Huntington Ingalls Inc. v. NLRB
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion--granting Motion for enforcement of agency order (FRAP 15) [999452031-2] in 14-2072, granting Motion for enforcement of agency order (FRAP 15) [999462251-2] in 14-2148 Originating case number: 05-CA-081306. Copies to all parties and the agency. [999704570]. Mailed to: Charles Posner & Wayne Gold. [14-2051, 14-2072, 14-2148]
Appeal: 14-2051
Doc: 79
Filed: 11/23/2015
Pg: 1 of 11
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2051
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED,
Petitioner,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent,
INTERNATIONAL
WORKERS,
ASSOCIATION
OF
MACHINISTS
AND
AEROSPACE
Intervenor.
-----------------------------CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Amicus Supporting Petitioner.
No. 14-2148
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner,
v.
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED,
Respondent,
INTERNATIONAL
WORKERS,
ASSOCIATION
OF
MACHINISTS
AND
AEROSPACE
Appeal: 14-2051
Doc: 79
Filed: 11/23/2015
Pg: 2 of 11
Intervenor.
----------------------------CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Amicus Supporting Petitioner.
Petition for Review and Cross Application for Enforcement of an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board. (05−CA−081306)
No. 14-2072
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner,
v.
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY SOUTHEAST, LLC,
Respondent.
_______________
On Application for Enforcement of an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board. (11−CA−073779)
Argued:
September 16, 2015
Decided:
November 23, 2015
Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Enforcement granted by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2
Appeal: 14-2051
Doc: 79
Filed: 11/23/2015
Pg: 3 of 11
Nos. 14-2051/2148.
ARGUED: Gregory Branch Robertson, HUNTON &
WILLIAMS
LLP,
Richmond,
Virginia,
for
Petitioner/CrossRespondent.
Heather Stacy Beard, Robert James Englehart,
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
BOARD,
Washington,
D.C.,
for
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner. ON BRIEF: Kurt G. Larkin, HUNTON &
WILLIAMS LLP, Richmond, Virginia; Dean C. Berry, Assistant
General Counsel, HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIES, INC., Newport
News, Virginia, for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent.
Richard F.
Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, Jennifer Abruzzo, Deputy General
Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda
Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel, David Seid, NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Respondent/CrossPetitioner.
William H. Haller, Associate General Counsel,
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,
Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Intervenor.
Kate Comerford Todd,
Steven P. Lehotsky, U.S. CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, Washington,
D.C.; Noel J. Francisco, James M. Burnham, Sarah A. Hunger,
JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.
No. 14-2072.
ARGUED: Heather Stacy Beard, David A. Seid,
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
BOARD,
Washington,
D.C.,
for
Petitioner.
Dean John Sauer, JAMES OTIS LAW GROUP, LLC, St.
Louis, Missouri; Daniel R. Begian, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,
SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., St. Louis, Missouri, for Respondent. ON
BRIEF: Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, Jennifer
Abruzzo, Deputy General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, Associate
General
Counsel,
Linda
Dreeben,
Deputy
Associate
General
Counsel, Robert J. Englehart, Supervisory Attorney, NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
BOARD,
Washington,
D.C.,
for
Petitioner.
Michael Martinich-Sauter, CLARK & SAUER, LLC, St. Louis,
Missouri, for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3
Appeal: 14-2051
Doc: 79
Filed: 11/23/2015
Pg: 4 of 11
PER CURIAM:
These refusal-to-bargain cases are before us for the second
time on appeal.
In the first appeal, Enterprise Leasing Company
Southeast, LLC (Enterprise) and Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated
(Huntington) challenged orders of the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) requiring each company to bargain with the
union, Local 391 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
in the case of Enterprise and the International Association of
Machinists
and
Aerospace
Workers
in
the
case
following Board-conducted union elections.
of
Huntington,
Because each case
involved the constitutional question of whether the President’s
three January 2012 appointments to the Board ran afoul of the
United
States
Constitution’s
Recess
Appointments
Clause,
U.S.
Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3, thereby depriving the Board of a
proper quorum, we first addressed whether each company violated
the
NLRA
as
presented.
a
means
of
avoiding
the
constitutional
question
NLRB v. Enterprise Leasing Co. Southeast, LLC, 722
F.3d 609, 613-14 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2902
(2014).
Board
On this nonconstitutional question, we agreed with the
that
both
Enterprise
and
Huntington
violated
Sections
8(a)(1) and (a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (5), by refusing to bargain with the
unions,
722
F.3d
at
616-20,
624-31.
