Thomas Coyne v. Omnicare, Inc.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion--denying Motion to appoint/assign counsel [999460270-2]; granting Motion to proceed in forma pauperis (FRAP 24) [999445871-2] Originating case number: 1:14-cv-01225-CCB. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999534112]. Mailed to: Thomas Coyne. [14-2026]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2026

THOMAS COYNE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
OMNICARE, INC.; EDWARD O’CONNELL; BETH MESEROLL,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Catherine C. Blake, Chief District
Judge. (1:14-cv-01225-CCB)

Submitted:

February 20, 2015

Decided:

February 24, 2015

Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas Coyne, Appellant Pro Se. Ariana Wright Arnold, Jennifer
Lynn
Curry,
JACKSON
LEWIS
PC,
Baltimore,
Maryland,
for
Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Thomas Coyne appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Coyne’s claims under
the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(2012), and the Maryland Flexible Leave Act (“MFLA”), Md. Code
Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-802 (LexisNexis 2014 Supp.).
reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

We have

Accordingly,

although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we affirm
the grant of summary judgment as to Coyne’s FMLA claim for the
reasons stated by the district court.

Coyne v. Omnicare, Inc.,

No. 1:14-cv-01225-CCB (D. Md. Sept. 3, 2014).
the

grant

of

summary

judgment

on

Coyne’s

We further affirm
MFLA

claim

because

Coyne did not commence taking leave prior to his termination.
See Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-802(f); Gainsburg v. Steben
& Co., Inc., 519 F. App’x 199, 200 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1476)
(“[T]he MFLA applies only to an employee who ‘has taken leave,’
. . . [t]he clear language of the statute precludes any vague,
atextual argument that requesting leave or providing notice of
leave — rather than actually taking it by spending time away
from work — constitutes protected activity.”).
motion

to

appoint

counsel

and

dispense

with

We deny Coyne’s
oral

argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

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in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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