231 and affirm the decision
of the Tax Court.

1

The Internal Revenue Code treats limited liability
companies with two or more members as a partnership unless the
company elects otherwise. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.7701-1, 7701-2,
7703-3.
Route 231 filed returns consistent with being treated
as a partnership for federal tax purposes.
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I.
In May 2005, Raymond Humiston and John Carr formed Route
231, a limited liability company (“LLC”) registered in Virginia.
Humiston and Carr each made initial capital contributions of
$2,300,000 and each received a 50% membership interest in the
LLC.

Route 231’s initial operating agreement stated its purpose

was

“to

property.”

own,

acquire,

(J.A. 225.)

manage

and

operate

[certain]

real

Consistent with that purpose, Route 231

purchased two parcels, known as Castle Hill and Walnut Mountain,
in Albemarle County, Virginia, for approximately $24 million.
Carr and Humiston personally guaranteed the bank loan financing
the purchase.
Carr and Humiston were interested in donating some of Route
231’s

property

for

conservation

purposes

consultant to assist with that process.

and

retained

a

At that time, Virginia

offered state income tax credits “equal to 50 percent of the
fair market value of any land or interest in land located in
Virginia” donated to a public or private agency eligible to hold
such land and interests therein for conservation or preservation
purposes.

Va. Code § 58.1-512 (2005).

Route

discussed

231

the

possibility

Through the consultant,
of

Virginia

Conservation

joining the LLC by contributing money to Route 231 and receiving
a majority of the Virginia tax credits that would be earned as a
result of three proposed conservation donations.
3

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These

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discussions

led

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to

Route

231’s

first

amended

operating agreement, signed December 27, 2005, in which Virginia
Conservation became a member of Route 231 with a 1% membership
interest, with Humiston and Carr’s interests each being reduced
to

49.5%.

Virginia

The

amended

Conservation

operating

agreed

to

agreement

make

an

provided

“initial

that

capital

contribution” of $500 plus an additional sum “in an amount equal
to the product of $0.53 for each $1.00 of [the tax credits]
allocated

to”

it.

operating

agreement

(J.A.

477,

anticipated

§

2.2.)

that

The

Route

first

231

amended

would

earn

Virginia tax credits “in the range of $6,700,000 to 7,700,000”
as

a

result

provided

that

of

the

while

proposed
Carr

conservation

would

receive

donations,

$300,000

Virginia Conservation would receive “the balance.” 2

of

and

it

credits,

(J.A. 479, §

3.6.)
Two days later, on December 29, 2005, Virginia Conservation
paid $3,816,000 into an escrow account pursuant to three escrow
agreements reflecting the three conservation donations Route 231

2

For tax credits earned during the time in question,
taxpayers could claim up to $100,000 of tax credits on their
state income tax returns as a $1 for $1 credit. If the value of
tax credits earned exceeded this cap, taxpayers were permitted
to carry over the tax credits for use up to five years after the
tax credits were earned. See Va. Code § 58.1-512(C)(1) (2005).
4

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intended to make. 3

The escrow agreements provided that the funds

would

to

be

released

Route

231

upon

written

confirmation

by

Virginia Conservation that it had received copies of several
documents verifying the conservation donations and Virginia tax
credits.

One

item

listed

Taxation’s

transaction

was

number

the

for

Virginia

tracking

Department

the

of

conservation

donations and Virginia tax credits.
The next day, December 30, 2005, Route 231 recorded deeds
conveying the following conservation donations of real property:
(1) a deed of gift of an easement on Castle Hill to the Nature
Conservancy, which was valued at $8,849,240; (2) a deed of gift
of an easement on Walnut Mountain to the Albemarle County Public
Recreational

Facilities

Authority,

which

was

valued

at

$5,225,249; and (3) a fee interest in Walnut Mountain (subject
to

the

above

easement)

to

the

Nature

Conservancy,

which

was

valued at $2,072,880.
The final value of these conservation donations – and hence
the amount of Virginia tax credits – was slightly lower than
Route

231’s

consultant

had

anticipated.

Consequently,

Carr

agreed to defer receiving approximately $84,000 of the $300,000
in

tax

credits

he

had

been

promised

3

in

the

first

amended

The escrow agreements contain nearly identical language,
with each agreement corresponding to one of Route 231’s proposed
conservation donations.
5

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operating
receive

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agreement

tax

so

credits

as

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to

allow

equivalent

to

Virginia
the

Conservation

formula

for

Carr,

the

and

to

full

amount of money it had paid into escrow.
On

January

1,

2006,

Humiston,

Virginia

Conservation executed a second amended operating agreement for
Route

231.

The

agreement

described

the

three

specific

conservation donations the LLC had made and set out the Virginia
tax credits Route 231 had earned as a result of those donations.
It indicated that those credits “have been allocated as follows:
(i)

$215,983.00

.

.

Virginia Conservation.

.

to

Carr

and

(ii)

$7,200,000.00”

to

(J.A. 508, § 3.5.)

After execution of the second amended operating agreement,
Route 231 submitted three Virginia Land Preservation Tax Credit
Notification Forms (“Forms LPC”) to the Virginia Department of
Taxation.
Virginia

The
tax

forms

credits

stated
on

that

December

Route
30,

231

2005

had

(the

earned
date

of

its
the

conservation donations), and that it allocated those credits to
Carr and Virginia Conservation in the amounts reflected in the
second amended operating agreement.
In March 2006, the Virginia Department of Taxation provided
Virginia Conservation and Carr with the transaction numbers for
Route 231’s conservation donations and the tax credits.

