Sharon Thomas v. The Salvation Army
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:14-cv-00403-RJC-DCK. [999964575]. [14-2214]
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2214
SHARON T. THOMAS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
THE SALVATION ARMY SOUTHERN TERRITORY; F. BRADFORD BAILEY;
THE SALVATION ARMY; BOBBY LANCASTER; DERONDA METZ; BARBARA
GREEN; VICTORY CHRISTIAN CENTER, INCORPORATED; CHURCH IN THE
CITY MINISTRIES; CATHY DOE; FRIENDSHIP COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, My Sister’s House Transitional Living Center;
IRIS HUBBARD,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:14-cv-00403-RJC-DCK)
Argued:
September 21, 2016
Decided:
November 8, 2016
Before WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Irene M. KEELEY,
United States District Judge for the Northern District of West
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed as modified by published opinion.
Judge Wilkinson
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Floyd and Judge Keeley joined.
ARGUED: Gregory Dolin, UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Matthew David Lincoln,
MOORE & VAN ALLEN PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Catherine Florea, Third Year Law Student,
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Marie Langlois, Second Year Law Student, UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE
SCHOOL OF LAW, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
Sharon
Thomas
appeals
the
dismissal
under
28
U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) of her claims against three charitable organizations,
which
she
says
unlawfully
refused
to
admit
her
to
homeless
shelters because of her alleged mental health disability. We
affirm the judgment of dismissal as modified to indicate that it
be without prejudice.
I.
Thomas
was
receiving
behavioral
health
services
from
Monarch Mental Health Care, a non-profit organization, when she
became
homeless
on
July
10,
2012.
Monarch
referred
her
to
defendant Salvation Army. When she arrived at the Salvation Army
shelter
on
paperwork,
July
agreed
12,
to
2012,
Thomas
follow
the
completed
shelter’s
some
preliminary
rules,
and
was
admitted.
The Salvation Army shelter was crowded, and on July 16, a
Salvation Army staff member informed Thomas that she would be
transferred to defendant Church in the City, a shelter run by
the third and final defendant, Victory Christian Center. 1 During
1
Thomas’s original complaint named an additional charity –
My Sister’s House – and various employees of the charities as
defendants. Her counseled brief advances arguments only against
the Salvation Army, Church in the City, and Victory Christian
Center. Because Thomas has waived claims against the other
defendants, we address only her claims against the Salvation
(Continued)
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an intake interview with a Church in the City nurse, Thomas
disclosed her mental health issues. In her complaint, Thomas
describes Church in the City as having strict rules and as being
“very clean and quiet.” J.A. 13. Thomas stayed at Church in the
City for almost a month before being evicted, and she claims
that she followed all of the shelter’s rules during her stay.
While at Church in the City, Thomas visited the Salvation
Army
shelter
twice.
First,
on
July
19,
Thomas
completed
the
Salvation Army’s official intake assessment paperwork. In this
paperwork, Thomas disclosed that she was receiving behavioral
mental
health
services
and
authorized
the
release
of
some
medical information to the Salvation Army. Second, on July 31,
Thomas
went
medication.
receiving,
to
the
Thomas
but
she
Salvation
does
notes
not
Army
specify
that
the
to
see
what
doctor
a
doctor
medication
referred
to
get
she
was
her
to
a
behavioral health center. On the same visit, Thomas met with her
Salvation Army case manager. The meeting included a discussion
of Thomas’s mental health issues.
Thomas’s problems with the shelters began on August 12,
when Church in the City evicted her. The shelter did not give
Thomas a reason for her ejection. Another woman was evicted at
Army, Church in the City, and Victory Christian Center.
Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 593 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994).
4
See
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the same time for missing the shelter’s curfew, though Thomas
avers that she never missed curfew. Thomas’s complaint notes
that
she
had
been
given
additional
chores
the
day
before
–
cleaning three showers instead of two – by a volunteer who had,
a
few
weeks
earlier,
told
Thomas
not
to
question
the
Bible
during a Bible study class.
