Meryem Bentaous v. Asset Acceptance LLC

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cv-03314-JFM Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999648640].. [14-2266]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2266

MERYEM BENTAOUS, Individually
similarly situated,

and

on

behalf

of

others

Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
ASSET ACCEPTANCE, LLC; FULTON FRIEDMAN & GULLACE LLP,
Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:13-cv-03314-JFM)

Submitted:

June 29, 2015

Decided:

August 27, 2015

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

E. David Hoskins, Max F. Brauer, THE LAW OFFICES OF DAVID
HOSKINS, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Terri S.
Reiskin, DYKEMA GOSSETT PLLC, Washington, D.C.; Cynthia Fulton,
Jason P. Verhagen, FULTON FRIEDMAN & GULLACE, L.L.P., Phoenix,
Arizona, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Meryem Bentaous seeks to appeal the district court's order
compelling arbitration and staying and administratively closing
the action pending resolution of any arbitration proceedings.
Our jurisdiction to review cases originating in the district
court

is

limited

to

final

interlocutory orders.
Beneficial

Indus.

decisions

and

certain

specified

28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (2012); Cohen v.

Loan

Corp.,

337

U.S.

541,

545-47

(1949).

Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that “[a]n
appeal may be taken from . . . a final decision with respect to
an

arbitration

interlocutory

that

is

orders

subject

denying

to

this

title[,]”

arbitration,

but

or

an

from
appeal

generally “may not be taken from an interlocutory order . . .
granting

a

stay

of

any

action”

referred

to

arbitration,

or

“directing arbitration to proceed.” 9 U.S.C. § 16; see In re
Pisgah Contractors, Inc., 117 F.3d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1997).
A “final decision” for purposes of § 16 is one that “ends
the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the
court

to

Corp.-Ala.

do
v.

but

execute

Randolph,

the
531

quotation marks omitted).

judgment.”
U.S.

79,

86

Green
(2000)

Tree

Fin.

(internal

Therefore, where a district court

orders arbitration and dismisses an action, “leaving the court
nothing to do but execute the judgment,” the order is a final,
appealable order.

Id.

By contrast, where the district court
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orders

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arbitration

dismissal . . .
interlocutory.

that

and

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enters

order

[is

“a
not]

stay

instead

appealable,”

as

of

a

it

is

Id. at 87 n.2.

As the district court’s order compelling arbitration stayed
the action rather than dismissing it, that order is not a final,
appealable

order.

In

addition,

the

fact

that

the

court

administratively closed the case following the stay does not
render the order final.

Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Mapp, 521 F.3d

290, 295 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Put simply, an otherwise non-final
order

does

not

become

final

because

the

district

court

administratively closed the case after issuing the order.”).

We

therefore lack jurisdiction over the appeal.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid in the decisional process.
DISMISSED

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