FLAME S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd.
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion denying Motion to supplement [999570950-2] Originating case number: 2:13-cv-00658-RGD-LRL,2:13-cv-00704-RGD-LRL. [999705910]. [14-2267, 15-1120]
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-2267
FLAME S.A.; GLORY WEALTH SHIPPING PTE LTD.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
and
VITOL, S.A.,
Party-in-Interest,
NOBLE CHARTERING INCORPORATED,
Intervenor/Plaintiff,
v.
FREIGHT BULK PTE. LTD.,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
INDUSTRIAL
BARANSKIY,
CARRIERS,
INC.;
VISTA
SHIPPING,
Defendants.
No. 15-1120
FLAME S.A.; GLORY WEALTH SHIPPING PTE LTD.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
and
INC.;
VIKTOR
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VITOL, S.A.,
Party-in-Interest,
NOBLE CHARTERING INCORPORATED,
Intervenor/Plaintiff,
v.
FREIGHT BULK PTE. LTD.,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
INDUSTRIAL
BARANSKIY,
CARRIERS,
INC.;
VISTA
SHIPPING,
INC.;
VIKTOR
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Robert G. Doumar, Senior
District Judge. (2:13-cv-00658-RGD-LRL; 2:13-cv-00704-RGD-LRL)
Argued:
September 17, 2015
Decided:
November 24, 2015
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Harris joined.
ARGUED: Anthony J. Franze, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant.
William Robert Bennett, III, BLANK ROME
LLP, New York, New York; James H. Power, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP,
New York, New York, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Andrew G. McBride,
WILEY REIN LLP, Washington, D.C.; John N. Nassikas III, R.
Stanton Jones, Daniel F. Jacobson, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Thomas H. Belknap, Jr., Alan
M. Weigel, Lauren B. Wilgus, Nicholas R. Tambone, BLANK ROME
LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee Flame S.A.
Robert T.
2
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Hicks, Samuel Spital, Michael J. Frevola, Marie E. Larsen, Stosh
Silivos, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee
Glory Wealth Shipping PTE LTD.
3
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AGEE, Circuit Judge:
Industrial
shipping
Carriers,
company,
Inc.,
breached
(“ICI”),
numerous
a
defunct
contracts
in
maritime
the
final
months of its operation.
Among ICI’s creditors were FLAME S.A.
(“Flame”),
a
who
obtained
foreign
judgment
against
ICI
for
breach of four Forward Freight Swap Agreements ("FFAs"), and
Glory Wealth Shipping Pte. Ltd. (“Glory Wealth”), who obtained a
foreign arbitration award against ICI based on the breach of a
charter party.
Both
Flame
and
Glory
Wealth
sought
a
writ
of
maritime
attachment under Supplemental Rule B of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to attach the vessel M/V CAPE VIEWER when it
docked in Norfolk, Virginia.
Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd. (“Freight
Bulk”) is the registered owner of the vessel, but Flame and
Glory Wealth asserted that Freight Bulk was the alter ego of
ICI,
and
that
ICI
had
fraudulently
conveyed
Freight Bulk in order to evade its creditors.
they
argued
District
of
that
the
Virginia
through Freight Bulk.
U.S.
could
District
enforce
Court
their
its
assets
to
For that reason,
for
claims
the
Eastern
against
ICI
Following a bench trial, the district
court awarded judgment to Flame and Glory Wealth, ordered the
sale of the M/V CAPE VIEWER, and confirmed the distribution of
the sale proceeds to Flame and Glory Wealth.
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Freight Bulk now appeals.
Finding no merit to its claims,
we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
A.
In 2008, Flame entered into four FFAs with ICI.
After ICI
defaulted on those contracts, Flame sued ICI in the High Court
of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court, in London,
England, alleging the breach and seeking monetary damages.
English
court
awarded
judgment
to
Flame
in
the
amount
The
of
$19,907,118.36 (“Flame’s English judgment”).
Flame
had
the
English
judgment
recognized
in
the
U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, and later
registered
the
judgment
in
the
Eastern District of Virginia.
U.S.
District
Court
for
the
It then sought and obtained the
order of attachment against the M/V CAPE VIEWER.
Freight
Bulk
moved
to
vacate
the
order
of
attachment,
contending the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because under either United States (federal) or English law, the
FFAs were not maritime contracts.
Freight
Bulk’s
motion
and
The district court denied
concluded
it
had
admiralty
jurisdiction, but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal.
We
granted
Freight
Bulk
permission
appeal.
5
to
file
an
interlocutory
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We then held that federal law governed our jurisdictional
inquiry, and that the FFAs were maritime contracts under federal
admiralty law.
Flame S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 762 F.3d
352 (4th Cir. 2014) (the “Interlocutory Appeal”).
Because the
FFAs were maritime contracts, we concluded that “the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter
before it.”
Id. at 363.
We remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings.
B.
Separately, but also in 2008, Glory Wealth contracted for
ICI to charter a vessel.
making
payments
under
After three installments, ICI stopped
this
agreement.
Glory
Wealth
pursued
arbitration against ICI in England and won an arbitration award
(Glory
Wealth’s
“English
arbitration
award”).
Subsequently,
Glory Wealth sought and obtained recognition of the arbitration
award in the Southern District of New York.
It did not register
that judgment in the Eastern District of Virginia.
Glory
Wealth
filed
a
complaint
in
the
Eastern
Instead,
District
of
Virginia alleging that it was an ICI creditor who could maintain
a maritime claim against ICI for breach of a charter party, as
established by its English arbitration award. 1
It then sought
Glory Wealth represented to the district court that it was
in the process of having its English arbitration award reduced
to a judgment in England.
1
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and
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obtained
an
attachment
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order
for
the
M/V
CAPE
VIEWER
pursuant to Supplemental Rule B.
C.
While the Interlocutory Appeal in Flame’s case was pending,
the district court consolidated the Flame and Glory Wealth cases
based on the common questions of law and fact.
Both complaints
named other defendants in addition to Freight Bulk and ICI.
such
co-defendant
was
the
beneficial
owner
of
Freight
One
Bulk,
Viktor Baranskiy, who is the son of ICI’s final Chairman of the
Board
of
Directors.
Baranskiy
is
also
the
sole,
owner of co-defendant Vista Shipping Ltd. (“Vista”).
beneficial
In fact,
Baranskiy is the sole owner of numerous maritime companies —
now, collectively known as the Palmira Group — of which Freight
Bulk and Vista are just two.
The
basic
theory
underlying
both
complaints
was
that
Baranskiy aided ICI in evading its creditors by funneling money
and other assets into multiple entities he controlled, including
Vista and Freight Bulk.
Vista was formed in late 2008, around
the same time as ICI’s failure.
Freight Bulk, on the other
hand, was not formed until several years later.
Consequently,
the
of
complaints
relied
on
the
interconnectedness
ICI
with
Vista and Vista with Freight Bulk to establish the requisite
link showing Freight Bulk's responsibility as an alter ego for
ICI’s debts.
