John Bishop v. County of Macon, N.C.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:10-cv-00009-MOC-DLH. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999617406]. [14-2172]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2172

JOHN WILLIAM BISHOP; DONNA J. BISHOP,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
COUNTY OF MACON, NORTH CAROLINA; MACON COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT; ROBERT L. HOLLAND, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as Sheriff of Macon County; C. J. LAU,
Individually and in his Official Capacity as Deputy Sheriff
of Macon County; GARY GARNER; W. T. POTTS; OHIO CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (2:10-cv-00009-MOC-DLH)

Submitted:

June 29, 2015

Decided:

July 9, 2015

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Paul Louis Bidwell, Asheville, North Carolina; Douglas A. Ruley,
Leicester, North Carolina, for Appellants. Sean F. Perrin, WOMBLE
CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; Ronald
K. Payne, LONG, PARKER, WARREN, ANDERSON & PAYNE, PA, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
John William Bishop (“John”) and his mother, Donna J. Bishop
(“Donna”),

appeal

the

district

magistrate

judge’s

revised

court’s

order

recommendation

and

adopting

dismissing

the
with

prejudice Donna’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012);
dismissing

with

prejudice

the

Bishops’

state

law

claims

for

negligence and bailment against Appellees Holland and Lau in their
individual capacities; dismissing with prejudice Donna’s state law
claims against Appellee Garner; and dismissing without prejudice
Donna’s remaining state law claims.
court

erred

in

dismissing

The Bishops assert that the

Donna’s

federal

claims,

erred

in

dismissing the negligence and bailment claims, and abused its
discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over some of
their state law claims but not others.

Finding no error, we

affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim, accepting factual allegations in the complaint as
true

and

nonmoving

drawing
party.

all

reasonable

Kensington

inferences

Volunteer

Fire

in

favor

Dep’t,

of
Inc.

the
v.

Montgomery Cnty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012); see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint’s

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level,” with “enough facts to state a claim

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to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Under this standard, bare

legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth”
and are insufficient to state a claim.
U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

Moreover, when “a complaint pleads facts

that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops
short

of

the

line

between

entitlement to relief.”

possibility

and

plausibility

of

Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks

omitted).
The Bishops first challenge the dismissal of Donna’s § 1983
claims, asserting that personal property was wrongfully seized
from her home because the items were not listed in the search
warrants.

A valid search warrant must “particularly describ[e]

the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV.

The purpose of this requirement is to

preclude officers from a general, “exploratory rummaging in a
person’s belongings.”

United States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 647

(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Nevertheless,

a

warrant

is

not

intended

to

impose

constitutional strait jacket on investigating officers.

a

Courts

must refrain from interpreting warrant terms in a hypertechnical
manner, and should instead employ a commonsense and realistic
approach.”

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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“A search is not invalidated in its entirety merely because some
seized items were not identified in the warrant.”
v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir. 2001).

United States

Thus, to prevail

on an unlawful seizure claim, a plaintiff must prove that the
government unreasonably seized property. Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506
U.S. 56, 71 (1992).
Although some of the personal property seized was not listed
in the search warrants, we find no error in the district court’s
dismissal of these claims.

A commonsense but not hypertechnical

review of the search warrants accounts for the items seized.

The

mere assertion, without more, that police seized some items not
listed

in

the

warrants

does

not

render

the

seizures

unconstitutional.
The Bishops next contend that the district court erred in
dismissing their state law claims for negligence and bailment
against Holland and Lau in their individual capacities, arguing
that public official immunity did not apply.
North

Carolina,

public

officials

are

We disagree.

generally

immune

In
from

personal liability for negligence in the performance of their
duties unless evidence demonstrates that they acted maliciously,
corruptly, or outside the scope of their official authority.
Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 742 (4th Cir. 2003); Wilcox v.
City of Asheville, 730 S.E.2d 226, 238 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012).

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Here,

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the

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Bishops

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have

neither

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alleged

nor

presented

any

evidence

demonstrating that Holland or Lau acted maliciously, corruptly, or
outside the scope of their official authority.

Moreover, the

Bishops’

cannot

mere

immunity.

allegations

of

gross

negligence

defeat

Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 803 (4th Cir. 1994).

The Bishops also challenge the district court’s exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims.

We review

the court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of
discretion.

Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 203

(4th Cir. 1997).

The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction allows

district courts “authority to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction in limited circumstances, including . . . where the
court

dismisses

jurisdiction.”

the

claims

over

which

it

has

original

ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376,

394 (4th Cir. 2012); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (2012).

In

deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a court
should consider “the values of judicial economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity.”

Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.

343, 350 (1988).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse

its

in

discretion

exercising

supplemental

jurisdiction

and

dismissing the state law claims that involved issues of settled
state law.

Mauro v. S. New England Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d

384, 388 (2d Cir. 2000).

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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