Joyce Anderson v. Consolidation Coal Company

Filing

UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:11-cv-00138-FPS-JSK. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999739490]. [14-2048]

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 1 of 33

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2048

JOYCE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
CONSOL ENERGY, INC.,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.
Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:11-cv-00138-FPS-JSK)

Argued:

October 29, 2015

Decided:

January 21, 2016

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the majority
opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson joined.
Judge Wynn wrote a
dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Allan Norman Karlin, ALLAN N. KARLIN & ASSOCIATES,
Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Larry Joseph Rector,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON, PLLC, Bridgeport, West Virginia, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jane E. Peak, ALLAN N. KARLIN & ASSOCIATES,

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 2 of 33

Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant.
STEPTOE & JOHNSON, PLLC, Morgantown,
Appellee.

Denielle M. Stritch,
West Virginia, for

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 3 of 33

SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
While working in a coal mine operated by Consolidation Coal
Company (“CCC”), Joyce Anderson fell and suffered multiple bone
fractures.

Before

her

fall,

Anderson

had

been

diagnosed

as

having osteoporosis. After her recovery, Anderson attempted to
return to her former job. Presented with conflicting medical
evidence about Anderson’s post-injury ability to work safely in
the mine, CCC implemented a medical-review process dictated by
its

collective

bargaining

agreement

(“CBA”)

with

her

union.

Because two of the three doctors selected under the CBA process
opined

against

Anderson’s

return

to

underground

work,

CCC

prohibited her from returning to her former position. Anderson
filed an unsuccessful labor grievance, and when CCC was unable
to find a suitable alternative position for her, it terminated
her

employment.

(among

other

Anderson

things)

that

then

filed

CCC

this

violated

lawsuit

West

contending

Virginia

law

by

retaliating against her for filing a workers’ compensation claim
and by discriminating against her based on the fact that she has
osteoporosis. The district court granted CCC’s summary judgment
motion

on

these

claims,

and

Anderson

now

appeals.

For

the

that

the

following reasons, we affirm.
I
Federal

Civil

Procedure

Rule

56(a)

provides

district court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
3

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 4 of 33

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” We review a
summary judgment order de novo. Lee Graham Shopping Ctr., LLC v.
Estate of Kirsch, 777 F.3d 678, 681 (4th Cir. 2015).
West Virginia Code § 23-5A-1 provides that “[n]o employer
shall discriminate in any manner against any of his present or
former employees because of such present or former employee’s
receipt

of

or

attempt

to

receive”

workers’

compensation

benefits. West Virginia Code § 5-11-9(1) provides that it is
unlawful

“[f]or

any

employer

to

discriminate

against

an

individual with respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment if the individual is able
and

competent

to

perform

the

services

required

even

if

such

individual is blind or disabled.”
For claims under either statute, the employee bears the
ultimate burden of proving the employer’s illegal motive. See
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Smith, 729 S.E.2d 151, 169 (W.Va. 2012)
(retaliation); Hanlon v. Chambers, 464 S.E.2d 741, 748 (W.Va.
1995)

(discrimination).

Where,

as

here,

there

is

no

direct

evidence of retaliation or discrimination, the general scheme of
proof

for

both

claims

is

substantially

the

same:

(1)

the

employee bears the burden of presenting a prima facie case; (2)
if she presents a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
4

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 5 of 33

her discharge; and (3) if the employer presents such a reason,
the

employee

must

establish

that

the

proffered

reason

is

pretextual. See Powell v. Wyoming Cablevision, Inc., 403 S.E.2d
717,

721-22

Assoc.

Coal

(W.Va.

1991)

Corp.,

358

(retaliation);
S.E.2d

423,

Conaway
429-30

v.

Eastern

(W.Va.

1986)

(discrimination).
II
The following material facts are not disputed. Anderson is
a long-time CCC employee who was diagnosed with osteoporosis in
2005.

In

November

2009,

while

Anderson

was

working

in

the

Loveridge Mine, she fell and fractured her elbow and pelvis.
Anderson

was

treated

by

Dr.

Nancy

McKinley,

an

orthopedic

surgeon and also underwent physical therapy. Anderson filed a
workers’

compensation

claim

for

this

injury

and

received

workers’ compensation benefits.
Several

months

later,

Dr.

McKinley

released

Anderson

to

return to work. Before allowing her to return, CCC (through its
workers’

compensation

examination,
Steinman

which

performed

administrator)

included
this

a

bone

examination

obtained
density

and

found

a

scan.
that

medical
Dr.

Dean

the

scan

results, accompanied by other risk factors and the severity of
her injuries from her relatively minor 2009 fall, presented too
great a risk of re-fracture to return her to work in the coal
mine. When Dr. Steinman’s report was presented to Dr. McKinley
5

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 6 of 33

for review, Dr. McKinley noted that although “common sense” may
suggest that Anderson not return to work in the mine, J.A. 1262,
she did not believe that Anderson was precluded from doing so.
Faced

with

this

conflict

of

opinions,

CCC

approved

a

record

review by Dr. Vincent Ripepi. Following his review, Dr. Ripepi
agreed with Dr. Steinman.
Anderson

disagreed

with

Dr.

Steinman’s

and

Dr.