The complaints alleged that Vista and Freight Bulk
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were both formed with funds that originated from ICI and that
ICI fraudulently transferred those funds and other assets in
order to avoid its creditors.
The district court, with the assistance of a magistrate
judge, oversaw “many, many” motions during discovery.
Flame
S.A. v. Indus. Carriers, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 769, 771 (E.D. Va.
2014).
by
Freight Bulk repeatedly sought to delay the proceedings
obfuscation,
often
challenging
the
discovery orders with meritless claims.
meaning
and
scope
of
As a result of Freight
Bulk’s noncompliance, Flame and Glory Wealth obtained sanctions
in the form of certain presumptions to be applied at trial.
The
evidence
adduced
at
trial
and
the
district
court’s
factual findings are discussed below in the context of Freight
Bulk’s sufficiency challenge.
But as background to our review,
we note that things did not bode well for Freight Bulk when, by
the
end
of
the
first
day
of
his
testimony,
Baranskiy
had
provided inconsistent and evasive explanations for many of the
key relationships and transactions at issue in the case.
Even
so, the district court expressed its surprise when Baranskiy and
Freight Bulk’s lead trial attorney “abandoned the case on the
second morning of his testimony by not appearing” and instead
left the country.
Id. at 776.
Local counsel notified the court
of Baranskiy and lead counsel’s decision and did not present any
further evidence.
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Flame and Glory Wealth subsequently moved for judgment in
their favor, which the district court granted.
Id. at 790. In
so doing, the court concluded that the evidence demonstrated
that ICI, Vista, Freight Bulk, and Baranskiy were alter egos of
one
another.
In
addition,
it
found
that
ICI
fraudulently
transferred assets to Vista and related Palmira Group entities
to
avoid
creditors,
and
that
these
latter
entities
fraudulently transferred funds to Freight Bulk.
held
the
defendants
jointly
and
severally
had
also
Accordingly, it
liable
for
ICI’s
The court
debts, up to the value of the M/V CAPE VIEWER. 2
ordered the sale of the vessel, and later confirmed the sale and
ordered
distribution
of
the
sale
proceeds
between
Flame
and
Glory Wealth under a formula to which they had agreed.
Freight
Bulk
noted
a
timely
appeal
and
we
exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The liability finding was limited in this manner because
attachment proceedings under Supplemental Rule B confers only
quasi in rem jurisdiction, which limits personal jurisdiction
over the defendants in the case to the value of the attached
vessel. See Supplemental Rule B(1)(a); Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose
Shipping Co. Ltd., 708 F.3d 527, 540 (4th Cir. 2013). Flame and
Glory Wealth had also sought to hold the defendants liable for
the entire amount of their judgments against ICI, but the
district court rejected that argument. Since they did not file
a cross-appeal challenging that determination, it is not at
issue in this appeal.
2
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II.
On
appeal,
Freight
multiple sub-arguments.
Bulk
raises
six
discrete
issues
and
While we have reviewed its arguments in
detail, we will only address its primary contentions of error.
Those
are:
(1)
that
under
Fourth
Circuit
precedent,
United
States substantive law does not apply to this dispute, which
means the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2)
that under Supreme Court precedent, actions to shift liability
do not state an independent cause of action to establish subject
matter
jurisdiction,
nor
can
a
plaintiff
rely
on
a
prior
lawsuit’s basis for the court’s jurisdiction in a subsequent
suit to shift liability; (3) that the district court erred in
distributing proceeds of the M/V CAPE VIEWER’s sale to Glory
Wealth
because
Glory
Wealth
failed
to
register
its
New
York
default judgment against ICI in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia; (4) that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing certain discovery sanctions; (5) that
the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment as to both
alter ego liability and fraudulent conveyance; and (6) that the
district
court
defendants’
judge
Ukrainian
exhibited
personal
bias
which
tainted
nationality,
proceeding and requires a new trial.
turn.
10
against
the
the
entire
We address each issue in
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A.
Freight
court’s
Bulk
subject
previously
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
raises
court
claims,
the
two
matter
determined
district
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new
challenges
jurisdiction.
in
the
possessed
we
district
the
Appeal
jurisdiction
questions
the
Although
Interlocutory
admiralty
substantive
to
that
over
analyzed
Court
the
Flame’s
there
different from the arguments Freight Bulk now presents.
are
Flame
and Glory Wealth urge us to hold that the mandate rule precludes
our
reconsideration
of
the
district
court’s
subject
matter
jurisdiction.
We
serial,
have
reservations
piecemeal
about
challenges
to
whether
the
a
party
district
can
court’s
bring
subject
matter jurisdiction, and it is certainly a practice we do not
encourage.
Bulk’s
new
However,
we
arguments
will
for
address
two
the
reasons.
merits
First,
of
Freight
neither
the
Supreme Court nor we have directly opined on how to reconcile
the
mandate
Court’s
rule
subject
with
matter
subsequent
distinct
jurisdiction,
a
challenges
challenge
to
that
ordinarily be raised at any time and even sua sponte.
the
could
Second,
Glory Wealth was not a party to the Interlocutory Appeal.
We review de novo whether the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction.
See Vitol, 708 F.3d at 533.
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1.
Relying on Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348
(4th
Cir.
1985)
(en
banc),
Freight
Bulk
contends
that
the
district court lacked jurisdiction because the factors governing
choice of law set out in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571
(1953),
point
dispute.
against
applying
federal
law
to
the
parties’
Because neither the parties nor the alleged wrongful
conduct had any connection to the United States, Freight Bulk
asserts that Dracos requires us to conclude that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Many
of
Freight
Bulk’s
arguments
conflate
questions
of
choice of law with questions of subject matter jurisdiction, but
our
overriding
misunderstands
brought
a
our
F.2d
holding
negligence
unseaworthiness
762
impression
at
claim
350.
is
in
claim
under
The
that
Freight
Dracos.
There,
under
general
plaintiff
the
Bulk
the
Jones
“American
asserted
simply
plaintiff
Act
and
Maritime
both
tort
an
law.”
claims
against her deceased husband’s employer, the owner of the ship
upon which he had died.
The plaintiff, her husband, and the
defendant were all Greek individuals or corporations.
The only
connection to the United States was that the plaintiff’s husband
died while the ship was docked in Norfolk, Virginia.
350-51.
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Applying Lauritzen’s choice-of-law analysis, the district
court found that federal tort law should not apply to the case,
and without a federal claim to decide, the court dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
Id. at 351.
We held that the
district court’s findings that the defendant’s operations and
connections to the United States were insufficient to require
application of United States law to the plaintiff’s claims were
not clearly erroneous.
Id. at 352.
As a consequence, we agreed
that federal tort law did not govern the plaintiff’s claims and
that
the
case.
district
court
lacked
jurisdiction
to
consider
the
Id. at 353.