From August 12 through August 15, Thomas tried and failed
to be admitted to the Salvation Army shelter a number of times.
Immediately after being ejected from Church in the City, Thomas
went to the Salvation Army shelter. She was told that she would
not be allowed to stay there if she had been ejected from Church
in the City. That same day, Thomas was hospitalized for chest
pains, and a hospital social worker called the Salvation Army on
her
behalf.
The
social
worker
was
informed
that
Thomas’s
Salvation Army case worker had decided that Thomas would not be
admitted to the Salvation Army shelter.
Thomas herself called the Salvation Army twice the next
day, August 13. On the first phone call, Thomas’s case manager
told her that she had been ejected from Church in the City for
violating curfew. This call ended after Thomas accused her case
manager of acting unethically. On the second phone call, the
director of the Salvation Army shelter told Thomas she had been
ejected from Church in the City because she was not a good fit.
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The following night, August 14, Thomas had nowhere to stay
and went to the police department for help. Two police officers
escorted her to the Salvation Army shelter, where she was again
denied entry. This time, a staff member told Thomas that the
director of the shelter had instructed her not to let Thomas
stay. The staff member did not give a specific reason for that
instruction but apparently believed it was due to mental health
issues and that if Thomas received a mental health evaluation,
she
would
be
admitted
to
the
shelter.
Thomas
went
to
a
psychiatric emergency room and was examined by a psychiatrist.
The next day, August 15, Thomas returned to the Salvation Army
shelter with her psychiatric discharge papers. She was again
refused admission to the shelter, though this time Thomas was
not given a reason for the denial.
Thomas does not allege that she sought admission at the
Salvation Army shelter after August 15, but she did continue to
seek
an
answer
for
September
12,
2012,
Commander
for
the
investigated
her
why
she
she
and
been
received
Salvation
case
had
an
Army,
that
denied
admission.
email
from
explaining
the
denial
of
the
that
On
Area
he
had
services
was
justified because Thomas had “exhibited disrespect and hostility
toward the staff.” J.A. 21. The Area Commander offered shelter
if
Thomas
submitted
stabilization
services
to
“a
mental
from”
a
6
health
behavioral
evaluation
mental
and
health
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organization. J.A. 21. In response, Thomas requested records of
her stay and of the Salvation Army’s relationship with Church in
the City. On October 23, 2012, Thomas received an email from
another
Salvation
Army
employee,
denying
her
request
for
records.
Nearly two years later, on July 24, 2014, Thomas filed this
action
in
the
Western
District
of
North
Carolina,
moving
to
proceed in forma pauperis. The district court granted Thomas’s
motion. In the same order, however, the district court dismissed
all of Thomas’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. In
addition, the district court warned Thomas that if she continued
to file meritless lawsuits, it would require her to show cause
as to why the court should not enter a pre-filing injunction
against her. Thomas now appeals.
II.
Thomas
challenges
the
dismissal
of
her
claims
under
42
U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the Americans with Disabilities
Act
(“ADA”),
the
Fair
Housing
Act
(“FHA”),
and
the
Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed these claims
under
28
U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
“The
standards
for
reviewing a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are the same as
those
for
reviewing
a
dismissal
under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).” De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633
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(4th Cir. 2003). Thus, we review this dismissal de novo and
accept pleaded facts as true. King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206,
212, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). While we construe allegations in a pro
se complaint liberally, a complaint still “must contain ‘enough
facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Id. at 214 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544,
570
(2007)).
We
shall
address
each
of
Thomas’s
various
claims in turn. 2
A.
Thomas’s § 1983 claim cannot proceed because none of the
defendants are state actors. To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that he was “deprived of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the
alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Am.
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). The
color of law requirement “excludes from its reach merely private
conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Id. at 50
(internal quotations omitted). In rare cases, the state can “so
dominate[] [private] activity as to convert it to state action.”
2
Thomas advances arguments for her § 1983 and § 1985 claims
in her informal brief but not in her counseled brief.