Ripepi’s

medical opinions. CCC therefore implemented Article III(j) of
the CBA. In pertinent part, Article III(j) provides that “once
employed, an Employee cannot be terminated or refused . . .
recall from sick or injured status for medical reasons over his
objection

without

the

concurrence

of

a

majority

of

a

group

composed of an Employer-approved physician, an Employee-approved
physician, and a physician agreed to by the Employer and the
Employee,

that

condition

which

there

has

prevents

been
the

a

deterioration

Employee

from

in

physical

performing

his

regular work.” J.A. 861.
Anderson
physician,”
approved

selected

and

CCC

physician.”

Dr.

McKinley

selected
By

Dr.

as

the

Steinman

agreement,

the

“Employee-approved
as

the

parties

“Employer-

then

met

to

select the third physician, who would be the tiebreaker. Each
party

proposed

four

doctors

at

this

meeting,

and

each

party

struck three names proposed by the other, leaving each party

6

Appeal: 14-2048

with

Doc: 41

a

single

Filed: 01/21/2016

physician

Pg: 7 of 33

remaining. 1

The

names

of

the

two

remaining physicians, Dr. Sushil Sethi – who was CCC’s choice and Dr. Shelly Kafka – who was Anderson’s choice - were placed
in a hat. Anderson selected Dr. Kafka’s name out of the hat, and
CCC agreed to use Dr. Kafka. However, Dr. Kafka declined to
participate in the evaluation process.
Anderson then put forth two additional doctors’ names. CCC
struck

one

doctor,

leaving

Dr.

Brian

Houston

as

Anderson’s

proposed doctor. Dr. Houston’s name was then placed in the hat
with Dr. Sethi’s name. Anderson again selected a name from the
hat, this time choosing Dr. Sethi. Anderson did not object to
being

seen

by

Dr.

Sethi,

and

he

performed

her

physical

examination. Thereafter, Dr. Sethi opined that Anderson was not
able to work safely underground because of her high risk for
repeat fracture. Specifically, Dr. Sethi stated:
On the basis of my examination and review of
medical records as well as my thorough research
osteoporosis, it is my medical opinion that
deterioration of the bone due to early onset
1

the
of
the
of

Helen Blevins, a registered nurse, testified on behalf of
CCC that a limited number of area doctors were willing to engage
in workers’ compensation and similar evaluative work. When she
selected doctors for the CBA process, she looked at factors such
as a doctor’s capability, knowledge, availability, willingness,
and timeliness in an effort to obtain the best and most timely
results. Anderson argues that proof of CCC’s improper motives
lies in the fact that CCC proffered only doctors who were not
osteoporosis specialists. However, CCC did proffer an orthopedic
surgeon, but Anderson struck this doctor from the list.

7

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 8 of 33

menopause as well as aging and having caused a
fracture with a very minor activity, is a very high
risk factor in performing her regular work. The use of
medication including Boniva as well as other listed
medications that are available on the market, simply
prevent some osteoclastic activity. It does not cure
the problem of osteoporosis. After having reviewed the
job duties and the risk factors as well as the
description of the bunker employee including ability
to have the capability of safely evacuating the mine
in the event of an emergency, I can say with
reasonable
degree
of
medical
probability
and
certainty, that [Anderson] is not able to safely
perform her regular work as a bunker attendant at
Loveridge Mine. She is a very high risk for repeat
fracture which can happen spontaneously or even from a
minor tripping and would be a risk to herself as well
as other fellow workers.
J.A. 865-66.
Thus, the majority of the medical opinions obtained under
the CBA process recommended that Anderson’s high fracture risk
made it unsafe for her to return to work in the coal mine. CCC
attempted to accommodate Anderson with a surface position as a
dispatcher. CCC’s effort, however, was precluded by seniority
rules

in

the

CBA.

Anderson

then

filed

a

grievance

seeking

reinstatement, but an arbitrator ruled against her, finding that
CCC complied with the CBA. CCC encouraged Anderson to apply for
an open above-ground position. Although Anderson applied and was
interviewed for this position, she ultimately declined to pursue
it.

Unable

to

find

a

satisfactory

alternative

Anderson, CCC terminated her employment.

8

position

for

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 9 of 33

III
Anderson

filed

this

action

asserting

several

state-law

claims. Pertinent to this appeal, Anderson alleged that CCC (1)
retaliated against her for filing a workers’ compensation claim,
in

violation

based

on

of

perceived

to

23-5A-1

fact

the

§

that

be,

or

and
she

which

(2)
has

is

in

discriminated
osteoporosis
fact,

a

against
-

her

which

CCC

disability

-

in

violation of § 5-11-9(1). At the close of discovery, CCC moved
for

summary

judgment

on

several

grounds.

The

district

court

granted the motion for the following reasons.
Regarding

Anderson’s

workers’

compensation

retaliation

claim, the district court noted that Anderson was required to
show three elements to establish a prima facie case: (1) she
sustained

an

on-the-job

injury;

(2)

she

filed

a

claim

for

workers’ compensation benefits; and (3) CCC treated her filing
of a workers’ compensation claim as a significant factor in its
decision to discharge her. See Powell, 403 S.E.2d at 721. The
court found that although Anderson sufficiently showed the first
two elements, she failed to show the third element. The court
explained

that

procedure”

CCC

regarding

“acted
her

under

the

potential

CBA

which

return

to

governed
work

and

the
“a

majority of the necessary medical opinions found that [Anderson]
should not return to work.” J.A. 1039. The court stated: “Simply
put,

no

evidence

exists

to

demonstrate
9

or

imply

that

[CCC]