Dracos thus held that when federal law does not provide the
basis
for
district
court
a
court
relied
determine
what
plaintiff’s
is
on
law
without
the
claims
subject
Lauritzen
would
against
govern
matter
the
defendant,
jurisdiction.
choice-of-law
the
maritime
analysis
tort
action
the
The
to
at
issue, which in turn determined whether a federal tort claim
existed. 3
Here, in contrast, Flame and Glory Wealth do not need
to look to Lauritzen’s choice-of-law analysis to pursue a claim
under federal law.
Instead, their claims rest on the long-
Glory
Wealth
argues
that
Dracos’s
reference
to
“jurisdiction” was imprecise and that recent Supreme Court
precedent calls into question whether that analysis implicates
the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
We need not
address that argument because even a straightforward reading of
Dracos does not support Freight Bulk’s position.
3
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standing recognition that district courts have subject matter
jurisdiction
in
admiralty
both
to
enforce
the
judgments
of
foreign admiralty courts, see Vitol, 708 F.3d at 533, 538, and
to consider the issues of alter ego and fraudulent transfer as
part of an attachment proceeding pursuant to Supplemental Rule
B, see id. at 537-38.
In the Interlocutory Appeal, we held that the FFAs between
Flame and ICI were maritime contracts, which meant that Flame’s
claim to enforce its English Judgment by means of a Supplemental
Rule
B
attachment
was
cognizable
admiralty jurisdiction.
under
the
district
Flame, 762 F.3d at 354-63.
court’s
None of
Freight Bulk’s arguments in this appeal challenge that holding,
nor would it be able to do so as that holding is the law of the
case.
Everett v. Pitt Cty. Bd. of Educ., 788 F.3d 132, 142 (4th
Cir. 2015) (observing that with limited exceptions, once a court
has established the law of the case, “it must be followed in all
subsequent
proceedings
in
the
same
case” 4).
Although
Glory
Wealth seeks to enforce its English arbitration award, its claim
against
ICI
also
arose
from
the
breach
of
maritime contract, namely, a charter party.
an
indisputably
E.g., Kossick v.
United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961) (“Without doubt a
Here and throughout the opinion, internal quotation marks,
citations, alterations, or footnotes have been omitted in
citations.
4
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contract
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for
hire
either
of
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a
ship
or
of
the
sailors
and
officers to man her is within the admiralty jurisdiction.”).
Accordingly, Flame and Glory Wealth have claims arising squarely
within federal admiralty jurisdiction.
At
bottom,
neither
Dracos
nor
the
See 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
Lauritzen
choice-of-law
analysis have any bearing on Flame and Glory Wealth’s ability to
bring
the
type
establishing
the
of
federal
district
action
court’s
they
assert,
admiralty
nor
jurisdiction
in
over
this case.
2.
Freight
Peacock
v.
Bulk’s
second
Thomas,
jurisdiction
over
516
alter
jurisdictional
U.S.
ego
349
and
challenge
(1996),
is
“precludes
fraudulent
that
federal
conveyance
claims
that seek to shift liability for an existing judgment—including
a
maritime
judgment—onto
(Opening Br. 15.)
Wealth’s
liability
not
non-party
to
that
judgment.”
Freight Bulk contends that Flame and Glory
allegations
did
a
of
alter
ego
independently
subject matter jurisdiction.
and
fraudulent
provide
the
concealment
district
court
In addition, it asserts that the
district court could not exercise ancillary, or supplemental,
jurisdiction because Peacock prohibits a plaintiff relying on
the
court’s
jurisdiction
in
an
earlier
lawsuit
to
establish
jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit to enforce a judgment.
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We disagree.
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Freight Bulk fails to grasp key substantive
distinctions between federal question jurisdiction and admiralty
jurisdiction
when
bringing
suit
to
enforce
a
judgment.
In
Peacock, the Supreme Court held that the district court lacked
jurisdiction
judgment
to
consider
creditor
a
[sought]
“new
to
action[]
impose
in
which
liability
a
for
federal
a
money
judgment on a person not otherwise liable for the judgment.”
516 U.S. at 351.
Because the second action did not allege a new
violation of any federal law, the district court did not have
original
jurisdiction
in
the
second
lawsuit
U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).
pursuant
to
28
Id. at 353-54.
The Supreme Court also held that the district court did not have
supplemental jurisdiction. 5
This was so, the Court concluded,
because
lawsuit
“[i]n
a
subsequent
involving
claims
with
no
independent basis for jurisdiction, a federal court lacks that
threshold jurisdictional power that exists when ancillary claims
are asserted in the same proceeding as the claims conferring
federal jurisdiction.”
Id. at 355.
While the plaintiff in Peacock sought to enforce a judgment
arising from the court’s federal question jurisdiction, Flame
Supplemental jurisdiction, which is sometimes referred to
as ancillary jurisdiction, “permit[s] disposition by a single
court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees,
factually interdependent” and “enable[s] a court to function
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its
authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 354.
5
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and
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Glory
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Wealth
sought
to
Pg: 17 of 43
enforce
a
foreign
judgment
and
arbitration award through the attachment of a vessel by invoking
the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction.
This distinction
matters because under long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence,
a district court’s admiralty jurisdiction extends to claims to
enforce foreign admiralty judgments.
See Pennhallow v. Doane
Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 97 (1795) (opinion of Iredell, J.);
see also Vitol, 708 F.3d at 538 (stating “centuries of settled
hornbook admiralty law establish that ‘admiralty jurisdiction in
the United States may be broadly stated as extending to . . .
any claim to enforce a judgment of a foreign admiralty court’”);
Ost-West-Handel Bruno Bischoff GmbH v. Project Asia Line, Inc.,
160 F.3d 170, 174 (4th Cir. 1998); 1-VII Benedict on Admiralty §
106.
This
recognition
of
subject
matter
jurisdiction
in
the
admiralty context “differs substantially from the law governing
jurisdiction
exercising
1331.”
to
enforce
federal
question
rendered
jurisdiction
by
federal
under
28
courts
U.S.C.
§
D’Amico Dry Ltd. v. Primera Mar. (Hellas) Ltd., 756 F.3d
151, 155 (2d Cir. 2014).
under
judgments
§
1331
jurisdiction
must
While an enforcement action brought
demonstrate
independent
of
the
the
existence
judgment
to
be
of
federal
enforced,
a
district court’s ability to enforce foreign admiralty judgments
has not been so limited.
Id. at 155-56 (collecting cases on
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point).
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Similarly,
as
we
Pg: 18 of 43
reiterated
in
Vitol,
the
district
court’s admiralty jurisdiction includes the inherent authority
to grant attachments, including an attachment of assets pursuant
to Supplemental Rule B.
See 708 F.3d at 537-38.
Peacock only discussed the requirements of federal question
jurisdiction under § 1331 and was unrelated to the scope of a
district court’s admiralty jurisdiction.
recognized
in
another
context,
As we have previously
“Peacock
does
not
prohibit
a
federal court from taking jurisdiction over a postjudgment alter
ego claim where an independent basis for jurisdiction exists.”
