Troy Stewart v. Morgan State University

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion--denying Motion for default judgment [999480082-2] Originating case number: 8:11-cv-03605-DKC Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999552543]. Mailed to: Stewart. [14-2056]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2056

TROY STEWART,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY; WARREN HAYMAN; BENJAMIN WELSH;
DALLAS R. EVANS; MARTIN R. RESNIK; T. JOAN ROBINSON; DAVID
WILSON,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District
Judge. (8:11-cv-03605-DKC)

Submitted:

February 27, 2015

Decided:

March 25, 2015

Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Troy Stewart, Appellant Pro Se.
Thomas Faulk,
Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Assistant

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Troy Stewart, a former doctoral candidate at Morgan State
University

(MSU),

faculty

and

Hayman,

Dallas

filed

a

civil

administrators,

David

Wilson

Title

VII

Evans,

employment

including

Martin

(collectively,

action

against

and

Benjamin

Resnick,

Welsh,

T.

Robinson,

Joan

“Defendants”).

discrimination

MSU

and

MSU

Warren
and

Stewart

alleged

retaliation

claims,

violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), and breach of contract.

At the heart of

Stewart’s claims is his disagreement with feedback and grades he
received for an internship course and two lecture courses taught
by

Welsh

academic

during

the

probation,

Spring

2010

unsuccessful

semester,
grade

and

appeal,

his
and

eventual
dismissal

from the doctoral program.
Following

the

dismissal

of

several

of

Stewart’s

claims,

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Stewart
responded.

The court granted summary judgment as to each of

Stewart’s remaining claims.

Stewart now appeals the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

For

the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On

appeal,

Stewart’s

brief.

we

limit
See

our
4th

review
Cir.

R.

to

arguments

34(b).

raised

in

Additionally,

arguments and allegations not raised in the district court are

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not properly before us.

Pg: 3 of 7

See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285

(4th Cir. 2014).
We

review

a

district

court’s

grant

of

summary

judgment

de novo, “viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Smith v.

Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks

omitted).

Summary

judgment

is

appropriate

when

“the

movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Title
individual,

VII

prohibits

an

or

otherwise

.

employer
.

.

from

“discharg[ing]

discriminat[ing]

against

any
any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.”
42

U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)

discriminatory

(2012).

discharge

A

claim

plaintiff

either

by

can

establish

providing

a

direct

evidence of discrimination or by proceeding under the burdenshifting

framework

established

in

McDonnell

Douglas

Corp.

v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

See Diamond v. Colonial Life &

Accident

310,

Ins.

Co.,

416

F.3d

318

(4th

Cir.

2005).

A

plaintiff provides direct evidence by demonstrating that race
was “a motivating factor” in the employer’s adverse employment
decision.

Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640

3

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F.3d

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550,

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558

(4th

Cir.

Pg: 4 of 7

2011)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
To demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must show that (1) he is a
member

of

a

protected

class,

employment

action,

performing

his

legitimate

expectations,

circumstances

(3)

job

at

in

giving

a

Adams, 640 F.3d at 558.

the

to

he

time

manner

and

rise

(2)

(4)
an

suffered

of

the

that

met

he

was

inference

an

adverse

action,
his

he

employer’s

terminated
of

was

under

discrimination.

If the employer provides evidence of a

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the
presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and the employee must
demonstrate

that

discrimination.

the

proffered

reason

was

pretext

for

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc.,

354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
We

have

reviewed

the

record

in

this

case

and

find

no

reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that Stewart
failed to meet his burden of establishing a viable claim of
racial discrimination under either method.

We therefore affirm

substantially for the reasons stated by the district court.

See

also Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 135 (4th Cir.
2002) (recognizing that subjective beliefs about discrimination
are “insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as
to any discriminatory conduct on [employer’s] part”).
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Similarly, a plaintiff may prove a Title VII retaliation
claim either by providing direct evidence of retaliation or by
proceeding

under

the

McDonnell

Douglas

framework.

Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004).
method,

the

plaintiff

establishes

a

prima

Price

v.

Under the latter
facie

retaliation

claim by demonstrating “(1) engagement in a protected activity;
(2) adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the
protected activity and the employment action.”
Ct.

App.,

626

F.3d

187,

190

(4th

Cir.

Coleman v. Md.

2010).

Protected

opposition activities include both “complaints about suspected
violations” and “staging informal protests and voicing one’s own
opinions

in

order

to

bring

discriminatory activities.”
F.3d

397,

406

(4th

Cir.

attention

to

an

employer’s

EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424
2005)

(internal

quotation

marks

and

discern

no

alterations omitted).
Reviewing

the

record

in

its

entirety,

we

reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that Stewart
failed to establish a viable retaliation claim.

See Coleman,

626 F.3d at 190; Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 338
(4th Cir. 2006).
To succeed on a breach of contract claim under Maryland
law, a plaintiff must establish “that the defendant owed the
plaintiff

a

contractual

breached that obligation.”

obligation

and

that

the

defendant

Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 776
5

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A.2d 645, 651 (Md. 2001).

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A contract is only binding if it is

supported by consideration — that is, “a performance or a return
promise must be bargained for” in that “it is sought by the
promisor

in

exchange

for

his

promise

promisee in exchange for that promise.”

and

is

given

by

the

Chernick v. Chernick,

610 A.2d 770, 774 (Md. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We find no error in the court’s conclusion that the Statement of
Agreement between Stewart and Welsh lacked either an obligation
on

Welsh

therefore

(or

any

Stewart

other
did

Defendant)

not

demonstrate

or

consideration,
the

existence

and
of

a

contract to support his breach of contract claim.
Turning to Stewart’s § 1983 claims, Stewart argues that the
district court erred in adjudicating his First Amendment and
Equal Protection claims.

Even assuming, without deciding, that

Stewart properly alleged in the district court a First Amendment
claim of infringement on his right to free speech, we conclude
such a claim necessarily fails.

See Smith v. Gilchrist, 749

F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2014) (addressing requirements for claim
that adverse employment action violates public employee’s free
speech rights); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir.
2004)

(addressing

school-sponsored speech).

constitutional

restrictions

on

Additionally, we find no error in the

court’s adjudication of Stewart’s claim related to his grade

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appeal and affirm as to that claim for the reasons stated by the
district court.
Finally, to the extent Stewart alleges that the district
judge

exhibited

assertions

bias

provide

impartiality

of

the

no

against

him,

legitimate

experienced

we

basis
district

conclude
for

questioning

court

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
we

affirm

the

district

court’s

motion for default judgment.

judgment.

We

his

judge.

bald
the
See

Accordingly,

deny

Stewart’s

We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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