The

Virginia Department of Taxation’s letter stated that these tax
credits were “effective” in 2005.
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Soon after Virginia Conservation received these tax credit
transaction numbers, the escrow funds were released to Route
231.
In April 2006, Carr – acting as Route 231’s tax matters
partner – filed Route 231’s 2005 federal Return of Partnership
Income

Tax. 4

capital

Schedule

contributions

M-2

of

received

that
in

form
2005

lists
in

total

the

annual

amount

of

$8,416,000, which includes the amounts Humiston and Carr had
provided

as

capital

contributions

as

Virginia Conservation paid into escrow.

well

as

the

$3,816,000

In addition, Schedule

K-1 of Route 231’s tax form lists Virginia Conservation as a
partner that had contributed $3,816,000 in capital “during the
[taxable] year.”

(J.A. 120.)

4

While
there
are
substantive
legal
differences,
particularly for state law purposes, between partnerships and
limited
liability
companies,
they
are
treated
alike
as
partnerships for federal income tax purposes.
See supra n.1.
For
convenience,
we
refer
to
partners
and
partnerships
interchangeably with members and limited liability companies in
our discussion of the federal tax issues in this opinion.
Under the Internal Revenue Code, a partnership is a “passthrough” entity, meaning that although the partnership prepares
a tax return, the partnership does not pay federal income taxes.
Instead, its taxable income and losses pass through to the
individual
partners,
who
in
turn
are
liable
for
their
distributive shares of the partnership’s tax items on their own
individual returns. United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, 562
(2013).

7

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The

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Internal

indicating,

in

Revenue

relevant

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Service

part,

that

sent

Route

Route

231

231
had

an

FPAA

improperly

characterized the $3,816,000 received as a capital contribution
rather than as income from the sale of the Virginia tax credits
to

Conservation. 5

Virginia

Route

231

challenged

that

determination in a petition for readjustment in the Tax Court.
In

a

detailed

memorandum

Commissioner’s
Virginia

opinion,

determination

Conservation

and

the

that

Route

Tax

the

231

Court

upheld

transaction

constituted

a

the

between

“disguised

sale” that occurred in 2005, and it adjusted Route 231’s 2005
tax return to reflect the $3,816,000 as gross income.
At the outset of its opinion, the Tax Court described our
decision

in

Commissioner,

Virginia
639

F.3d

Historic
129

Tax

(4th

point” with the case before it.

Credit

Cir.

Fund

2011),

as

2001

LP

v.

“squarely

on

(Cf. J.A. 1518.)

Following

much of the same analysis we applied in Virginia Historic, the
Tax Court first concluded that Route 231’s Virginia tax credits
were “property” so their transfer would fall within the scope of
I.R.C. § 707.

Next, the Tax Court determined that under the

applicable

regulations

tax

of

§

5

707,

the

transaction

was

a

The FPAA made additional adjustments that were resolved by
the parties.
While those adjustments were included in the Tax
Court’s final decision reflecting all of the adjustments to
Route 231’s 2005 tax return, they are not at issue in this
appeal.
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“disguised sale” because the record demonstrated that (1) Route
231

would

Virginia

not

have

transferred

Conservation

“but

the

for”

Virginia
the

fact

tax

credits

that

to

Virginia

Conservation transferred $3,816,000 to it, and (2) Route 231’s
transfer of the Virginia tax credits was not dependent on the
ongoing entrepreneurial risks of Route 231’s operations.

In

examining the totality of the facts and circumstances relevant
to

this

inquiry,

operating

the

agreements

Tax

set

Court

out

the

observed
timing

that
and

the

amount

amended
of

the

exchange with “reasonable certainty”; they established Virginia
Conservation’s

binding

contractual

right

to

the

Virginia

tax

credits; and they secured Virginia Conservation’s rights by an
indemnification clause.

In addition, the Tax Court observed

that Virginia Conservation’s share of the Virginia tax credits
was

disproportionately

large

in

comparison

to

its

membership

interest and that it had no obligation to return the credits to
Route

231.

As

such,

the

Tax

Court

held

that

the

transfer

between Route 231 and Virginia Conservation was a disguised sale
and that the $3,816,000 received was thus gross income.
Lastly, the Tax Court rejected Route 231’s argument that
the transfer occurred for tax purposes in 2006, instead of 2005,
for three separate and independent reasons.

First, for purposes

of federal tax law, the factual circumstances indicate the sale
occurred in 2005; second, because Route 231 used the accrual
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method of accounting, it had to report the transfer as income in
2005

regardless

payment;

and,

of

when

third,

it

Route

received
231’s

Virginia

statements

in

Conservation’s
its

2005

tax

return constituted binding admissions that the transfer of money
(however characterized) occurred in 2005.
Route

231

noted

a

timely

appeal,

and

this

Court

has

jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).

II.
Route

231

reasserts

its

two

arguments

on

appeal.

It

principally contends that the Virginia tax credit transaction
with

Virginia

Conservation

constituted

a

nontaxable

capital

contribution followed by a permissible allocation of partnership
assets to a bona fide partner.

In the alternative, Route 231

asserts that even if Virginia Conservation’s payment was part of
a sale of tax credits, then the sale occurred in 2006 and not
2005.

If that is so, then because 2006 is a closed tax year as

to Route 231, the IRS could not adjust income the LLC received
in that year. 6

6

At the same time it issued the 2005 FPAA, the Commissioner
issued an FPAA with respect to Route 231’s 2006 tax return.
However, Route 231 did not challenge those adjustments before
the U.S. Tax Court. Accordingly, the limitations period for the
IRS to adjust Route 231’s 2006 return expired one year and 151
days after the date of the FPAA, see I.R.C. § 6229(d), or in
August 2011. Therefore, 2006 is now a closed tax year.
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In addressing these arguments, we review the decision of
the Tax Court “on the same basis as [a] decision[] in [a] civil
bench trial[] in United States district court[].”
Comm’r, 179 F.3d 124, 126 (4th Cir. 1999).