Appellant’s Reply Br. 2 n.1. We have held in similar
circumstances that this results in waiver of the claims. Slezak,
21 F.3d at 593 n.2 (declining to consider issues not raised in
counseled brief). Nonetheless, we will in the exercise of our
discretion address her § 1983 and § 1985 claims.
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Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 181 (4th Cir.
2009).
The
defendants
here
are
three
private
charities,
and
Thomas has not alleged any facts that even remotely suggest that
defendants’
actions
were
attributable
to
the
state.
Without
state action, Thomas has no § 1983 claim.
B.
Thomas’s § 1985 claim of a civil conspiracy between the
Salvation Army and Church in the City must also be dismissed
because there are no allegations to support the existence of any
conspiracy. To bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a plaintiff
must show:
(1) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are
motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus to (3) deprive the plaintiff of
the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to
all, (4) and which results in injury to the plaintiff
as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by the
defendants in connection with the conspiracy.
Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995). Allegations
of “parallel conduct and a bare assertion of a conspiracy” are
not enough for a claim to proceed. A Soc'y Without A Name v.
Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556).
Thomas provides no facts to suggest that the Salvation Army
and Church in the City conspired to do anything, much less to
deprive her of rights because of her alleged mental disability.
For
example,
Thomas
claims
9
that
her
Salvation
Army
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identification badge included a mention of Church in the City
and that she was told she could not return to the Salvation Army
after being evicted from Church in the City. But these facts do
not show any coordination or conspiracy – they simply show two
charities working to help the same population of homeless people
in
Charlotte.
Thomas’s
complaint
offers
only
conclusory
allegations that the Salvation Army conspired with Church in the
City, and that is not enough to proceed on a claim under § 1985.
C.
Thomas
also
raises
a
claim
under
the
Americans
with
Disabilities Act but lacks standing to bring it. Title III of
the ADA prevents discrimination on the basis of a disability in
places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. It provides a
private right of action for injunctive relief but no right of
action for monetary relief. 42 U.S.C. § 12188; see also Ervine
v. Desert View Reg’l Med. Ctr. Holdings, LLC, 753 F.3d 862, 867
(9th
Cir.
2014)
(“Damages
are
not
an
available
remedy
to
individuals under Title III of the ADA; individuals may receive
only
injunctive
unavailable
relief.”).
absent
a
Injunctive
showing
of
relief,
however,
irreparable
injury,
“is
a
requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing of any
real
or
immediate
threat
that
the
plaintiff
will
be
wronged
again.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
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Thomas fails to show any real or immediate threat that she
will be wronged again. Any denial of access to the shelters
occurred almost two years before Thomas filed this action. Her
complaint does not allege that she is still homeless or that the
defendants would still deny her access to the shelters because
of her disability. Moreover, Thomas indicates that she filed her
complaint “due [to] the persistent and distressing memories and
thoughts
J.A.
about
24,
threat
of
not
the
to
future
experiences
prevent
harm,
of
future
Thomas
abuse
and
discrimination,”
discrimination.
is
not
entitled
Without
to
the
injunctive
relief and thus has no valid claim under Title III of the ADA.
In dismissing Thomas’s ADA claim for failure to exhaust
administrative
remedies,
the
district
court
erred
by
characterizing her claim as an employment claim under Title I of
the ADA. The district court was correct that Title I requires a
plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before pursuing
litigation in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 12117; see also Sydnor
v. Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012). But because
Thomas’s claims do not concern her employment, they do not fall
under Title I and thus are not subject to the administrative
exhaustion
requirement.
McInerney
v.
Rensselaer
Polytechnic
Inst., 505 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“Title
III,
unlike
Title
I,
does
11
not
require
administrative
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exhaustion.”). Nonetheless, we may affirm the district court on
alternate grounds, Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th
Cir. 1996) (en banc), and we have done so here.
In her original complaint, Thomas cites the sections of the
ADA that comprise Title II. Title II, however, applies only to
“the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12132; see also Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S.
206,
209
(1998).
None
of
the
defendants
here
are
public
entities, so Thomas cannot proceed under Title II of the ADA
either.