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 10 of 33

terminated [Anderson] with [workers’] compensation costs serving
as a ‘significant’ factor.” J.A. 1039-40.
Regarding Anderson’s disability discrimination claim, the
district court noted that Anderson was required to show three
elements to establish a prima facie case: (1) she is a member of
a protected class; (2) CCC took an adverse action against her;
and (3) but for her protected status, CCC would not have taken
the adverse action. See Conaway, 358 S.E.2d at 429. Again, the
court

found

that

Anderson

sufficiently

showed

the

first

two

elements, but she failed to show the third element. The court
explained

that

although

CCC

was

aware

of

Anderson’s

osteoporosis, it did not base the decision to terminate her on
the grounds that she is disabled. The court stated:
Rather, in compliance with the CBA, [CCC and Anderson]
received
three
medical
opinions
regarding
[her]
ability to return to work. Of those three opinions,
two
of
the
opinions
advised
the
parties
that
[Anderson] should not return to work. Relying on these
medical opinions, and not simply [her] status as
“disabled” . . . [CCC] terminated her employment.
J.A. 1044.
The

district

court

addressed

and

rejected

Anderson’s

argument that the doctors chosen by CCC for the CBA process were
“company
court

doctors”

found

that

rather

than

“insufficient

osteoporosis
evidence

has

specialists.
been

offered

The
to

support these claims, and they are speculation at best.” J.A.
1044. Further, the court stated that “the specialty-level of the
10

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

doctors

in

Filed: 01/21/2016

this

case

is

not

Pg: 11 of 33

a

germane

issue

to

the

law

at

issue.” J.A. 1044-45. Reiterating its earlier discussion of the
workers’ compensation retaliation claim, the court explained:
The facts show that [CCC] acted under an honest belief
regarding whether to discharge [Anderson], basing the
decision on the recommendations by licensed physicians
with experience, though technically not specialties,
in osteoporosis. Both parties together selected the
third physician, meaning that [Anderson] herself
agreed to be examined by this physician. More
importantly, the terms of the CBA do not require the
evaluating doctors be specialists in their field.
Thus, the argument that the evaluating doctors did not
practice in any medical specialty or possess any
particular certification relating to osteoporosis is
not relevant in this civil action, as such was not
required under the CBA.
J.A. 1045.
The district court further concluded that even if Anderson
had shown a prima facie case of disability discrimination, CCC
offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge:
the

CBA

medical

review

process,

which

led

to

the

medical

opinions advising that she not return to her former position.
Finally,

the

court

found

that

Anderson

failed

to

present

sufficient evidence of pretext to rebut CCC’s proffered reason.
IV
Anderson contends that the district court erred in several
respects
primarily

by

granting

argues

CCC’s

that

the

summary
court

judgment
erred

in

motion.

Anderson

assessing

her

disability discrimination claim because it failed to conduct the

11

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 12 of 33

analysis set forth in West Virginia Code of State Rules § 77-14.8. She also argues with respect to both of her claims that the
court

resolved

disputed

facts

against

her

and

failed

to

recognize the existence of genuine issues of material fact. In
response, CCC argues that the court correctly entered summary
judgment on Anderson’s claims.
Having

carefully

appropriate

summary

considered

judgment

this

standard,

matter
we

under

agree

the

with

the

district court that the undisputed material facts in the record
establish as a matter of law that CCC’s decision to terminate
Anderson’s

employment

retaliatory

motive.

was

not

Instead,

based

those

on

facts

a

discriminatory

establish

that

or

when

Anderson attempted to return to work following her work-related
injury,

CCC

was

presented

with

conflicting

medical

opinions

about whether she could do so safely. 2 For that reason, CCC
implemented the CBA medical-review process, in which Anderson
fully and

freely

participated,

and

two

of

the

three

doctors

selected in that process opined against her return to the coal

2

CCC’s decision to have Anderson evaluated before returning
her to work did not violate West Virginia law. See, e.g., Stone
v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Parkersburg, 538 S.E.2d 389, 407 (W.Va.
2000) (“[T]he mere fact that the Hospital sent Mr. Stone for an
independent medical examination did not prove a case of
disability discrimination.”).

12

Appeal: 14-2048

mine. 3

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Consequently,

CCC

was

Pg: 13 of 33

then

within

its

collectively

bargained right to prohibit Anderson from returning to the coal
mine.

Ultimately,

after

it

was

CCC

unable

terminated

to

place

Anderson’s

her

in

a

employment

suitable

only

alternative

position.
Anderson has proffered evidence which she contends creates
genuine issues of material fact about the qualifications and
opinions of the doctors who examined her as part of the CBA
medical-review process and about the purported motives of CCC
personnel.

We

have

considered

this

evidence

in

our

summary

judgment review. However, we conclude that Anderson has failed
to

present

material

sufficient

fact

to

evidence

establish

to

that

create
her

a

genuine

filing

of

issue

a

of

workers’

compensation claim was a significant factor in CCC’s decision to
terminate her. For this reason, we affirm the grant of summary
judgment on the retaliation claim. See, e.g., Yoho v. Triangle
PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204, 210 (W.Va. 1985) (affirming dismissal
of § 23-5A-1 claim where the employee was discharged pursuant to
a

“facially

neutral

provision

3

of

the

collective

bargaining

Dr. Ripepi also opined against Anderson’s return to work
in the mine. Therefore, three doctors who considered the matter
before Anderson was terminated believed that she should not
return to the mine. Moreover, Dr. McKinley (who was Anderson’s
choice in the Article III(j) process) equivocated, stating that
“common sense” suggested that Anderson not return to the mine.