Waterman v.

Accordingly, we

review the Tax Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings for clear error.

Va. Historic, 639 F.3d at 142.

A.
It

comes

as

no

Disguised Sale

secret

that

taxpayers

often

seek

to

structure transactions creatively in an effort to minimize the
tax

consequences.

Id.

at

138.

In

response,

Congress

has

enacted various statutes that look beyond form to substance in
order to differentiate taxable and nontaxable events.
characterization
with

Virginia

of

the

structure

Conservation

–

a

of

Route

231’s

contribution

to

Id.

The

transaction
partnership

capital or a sale of assets – has significant tax consequences:
“[w]hereas a partnership must report any proceeds received from
the

sale

of

its

assets

as

taxable

income,

partners’

contributions to capital and a partnership’s distributions to
partners are tax-free.”

Id.

Relevant to this case is I.R.C. § 707, which “prevents use
of the partnership provisions to render nontaxable what would in
substance have been a taxable exchange if it had not been ‘run
through’ the partnership.”

Id.

In such a circumstance, the

transaction between the partner and partnership is treated as if
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a

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transaction

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between

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third

parties

regardless

of

the

partnership format: “[i]f a partner engages in a transaction
with a partnership other than in his capacity as a member of
such

partnership,

the

transaction

shall,

except

as

otherwise

provided in this section, be considered as occurring between the
partnership

and

one

who

is

not

a

partner.”

I.R.C.

§

707(a)(1)(A).
Particularly

applicable

in

this

case

is

§

707(a)(2)(B),

which provides:
(B) Treatment of certain property transfers. If-(i)
there is a direct or indirect transfer of
money or other property by a partner to a
partnership,
(ii) there is a related direct or indirect
transfer of money or other property by the
partnership to such partner (or another
partner), and
(iii) the transfers described in clauses (i) and
(ii), when viewed together, are properly
characterized as a sale or exchange of
property,
such transfers shall be treated either as a
transaction described in paragraph (1) . . . .
The treasury regulations further explain when such transactions
are “properly characterized as a sale or exchange of property.”
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.707-3. 7

In general, a partner/partnership

7

The regulation describes such “disguised sales” as
transactions in which a partner transfers “property” to the
partnership and the partnership transfers “money or other
consideration to the partner.”
26 C.F.R. § 1.707-3(a)(1).
(Continued)
12

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transaction

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is

a

sale

“if

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based

on

all

the

facts

and

circumstances,” “[t]he transfer of money or other consideration
would not have been made but for the transfer of property” and,
when

the

transfer

transfers
is

not

are

not

dependent

partnership operation.”

simultaneous,

on

the

“the

entrepreneurial

subsequent
risks

of

§ 1.707-3(b)(1).

The regulations additionally provide a non-exclusive list
of ten relevant facts and circumstances “that may tend to prove
the

existence

of

a

sale,”

including

whether

“the

timing

and

amount of a subsequent transfer are determinable with reasonable
certainty at the time of an earlier transfer”; “the transferor
has a legally enforceable right to the subsequent transfer”;
“the partner’s right to receive the transfer of money or other
consideration is secured in any manner”; “the transfer of money
or

other

consideration

disproportionately
general

and

by

large

continuing

the
in

partnership

to

relationship

to

interest

in

the

partnership

the

partner

is

partner’s

profits”;

and

“the partner has no obligation to return or repay the money or
other

consideration

to

the

partnership[.]”

§

1.707-3(b)(2).

The regulations also create a presumption of a sale whenever the

However, we have observed that the regulations specifically
provide that these principles also apply when a partnership
transfers “property” to a partner in exchange for “money or
other consideration.” See Va. Historic, 639 F.3d at 139 (citing
26 C.F.R. § 1.707-6(a)).
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partner/partnership

transfers

Pg: 14 of 35

occur

within

a

two-year

period

“unless the facts and circumstances clearly establish that the
transfers do not constitute a sale.”

§ 1.707-3(c)(1).

“This

presumption places a high burden on the partnership to establish
the

validity

of

any

suspect

partnership

transfers.”

Va.

Historic, 639 F.3d at 139.
Route

231

takes

issue

with

the

Tax

Court’s

reliance

on

Virginia Historic in the application of § 707.

Its arguments

largely

with

attempt

Conservation
partnership

to

from

distinguish
what

“reported

a

its

occurred
series

transaction
in

of

that

Virginia

case,

transactions

where

with

a

investor

partners” as capital contributions rather than as income from
“sales” of state historic rehabilitation tax credits.

Id. at

132-33.

sought

The

Virginia

Historic

partnership

actively

investors to contribute “capital” in exchange for a less-thanone-percent

partnership

state tax credits.

interest

and

Id. at 133-35.

an

“allocation”

of

the

The Commissioner asserted

that the investors were not bona fide partners and that “under
the relevant Code provisions and regulations,” “the transactions
between the investors and the [partnership] should nevertheless
be classified as sales for federal tax purposes[.]”

Id. at 137.

We assumed, without deciding, that the investors were bona
fide

partners,

but

found

that

the

classified that series of transactions.
14

Commissioner
Id.

correctly

After rejecting

Appeal: 14-1983

the

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partnership’s

contention

constitute

“property”

rules,

concluded

we

presumption

that

Pg: 15 of 35

for

the

purposes

the

the

that

of

partnership

exchange

applicable regulatory factors.

was

tax

credits

the

“disguised

failed
a

did

to

“sale”

sales”

overcome
based

not

on

the
the

Id. at 140-46.

In attempting to distinguish Virginia Historic, Route 231
points

to

whether

its

tax

abstract.
the

“emphas[is]
credits

that

always

[the

Court

constitute

was]

not

‘property’

deciding
in

the

Rather, [the Court was] asked to decide only whether

transfer

of

tax

credits

acquired

by

a

non-developer

partnership to investors in exchange for money constituted ‘a
transfer of property’ for purposes of § 707.”
Route

231

contends

this

language

limited

Id. at 141 n.15.