C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P’ship, 306 F.3d 126, 133
(4th Cir. 2002).
Here, that “independent basis” is the court’s
admiralty jurisdiction.
The
Supreme
Court’s
Compania
Colombiana
confirms
our
Del
conclusion
decision
Caribe,
that
in
Swift
S.A.,
because
339
the
&
Co.
U.S.
Packers
684
district
v.
(1950),
court
was
properly exercising its admiralty jurisdiction, it could also
consider the issues of alter ego and fraudulent conveyance.
Swift,
the
plaintiff
filed
suit
against
a
In
defendant
for
nondelivery of cargo and attached the defendant’s vessel.
The
plaintiff later sought to amend its allegations to include a
second named defendant, which it argued was either the original
defendant’s
defendant
alter
had
ego
or
fraudulently
an
entity
transferred
18
to
whom
assets.
the
Id.
original
at
686.
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Although the Supreme Court ultimately rejected plaintiff’s alter
ego claim, it first reiterated that “[t]he jurisdiction of a
court of admiralty to determine the question of alter ego is
undoubted.”
Id.
at
689
n.4.
Thus,
under
Swift,
that
“undoubted” authority exists in this case as well.
Swift
reached
the
fraudulent conveyance.
Fifth
Circuit
same
conclusion
on
the
issue
of
The district court had held (and the
affirmed)
that
it
could
not
consider
the
plaintiff’s fraudulent conveyance claim because it ran too far
afield from the admiralty claim that provided the basis for the
court’s
jurisdiction.
Id.
at
689-90.
The
Supreme
Court
disagreed, observing that although there are restraints on the
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction,
[The plaintiffs, as creditors of the defendant] went
into admiralty on a claim arising upon . . . matters
obviously within admiralty jurisdiction.
As an
incident
to
that
claim,
in
order
to
secure
respondents’ appearance and to insure the fruits of a
decree in [their] favor, they made an attachment . . .
.
The issue of fraud [arose] in connection with the
attachment as a means of effectuating a claim
incontestably in admiralty.
To deny an admiralty
court jurisdiction over this subsidiary or derivative
issue in a litigation clearly maritime would require
an absolute rule that admiralty is rigorously excluded
from all contact with nonmaritime transactions and
from all equitable relief . . . . It would be strange
indeed thus to hobble a legal system that has been so
responsive to the practicalities of maritime commerce
and so inventive in adapting its jurisdiction to the
needs of that commerce.
Id. at 691.
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These principles govern this case as well: Flame and Glory
Wealth
filed
admiralty
enforcement
jurisdiction.”
Supplemental
Rule
B
claims
that
Attendant
attachment.
were
to
The
“obviously
these
claims
issue
of
conveyance arose in connection with those claims.
within
was
the
fraudulent
And because
the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction had been invoked by
the Supplemental Rule B attachment, it could also consider the
latter.
Freight Bulk points to two cases where circuit courts have
applied Peacock in a maritime context.
See Nat’l Mar. Servs.,
Inc. v. Straub, 776 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2015); Zamora v. Bodden,
395 F. App’x 118 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (limiting its
analysis
Neither
to
is
whether
binding,
federal
of
question
course,
but
unpersuasive to Freight Bulk’s position. 6
jurisdiction
we
also
exists).
find
them
Significantly, neither
In fact, Straub cuts against Freight Bulk’s argument with
respect to the fraudulent transfer claim because the Eleventh
Circuit distinguished Peacock, and concluded it could exercise
ancillary jurisdiction in a supplementary proceeding to avoid a
fraudulent transfer by a judgment debtor where jurisdiction in
the original proceeding had been based in admiralty.
See
Straub, 776 F.3d at 786-88.
This was so because the suit
“sought
to
disgorge
[the
defendant]
of
a
fraudulently
transferred asset, not to impose liability for a judgment on a
third party,” and liability would be limited to “the proceeds
that [the judgment debtor] fraudulently transferred to [the
defendant].” Id. at 787. While we need not reach that analysis
here since admiralty jurisdiction otherwise exists, Freight
Bulk’s
attempt
to
distinguish
Straub
in
its
favor
mischaracterizes that case’s holding.
6
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case considers whether Peacock applies to an action where an
independent
basis
for
establishing
the
district
court’s
admiralty jurisdiction exists (apart from the fraud or alter ego
theories).
court’s
Nor does either case challenge that the district
admiralty
jurisdiction
extends
to
enforcing
foreign
admiralty judgments in attachment proceedings.
To
Freight
reiterate,
Bulk
proceedings
then,
unlike
relies
on,
the
district
in
Flame
Peacock
and
court
to
and
the
Glory
other
Wealth
enforce
an
cases
brought
admiralty
judgment and attach a vessel under Supplemental Rule B.
district
court
had
admiralty
jurisdiction
under
§
The
1333
to
determine those claims, and as part of considering those claims,
the court also had authority to consider the questions of alter
ego and fraudulent conveyance.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Vitol, 708
F.3d at 537-39.
Peacock’s
court’s
analysis
subject
Wealth’s claims.
matter
thus
has
no
jurisdiction
bearing
on
the
over
Flame
district
and
Glory
For these reasons, the district court properly
exercised jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute. 7
Freight Bulk also contends that even if the district court
possessed subject matter jurisdiction, the district court erred
by adopting Virginia’s fraudulent conveyance framework because
it is an outlier among state-law provisions.
Freight Bulk has
not preserved this issue for appeal because it failed to raise
it in the district court. As such, we will not consider it for
(Continued)
7
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B.
Pg: 22 of 43
Glory Wealth’s Judgment Against ICI
Next, Freight Bulk contends the district court should not
have permitted Glory Wealth to receive a share of the proceeds
from the sale of the M/V CAPE VIEWER because Glory Wealth failed
to register its New York judgment in the Eastern District of
Virginia, “a perquisite to enforce[ment] . . . under 28 U.S.C. §
1963.”
(Opening Br. 38.)
Freight Bulk raises various arguments
flowing from this main premise, all of which it asserts require
“this Court [to] render judgment for Freight Bulk.”
Br. 40.)
(Opening
We need not consider the substance of Freight Bulk’s
arguments in light of two threshold considerations: waiver and
harmlessness.
To start, Freight Bulk never argued to the district court
that Glory Wealth’s failure to formally submit the judgment it
sought to be enforced precluded it from receiving a share of the
proceeds from the sale of the M/V CAPE VIEWER.
Bulk
did
not
put
the
district
court
“on
As such, Freight
notice
as
to
the
substance of the issue” now raised on appeal, as required to
preserve it for review.
Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S.
460, 469 (2000).
the first time on appeal.
86 (4th Cir. 2014).
In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 28522
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In addition, the record shows that between the district
court’s order holding Freight Bulk liable and the sale of the
M/V CAPE VIEWER, Freight Bulk never argued that Glory Wealth’s
failure to formally introduce a judgment against ICI precluded
it from recovering a portion of the proceeds.