13

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

agreement”).

Filed: 01/21/2016

Likewise,

we

Pg: 14 of 33

conclude

that

even

if

Anderson

presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination,

CCC

has

presented

a

legitimate,

non-

discriminatory reason for terminating her employment (i.e., the
CBA

medical-review

process),

and

she

has

failed

to

present

sufficient evidence to establish pretext. Therefore, we affirm
the grant of summary judgment on the discrimination claim. See,
e.g., Bailey v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 527 S.E.2d 516, 536
(W.Va.

1999)

(noting

that

the

parties’

collective

bargaining

agreement provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the challenged action).
As noted, Anderson primarily argues that the district court
failed to analyze her discrimination claim under West Virginia
Code

of

State

Rules

§

77-1-4.8.

We

disagree

with

Anderson’s

contention that § 77-1-4.8 dictates a different outcome.
Rule

77-1-4

is

titled

and

part

of

Prohibited”
general

is

anti-discrimination

“a

“Employment
detailed

requirements

Discrimination

explication
of

the

Human

of

the

Rights

Act, [§ 5-11-9].” Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 396 n.8. Section 77-1-4.1
and

its

subsections

employment.
matters

Various

that

are

prohibit

other

disability

sections

unrelated

to

this

of

Rule

case,

discrimination
77-1-4
but

two

§§ 77-1-4.7 and 4.8, are pertinent to our discussion.

14

deal

in
with

sections,

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 15 of 33

Section 77-1-4.7 provides that an “individual’s ability to
perform

a

particular

job

must

be

assessed

on

an

individual

basis,” and an employer “may discharge a qualified individual
with a disability if, even after reasonable accommodation, the
individual is unable to perform the essential functions of the
job without creating a substantial hazard to his/her health and
safety or the health and safety of others.” Section 77-1-4.7
cautions

that

“any

such

decision

shall

be

[based]

upon

the

individual’s actual abilities, and not upon general assumptions
or stereotypes about persons with particular mental or physical
disabilities.”
Section 77-1-4.8 then provides that “[i]n deciding whether
an individual poses a direct threat to health and safety, the
employer

has

the

burden

of

demonstrating

that

a

reasonable

probability of a materially enhanced risk of substantial harm to
the

health

eliminated

or

safety

or

of

reduced

by

the

individual

reasonable

or

others

cannot

accommodation.”

be

Further,

§ 77-1-4.8 specifies that “[t]he employer’s determination that
an

individual

poses

a

‘direct

threat’

shall

be

based

on

an

individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to
safely

perform

assessment

shall

the
be

essential
based

on

functions
a

of

reasonable

the

job.

medical

This

judgement

[sic] that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or
on

the

best

available

objective
15

evidence.”

Section

77-1-4.8

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

concludes

by

Filed: 01/21/2016

listing

several

Pg: 16 of 33

non-exclusive

factors

to

be

considered in determining whether an individual would pose a
direct threat.
According

to

Anderson,

§

77-1-4.8

“is

an

affirmative

defense that requires the employer to prove that the medical
opinion upon which it relies was based on an ‘individualized
assessment’ of the employee, on ‘competent medical advice’ and
on the ‘most current medical knowledge’ in the relevant field.”
Opening

Brief

failed

to

of

Appellant,

comply

with

§

at

8. 4

77-1-4.8

Anderson
because

argues
it

that

CCC

selected

and

recommended evaluators who “it knew or should have known had
little

or

no

expertise

in

osteoporosis,

who

lacked

‘current

medical knowledge’ about the disease and who did not provide
competent opinions about [her] risk of future injury.” Id. at 9.
Although the role of § 77-1-4.8 within the shifting-burden
analysis

used

entirely

clear,

for
we

employment
will

discrimination

assume

that

the

claims
section

is

not

becomes

applicable when, in response to an employee’s prima facie case,
the employer asserts that an employee cannot safely perform her
job as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination.
4

In Stone, the court explained that “to satisfy the
standard of a serious threat to one’s health or safety, the
employer must establish that it relied upon competent medical
advice that there exists a reasonably probable risk of serious
harm.” 538 S.E.2d at 397 (emphasis added and citation omitted).

16

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 17 of 33

As we have already held, the undisputed evidence establishes
that CCC terminated Anderson as a result of the CBA medicalreview

process,

discriminatory

which

is

reason.

unquestionably

Contrary

to

a

legitimate,

Anderson’s

argument,

nonwe

conclude that through its implementation of the CBA medicalreview process, CCC met its burden under § 77-1-4.8. 5
Fundamentally,

§

77-1-4.8

requires

that

the

employer’s

decision must be made on “an individualized assessment of the
individual’s
functions

of

present
the

ability

job.”

By

to

safely

relying

on

perform
the

the

various

essential
specific

medical opinions obtained before and during the CBA medicalreview process, CCC made its decision about Anderson’s ability
to return to the coal mine on an individualized assessment of
her condition and ability rather than “upon general assumptions
or stereotypes about persons” with osteoporosis. § 77-1-4.7.