Virginia

Historic’s

holding to sham partnerships that “ceased to exist as soon as
the credits were transferred” and that the “disguised sale rules
do not apply to a valid partnership with economic substance like
Route 231.”

(Opening Br. 26.)

Furthermore, Route 231 posits

that because Virginia Conservation remains a bona fide partner
in

an

ongoing

partnership,

the

transfer

of

tax

credits

was

“simply an allocation [of partnership assets] among partners,
and

not

a

investors.”

sale

of

property

by

a

sham

entity

to

transitory

(Opening Br. 27.)

Route 231’s argument misses the mark.

We note initially

that Route 231 does not challenge the validity of § 707 or the
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corresponding regulations.

Pg: 16 of 35

For the most part, Route 231 also

does not challenge the Tax Court’s application of the § 1.7073(c)

“facts

and

surrounding

circumstances”

its

transaction

test
with

to

the

circumstances

Virginia

Conservation.

Although Route 231 denies doing so, most of its arguments center
on the premise that as Virginia Conservation is a bona fide
partner

in

a

bona

fide

partnership,

its

partner/partnership

transactions are immune from the scope of § 707 and related
provisions.
apply

to

involved

Put another way, Route 231 contends § 707 cannot

the

transaction

at

are

bona

entities

fide

issue

here
in

because

a

genuine

the

entities

contractual

relationship.
The Commissioner does not contest that Route 231 is a valid
entity or that Virginia Conservation is a true partner in it.
Neither did the Tax Court rely on a failure of the bona fides of
the entities in reaching its decision.

There was no need to do

so as Route 231’s argument fails under the plain language of §
707, which expressly applies to transactions between a partner
and

partnership

without

qualification

whenever

a

partner

“engages in a transaction with a partnership other than in his
capacity as a member of such partnership.”

The bona fides of

Virginia Conservation’s status as a member of Route 231, or that
entity’s status as a valid limited liability company (and valid
partnership for tax purposes) do not matter for this inquiry.
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In short, the analysis under § 707 goes to the bona fides of a
particular

transaction,

participants

to

that

not

to

the

transaction.

general
Contrary

status
to

of

Route

the
231’s

repeated assertions, I.R.C. § 707 applies by its plain terms to
designated

transactions

between

otherwise

valid

ongoing

partnerships and their legitimate partners. 8
Relatedly,

in

Virginia

Historic

we

expressly

did

not

analyze whether the partnership itself was legitimate, nor did
we

limit

§

707’s

scope

to

sham

partnerships.

Quite

the

contrary, the Court expressly assumed the existence of a bona
fide partnership and proceeded directly to analyzing whether the
transaction
707.

nonetheless

constituted

a

disguised

Cf. Va. Historic, 639 F.3d at 137.

sale

under

So, too, here:

§

this

case does not turn at all on characteristics of the Route 231
8

To supports its contention that § 707 and the disguised
sale rules apply only when a partnership is illegitimate or a
sham, Route 231 points to Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v.
Commissioner, 694 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2012).
There, the Third
Circuit observed that some of the same principles applicable to
disguised
sales
also
apply
in
the
separate
context
of
determining whether a bona fide partnership exists. Where those
points overlapped, the court relied in part on our decision in
Virginia Historic.
See id. at 454-55.
Nothing about the
Commissioner’s position or the analysis in Historic Boardwalk
suggests that the two analyses can only take place together, or
that a bona fide partnership cannot engage in a transaction that
§ 707 recognizes as a disguised sale between a partnership and
its partner.
To the extent that its analysis is persuasive
authority, Historic Boardwalk stands for the unremarkable
principle that in certain instances, factors relevant to the one
of these inquiries may overlap with factors relevant to the
other.
17

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entity or its members.

Pg: 18 of 35

Instead, as contemplated by § 707(a),

this case turns on the nature of the transaction at issue: the
exchange of Virginia tax credits for money. 9
Turning

to

Conservation

and

the
Route

specific
231’s

circumstances

transaction,

we

of

Virginia

first

determine

whether the Virginia tax credits constitute “property” within
the scope of I.R.C. § 707 (regulating the “transfer of money or
other property”).

We agree with the Tax Court’s analysis and

its conclusion that the Virginia tax credits are “property” for
purposes of I.R.C. § 707.
is

evidenced

by

their

The tax credits’ status as “property”
value

as

Conservation to join Route 231.

an

inducement

to

Virginia

It bears noting that Virginia

Conservation was paying fifty-three cents on the dollar for a
credit worth a full dollar in tax relief from Virginia state
income tax: a transaction of real economic value.

Moreover,

Route 231’s ownership of the Virginia tax credits gave rise to
such essential proprietary rights as the right to own or use an
item,

to

exclude

others

from

9

ownership,

and

the

right

to

Nor did Virginia Historic limit § 707(a)’s scope to nondeveloper partnerships as Route 231 contends.
To be sure, in
examining the transaction at issue in Virginia Historic, we
pointed out that our holding that the tax credits were property
arose in the factual context of a “non-developer partnership,”
and
that
tax
credits
may
not
categorically
constitute
“property.”
But this language simply recognizes the factual
setting of Virginia Historic and reflects the requisite analysis
of “property” must be made in each case and not taken as a per
se rule.
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transfer them as permitted under state law.