This was so even
though the district court explicitly asked Freight Bulk if it
had any objections to the distribution.
At that time, Freight
Bulk only expressed a somewhat indifferent concern that it did
not know the basis for the agreed-upon allocation between Glory
Wealth and Flame.
We have refused to consider newly raised
arguments absent “exceptional circumstances,” that is to say, a
“‘fundamental error’ or a denial of fundamental justice.”
Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 285-86.
In re
No exceptional circumstances
exist in this case.
Another consideration demonstrates the absence of any such
fundamental
injustice
and
stands
reject Freight Bulk’s argument.
as
an
alternative
basis
to
Even assuming error, Freight
Bulk would not be entitled to any relief as a consequence of
Glory Wealth’s failure to formally file its judgment.
This is
so
in
the
amount
of
because
district
Flame
court
$19,907,118.36.
registered
against
That
an
enforceable
Freight
judgment
far
Bulk
in
exceeds
judgment
the
the
approximately
$8.3 million in proceeds arising from the sale of the M/V CAPE
VIEWER.
Flame’s
claim
thus
precluded
23
Freight
Bulk
from
any
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portion of the proceeds from the sale.
Prior to distribution of
the proceeds, however, Flame and Glory Wealth mutually agreed
how to divide the proceeds between themselves, and the district
court entered judgment based on that agreement.
thus
has
claims.
no
interest
in
how
they
resolved
Freight Bulk
their
competing
It has not been harmed by the alleged error, nor has it
shown that it would be entitled to any relief as a result.
See
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (stating the court will not consider harmless
errors); Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (same).
Accordingly, we decline to
consider the substance of Freight Bulk’s argument. 8
C.
Discovery Sanctions
After finding that Freight Bulk had violated several of the
court’s discovery orders, the magistrate judge issued certain
sanctions.
resulting
documents. 9
Freight Bulk challenges only one of the findings and
sanctions:
the
failure
to
produce
responsive
ICI
As a consequence of that violation, the magistrate
In light of our conclusion, we deny Glory Wealth’s motion
to supplement the record with the English judgment enforcing the
arbitration award that it obtained after final judgment had been
obtained in this proceeding.
9
The district court also found that Freight Bulk had
violated discovery orders by failing to produce (1) employee
workbooks, (2) responsive emails from Baranskiy’s account, (3)
documents relating to a loan agreement between Sea Traffic and
Freight Bulk, and (4) responsive email attachments.
As a
consequence, it authorized a sanction in the form of deeming the
following facts established for purposes of the case: (1)
Freight Bulk and Vista were alter egos of each other, and (2)
the loan from Sea Traffic to Freight Bulk was a sham transaction
(Continued)
8
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judge deemed “as established for purposes of” the proceedings,
that “had any [ICI] documents been produced by [Freight Bulk] in
compliance with the Court’s discovery orders, those documents
would
have
been
favorable
harmful to [Freight Bulk].”
to
[Flame
and
Glory
(J.A. 1323.)
Wealth]
and
The district court
overruled Freight Bulk’s objections, agreeing that Freight Bulk
controlled
produce
responsive
them,
and
ICI
documents
that the
and
yet
had
failed
sanction
was
appropriate.
to
(J.A.
1762-66, 1778-79.)
Freight Bulk contends this discovery sanction was improper
because
it
did
not
possess,
control,
or
have
custody
of
responsive ICI documents and thus should not have been compelled
to produce them.
It also attacks the scope of the discovery
order as being too broad.
sanctions
“were
Freight Bulk further asserts that the
overwhelmingly
prejudicial”
given
that
the
district court repeatedly referred to the sanctions to “fill
wide gaps” in the trial evidence.
(Opening Br. 46.) 10
and Freight Bulk was prohibited from offering evidence of
repayment.
In addition, the court held Freight Bulk and its
counsel jointly and severally liable for attorneys’ fees and
expenses in pursuing the motions for sanctions.
10 Freight Bulk’s Opening Brief mentions one other discovery
sanction in passing (deeming Freight Bulk and Vista to be alter
egos).
(Opening Br. 41.)
Since the alter ego sanction was
approved due to “the magnitude of [Freight Bulk’s discovery]
violations,” (J.A. 1777), it was arguably based, at least in
part, on Freight Bulk’s failure to produce ICI documents.
But
(Continued)
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We typically review the substance of a district court’s
decision to impose discovery sanctions for abuse of discretion.
Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 329 (4th Cir. 2011).
We are also obligated, however, to “disregard all errors and
defects
that
do
not
affect
any
party’s
substantial
rights.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; see also McNanama v. Lukhard, 616 F.2d 727,
730 (4th Cir. 1980) (concluding error in compelling discovery
was harmless); Tagupa v. Bd. of Dirs., 633 F.2d 1309, 1312 (9th
Cir. 1980) (“The harmless error doctrine applies to discovery
orders.”).
We
need
not
wade
into
the
nuances
of
Freight
Bulk’s
arguments because we readily conclude on this record that even
if the district court abused its discretion on this issue, its
error was harmless.
that
this
discovery
Freight Bulk markedly overstates the impact
order
and
resulting
sanction
had
district court’s consideration of the case as a whole.
on
the
Although
since the failure to produce ICI documents was just one of five
discrete categories of discovery violations leading to this
sanction, it likely would have still been an appropriate
exercise of the district court’s discretion to have imposed it
based on the other violations.
In addition, Freight Bulk has
failed to develop any argument in its opening brief discussing
the propriety of this particular sanction. Its analysis solely
involves the ICI documents.
As such, Freight Bulk has not
adequately developed any additional issues related to the
propriety of the alter ego sanction for us to review on appeal.
See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); see also Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999).
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the negative inference from the ICI documents informed some of
the factual findings underpinning the district court’s analysis,
each
factual
finding
that
noted
the
negative
inference
was
supported by more than one piece of additional evidence that had
been
admitted
at
trial. 11
Moreover,
by
the
time
the
court
explained its legal conclusions as to each of the claims, it had
so cabined the negative inference about the ICI documents that
this
evidence
analysis.
More
effect
of
was
only
one
of
many
facts
supporting
its
disregards
the
See Flame, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 787-89.
problematic,
the
other
Freight
Bulk’s
negative
argument
inferences
the
district
court
relied on throughout its opinion and which arose from a key
aspect of the trial: Baranskiy and his lead counsel’s decision
to abandon their case mid-trial.
The district court identified
that event as “[p]erhaps [the] most important in [the] case,”
observing that Baranskiy’s testimony to that point had been “at
times false, inaccurate, contradictory, and untruthful.”
776.
Id. at
The district court concluded that Baranskiy’s “desertion”
prejudiced Flame and Glory Wealth, and found that had Baranskiy
For example, although the district court noted the nonproduction of ICI documents showing when it became insolvent,
testimony at trial supported an insolvency “as early as June 30,
2008” and “no later than mid-September,” which also allowed the
district court to make its ultimate finding “that ICI’s
insolvency began in July 2008 and continued through October 2008
and thereafter.” Flame, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 777.