Because
the
nonconstitutional question was resolved in favor of the Board,
4
Appeal: 14-2051
Doc: 79
Filed: 11/23/2015
Pg: 5 of 11
we addressed the constitutional question presented.
question,
we
appointments
held
to
that
the
the
Board
President’s
violated
three
the
On this
January
Recess
2012
Appointment
Clause, and, therefore, the Board lacked a proper quorum when it
issued its decisions in 2012.
Id. at 631-60.
Because the Board
lacked a proper quorum, we “vacated” the Board’s decisions and
denied enforcement of the Board’s orders.
Following
our
decision,
the
Board
Id. at 660.
filed
a
petition
for
rehearing for the limited purpose of requesting that we modify
our judgment to include language explicitly remanding the cases
to the Board for further proceedings.
In so requesting, the
Board posited that such a request was actually unnecessary given
that our decision “anticipat[es] the possibility of issuance of
new Board orders.”
(Huntington J.A. 640).
Nevertheless, the
Board desired such language in our judgment to avoid “needless
litigation.”
denied
the
(Huntington
petition
for
J.A.
640).
rehearing.
Summarily,
The
Board
this
then
court
filed
a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court.
In
NLRB
v.
Noel
Canning,
134
S.
Ct.
2550
(2014),
the
Supreme Court resolved the constitutional question addressed by
this
court
in
its
prior
panel
opinion.
There,
the
Court
affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s determination that the President’s
three January 2012 appointments to the Board were invalid.
5
Id.
Appeal: 14-2051
Doc: 79
at 2578.
the
Filed: 11/23/2015
Pg: 6 of 11
In so affirming, however, the Court took issue with
D.C.
Circuit’s
reasoning,
opining
that
the
Recess
Appointments Clause applies to both inter-session recesses and
“intra-session recess[es] of substantial length,” id. at 2561,
as well as to Board vacancies that occur prior to or during the
recess,
id.
at
President’s
2567.
three
According
January
2012
to
the
Court,
appointments
because
to
the
the
Board
occurred during a three-day recess of the Senate, the recess was
“too short a time to bring [the] recess within the scope of the
Clause,” and, therefore, the recess appointments were invalid.
Id. at 2557.
Following the Court’s decision in Noel Canning,
the Supreme Court denied the Board’s petition for a writ of
certiorari
in
this
case.
NLRB
v.
Enterprise
Leasing
Co.
Southeast, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014).
On
August
14,
2014,
the
Board’s
Executive
Secretary
notified both Enterprise and Huntington that because the “Board
panel
that
previously
decided”
each
case
was
“not
properly
constituted,” the Board was going to consider each case “anew.”
(Enterprise J.A. 467; Huntington J.A. 1808).
Both Enterprise
and Huntington objected to the Board’s consideration of their
respective cases on the basis that, absent a remand from this
court, the Board lacked jurisdiction.
On October 2, 2014, a properly constituted Board issued a
decision in Enterprise’s case, and a similarly constituted Board
6
Appeal: 14-2051
Doc: 79
Filed: 11/23/2015
Pg: 7 of 11
issued a decision in Huntington’s case on October 3, 2014.
The
Board rejected Enterprise’s and Huntington’s arguments that the
Board lacked jurisdiction to issue its decisions.
The Board
reasoned that our prior decision clearly contemplated further
Board action and that such further action was consistent with
the Eighth Circuit’s decision in NLRB v. Whitesell Corp., 638
F.3d
883,
889
(8th
Cir.
2011)
(holding
that
the
denial
of
enforcement on the basis that the Board lacked a proper quorum
did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction to consider the case
anew).
On the merits, the Board adopted the reasoning of its
earlier decisions, further observing that neither Enterprise nor
Huntington
unavailable
reexamine”
offered
“any
evidence”
its
and
Huntington
that
earlier
Huntington J.A. 1816).
to
newly
discovered”
would
or
“require
decisions.
the
(Enterprise
“previously
Board
J.A.
to
472;
The Board’s orders require Enterprise
bargain
with
the
unions
upon
request
and
embody any understanding in a signed agreement.
On October 6, 2014, Huntington filed a petition for review
of the Board’s order against it.
filed
an
application
for
On October 8, 2014, the Board
enforcement
of
its
order
against
Enterprise, and, on October 24, 2014, the Board filed a crossapplication for enforcement of its order against Huntington.
Relying on our decision in NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 81
F.3d 25 (4th Cir. 1996) (Lundy II), Enterprise and Huntington
7
Appeal: 14-2051
first
Doc: 79
Filed: 11/23/2015
contend
that
the
consider the cases anew.