In addition, as we

explained in greater detail in Virginia Historic, treating the
tax credits as “property” is consistent “with Congress’s intent
to widen [§ 707’s] reach” when that statute was amended in 1984.
See 639 F.3d at 142.
Having determined that the Virginia tax credits constitute
“property,” we turn to whether the transfer of this property
from Route 231 to Virginia Conservation constituted a “sale.”
Because the exchange of tax credits for money occurred within a
two-year

period,

the

disguised

sale

arises

presumption
unless

that

the

clearly establish” otherwise.

the

“facts

transaction
and

is

a

circumstances

See 26 C.F.R. § 1.707-3(c)(1).

The regulations provide that transactions of this nature are in
fact sales if, “based on all the facts and circumstances,” (1)
the

transfer

of

money

would

not

have

been

made

without

the

transfer of property, and (2) the subsequent transfer was not
dependent on the entrepreneurial risks of the partnership.

26

C.F.R. § 1.707-3(b)(1).
The analysis of these two considerations is based on the
totality of the “facts and circumstances,” including the ten
potentially

applicable

1.707-3(b)(2).

factors

noted

earlier.

26

C.F.R.

§

As the Tax Court noted, among the items that

“tend to prove the existence of a sale” in this case are:

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• the fixed cash-to-credit ratio for the transaction as
set out in the amended operating agreements, coupled
with Route 231’s agreement to earn those tax credits
by December 31, 2005 (cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.7073(b)(2)(i); Va. Historic, 639 F.3d at 143);
• Virginia Conservation’s contractual right under the
amended operating agreement to all but Carr’s share
of the tax credits Route 231 earned (cf. 26 C.F.R. §
1.707-3(b)(2)(ii); Va. Historic, 639 F.3d at 143);
• Virginia Conservation’s right to be indemnified by
Route 231, Carr, and Humiston should it not receive
all the tax credits for which it provided Route 231
money (cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(iii); Va.
Historic, 639 F.3d at 143-44) 10;
• Carr’s agreement to reduce the amount of tax credits
he would receive so that Route 231 could transfer to
Virginia Conservation the full amount of tax credits
for which it had contracted and paid (cf. 26 C.F.R. §
1.707-3(b)(2)(v));
• That Virginia Conservation received a 1% interest in
the LLC and yet received 97% of Route 231’s state tax
credits for the “contribution” of $3,816,000 while
Carr and Humiston each received a 50% (later reduced
10

We reject Route 231’s argument that the amended operating
agreements’ indemnity clause should not serve as proof that
Virginia Conservation’s right to the tax credits or their value
was secured.
Route 231 contends that the indemnity clause did
not “fully protect [it] from partnership risks” because Route
231, Carr, and Humiston had minimal available assets should any
one of them have been required to pay Virginia Conservation in
satisfaction of the indemnity obligation.
That argument
misunderstands the relevant factor, which is whether “the
partner’s right to receive the transfer of money or other
consideration is secured in any manner[.]”
26 C.F.R. § 1.7073(b)(2)(iii).
The regulation only asks whether the secured
right exists, not whether there is a risk that the secured party
may not in fact be able to collect on a judgment for breach of
contract at some point in time.
Because the indemnity clause
creates a legally enforceable right of indemnity, the Tax Court
appropriately concluded that this factor weighed in favor of a
disguised sale.
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to 49.5%) interest in the partnership and yet
received 3% and 0% of Route 231’s conservation tax
credits for their “contributions” of $2,300,000 (cf.
26 C.F.R. § 1.707-3(b)(2)(ix); Va. Historic, 639 F.3d
at 144); and
• That Virginia Conservation had no obligation to return
or repay the tax credits to Route 231, but exercised
full ownership rights in them (cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.7073(b)(2)(x); Va. Historic, 639 F.3d at 144).
These

facts

and

circumstances

form

the

basis

for

our

conclusion that the Tax Court correctly determined that this
transaction was a sale under 26 C.F.R. § 1.707-3(b)(1).

Viewing

all

and

the

circumstances

surrounding

this

transaction,

in

particular the terms of the amended operating agreements, the
Tax Court did not err in finding that “Route 231 would not have
transferred

$7,200,000

of

Virginia

tax

credits

to

Virginia

Conservation but for the fact that Virginia Conservation had
transferred $3,816,000 to it” and vice versa.

J.A. 1526; cf. 26

C.F.R. § 1.707-3(b)(1)(i).
Moreover, Virginia Conservation’s right to the tax credits
did

not

depend

operations.

on

the

entrepreneurial

risks

Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.707-3(b)(1)(ii).

of

Route

231’s

Arguing to the

contrary, Route 231 points to Virginia Conservation’s assuming
certain

entrepreneurial

partnership,

but

whether

later

the

26

risks

C.F.R.
of

the

as
§

partner

in

1.707-3(b)(1)(ii)

two

entrepreneurial risks of Route 231.
21

a

transfers

an

ongoing

focuses

depended

on

on
the

Here, the plain language of

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the amended operating agreements created a fixed cash-to-credit
ratio to determine what each party would exchange.

They also

contained a specific guarantee that Virginia Conservation would
receive all of the tax credits it paid for and that it would be
entitled to reimbursement in cash for any shortfall.

At bottom,

Virginia Conservation’s right to the tax credits depended on
fixed contractual terms, not the entrepreneurial risks of Route
231’s operations.
For these reasons, our review of the record leads us to the
firm belief that Route 231 failed to rebut the presumption that
the transaction between Route 231 and Virginia Conservation was
a sale.
transfers
“unless

Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.707-3(c) (creating a presumption that
made
the

within
facts

two
and

years

are

presumed

circumstances

to

clearly

be

a

sale

establish”

otherwise).

Accordingly, we hold that the Tax Court did not err

in

with

agreeing

the

Commissioner

that

the

money

Route

231

received from Virginia Conservation was “income” for federal tax
purposes.
B.

Applicable Tax Year

Route 231 contends that even if the funds it received from
Virginia

Conservation

should

have

been

reported

as

“income,”

that income was reportable in 2006 rather than 2005.

