Tough Mudder, LLC v. Mita Sengupta

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:14-cv-00056-GMG Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999610037].. [14-2200]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2200

TOUGH MUDDER, LLC; PEACEMAKER NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER,
LLC; GENERAL MILLS, INC.; GENERAL MILLS SALES, INC.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MITA SENGUPTA, Individually and as Personal Representative
of Avishek Sengupta; BIJON SENGUPTA; PRIYANKA SENGUPTA,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg.
Gina M. Groh,
District Judge. (3:14-cv-00056-GMG)

Submitted:

June 23, 2015

Before SHEDD and
Circuit Judge.

HARRIS,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

June 26, 2015

DAVIS,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert N. Kelly, Michele L. Dearing, JACKSON & CAMPBELL, PC,
Washington, D.C.; Alonzo D. Washington, FLAHERTY SENSABAUGH &
BONASSO, PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellants.
Robert P. Fitzsimmons, Clayton J. Fitzsimmons, FITZSIMMONS LAW
FIRM PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia; Robert J. Gilbert, Edward J.
Denn, GILBERT & RENTON LLC, Andover, Massachusetts, for
Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Tough
LLC,

Mudder,

General

Mills,

(collectively
dismissing

Peacemaker

Inc.,

“Appellants”)

their

jurisdiction.
Mita

LLC,

and

General

appeal

petition

to

National

the

compel

Training

Center,

Mills

Sales,

Inc.,

district

court’s

order

arbitration

for

lack

of

Appellants filed their petition to compel against

Sengupta,

invoking

the

district

court’s

diversity

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012), after Sengupta filed a
state

court

Pittman,

wrongful

and

action

Airsquid
district

court

against

Ventures,

petition,

the

Maryland

citizenship

indispensable

death

party

with

under

Inc.

held

Fed.

R.

In

that

Sengupta,
Civ.

joinder would defeat complete diversity.

Appellants,

dismissing

Pittman,

was
P.

Travis

a
19,

who

shared

necessary
and

the

that

and
his

Appellants argue that

the district court erred when it held that Pittman was both a
necessary and indispensable party.

Finding no error, we affirm.

The threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law that we review de novo.

Home Buyers Warranty

Corp. v. Hanna, 750 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 2014).

We review

the district court’s dismissal of an action pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19 for abuse of discretion, and review the district
court’s factual findings underlying the Rule 19 dismissal for
clear error.

Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid of S.C.,

Inc., 210 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 2000).
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For a court to have jurisdiction over an action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), “diversity must be complete such that the
state of citizenship of each plaintiff must be different from
that of each defendant.”

Home Buyers Warranty Corp., 750 F.3d

at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted).
district

court

must

dismiss

an

action

Under Rule 19, a

brought

in

diversity

jurisdiction if a nondiverse, nonjoined party is “necessary” and
“indispensable” to the action.
F.3d at 433.

Home Buyers Warranty Corp., 750

In deciding whether to dismiss an action, Rule 19

is to be applied “pragmatically, in the context of the substance
of each case, and courts must take into account the possible
prejudice to all parties, including those not before it.”

Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Among

other

reasons

provided

in

Rule

19,

a

party

is

necessary to an action where “that person claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . leave
an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because
of

the

interest.”

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

19(a)(1)(B)(ii).

The

district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
Pittman was a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) because
(1) Pittman, as a defendant seeking to compel arbitration in the
state action, had an interest in the validity of the arbitration
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provision;

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and

(2)

Sengupta

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faced

the

substantial

risk

of

inconsistent results regarding the validity of the arbitration
provision, potentially causing her to simultaneously pursue her
claims through arbitration and trial.

See Owens-Illinois v.

Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 438-41 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that party
faces “conflicting legal obligations” and is necessary to an
action to compel arbitration where failure to join creates a
“high potential for inconsistent judgments”).
Having found Pittman a necessary party, we must assess, as
did

the

district

court,

whether

he

is

an

indispensable

one.

Four factors control whether a necessary party is indispensable:
(1) “the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s
absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties”;
(2) “the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or
avoided”;

(3)

“whether

a

judgment

rendered

in

the

person’s

absence would be adequate”; and (4) “whether the plaintiff would
have

an

adequate

nonjoinder.”

remedy

if

the

action

were

dismissed

for

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b); see Home Buyers Warranty

Corp., 750 F.3d at 435-36.

Because Sengupta faces a substantial

risk of inconsistent obligations, the first and third factors
support the conclusion that Pittman is an indispensable party.
See Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at 441-42 (noting that first and
third factors of indispensable evaluation “address much the same
concerns as the Rule 19(a)[(1)(B)] analysis”).
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Regarding the

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second

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factor,

Appellants

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suggested

no

way

to

mitigate

prejudice to Sengupta, and no remedy is apparent.

the

Home Buyers

Warranty Corp., 750 F.3d at 435-36; Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at
442.

Finally, as to the fourth factor, the West Virginia state

courts provide Appellants an adequate forum to seek enforcement
of the arbitration provision and the state courts are better
positioned to apply West Virginia law to determine the validity
of the provision. *

Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at 442.

All four factors support the conclusion that Pittman is an
indispensable
abuse

its

party.

discretion

Therefore,
when

it

the

held

district

that

required joining Pittman as a petitioner.
to

the

court

action
lacked

would

defeat

jurisdiction

complete
under

properly dismissed the petition.

28

court

Fed.

R.

did

Civ.

P.

not
19

As Pittman’s joinder

diversity,

the

U.S.C.

1332(a),

§

district
and

Home Buyers Warranty Corp.,

750 F.3d at 436; Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at 442.
Accordingly,
order.
legal

we

affirm

the

district

court’s

dismissal

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions

are

adequately

*

presented

in

the

materials

Sengupta’s brief to this court notes that the state
circuit court denied Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration,
and that Appellants are seeking appellate review of this denial
in the West Virginia Supreme Court.

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before

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and

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argument

would

not

aid

the

decisional

process.
AFFIRMED

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