11
27
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continued
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to
testify,
“his
Pg: 28 of 43
testimony
would
have
been
substantially against his own interests in relation to” Vista,
Freight Bulk, and ICI.
that
negative
Id.
inference
legal analysis.
The district court then relied on
throughout
its
factual
findings
E.g., id. at 778, 779, 787-88, and 789.
and
By the
district court’s own indication, these negative inferences were
considerably more damaging to Freight Bulk than the negative
inference created by the document discovery violation contested
on appeal.
Based on the totality of the record, even if we assume that
the district court erred in sanctioning Freight Bulk for failing
to
produce
ICI
documents,
affect the judgment.
that
error
did
not
substantially
See Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d
219, 235 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“In order to conclude the
district court’s assumed evidentiary errors did not affect [the
judgment], and therefore were harmless, ‘we need only be able to
say
with
fair
assurance,
after
pondering
all
that
happened
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
judgment
was
not
substantially
swayed
by
the
error[s].’”),
abrogated on other grounds by, Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539
U.S. 90 (2003).
Accordingly, we reject Freight Bulk’s claim of
error.
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D.
Pg: 29 of 43
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Freight Bulk next claims the evidence is insufficient to
support the judgment in favor of Flame and Glory Wealth.
It
contends that the hallmarks for establishing alter ego liability
are missing as between ICI, Vista, and Freight Bulk. 12
Bulk further
posits
that
the
evidence
did
not
Freight
establish
the
requisite fraud to support the fraudulent conveyance claim, but
rather
reflected
legitimate
business
transactions.
Neither
argument has merit.
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence after a
bench trial, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear
error
and
its
legal
conclusions
de
novo.
Universal
Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d
417, 427 (4th Cir. 2010).
1.
Alter Ego
Although the corporate form ordinarily prohibits one entity
from being liable for the acts of a separate, though related,
entity, courts will pierce the corporate veil in “extraordinary
circumstances,” such as when the corporate form is being used
for wrongful purposes.
Vitol, 708 F.3d at 543-44.
The standard
for piercing the corporate veil is high, but its purpose is to
As noted above, the alter ego analysis here is a two-step
process showing Vista operated as an alter ego of ICI and that
Freight Bulk is an alter ego of Vista.
12
29
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“achieve an equitable result” by “focus[ing] on reality and not
form,
on
how
the
corporation
operated
and
defendant’s relationship to that operation.”
the
individual
Id. 13
Freight Bulk first contends that the district court erred
in holding that ICI and Vista were alter egos.
It points to the
alter ego analysis in Vitol – wherein we concluded the evidence
was insufficient to allege an alter ego claim – and maintains
that certain allegations here were identical to, and in some
cases less than, the allegations in Vitol.
However, because
numerous factors can support the conclusion that corporations
are alter egos, the inquiry is fact-intensive and specific facts
may be relevant in one case and irrelevant in another.
See Ost-
West-Handel, 160 F.3d at 174 (“Such a determination is to be
made on a case-by-case basis.”).
To that end, Freight Bulk’s
focus on how the factors in this case align with those in Vitol
is
misplaced.
The
relevant
inquiry
is
not
whether
any
particular factor was present, but whether the totality of the
evidence established during the trial demonstrated that ICI and
Vista were alter egos of each other.
The parties do not dispute that federal common law
applies to this analysis. See Ost-West-Handel, 160 F.3d at 174
(“[I]n an admiralty case, a court applies federal common law and
can look to state law in situations where there is no admiralty
rule on point.”).
13
30
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On that point, the district court applied the proper legal
standards, relied on factors we have previously identified as
relevant, and concluded that the evidence supported an alter ego
finding.
The factors considered by the district court included
ICI’s insolvency; Baranskiy’s siphoning of funds; the failure of
ICI, Vista, and Palmira Group companies to observe corporate
formalities
and
maintain
corporate
records;
that
Baranskiy
controlled the acts of specific Vista officers as well as Vista
and Palmira Group companies as a whole; and that ICI and Vista
had some shared ownership and employees.
544
(listing
these
factors
as
See Vitol, 708 F.3d at
indicative
of
alter
ego
corporations).
Freight
findings,
and
erroneous.
trial
Bulk
does
the
For
few
not
it
testimony
example,
to
dispute
does
that
negligible overlap in employees.
of
challenge
Freight
assert
most
Bulk
ICI
were
points
and
to
Vista
not
factual
clearly
Baranskiy’s
had
only
a
But the district court did not
find Baranskiy’s testimony to be credible.
3d at 776.
these
Flame, 39 F. Supp.
Moreover, the district court’s finding that ICI and
Vista “shared the same employees performing substantially the
same
tasks”
unnamed
relied
reflects,
“others.”
the
on
four
Id.
significant
at
named
780.
factor
management
As
the
underpinning
employees
court’s
its
plus
analysis
finding
on
this point was not the percentage of overall shared employees,
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but rather their roles and fluidity between ICI, Vista, and the
other Palmira Group affiliates (including Freight Bulk).
Id.
This finding was an appropriate one to make under the record
evidence and to be considered as part of the district court’s
alter ego analysis.
Similarly, Freight Bulk asserts the district court errantly
found that Baranskiy’s “working at [his] father’s company [made
him ICI’s] alter ego.”
Bulk
mischaracterizes
finding,
which
was
(Opening Br. 49.)
the
not
basis
based
employee of both ICI and Vista.
for
on
Yet again, Freight
the
district
Baranskiy’s
court’s
status
as
an
Instead, the court’s conclusion
followed a detailed explanation of Baranskiy’s specific conduct
as a conduit for cash between ICI and Vista.
See Flame, 39 F.
Supp. 3d at 776-83.
Freight
Bulk
also
challenges
the
second
step
of
the
district court’s analysis – i.e., its conclusion that Freight
Bulk and Vista were alter egos.
Freight Bulk contends that “as
a matter of law” they are not.
this
argument
for
two
sufficient on its own.
Bulk’s
cumulative
reasons,
(Opening Br. 50.)
either
of
which
We reject
would
First, one of the sanctions for Freight
discovery
violations
was
the
finding
Freight Bulk and Vista are “alter egos of one another.”
773.
be
that
Id. at
For the reasons discussed in footnote 10, that sanction
stands.
As such, the district court could properly rely on it
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at trial.
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Pg: 33 of 43
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i) (stating that a
proper sanction for discovery violations is “directing that . .
. designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the
action”).
Second, and quite apart from the sanction-based finding,
the
evidence
fully
supports
the
district
court’s
conclusion.