If Route

231 is correct, then the determination that the Virginia tax
credit transfer constituted “income” would have no impact on it
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because the IRS did not seek an adjustment of Route 231’s 2006
tax return on that ground and any change to that tax year is now
barred

by

the

statute

of

limitations.

See

I.R.C.

§

6229

(articulating the limitations period for making assessments).
As we discuss below, we find none of Route 231’s arguments
on the applicable tax year to be meritorious.

The Tax Court

correctly determined that the tax credit sale occurred in 2005
for federal tax purposes. 11
1.
As

an

initial

matter,

Route

231

remains

bound

by

its

affirmative representation on its 2005 federal tax form that it
received $3,816,000 from Virginia Conservation in 2005.

That

factual representation to the Commissioner sets the parameters
of the legal dispute between the Commissioner and Route 231:
given

that

this

transaction

occurred,

how

does

the

Internal

Revenue Code characterize it?
We

have

previously

recognized

with

approval

the

Fifth

Circuit’s decision in Wichita Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. United
States, 152 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1945), where the court recognized
that a “duty of consistency in tax accounting” does not require

11

Route
the exhibits
occurred in
supports the
address those

231 also raises evidentiary challenges to some of
the Tax Court relied upon in concluding the sale
2005.
Because other independent evidence fully
Tax Court’s conclusion, it is unnecessary to
arguments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111.
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a “willful misrepresentation” to be proven, nor does it require
“all the elements of a technical estoppel.

It arises rather

from the duty of disclosure which the law puts on the taxpayer,
along with the duty of handling his accounting so it will fairly
subject his income to taxation.” Id. at 8, relied on favorably
in Interlochen Co. v. Comm’r, 232 F.2d 873, 877-78 (4th Cir.
1956).

Thus,

in

Wichita

Coca

Cola

Bottling

Co.,

the

Fifth

Circuit concluded that if a taxpayer mistakenly “represented a
transaction as to defer taxation on it to a later year he ought
not, when the time for taxation under his view of it comes, to
be allowed to assert the tax ought to have been levied in the
former year if it is then too late so to levy it.”

152 F.2d at

8.
The same basic principle applies here.

Through its 2005

tax return, Route 231 represented to the IRS that the events
constituting the transaction occurred in 2005.

Upon proof that

the reported tax credit transaction is properly characterized as
a disguised sale and thus taxable as income, Route 231 cannot
then

be

allowed

to

assert

the

transaction

occurred

in

a

different year than it represented, given that it is too late to
require Route 231 to report it as income in the later year,
2006.
The bottom-line principle remains constant:

A taxpayer may

be barred from taking one factual position in a tax return and
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then taking an inconsistent position later in a court proceeding
in

an

effort

to

avoid

liability

based

consequences of the original position.

on

the

altered

tax

E.g., Janis v. Comm’r,

461 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2006) (“‘[T]he duty of consistency
not only reflects basic fairness, but also shows a proper regard
for the administration of justice and the dignity of the law.
The law should not be such a[n] idiot that it cannot prevent a
taxpayer from changing the historical facts from year to year in
order to escape a fair share of the burdens of maintaining our
government.
honesty,

Our tax system depends upon self assessment and

rather

than

upon

hiding

of

the

pea

or

forgetful

[equivocation].’” (quoting Estate of Ashman v. Comm’r, 231 F.3d
541, 544 (9th Cir. 2000))); Alamo Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 95 F.2d
622, 623 (5th Cir. 1938) (“It is no more right to allow a party
to blow hot and cold as suits his interests in tax matters than
in other relationships.

Whether it be called estoppel, or a

duty of consistency, or the fixing of a fact by agreement, the
fact

fixed

for

one

year

ought

to

remain

fixed

in

all

its

consequences, unless a more just general settlement is proposed
and can be effected.”).

Accordingly, the Tax Court did not err

in concluding Route 231 remained bound by its original factual

25

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representation

Filed: 01/08/2016

that

the

Pg: 26 of 35

transfer

of

funds

from

Virginia

Conservation occurred in 2005. 12
2.
Quite apart from the equitable consistency consideration,
we

also

conclude

that

the

record

demonstrates

Virginia tax credits in fact occurred in 2005.

the

sale

of

In particular,

the record supports the Tax Court’s determination that Route 231
transferred to Virginia Conservation before January 1, 2006 the

12

Route 231 urges that the duty of consistency should not
apply because, among other things, the IRS could have, and yet
did not, challenge Route 231’s 2006 return in light of its
position with respect to Route 231’s 2005 return.
As such, it
contends the Commissioner is responsible for its inability to
adjust the 2006 return.
In addition, it contends the
Commissioner’s position in this case is inconsistent with its
position in Virginia Historic, where adjustments were proposed
to two years of tax returns based on the argument that the
challenged
transactions
constituted
sales
and
where
the
Commissioner agreed that any adjustments should be made to the
second year’s returns.
This argument overlooks key factual differences between
this case and Virginia Historic. There, the partnership engaged
in multiple transactions with partners that occurred “between
November 2001 and April 2002.”
639 F.3d at 135.
The
Commissioner challenged the partnership’s tax returns for both
2001 and 2002 because the transactions at issue occurred in both
tax years.
Furthermore, the Commissioner stipulated that any
adjustments for all of the transactions should apply to the
partnership’s 2002 tax returns.
Id. at 136.
That stipulation
has no bearing on the Commissioner’s position in this case and
even less on the appropriate analysis.
Here, in contrast, the
Commissioner only challenged one transaction.
The Commissioner
appropriately challenged Route 231’s characterization of that
transaction for the tax year where Route 231 reported the
transaction as having occurred. Far from being inconsistent
positions, the Commissioner has taken its position based on the
facts of the cases before it.
26

Appeal: 14-1983

tax

Doc: 36

credits

Filed: 01/08/2016

that

it

had

Pg: 27 of 35

earned

because

of

the

December

30

conservation donation.
Under

the

then-applicable

Virginia

statute,

Va.

