Jordan Tonkin v. Shadow Management, Inc.
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:12-cv-00198-JFA. Copies to all parties and the district court. . [14-2219]
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JORDAN M. TONKIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
SHADOW MANAGEMENT, INC., d/b/a Platinum Plus,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia.
Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:12-cv-00198-JFA)
May 14, 2015
June 2, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lovic A. Brooks, III, JANIK, L.L.P. Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellant. Christopher Scot McDonald, Richard James Morgan,
MCNAIR LAW FIRM, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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exhaust her administrative remedies.
On appeal, Tonkin asserts
that the district court erred in finding that failure to exhaust
her administrative remedies deprived the court of subject matter
jurisdiction, and that it erred in finding her retaliation claim
did not relate back to her original EEOC charge in which she
alleged only pregnancy discrimination.
The failure of a plaintiff to exhaust her administrative
remedies with the EEOC deprives the federal courts of subject
Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009).
“The scope of the
plaintiff’s right to file a federal lawsuit is determined by the
stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the
investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a
subsequent Title VII lawsuit.”
Evans v. Techs. Applications &
Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996).
bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction.
v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir.
jurisdiction de novo.
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Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs.,
Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 408 (4th Cir. 2011).
Applying this standard, we conclude that the district court
Her initial EEOC charge alleged only
See Sloop v. Mem’l Mission Hosp., Inc.,
198 F.3d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1999).
Additionally, Tonkin had
knowledge of the factual basis for her retaliation claim before
discrimination claim and retaliation claim focused on discrete
based on her termination.
See Jones, 551 F.3d at 300.
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982), and Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500 (2006), those cases are unavailing.
Moreover, we have noted that the holding in Zipes is limited to
the untimeliness of an EEOC charge.
Jones, 551 F.3d at 300,
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
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