D.
Thomas’s
complaint
FHA
does
claim
not
was
properly
contain
a
dismissed
her
allegation
plausible
because
of
discrimination. As relevant here, the FHA makes it unlawful to
“make
unavailable
or
deny . . .
a
dwelling
to
any
buyer
or
renter because of a handicap,” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), or to
“discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of a
handicap.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2). A handicap is “a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person's
major
life
activities.”
42
U.S.C.
§ 3602(h).
The
Salvation Army argues that homeless shelters are not covered
under § 3604(f) because the residents are not buyers or renters
and because a homeless shelter does not meet the definition of a
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dwelling under the FHA. Courts have differed on these points.
See, e.g., Hunter ex rel. A.H. v. D.C., 64 F. Supp. 3d 158, 177
(D.D.C. 2014) (homeless shelter is a dwelling under the FHA);
Intermountain
Fair
Hous.
Council
v.
Boise
Rescue
Mission
Ministries, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1109 (D. Idaho 2010), aff'd on
other grounds, 657 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2011) (homeless shelter is
not a dwelling under the FHA). We see no need to reach these
questions here because Thomas’s complaint independently suffers
from serious defects, as discussed below.
One
such
adequately
defect
identify
is
her
that
Thomas’s
mental
complaint
disability.
Thomas
fails
to
provides
limited evidence in her complaint that she has some type of
mental
illness
–
she
received
care
from
a
behavioral
health
organization, she had an appointment with a doctor, and she was
on medication. In her informal appellate brief, Thomas specifies
her mental illness as a mood disorder. This evidence, though,
does not suggest that her mental illness is a handicap covered
by
the
FHA.
stable”
and
Moreover,
that
the
Thomas
alleges
mental
that
evaluation
she
was
requested
“mentally
by
the
Salvation Army was “unnecessary.” J.A. 5, 20. These facts do not
give rise to a “reasonable inference,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009), that Thomas is handicapped under the FHA.
Another defect is that Thomas’s complaint does not draw a
sufficient nexus of causation between whatever mental illness
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she may have and the defendants’ actions. To state a claim under
the FHA, Thomas must show that the defendants denied her housing
“because
of”
her
handicap.
42
U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(1).
Thomas’s
allegation against Church in the City on this point is purely
conclusory. Church in the City did not give Thomas a reason for
the
denial
suggests
of
that
disability.
shelter,
the
While
and
denial
nothing
Thomas’s
Thomas’s
because
was
in
of
her
allegations
complaint
alleged
against
the
mental
Salvation
Army are somewhat more detailed, the complaint does not make a
plausible allegation that the Salvation Army unlawfully denied
Thomas
shelter
“because
of”
a
mental
disability.
Even
when
construed liberally and with all reasonable inferences made in
Thomas’s favor, De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 633, this is not a “claim
to relief that is plausible on its face,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570.
The communications between the Salvation Army and Thomas
indicate that the Salvation Army had legitimate reasons to be
wary of admitting Thomas and sought reasonable reassurance that
Thomas would not cause problems as a resident. The most detailed
explanation
of
the
Salvation
Army’s
concerns
was
in
the
September 12, 2012 email sent by the Area Commander for the
Salvation
situation:
Army
“Your
summarizing
actions
his
during
investigation
your
time
at
of
the
Thomas’s
shelter
exhibited disrespect and hostility toward the staff that was
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endeavoring to help you, therefore you were asked to leave the
facility.” J.A. 21. The email also offered shelter if Thomas
would
“receive
a
mental
health
evaluation
and
stabilization
services.” J.A. 21. It is not reasonable to read this email as
evidence that the Salvation Army refused to admit Thomas because
of a mental disability. Rather, it is clear that the Salvation
Army’s decision to deny Thomas access was an effort to exercise
prudence and to ensure that, with the support of appropriate
medical
evidence,
control. This
is
any
mental
consistent
condition
with
the
of
only
hers
other
was
under
instance
in
Thomas’s complaint of a Salvation Army staff member referencing
her mental illness. In denying her access to the shelter, the
staff
member
suggested
Thomas
would
be
readmitted
if
she
rights
require
obtained a mental health evaluation. J.A. 19.