Code

§

58.1-512 (2005), Route 231 earned tax credits as a matter of law
as soon as it made a qualifying conservation donation.

The

statute set out – among other things – the value of the tax
credits (“50% of the fair market value”), what type of donation
qualified, and how the fair market value of the donation was to
be substantiated.

See Va. Code § 58.1-512 (2005).

As the Tax

Court observed, this statutory language was later amended to add
language requiring taxpayers to “apply for a credit” that would
then be “issued” by the Virginia Department of Taxation.
Code § 58.1-512(D)-(E) (2007).

Va.

But that amended language was

not the law of Virginia in 2005.
Based on the applicable Virginia statutory language, Route
231 earned the tax credits by making the statutorily compliant
donation on December 30, 2005.

Notably, Route 231 does not

contend that it had failed to meet any of the Virginia statutory
requirements,

and

Department

of

Taxation

number

earned

of

requirements.

it

tax

only

speculates

might

have

credits

that

decreased

despite

having

the
the

Virginia

anticipated

satisfied

those

The point remains, under the applicable state

27

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statutes, Route 231 earned – and therefore owned – tax credits
as of the time of its donation, which occurred in 2005. 13
The record also shows that Route 231 transferred all but
Carr’s share of those tax credits to Virginia Conservation in
2005.

Under 26 C.F.R. § 1.707-3(a)(2), a

sale is considered to take place on the date that,
under general principles of Federal tax law, the
partnership is considered the owner of the property.
If the transfer . . . from the partnership to the
partner occurs after the transfer . . . . to the
partnership[,] the partner and the partnership are
treated as if, on the date of the sale, the
partnership transferred to the partner an obligation
to transfer to the partner[.]
As

noted

earlier,

a

corollary

principle

applies

when

the

transfer from the partner occurs after the transfer from the
partnership.

See 26 C.F.R. § 1.707-6(a).

Under federal tax law, an entity “owns” property when it
possesses the benefits and burdens of ownership.

The Tax Court

appropriately

to

applied

a

multi-factor

analysis

whether Route 231 owned the tax credits in 2005.

13

determine

The relevant

Route 231’s argument that while it might have been able
to use the tax credits immediately, it could not transfer the
credits
without
registering
them
misreads
the
applicable
Virginia statute.
Va. Code § 58.1-513(C) (2005) allowed the
transfer of “unused but otherwise allowable credit for use by
another taxpayer on Virginia income tax returns” without
reservation.
While that statute required taxpayers to file a
notification of the transfer with the Virginia Department of
Taxation, nothing in the statute required that the notification
occur prior to the transfer of tax credits.
See Va. Code §
58.1-513(C) (2005).
28

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factors in that analysis include: whether legal title passed;
how

the

parties
in

interest
created

treated
property

a

the

present

the

transaction;

was

obligation

acquired;
on

the

whether

whether

seller

an

the

to

equity

contract

execute

and

deliver a deed and a present obligation on the purchaser to make
payments;

whether

the

right

of

possession

was

vested

in

the

purchasers; which party bore the risk of loss or damage to the
property; and which party received profits from the operation
and sale of the property.

Calloway v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1315,

1327-28 (11th Cir. 2012); Arevalo v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 436, 439
(5th Cir. 2006); Crooks v. Comm’r, 453 F.3d 653, 656 (6th Cir.
2006); Upham v. Comm’r, 923 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1991).

No

one of these factors controls, as the determination of ownership
is based on all the facts and circumstances of a particular
case, and some factors may be “ill-suited or irrelevant” to a
particular case.

Calloway, 691 F.3d at 1327.

Under the totality of the relevant circumstances here, the
Tax Court correctly determined that the sale occurred in 2005.
We

already

discussed

Route

231’s

representation

on

its

2005

federal tax forms, but that is just one of several instances
where Route 231 treated or represented the transfer as occurring
in 2005.

Route 231’s Forms LPC represented to the Virginia

Department of Taxation that the tax credits had been transferred
to Virginia Conservation in December 2005.
29

In addition, the

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first

Doc: 36

amended

Filed: 01/08/2016

operating

Pg: 30 of 35

agreement

(signed

on

December

28)

created a present contractual obligation for Route 231 to convey
to Virginia Conservation all but $300,000 of any tax credits
Route 231 earned from a conservation donation before December
31, 2005.

Thus, as soon as Route 231 earned the tax credits by

recording

the

statutory-compliant

conservation

donation

on

December 30, 2005, Virginia Conservation had the legal right to
those credits.
As further support for our conclusion, the language used in
Route 231’s second amended agreement (signed January 1, 2006)
recited the salient sale events as having occurred in the past,
not as prospective acts.

For example, that agreement refers to

Virginia Conservation as having “made” its contribution, Route
231 as having “duly earned” the tax credits, and those credits
having

“been

respectively.

allocated”
(J.A.

to

504,

Carr

508,

and

517.)

Virginia
Lastly,

Conservation,
in

additional

correspondence between Route 231, Virginia Conservation, and the
escrow agent, Route 231 specifically recognized the potential
tax consequences of the transaction occurring in 2005 versus
2006, and maintained that it occurred in 2005.

Consistent with

that view, when a concern arose as to who bore the risk of loss
and

owned

any

interest

earned

while

the

funds

were

held

in

escrow, Route 231 and Virginia Conservation agreed that Route
231 bore that risk and would also be entitled to any interest
30

Appeal: 14-1983

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earned.