5

CCC unsuccessfully argued below that Anderson’s claims are
preempted by the Federal Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”). CCC reiterates this argument as one of several
alternate bases for affirming the summary judgment. We need not
decide the issue, but we note that Anderson’s reliance on § 771-4.8 does raise a significant LMRA preemption question. See
Barton v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 745 F.3d 95, 107 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 160 (2014) (stating the general
rule that when the evaluation of the state law claim is
inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the
labor contract, such that it is necessary to interpret the
collective-bargaining agreement to resolve the claim, the claim
is preempted).

17

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 18 of 33

Moving forward in the analysis, § 77-1-4.8 specifies that
the individualized assessment must be based on a “reasonable”
medical

judgment

(from

a

competent

medical

practitioner)

who

relies on “the most current medical knowledge” or on “the best
available

objective

evidence.” 6

We

believe

the

undisputed

material evidence in the record establishes that CCC met this
standard. CCC utilized doctors who had the ability to conduct
the medical testing specific to Anderson’s condition and who
were experienced in providing occupational medical evaluations.
These doctors assessed Anderson’s bone density scans, along with
other risk factors, and examined extensive details regarding the
specific job requirements of her position. To be sure, Anderson
points to conflicting evidence regarding her ability to return
to

her

former

position,

but

the

fact

that

medical

opinions

differ does not establish that CCC’s reliance on Dr. Steinman’s
and Dr. Sethi’s assessments was unreasonable. 7 Moreover, although

6

Section 77-1-4.8 states that the assessment “shall be
based on a reasonable medical judgement [sic] that relies on the
most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available
objective evidence.” The term “and/or” typically means “or.” See
Curry v. W.Va. Consol. Pub. Retire. Bd., 778 S.E.2d 637, 642 n.4
(W.Va. Oct. 7, 2015); Dynalectron Corp. v. Equitable Trust Co.,
704 F.2d 737, 739 (4th Cir. 1983).
7

As noted, Anderson recommended both Dr. McKinley and Dr.
Kafka during the CBA medical-review process, but Dr. Kafka
declined to participate. Dr. Kafka did examine Anderson at a
later time, and Anderson now relies on Dr. Kafka’s opinion to
support her case. Had Dr. Kafka rendered her opinion during the
(Continued)
18

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 19 of 33

Anderson contends that CCC was required to utilize and rely only
on

osteoporosis

specialists

in

making

its

individualized

assessment, we find nothing to establish that § 77-1-4.8 imposes
such a rigid requirement. See generally Farley v. Shook, 629
S.E.2d 739, 746 (W.Va. 2006) (“While a physician does not have
to be board certified in a specialty to qualify to render an
expert

opinion,

the

physician

must

have

some

experience

or

knowledge on which to base his or her opinion.”).
V
We are not unsympathetic to Anderson’s desire to return to
her job. However, West Virginia law recognizes “the right of an
employer to protect employees, the public, and the workplace
from danger or injury that might occur as a result of a person’s
possible impairments, when such protection is done in a fashion
that is consistent with the duty of reasonable accommodation.”
Stone, 538 S.E.2d at 397. This right is also embodied in the
CBA. Based on the record before us, we agree with the district
court that the undisputed material evidence establishes that CCC

CBA process, she would have cast the tiebreaking vote in
Anderson’s favor, and CCC presumably would have been obligated
under the CBA to return Anderson to work. These facts highlight
the role of the CBA process in Anderson’s termination and
undercut her claims of retaliation and discrimination.

19

Appeal: 14-2048

did

Doc: 41

not

Filed: 01/21/2016

illegally

retaliate

Pg: 20 of 33

or

discriminate

against

her.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
AFFIRMED

20

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 21 of 33

WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Joyce

Anderson

satisfactory

work

Consolidation

was
record

Coal

fifty-two
nearly

Company

years
three

(“CCC”)

old

and

decades

terminated

had

long

her,

a

when

on

the

grounds that her osteoporosis prevented her return to work after
recovering

from

termination

on

after

a

Ostensibly,

company-directed

Anderson’s

unreservedly

fracture.

treating

cleared

her

medical

return

based

evaluations

orthopedic
to

CCC

surgeon
to

rendered

had

work,

her

already

and

those

evaluations appear to have been based largely on an erroneous
interpretation of a single study found through Google or similar
search engines.
The majority opinion nevertheless concludes that there is
no genuine factual dispute regarding whether CCC’s termination
decision satisfied the relevant state standards—that is, whether
it

was

based

on

a

“reasonable”

medical

judgment,

one

“that

relie[d] on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the
best available objective evidence.”
§ 77-1-4.8.

I

cannot

reach

the

Ante, at 18; W. Va. Code R.
same

conclusion.

For

this

reason and those elaborated below, I dissent.
I.
A.
The
Anderson

majority
has

opinion

successfully

assumes,
made
21

out

without

deciding,

a

facie

prima

case

that
of

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

disability discrimination.

Pg: 22 of 33

Ante, at 14.

is simple enough to decide.

In my view, the issue

Anderson provided abundant evidence

that she was “regarded as” disabled by CCC, W. Va. Code § 5-113(m)(3); Stone v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. of Parkersburg, 538 S.E.2d
389, 399 (W. Va. 2000), and that “but for” that perception of
her disability, she would not have been terminated.

See Conaway

v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 358 S.E.2d 423, 429 (W. Va. 1986)
(enumerating the elements of a prima facie discrimination claim
under

West

Virginia

Code

§ 5-11-9).