The trial record established, among other things, Baranskiy’s
ownership
and
control
Baranskiy
directs
making;
that
between
of
rather
both
Freight
Freight
than
Bulk
Bulk
entities;
exercising
is
and
that
officers
independent
undercapitalized;
Vista
are
as
decision
that
intermingled
do
funds
amongst
themselves and other Palmira Group entities; that Baranskiy’s
companies
fail
to
observe
corporate
formalities
and
maintain
proper records; that they share office space; and that dealings
are not conducted at arm’s length.
Freight Bulk’s limited challenges to these findings again
minimize Baranskiy’s conduct and attack the court’s findings as
being based solely on his ownership of both Freight Bulk and
Vista.
alter
Certainly not all corporations with a common owner are
egos,
but
neither
can
a
corporation
escape
alter
ego
liability solely on the basis of being a separate, formal entity
sharing the same owner.
common
often
owner
who
comingles
fails
Where, as here, the evidence shows a
funds
to
to
observe
avoid
33
corporate
legal
formalities
obligations,
it
is
and
not
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to
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treat
the
entities
Pg: 34 of 43
as
one.
E.g.,
De
Witt
Truck
Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685
(4th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he mere fact that all or almost all of the
corporate stock is owned by one individual . . . will not afford
sufficient
grounds
for
disregarding
corporateness.
But
when
substantial ownership of all the stock of a corporation in a
single
individual
supporting
is
disregard
combined
of
the
with
corporate
other
factors
fiction
on
clearly
grounds
of
fundamental equity and fairness, courts have experienced ‘little
difficulty’
described
and
as
have
the
shown
‘alter
no
ego’
hesitancy
or
in
applying
‘instrumentality’
what
is
theory
in
order to cast aside the corporate shield[.]”).
Freight Bulk also mistakenly asserts that it cannot, as a
matter
of
law,
have
been
ICI’s
alter
established years after ICI’s demise.
ego
because
it
was
This argument overlooks
the requisite causal link between the entities through Vista.
Freight Bulk does not deny that ICI and Vista were in existence
at the same time.
Since those two entities were alter egos,
they are liable for each other’s debts.
See Keffer v. H.K.
Porter Co., Inc., 872 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989) (describing
the effect of piercing the corporate veil).
Similarly, because
Vista and Freight Bulk are alter egos, they can be responsible
34
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Filed: 11/24/2015
for each other’s debts. 14
Pg: 35 of 43
In short, Freight Bulk is liable for
ICI’s liabilities through Vista.
The district court properly applied our case law regarding
alter ego liability to the facts presented.
Our conclusion in a
prior case applies equally here: “[T]his case patently presents
a blending of the very factors which courts have regarded as
justifying a disregard of the corporate entity in furtherance of
basic and fundamental fairness.”
2.
Freight
district
assets
to
creditors.
Bulk
court’s
the
Fraudulent Conveyance
also
raises
conclusion
defendants
Given
no
Keffer, 872 F.2d at 65.
multiple
that
and
ICI
related
federal
challenges
fraudulently
entities
admiralty
rules
to
the
conveyed
to
avoid
govern
its
such
a
claim, the district court appropriately looked to Virginia law.
See
Ost-West-Handel,
160
F.3d
at
174;
see
also
supra
n.7
(observing that Freight Bulk failed to preserve any argument
that
the
district
court
should
not
have
looked
to
Virginia
As part of its argument, Freight Bulk selectively
characterizes the Supreme Court’s statement in Swift that the
plaintiff could not pursue alter ego liability against a
particular defendant since it came into existence after the
underlying cause of action accrued. Significantly, however, the
Supreme Court noted that “apart from any transfer of assets by
[the originating defendant to an alleged alter ego company], the
latter company could not be held personally liable on an alter
ego theory.”
Swift, 339 U.S. at 689 n.4 (emphasis added).
Here, Flame and Glory Wealth alleged a transfer of assets, so
that principle does not apply.
14
35
Appeal: 14-2267
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fraudulent
statute
intent
other
Filed: 11/24/2015
transfer
treats
to
as
delay,
persons
of
entitled to[.]”
principles).
void any
hinder
or
Pg: 36 of 43
transfer
or
from
The
defraud
what
applicable
of
property
creditors,
they
are
or
Virginia
“given
with
purchasers
may
be
or
lawfully
Va. Code § 55-80.
“In a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, proof of
the fraudulent intent must be ‘clear, cogent and convincing.’”
Fox
Rest
Assocs.,
2011).
However,
L.P.
v.
because
Little,
of
the
717
S.E.2d
difficulty
126,
of
132
(Va.
establishing
fraudulent intent, Virginia courts have traditionally relied on
certain presumptions, known as “badges of fraud.”
Id.
These
“badges of fraud” include: the relationship of the parties, the
grantor’s insolvency, pursuit of the grantor by creditors at the
time of the transfer, want of consideration, retention of the
property by the grantor, fraudulent incurrence of indebtedness
after the conveyance, gross inadequacy of price, and lack of
security.
Id. at 131-32; 9A Michie’s Jurisprudence of Virginia
& West Virginia §§ 12, 15 (2015).
“Once a party has introduced
evidence to establish a badge of fraud, a prima facie case of
fraudulent conveyance is established[, and] the burden shifts
[so that] the defendant must establish the bona fides of the
transaction.”
At
the
Fox Rest Assocs., 717 S.E.2d at 132.
outset,
Freight
Bulk
asserts
the
district
court
inappropriately relied on adverse inferences in the absence of
36
Appeal: 14-2267
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evidence
Filed: 11/24/2015
supporting
Flame
and
Pg: 37 of 43
Glory
Wealth’s
claim.
While
Freight Bulk refers to “adverse inferences” in the plural, we
note again that its prior challenge was only to the negative
inference drawn from the failure to produce ICI documents, not
from
the
district
court’s
Baranskiy’s trial conduct.
additional
inferences
arising
from
Plus, we have already held that any
error on this front was harmless.
As to the inference arising
from trial, the district court acted within its discretion in
finding that any additional testimony from Baranskiy “would have
been detrimental to [Freight Bulk’s] positions.”
Flame, 39 F.
Supp. 3d at 789; see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,
318
(1976)
privilege
(noting,
against
in
the
context
of
self-incrimination,
the
that
Fifth
a
Amendment’s
court
may
draw
“adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they
refuse
to
testify
in
response
to
probative
evidence
offered
against them”); Brice v. Nkaru, 220 F.3d 233, 240 & n.9 (4th
Cir. 2000) (discussing limitations on when an adverse inference
can be made in a civil trial as a result of an opposing party’s
failure
to
testify
or
missing
testimony,
none
of
which
are
applicable here); Streber v. Comm’r, 138 F.3d 216, 221-22 (5th
Cir. 1998) (“In general, a court may draw a negative inference
from a party’s failure to produce a witness ‘whose testimony
would
elucidate
the
transaction.’”
States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893)).
37
(quoting
Graves
v.
United
Appeal: 14-2267
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Filed: 11/24/2015
Pg: 38 of 43
Next, Freight Bulk contends the evidence did not show that
ICI transferred the charter for the M/V HARMONY FALCON to Vista,
but rather that Vista simply entered into its own charter after
ICI went bankrupt.