Pg: 8 of 11
Board
was
without
jurisdiction
to
We reject this argument for the simple
reason that Lundy II is distinguishable from the case at hand.
In NLRB v. Lundy Packing Co., 68 F.3d 1577, 1579 (4th Cir.
1995) (Lundy I), we denied enforcement of the Board’s bargaining
unit
determination
for
a
production
and
maintenance
Lundy Packing’s Clinton, North Carolina facility.
1583.
unit
at
Id. at 1579,
The union election that followed the Board’s bargaining
unit determination resulted in a 318 to 309 win for the union.
Id. at 1579.
In denying enforcement of the Board’s bargaining
unit determination, we held that the Board abused its discretion
when it excluded certain employees from the bargaining unit.
Id. at 1580-83.
to
revisit
the
In response to our decision, the Board sought
union
challenged ballots.”
election
results
by
Lundy II, 81 F.3d at 26.
Lundy Packing sought a stay in our court.
Id.
“counting
the
To prevent this,
We held that the
Board was not at liberty to revisit the union election results,
“[a]bsent a remand” from this court.
Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Enterprise and Huntington argue that per Lundy II the Board
in this case was not at liberty to revisit their challenges to
the union election results absent a remand from this court.
We
reject this argument for the simple reason that the court in
Lundy I disposed of the case on the merits, while this court in
8
Appeal: 14-2051
Doc: 79
Filed: 11/23/2015
Pg: 9 of 11
its prior panel opinion did not.
The approach adopted in Lundy II makes perfect sense where
the Board seeks to revisit a merits determination made by this
court.
If the Board is permitted to do so, the products are the
prevention
of
litigation.
review
Id.
by
Indeed,
the
Supreme
to
have
Court
allowed
and
the
endless
Board
to
continuously stab at our merits determination in Lundy I that
the
bargaining
unit
was
underinclusive
would
have
prevented
Supreme Court review of our Lundy I decision and resulted in
endless litigation.
However, where the court denies enforcement
on the basis that the Board lacked a proper quorum, as was the
case
here,
Lundy
II’s
concerns
of
the
prevention
of
Supreme
Court review and endless litigation fall by the way side.
No
action by the Board is preventing Supreme Court review.
In
fact, our prior decision was brought to the Supreme Court for
review, and the parties here are at liberty to seek such review
from the decision we reach today.
endless
litigation
are
not
Likewise, the concerns of
present
where
reconstitutes to obtain a proper quorum.
the
Board
simply
Unlike Lundy II, the
Board here is not looking to find a new factual or legal basis
in
which
to
justify
its
previous
decisions.
Rather,
it
revisited the cases with a proper quorum, and the factual and
legal basis of its decisions have remained the same.
Moreover,
the
interpretation
9
of
Lundy
II
pressed
by
Appeal: 14-2051
Doc: 79
Enterprise
Filed: 11/23/2015
and
Huntington
Pg: 10 of 11
has
its
own
shortcomings.
First,
their interpretation makes little sense because it deprives the
employees of Enterprise and Huntington who have chosen union
representation
through
valid
union
elections
from
having
Enterprise’s and Huntington’s challenges to the union elections
resolved on the merits once and for all by this court.
We see
nothing in the NLRA that intimates the type of deprivation of
review
pressed
by
Enterprise
and
Huntington.
Second,
their
interpretation creates a circuit split and places us at odds
with
the
well-reasoned
Whitesell.
decision
by
the
Eighth
Circuit
in
That court understandably carved out a very narrow
exception to the remand rule where the court disposes of the
case on the basis that the Board issued a quorumless decision.
A
decision
finding
the
lack
of
a
proper
quorum
clearly
contemplates further Board action, and, thus, the Board here did
not
err
when
it
revisited
Enterprise’s
and
Huntington’s
challenges to the union elections.
Next, Enterprise and Huntington contend that the properly
reconstituted
Board
erred
when
it
challenges to the union elections.
rejected
their
respective
These contentions mirror the
challenges previously raised to this court in the prior appeal,
and we reject them for the reasons stated in our prior panel
opinion.
Enterprise
Leasing,
722
F.3d
at
616-20,
624-31.
Huntington also contends that because the bargaining unit has
10
Appeal: 14-2051
Doc: 79
Filed: 11/23/2015
Pg: 11 of 11
grown in size since the union election, we should refuse to
enforce the Board’s order against Huntington.
We have reviewed
this contention and find it to be without merit.
Accordingly,
for
the
reasons
stated
herein,
we
grant
enforcement of the Board’s orders.
ENFORCEMENT GRANTED
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?