The

district

court

therefore erred in concluding that Anderson failed to make out a
prima facie case of disability discrimination. 1
B.
The majority opinion concludes that Anderson failed to make
out a prima facie case of workers’ compensation retaliation,
ante,

at

evidence

13,
that:

which
“(1)

requires
an

an

employee

on-the-job

injury

to

offer

was

sufficient

sustained;

(2)

proceedings were instituted under the Workers’ Compensation Act
1

The district court arguably should have applied a
different
prima
facie
test,
specific
to
disability
discrimination suits in West Virginia, which requires that the
plaintiff (1) satisfy the definition of “handicapped” or
“disabled,”
(2)
be
able
to
perform,
with
reasonable
accommodation, the relevant job, and (3) was discharged.
Hosaflook v. Consolidation Coal Co., 497 S.E.2d 174, 179–80 (W.
Va. 1997).
Anderson provided sufficient evidence to satisfy
these elements, too.
Cf. Morris Mem’l Convalescent Nursing
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 431 S.E.2d 353, 357–59
(W. Va. 1993).

22

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 23 of 33

. . . ; and (3) the filing of a workers’ compensation claim was
a significant factor in the employer’s decision to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against the employee.”
Cablevision,

Inc.,

403

S.E.2d

717,

721

(W.

Powell v. Wyo.
Va.

1991).

The

majority opinion states that Anderson “has failed to present
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact”
regarding the third, “nexus” element, i.e., whether “her filing
of a workers’ compensation claim was a significant factor in
CCC’s decision to terminate her.”

Ante, at 13.

I disagree.

Due to the typical lack of direct evidence in employment
retaliation

cases,

we

are

to

examine

circumstantial

evidence

when evaluating the third element of a plaintiff’s prima facie
case,

including

firing,”

“[e]vidence

supervisory
evidence

“[p]roximity
of

evaluations

of

an

actual

submitting the claim.”

in

time

satisfactory
before
pattern

the
of

of

the

work

claim

and

the

performance

and

accident,”
harassing

and

“[a]ny

conduct

for

Powell, 403 S.E.2d at 721.

Here, Anderson offered evidence with respect to each of
these factors.

First, with respect to the “proximity in time”

factor, Anderson began receiving workers’ compensation benefits
on November 4, 2009, was released to return to work by her
physician

on

March

24,

2010,

effective

March

29,

without

restrictions, was informed on April 25 that she would not be
allowed to return to work, and was terminated on June 22.
23

The

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 24 of 33

proximity among these various dates contributes to a permissible
inference

that

the

workers’

compensation

“significant factor” in Anderson’s termination.
Second,
work

the

record

performance

accident.”

contains

and

Id.

“[e]vidence

supervisory

claim

was

a

Id.
of

satisfactory

evaluations

before

the

Anderson was employed continuously with CCC

from October 15, 1981, through the date of her termination; in
that time, she established a “good work record” and was “well
thought of by both Management and her fellow employees.”

J.A.

858.
Third,
following

although

the

there

submission

was

of

no

“pattern

Anderson’s

of

harassment”

workers’

compensation

claim, Powell, 403 S.E.2d at 721, there is evidence that before
learning

of

the

initial

return-to-work

examination,

Anderson

received a call from an employee of Wells Fargo, CCC’s workers’
compensation

administrator,

advising

Anderson

that

CCC

was

“going to make an issue of the osteoporosis” and “was going to
put the screws to” her.

J.A. 136–37.

Finally, in addition to the above factors, a trier of fact
is permitted to consider any circumstantial evidence relevant to
the “nexus” prong.

Such evidence includes the fact that CCC is

self-insured,

that

resources
include

and

managers

information

CCC

workers’
about

the

regularly

sends

compensation
cost
24

of

claim

benefits

to

its

human

reports

that

paid

each

to

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

injured miner.

Pg: 25 of 33

Such evidence suggests that CCC may have been

unusually concerned about the costs of its workers’ compensation
program.

See Nestor v. Bruce Hardwood Floors, L.P., 558 S.E.2d

691, 695–96 (W. Va. 2001) (finding a triable question of fact
where “[the employer’s] supervisor bonus system could encourage
a supervisor to discriminate against an employee who files for
workers’ compensation benefits, even if . . . the bonus system
helps reduce workplace injuries”).
In sum, Anderson presented sufficient evidence to establish
all

three

elements

retaliation

case,

of

a

prima

including

facie

evidence

workers’
that

compensation
her

workers’

compensation filing was a significant factor in CCC’s decision
to fire her.
II.
Both parties appear to concede, and the majority assumes,
that

the

requirements

of

section

77-1-4.8

apply

“when,

in

response to an employee’s prima facie case, the employer asserts
that an employee cannot safely perform her job as a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for termination.”
agree.

Ante, at 16.

I

See Ranger Fuel Corp. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 376

S.E.2d 154, 160 (W. Va. 1988) (“The fact that an applicant’s
handicap

creates

a

reasonable

probability

of

a

materially

enhanced risk of substantial harm to the handicapped person or
others is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason [for an adverse
25

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 26 of 33

employment action].”); Syl. Pt. 3, Davidson v. Shoney’s Big Boy
Rest., 380 S.E.2d 232, 233 (W. Va. 1989) (“[T]o satisfy the
standard of a serious threat to one’s health or safety, the
employer must establish that it relied upon competent medical
advice that there exists a reasonably probable risk of serious
harm.”).