The district court ably described the record
evidence supporting its finding to the contrary.
That evidence
included proof that ICI and Vista both hid Vista’s assumption of
the charter; that Vista “paid [the] same charter rate for the
same
ship
and
route
and
cargo
[as
ICI
had
contracted
for]
despite the drop in shipping rates which [had] occurred”; that a
subsidiary
of
ICI
paid
bunker
rates
for
the
charter
Vista
fulfilled; that Vista did not give ICI any consideration for the
transaction; and that Vista “made about $1.7 million profit for
the charter of the HARMONY FALCON, which sum ICI would have been
entitled” to collect and apply to its debts.
3d at 777-78.
Flame, 39 F. Supp.
As the district court concluded, these facts are
the very badges of fraud Virginia courts have indicated give
rise to a prima facie case of fraudulent transfer.
789.
Id. at 785,
And Freight Bulk failed to rebut that presumption with
evidence establishing the bona fides of the transaction.
Freight Bulk also contends Flame and Glory Wealth failed to
establish fraud with respect to $1.58 million in payments ICI
made to Baranskiy that it claims were commissions.
Freight
untitled,
Bulk
points
undated
to
as
sheet
of
proof
paper
38
for
this
containing
The document
position
columns
is
an
listing
Appeal: 14-2267
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clients
and
Filed: 11/24/2015
corresponding
Pg: 39 of 43
numbers
without
any
context.
We
cannot say on the basis of this document that the district court
clearly erred in rejecting Freight Bulk’s assertion as to its
meaning, particularly given the lack of credible corroborating
testimony.
Indeed,
Baranskiy’s
testimony
was
contradictory
throughout the duration of the case, including with respect to
explaining
money
he
capitalize Vista.
received
from
ICI
and
money
he
used
to
As such, the district court did not clearly
err in finding that these payments were actually payments ICI
made to capitalize Vista.
As a final argument, Freight Bulk asserts that, at most,
Flame
and
transfers
Glory
(the
Wealth
M/V
established
HARMONY
FALCON
cash) totaling only $3.28 million.
two
charter
discrete
and
fraudulent
$1.58
million
As such, it contends the
district court erred in holding that Freight Bulk was liable for
the total amount of Flame and Glory Wealth’s judgments against
ICI, which were in the neighborhood of $60 million.
Relatedly,
Freight Bulk asserts that the district court should have capped
Flame and Glory Wealth’s recovery at $3.28 million rather than
distributing the entire $8.3 million obtained from the sale of
the M/V CAPE VIEWER.
This
argument
fails
for
two
reasons.
First,
alter ego
liability made Freight Bulk jointly and severally liable for the
entirety
of
Flame
and
Glory
Wealth’s
39
judgments
against
ICI.
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Pg: 40 of 43
Thus, even if Freight Bulk were correct as to the fraudulent
conveyance claim, it would still not be entitled to a different
result because of the district court’s judgment on that issue.
Swift,
339
U.S.
at
689
n.4
(observing
that
if
plaintiffs
succeeded on a theory of alter ego, then the issue of fraudulent
transfer
would
be
irrelevant
because
relief under those standards).
Bulk’s
argument
-
that
the
they
ICI’s
court
alter
found
egos,
district
multiple
making
be
afforded
Second, the premise of Freight
court
fraudulent conveyances - is incorrect.
district
would
Bulk
found
two
To the contrary, the
fraudulent
Freight
only
conveyances
liable
for
between
the
entire
fraud perpetrated by ICI through Baranskiy and his compatriots.
While
its
holding
identified
the
charter
of
the
M/V
HARMONY
FALCON in particular, it also identified the transfer of other
“assets,”
“substantial
funds,”
and
“ostensible
‘loans,’
which
are in reality security—and interest-free transfers of funds[.]”
Flame, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 789.
In addition, the district court
relied on the discovery sanction – unchallenged on appeal – that
Vista
provided
transferred
to
funds
[Freight
to
Sea
Bulk]
Traffic,
for
of
“then
CAPE
VIEWER,” in a “sham transaction used to avoid creditors.”
Id.
40
purchase
were
the
at 781.
the
which
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Pg: 41 of 43
For these reasons, we conclude sufficient evidence supports
the judgment against Freight Bulk on the fraudulent conveyance
claim.
E.
Lastly,
Freight
Judicial Bias
Bulk
contends
the
district
court
demonstrated a personal bias against Ukrainians, which tainted
the
entire
proceeding
and
requires
reversal. 15
In
support,
Freight Bulk points to nine statements by the district court
that purportedly show this prejudice.
To be sure, “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process.”
556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009).
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
To protect the right to be heard by
an impartial jurist, Congress has authorized parties to timely
file an “affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or
in favor of any adverse party,” and upon such a showing, “such
judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall
be assigned to hear such proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 144.
This
is, of course, in addition to the judge’s own duty to consider
whether he must disqualify himself “in any proceeding in which
Alternatively, Freight Bulk asserts the district court’s
bias requires reassignment to a different judge in the event of
a remand. Because we have not found any other reversible error,
we only consider the remaining portion of Freight Bulk’s
argument.
15
41
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Filed: 11/24/2015
Pg: 42 of 43
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
28 U.S.C. §
455(a).
At
no
time
in
the
proceedings
below
did
Freight
Bulk
challenge the district court judge’s impartiality to hear the
case.
Accordingly, it has failed to preserve this claim for
appellate review.
See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 285-86
(discussing the consequences of failing to preserve a claim for
appeal); see also Corti v. Storage Tech. Corp., 304 F.3d 336,
343 (4th Cir. 2002) (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (“[I]t remains
the law of this circuit that when a party to a civil action
fails to raise a point at trial, that party waives review of the
issue
unless
circumstances
there
justifying
are
exceptional
review.”).
or
Having
extraordinary
reviewed
Freight
Bulk’s arguments and paid particular attention to the exemplars
it provided in the transcripts, we discern no exceptional or
extraordinary
circumstances
in
this
case
that
would
justify
reviewing it on the merits. 16
Freight Bulk cites an out-of-circuit case to support its
view that this Court should not deem its argument waived.
See
United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2007).
This
criminal sentencing case did not involve an allegation of
evidence of a judge’s personal bias or prejudice, but rather a
claim that the judge considered the defendant’s nationality in
deciding an appropriate sentence.
Id. at 156-58.
As such, it
is inapposite.
Moreover,
even
assuming
Freight
Bulk
preserved
its
argument, we find no error.
We have reviewed the statements
cited by Freight Bulk and conclude it has selectively quoted
(Continued)
16
42
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Pg: 43 of 43
III.
For
the
reasons
detailed
above,
the
judgment
of
the
district court in favor of Flame and Glory Wealth is
AFFIRMED.
only parts of the record and taken the comments far out of
context.
Viewed in full, there is nothing in the district
court’s commentary to support such a claim.
43
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