The
Salvation
reasonable
steps
Army
to
was
ensure
within
that
its
Thomas
was
to
stable
before
admitting her to the shelter. The Salvation Army is charged with
protecting all of those in its shelters, and it simply cannot
run
the
serious
disruptive
resident
and
risk
may
jeopardizes
of
admitting
inflict
the
a
resident
harm
on
others.
safety
of
other
who
Admitting
residents
will
be
such
and
a
may
subject the shelter to significant liability. See e.g. Corporan
v. Barrier Free Living Inc., 19 N.Y.S.3d 160 (N.Y. App. Div.
2015) (affirming denial of homeless shelter’s motion for summary
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judgment where factual issues existed as to whether fatal attack
by resident was foreseeable); Keri Blakinger & Reuven Blau, NYC
Shelter to Pay $1.2M to Stabbed Resident’s Kin, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
March 31, 2016, at 22 (describing $1.2 million settlement in
Corporan).
If
denying
shelter
to
shelter
would
access
extended
be
to
an
unstable
litigation
faced
with
a
and
applicant
potential
difficult
subjected
liability,
dilemma.
a
the
Charitable
organizations would be subject to liability whichever way they
turned. Denial of access would lead to lawsuits like this one,
and
ill-advised
judgments
grants
against
the
of
access
could
charitable
lead
to
organization
staggering
if
another
resident was seriously harmed. The time and expense involved in
all
of
this
would
risk
impairing
the
humane
mission
of
sheltering homeless persons that is these organizations’ very
reason for being.
In
fact,
repeatedly
Congress
declined
to
anticipated
this
very
extend
statutory
problem
and
protection
to
individuals who present a threat to public health or the safety
of others. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (“Nothing in [the FHA]
requires
that
a
dwelling
be
made
available
to
an
individual
whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in
substantial physical damage to the property of others.”); 42
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U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (“Nothing in [the ADA] shall require an
entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from
the
goods,
services,
accommodations
of
facilities,
such
entity
privileges,
where
such
advantages
individual
and
poses
a
direct threat to the health or safety of others.”); McGeshick v.
Principi,
defense
357
to
plaintiff]
F.3d
1146,
claims
may
1151
under
pose
a
(10th
the
‘direct
Cir.
2004)
Rehabilitation
threat’
to
(“[I]t
Act
the
is
a
that
[a
welfare
of
others.”). The district court was right not to put the shelter
between
a
rock
and
a
hard
place
by
imposing
liability
for
exercising prudence in the course of its admissions decisions.
In an effort to clear the bar of plausibility, Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678, Thomas claims in her complaint that “[t]here were
no instances . . . of conflict with staff,” J.A. 21, but this
assertion seems limited to her brief stay at the Salvation Army
before she was transferred to the Church in the City. Her own
descriptions of her later interactions with Salvation Army staff
do not serve to undermine the Salvation Army’s explanation. In
fact, those descriptions indicate the possibility of hostility,
including Thomas’s accusations of unethical staff conduct and
her threats of legal action. See J.A. 17, 20. Moreover, Thomas’s
alleged mental health problems are not inconsistent with hostile
interactions with staff members. In short, these problems may
have contributed to any unfortunate friction.
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Thomas argues that she received different explanations from
different Salvation Army staff members for refusing to admit
her. These explanations, however, show once again the Salvation
Army
exercising
caution
when
confronted
with
a
potentially
disruptive resident, and any minor inconsistencies are evidence
of
multiple
shelter
employees
dealing
with
a
difficult
situation. Cf. Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 217 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2004) (finding inconsistencies that “ar[o]se from reading
applications hastily or from being nervous during depositions”
were not evidence of pretext).
Thomas
also
complains
that
the
Salvation
Army
did
not
accept her discharge papers from the emergency room as a mental
health
evaluation.