In short, it is quite clear that CCC was required to

meet

standards

the

of

section 77-1-4.8

for

its

termination

decision to be “legitimate” and “non-discriminatory.”
Those standards are detailed and rigorous.
15–16.

And

at

summary

judgment

this

Court

See ante, at
is

tasked

with

determining, inter alia, if there is any “genuine dispute,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a), as to whether CCC’s termination decision was
“based on a reasonable medical judgement,” one founded “on the
most

current

medical

objective evidence.”

knowledge

and/or

on

the

best

available

W. Va. Code R. § 77-1-4.8.

Significant to my disagreement with the majority view, the
dispositive

question

is

not,

as

the

majority’s

discussion

suggests, whether CCC “utilized doctors who had the ability to
conduct the medical testing specific to Anderson’s condition and
who

were

experienced

evaluations.”
section 77-1-4.8

Ante,

in
at

requires

providing

18.
that

Rather,
the

26

occupational
by

its

assessment

be

plain

medical
terms,

“reasonable”

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 27 of 33

and based on “the most current medical knowledge” or the “best
available objective evidence.” 2
Nor

is

discussion

the

dispositive

elsewhere

question,

suggests,

whether

as

CCC

complied

terms of its collective bargaining agreement.
17.

the

That is not what section 77-1-4.8 says.

majority’s
with

the

See ante, at 14,
Indeed, on more

than one occasion, West Virginia’s highest court has recognized
that

a

facially

neutral

company

policy

achieve a discriminatory objective.

can

be

exploited

to

Skaggs v. E. Associated

Coal Corp., 569 S.E.2d 769, 777 (W. Va. 2002) (noting that “the
employer’s

use

of

a

system

of

preferred

providers

for

rehabilitation services . . . could be interpreted as a pretext
for a scheme to terminate employees who had received workers’
compensation

benefits”);

Wriston

v.

Raleigh

Cty.

Emergency

Servs. Auth., 518 S.E.2d 650, 659 (W. Va. 1999) (“[W]hile an
employment policy may be facially neutral, it cannot be applied
in a manner that nullifies or trumps the protective requirements
of [a statutory prohibition on discriminatory practices].”).

2

The majority opinion posits that “and/or” should be read
simply as a disjunctive “or.”
Ante, at 18 n.6.
I will not
quibble with the majority’s interpretation, because in this
case, there is a genuine dispute as to whether the judgment in
question was based on either the most current medical knowledge
or the best available objective evidence.

27

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 28 of 33

Section 77-1-4.8 did not require that CCC get the approval
of a specialist or that it comply with the terms of its own
policies.

It did require that CCC’s termination decision be

“based on a reasonable medical judgement,” one founded “on the
most

current

medical

objective evidence.”

knowledge

and/or

on

the

W. Va. Code R. § 77-1-4.8.

best

available

Here, there is

clearly at least a genuine dispute as to whether those standards
were met.
In countering the initial medical evaluation by Anderson’s
treating orthopedic surgeon, who cleared Anderson for work, 3 CCC
relied upon the evaluations of three doctors, none of whom had
any special expertise in osteoporosis, and all of whom relied
heavily

on

a

single

study

that

3

they

appear

by

their

own

Anderson has presented the evaluations of two doctors with
specialized expertise in osteoporosis concurring with Dr.
McKinley’s initial clearance of Anderson for work. One of these
doctors—Dr. Bellantoni—has “23 years of experience as a faculty
physician at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine with an
expertise in the evaluation and treatment of metabolic bone
disorders including osteoporosis.”
J.A. 703.
This expert
evidence is not necessary to or sufficient for my analysis, and
I do not intend to convert every “direct threat” case into a
battle of the experts. Nevertheless, Anderson’s expert evidence
is at least relevant in determining whether there is a genuine
dispute regarding whether the medical judgment CCC relied upon
in terminating Anderson complied with the standards outlined in
section 77-1-4.8,
including
whether
that
judgment
was
“reasonable.”
See Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 336 F.3d
1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining the relevance of a
plaintiff’s expert evidence in an analogous federal suit,
brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990).

28

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 29 of 33

admission either to have misunderstood or to have never read in
the first place.

To illustrate why there is at the very least a

genuine dispute as to whether these evaluations were based on
“the

most

objective

current

medical

evidence,”

W.

knowledge”

Va.

Code

R.

or

the

“best

§ 77-1-4.8,

available
I

briefly

discuss each.
Dr. Steinman was the first CCC doctor to examine Anderson.
His conclusion that Anderson’s osteoporosis prevented her return
to work was discussed in a single paragraph, and his discussion
of Anderson’s fracture risk relied upon a single study peddling
a

particular

patients

(the

fracture
“FRISK

risk

score

study”).

(“FRISK”)
Dr.

for

osteoporosis

Steinman’s

deposition

testimony suggests that a Google search led him to this study. 4
In applying the FRISK study to Anderson, Dr. Steinman selfadmittedly

committed

several

errors.

4

First,

although

Dr.

“Q. Well, you could have gone on – back in 2010, you could have
gone on medical journal databases and done some additional
research, couldn’t you?
A. What I did, I thought, was the – everything that I could do.
Q. Sir, couldn’t you have gone on PubMed – PubMed, P-U-B,
capital P, M-E-D, capital M?
A. It’s my understanding that what I normally do in looking for
things is actually bigger than PubMed –
Q. Where did you normally go – you go?
A. – because I – I get things that are above and beyond PubMed.
Q. Where did you go? Where did you do the research where you
came up with this article as the state of the art?
A. Just do database –
Q. What database? Google? You just Google?
A. Google, Bing, anything that’s available.” J.A. 578.

