Charles Brown v. Carolyn Colvin

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cv-00096-GCM Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999751727].. [14-2106]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2106

CHARLES A. BROWN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville.
Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (1:13-cv-00096-GCM)

Submitted:

January 26, 2016

Before GREGORY
Circuit Judge.

and

FLOYD,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

February 9, 2016

and

DAVIS,

Senior

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charlotte W. Hall, CHARLES T. HALL LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant.
Jill W. Rose, Acting United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina; John J. Engel, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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Brown

the

PER CURIAM:
Charles

A.

appeals

district

court’s

order

upholding the Commissioner’s denial of Brown’s applications for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.
On appeal, Brown primarily argues that the district violated
Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2013), when affirming
the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) finding that Brown’s heart
condition does not meet or equal the criteria of Listing 4.04C.
Specifically,

Brown

contends

that

the

ALJ

failed

to

explain

sufficiently his finding that Brown’s impairment does not meet
or equal the Listing criteria and that the district court erred
by mining facts from the medical record to support the ALJ’s
decision.

We agree that the ALJ’s explanation was inadequate

and that the district court erred in its analysis.

Accordingly,

we vacate the district court’s judgment and direct the court to
remand the case to the agency for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
“We

will

affirm

the

Social

Security

Administration’s

disability determination when an ALJ has applied correct legal
standards

and

the

ALJ’s

substantial evidence.”
Cir.

2015)

evidence

is

(internal
that

factual

findings

are

supported

by

Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th
quotation

which

a

marks

reasonable

adequate to support a conclusion.
2

omitted).
mind

might

“Substantial
accept

as

It consists of more than a

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mere

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scintilla

of

preponderance.”

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evidence

but

may

be

less

than

a

Pearson v. Colvin, ___ F.3d ___, No. 14-2255,

2015 WL 9204335, at *3 (4th Cir. Dec. 17, 2015) (citation and
internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

We

do

not

“reweigh

conflicting evidence[] [or] make credibility determinations” in
evaluating

whether

a

evidence;

rather,

“[w]here

reasonable

minds

differ,”

decision.

Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)

to

decision

is

supported

conflicting
we

defer

by

substantial

evidence

to

the

allows

Commissioner’s

(internal quotation marks omitted).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate a
disability claim.
(2015).

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)

Pursuant to this process, the Commissioner asks, in

sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged
period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an
impairment

that

met

impairment;

(4)

could

(5) if

not,

economy.

could

Id.

or

equaled

return

perform

to
any

the
his
other

severity
past

of

relevant

work

in

the

a

listed

work;

and

national

The claimant bears the burden of proof at Steps

One through Four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at
Step Five.

Pearson, 2015 WL 9204335, at *3.

If a decision

regarding disability can be made at any step of the process,
however,

the

inquiry

ceases.

20

416.920(a)(4).
3

C.F.R.

§§

404.1520(a)(4),

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Brown argues that the ALJ’s Step Three analysis was grossly
inadequate

under

our

holding

in

Radford.

In

explaining

his

decision at Step Three — that Brown’s heart condition does not
meet or equal the level of severity of Listing 4.04C — the ALJ
stated only that:
The medical evidence of record does not establish the
presence of objective findings that would meet or
equal any impairment listed in the Listing of
Impairments as found in Appendix 1, Subpart P of
Regulations No. 4.
This is consistent [with] the
State
Agency
opinion
considering
Listing[]
4.04
(Ischemic Heart Disease).
We

found

Radford

a

substantially

because

it

was

similar

“devoid

explanation

of

deficient

reasoning”

and

in

rendered

impossible the task of determining whether the ALJ’s finding was
supported by substantial evidence.

734 F.3d at 295.

The Commissioner contends that, despite the similarity in
the cursory explanations provided by the ALJ here and the ALJ in
Radford, we should not remand for further proceedings because,
unlike the medical record in Radford, the medical record here
clearly establishes that Brown’s heart condition does not meet
or

equal

the

criteria

Brown’s

medical

record

clearly

decide,

without

implicated.

Further,

of
is

Listing
not

so

analysis,
we

do

4.04C.
one-sided
that

not

We

that

Listing

accept

conclude
one

4.04C

Brown’s

that
could

is

not

and

the

Commissioner’s invitations to review the medical record de novo
to discover facts to support or refute the ALJ’s finding at Step
4

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Three,

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and

it

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was

error

for

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the

district

court

to

do

so.

Instead, we remand to avoid engaging in fact-finding “in the
first instance” and to allow the ALJ to further develop the
record so that we can conduct a meaningful judicial review in
the event the case returns to us.

Radford, 734 F.3d at 296.

Brown also argues on appeal that the district court erred
in

concluding

that

the

ALJ

properly

accorded

less

than

controlling weight to the opinion of one of Brown’s treating
cardiologists.

However, in view of our decision to vacate the

decision and remand on Step Three of the sequential analysis, we
decline to address this issue.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and
remand with instructions to remand the case to the agency for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately

presented

in

the

materials

before

this

court

and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

5