These
papers
were
the
result
of
a
brief
consultation and fell short of being the considered opinion of a
mental
health
obligation
to
professional.
accept
such
The
an
Salvation
Army
abbreviated
was
under
assessment
as
no
an
adequate response to its offer of shelter if Thomas submitted to
a
fuller
mental
health
evaluation
from
a
behavioral
health
organization.
In
sum,
Thomas’s
complaint
does
not
contain
“factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Because we cannot make a reasonable inference
from her complaint – even when liberally construed – that Thomas
18
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is
Doc: 49
Filed: 11/08/2016
handicapped
impermissibly
under
denied
the
Thomas
Pg: 19 of 21
FHA
or
that
because
shelter
the
of
defendants
her
mental
illness, Thomas’s FHA claim must be dismissed.
E.
Finally, Thomas’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act was
also
properly
dismissed.
As
with
the
ADA
and
the
FHA,
the
Rehabilitation Act forbids discrimination based on a disability.
The Rehabilitation Act, though, differs in two key ways. First,
it applies only to programs receiving federal assistance. 29
U.S.C.
§ 794;
see
also
Disabled
in
Action
v.
Mayor
&
City
Council of Baltimore, 685 F.2d 881, 883 (4th Cir. 1982). Second,
the Rehabilitation Act requires that a plaintiff show that the
exclusion was “solely by reason of her or his disability.” 29
U.S.C. § 794. This is a stricter causation requirement than the
ADA or FHA, under which the disability can be one of multiple
causes. Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454,
461-62
(4th
Cir.
2012)
(“To
succeed
on
a
claim
under
the
Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff must establish he was excluded
‘solely by reason of’ his disability; the ADA requires only that
the disability was ‘a motivating cause’ of the exclusion.”);
Asbury
v.
Brougham,
866
F.2d
1276,
1279
(10th
Cir.
1989)
(holding the discriminatory reason “need not be the only factor
in the decision” for a violation of the FHA).
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Pg: 20 of 21
Thomas’s complaint alleges that the Salvation Army received
federal funding; there is no similar allegation for Church in
the
City
Thomas’s
Victory
Army
Salvation
or
would
claim
Christian
be
should
Center.
to
subject
nonetheless
Assuming
Rehabilitation
the
be
dismissed
that
for
the
the
Act,
same
reasons as her FHA claim. Thomas’s complaint fails to allege (1)
a mental illness that would qualify as a disability under the
Act or (2) a nexus between the Salvation Army’s decision not to
admit
her
and
her
alleged
mental
disability.
The
heightened
causation required for the Rehabilitation Act claim makes the
inadequacy of Thomas’s complaint even more apparent.
F.
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of all of
Thomas’s federal claims, we also affirm its decision to decline
to
exercise
supplemental
jurisdiction
and
thus
to
dismiss
Thomas’s state law claims without prejudice. See Shanaghan v.
Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).
III.
The district court was right to dismiss the complaint given
its multiple deficiencies, namely the omission of the nature of
any
illness
much
less
the
presence
of
such
illness
as
a
causative agent of the Salvation Army’s decision. The Salvation
Army
was
residents
justified
and
its
in
exercising
staff,
and
20
prudence,
requesting
protecting
a
more
other
thorough
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Pg: 21 of 21
evaluation of Thomas’s mental health. Thomas has not thrown this
reasonable explanation into plausible doubt. Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570. We therefore affirm the district court. We note that
Thomas
district
did
not
court
have
an
dismissed
opportunity
her
to
complaint
respond
sua
before
sponte
or
the
an
opportunity to amend her complaint. Thus, we modify the judgment
only to the extent that the dismissal be without prejudice. 3
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
3
As the district court noted, Thomas has filed at least
eight lawsuits in the Western District of North Carolina,
prevailing in none, and at least five additional suits in the
Middle District of North Carolina. J.A. 59. Our opinion herein
does not reflect on whether Thomas should be subject to a prefiling injunction, a matter we leave to the district court in
the first instance.
21
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