29

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 30 of 33

Steinman intended to cite the study that developed the FRISK
score, he instead cited a letter to the editor critiquing that
study

on

Second,
study

the

while
to

probability

mean
of

grounds
Dr.

Steinman

that
a

that

it

over-predicted

previously

Anderson

fracture

had

within

fracture

interpreted

at

the

risk.
FRISK

a

fifty-percent

years,

two

least

he

now

concedes

gross error: It turns out that figure was only ten percent.
Finally, it appears that the FRISK study’s findings were at
best marginally relevant to Anderson.
cohort

of

subjects

significantly

The study was based on a

older

and

less

physically

active than Anderson, facts Dr. Steinman was unaware of at the
time,

and

the

fracture

risk

score

the

study

developed

was

intended for use in the context of making treatment decisions,
not fitness-for-work evaluations.
CCC also relied upon Dr. Ripepi’s “chart review” of Dr.
Steinman’s report, which was limited to examining that report
and the four corners of Anderson’s medical records.

Dr. Ripepi

noted that he agreed completely with Dr. Steinman’s conclusions,
and specifically that Anderson would be at a high risk of repeat
fracture, a conclusion Dr. Steinman had based primarily on his
self-admittedly

flawed

understanding

of

the

FRISK

study.

However, in his deposition, Dr. Ripepi admitted that he never

30

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

read that study. 5

Pg: 31 of 33

Rather, he assumed Dr. Steinman was “familiar

with that literature”: in Dr. Ripepi’s words, it “is a pretty
good assumption, that if you’re going to quote something, then
you’re pretty darn sure of it.”

J.A. 780.

Here, that was not a

good assumption to make.
Finally,

CCC

relied

upon

Dr.

Sethi’s

evaluation

of

Anderson, which in turn relied upon the previous evaluations by
Drs. Steinman and Ripepi.

In his deposition, Dr. Sethi also

admitted that he never read the FRISK study. 6

Indeed, he too

5

“Q. Did you review the article – literature [Dr. Steinman]
relied on at the time you rendered your opinion that you agreed
with him?
A. No. I agreed with his report.
Q. Did you review the literature that he relied on? . . .
A. No.
Q. Have you ever reviewed the literature he relied on?
A. No.” J.A. 772.
6

“Q. Doctor, when you said the fracture risk was developed by
Dr. J. Gorricho, published by the Journal of Radiologists on
October 1, 2007, before you put that in your report, did you
check out and see if that was true?
A. Doctor – I am simply – I am reporting in the context of a
review of the medical records. I’m not treating physician. I’m
not criticizing. I do not need to look up that. I am simply
going by what is in the record and simply quoting another
person’s – what they said. And the review of the record is only
a review of the records. It is –
Q. Did you check – I’m sorry.
A. I don’t know – I do not need to check anything.
Q. But my question is did you check and see if what Dr. Steinman
said about the Gorricho fracture risk was true? Did you check
and see if it was true?
A. I do not need to check it because my role is only reviewing
the record and quoting what is in the record.
(Continued)
31

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 32 of 33

erroneously cited the letter to the editor critiquing the study
he meant to cite.

Although Dr. Sethi reviewed Dr. McKinley’s

evaluation of Anderson, clearing her for work, he discredited
that

evaluation

McKinley
studies.
Anderson

did

on

not

the
base

grounds—now
her

somewhat

conclusion

on

ironic—that
specific

Dr.

medical

Much of Dr. Sethi’s analysis had nothing to do with
specifically.

The

rest

was

based

on

the

errant

assessments of fracture risk made by Drs. Steinman and Ripepi,
or what Dr. Sethi later admitted to relying on: “common sense.”
J.A. 823.

Although Dr. Sethi attached to his evaluation a copy

of one medical article on osteoporosis and a partial copy of
another, these studies are nowhere referenced or discussed in
his evaluation.
In sum, CCC’s doctors relied on an inapplicable study and
on each others’ faulty evaluations to conclude that Anderson’s
osteoporosis precluded her from returning to work.

I simply

cannot join the majority opinion in concluding that there exists
no genuine dispute as to whether those troubled evaluations were
“reasonable” and based on “the most current medical knowledge”

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

So the answer then is, no, you did not check it?
I do not need to check it.
And so you did not check it?
I did not.” J.A. 810–11.

32

Appeal: 14-2048

Doc: 41

Filed: 01/21/2016

Pg: 33 of 33

or the “best available objective evidence.”

W. Va. Code R.

§ 77-1-4.8.
III.
In conclusion, in my view, Anderson has made out a prima
facie

case

of

disability

compensation retaliation.

discrimination

and

workers’

Additionally, material issues of fact

remain regarding whether CCC has met West Virginia’s mandatory
standards for what constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory
basis

for

termination

under

these

circumstances.

Where

an

evaluating doctor has himself conceded that his methodology was
erroneous, I cannot conclude that it is beyond dispute that such
a

judgment

was

“reasonable”

and

based

on

“the

most

medical knowledge” or “the best objective evidence.”
summary

judgment

should

have

been

respectfully dissent.

33

denied.

current

Therefore,

Accordingly,

I