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During

those

Pg: 31 of 35

discussions,

Route

231

affirmed

that

Virginia Conservation’s payment of the funds into escrow (in
December

2005)

“satisfied

[its]

contractual

contribute to the capital of Route 231.”

obligation

to

(J.A. 608.)

To recap, Virginia Conservation had legal title, an equity
interest in, and the right to possess the tax credits as soon as
Route 231 earned them in 2005; Route 231, Virginia Conservation,
and

other

parties

transaction
occurred,

to

in

to

the

transaction

all

occur,

and

treated

transaction

2005

throughout

the

the

intended

negotiations

up

for
as

the

having

until

the

Commissioner challenged how Route 231 characterized the transfer
on

its

federal

tax

return;

and

the

first

amended

operating

agreement gave rise to a present obligation on the part of Route
231 to transfer the tax credits earned in 2005, while the second
amended operating agreement documented that this obligation had
been satisfied.

All of these circumstances demonstrate that the

sale occurred in 2005.
Route 231 argues that this analysis ignores the language of
the escrow agreements and the fact that Virginia Conservation
did not authorize release of the funds from escrow until March
2006, after it confirmed receiving various documents related to
the

conservation

donation

transaction numbers.
the

totality

of

and

the

Virginia

tax

credit

To the contrary, the above analysis takes

circumstances

into
31

consideration

rather

than

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focusing on the escrow agreements apart from the whole.
conclusion

also

agreements,
required

finds

which

the

support

provide

escrow

in

that

agent

to

the

language

only

two

return

of

events

the

the

This
escrow

automatically

funds

to

Virginia

Conservation and thus cancelled the sale: failure to record the
charitable donations “on or before December 31, 2005” or failure
to admit Virginia Conservation as a Route 231 partner “on or
before December 31, 2005.”

(J.A. 532, 536, 540.)

Both those

events were known and satisfied before the end of 2005, so the
escrow agreements’ contingency could not have occurred in 2006.
The remaining acts Route 231 points to as showing a sale of
tax credits did not occur in 2005 – that it provide Virginia
Conservation

copies

of

certain

documents

relating

to

the

conservation donation and the tax credits, and that Virginia
Conservation provide written confirmation of receiving them –
are

of

no

substantive.

consequence.
The

escrow

These

acts

agreements

are

only

ministerial,

speak

to

Route

not
231

providing copies of documents and are not directly contingent on
the

outcome

process.

of

the

Virginia

Department

of

Taxation’s

review

Providing copies is a quintessential ministerial task.

See Black’s Law Dictionary 1011 (defining “ministerial” as “[o]f
or relating to an act that involves obedience to instructions or
laws instead of discretion, judgment, or skill”); see also Ray
v. United States, 301 U.S. 158, 163 (1937).
32

In the unlikely

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event

that

Filed: 01/08/2016

the

Virginia

Pg: 33 of 35

Department

of

Taxation

reduced

the

amount of tax credits Virginia Conservation would receive, the
amended

operating

directed

how

agreements

Virginia

(not

the

Conservation

escrow

would

agreements)

be

compensated.

Moreover, it would have no bearing on the fact that Route 231
sold

a

portion

of

Conservation in 2005.

its

earned

tax

credits

to

Virginia

That is to say, it would not impact the

fact of the sale.
Based on the totality of the evidence, the sale of tax
credits for money occurred in 2005, and all that remained in
2006 were ministerial formalities.
3.
Route 231’s argument fails for a third reason:
accrual

method

of

accounting,

and

under

it uses the

the

principles

applicable to the accrual method, the sale occurred in 2005.
Gross

income

must

be

“included

in

the

gross

income

for

the

taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under
the method of accounting used in computing taxable income, such
amount

is

period.”

to

be

I.R.C.

properly
§

accounted

451(a).

“Under

for
an

as

of

accrual

a

different
method

of

accounting, income is includible in gross income when all the
events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income
and

the

accuracy.”

amount

thereof

can

be

determined

26 C.F.R. § 1.451-1(a).
33

with

reasonable

Generally speaking, this

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means that “income . . . is taxable in the year the income is
accrued, or earned, even if it is not received in that year.”
IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 357 (8th Cir.
2001).

Although

elaborating

on

we

not

“all

what

do

the

have

any

events”

published

means

for

authority

purposes

of

applying this regulation, the Tax Court adopted a reasonable
interpretation

that

other

cases

have

used:

(1)

the

required

performance takes place, (2) the payment is due, or (3) the
payment is made, whichever comes first.

Johnson v. Comm’r, 108

T.C. 448, 459 (1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 184 F.3d
786 (8th Cir. 1999).
Here, Route 231 earned Virginia Conservation’s $3,816,000
payment

with

conservation
credits.

reasonable
donations

certainty
that

gave

in

2005

rise

to

when

it

made

the

the

Virginia

tax

Under the terms of the amended operating agreements,

that act was sufficient to obligate Route 231 to transfer all
but Carr’s share of the tax credits to Virginia Conservation.
And,

in

turn,

that

occurrence

was

sufficient

to

obligate

Virginia Conservation to pay Route 231 the pre-determined cashto-credit ratio for the tax credits.

Consequently, by December

31, 2005, “all the events [had] occurred which fix[ed] the right
to

receive

the

amount

thereof c[ould] be determined with reasonable accuracy.”

Cf. 26

C.F.R.

§

[Virginia

1.451-1(a).

Conservation’s

Accordingly,
34

money]

the

Tax

and

Court

correctly

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determined that under the accrual method of accounting, Route
231

was

obligated

to

report

the

$3,816,000

in

income

from

Virginia Conservation on its 2005 federal tax forms.

III.
For the reasons set out above, we affirm the Tax Court’s
decision adjusting Route 231’s 2005 Return of Partnership Income
federal

tax

form

to

reflect,

in

relevant

part,

income

of

$3,816,000.
AFFIRMED

35