Kimberly Covarrubias v. Citimortgage, Incorporated

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:14-cv-00157-JAG Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999651572].. [14-2420]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2420

KIMBERLY COVARRUBIAS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITIMORTGAGE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:14-cv-00157-JAG)

Submitted:

August 20, 2015

Decided:

September 1, 2015

Before KING, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Henry W. McLaughlin, III, LAW OFFICE OF HENRY MCLAUGHLIN, P.C.,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Anand V. Ramana, Elizabeth
H. Goodall, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Kimberly

Covarrubias

appeals

the

district

court’s

orders

granting summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings in favor
of

CitiMortgage,

prejudice.

Inc.

(“CMI”)

and

dismissing

the

case

with

In November 2011, CMI foreclosed on Covarrubias’

home after she defaulted on the mortgage.

Covarrubias’ lawsuit

asserted that CMI improperly foreclosed by failing to comply
with

U.S.

Department

of

Housing

and

Urban

Development

regulations (“HUD regulations”) incorporated into the deed of
trust, and committed actual fraud by foreclosing shortly after a
CMI

representative

deferred.

assured

her

that

foreclosure

would

be

On appeal, Covarrubias contends that the district

court erred in determining that CMI’s breach of HUD regulations
did not result in her claimed damages (Count One), and that
Covarrubias failed to support her fraud claim (Count Three). ∗

We

affirm in part and vacate in part.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir.
2014).

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant

∗

Covarrubias disclaims any challenge to the district
court’s other dispositive holdings, which accordingly are
abandoned on appeal.
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A); Edwards v.
City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999).

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shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.

56(a).

The

relevant

inquiry

in

a

summary

judgment analysis, then, is “whether the evidence presents a
sufficient

disagreement

to

require

submission

to

a

jury

or

whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

251-52 (1986).

“Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no genuine issue for trial.”

Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“The

nonmoving

party

cannot

create

a

genuine

issue

of

material fact through mere speculation or the building of one
inference upon another,” Othentec Ltd. v. Phelan, 526 F.3d 135,
140

(4th

“cannot

Cir.
defeat

2008)

(internal

summary

quotation

judgment

with

marks

merely

a

omitted),

and

scintilla

of

evidence,” Am. Arms Int’l v. Herbert, 563 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir.
2009).

In our review of summary judgment, we do not weigh the

evidence

or

make

credibility

determinations.

Williams

Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662, 667 (4th Cir. 2004).
uphold

a

grant

of

summary

judgment

unless

we

find

v.

We will
that

a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party

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on the evidence presented.

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EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573

F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2009).
I.
To prevail on a breach of contract claim under Virginia
law, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant owed her a
legally enforceable obligation; (2) the defendant violated that
obligation; and (3) she suffered injury or damage as a result of
the defendant’s breach.

Filak v. George, 594 S.E.2d 610, 619

(Va. 2004).

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the

causal

between

link

the

alleged

breach

and

damages

claimed.

Saks Fifth Ave., Inc. v. James, Ltd., 630 S.E.2d 304, 311 (Va.
2006).
Virginia

courts

construe

deeds

of

trust

as

contracts.

Mathews v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 724 S.E.2d 196, 200 (Va. 2012).
Accordingly, lenders “must comply with all conditions precedent
to foreclosure in a deed of trust even if the borrowers are in
arrears.”

Id.

at

199.

Where

the

deed

of

trust

requires

compliance with incorporated HUD regulations, “the face-to-face
meeting

requirement

[of

24

C.F.R.

§ 203.604(b)

(2015)]

is

a

condition precedent to the accrual of the rights of acceleration
and foreclosure.”

Id. at 202.

Here, CMI was obligated under HUD regulations to conduct,
or make a reasonable effort to conduct, a face-to-face meeting
prior to foreclosure.

The record reveals CMI failed to do so.
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The

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record

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also

reveals

evidence of causation.

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Covarrubias

presented

prima

facie

She produced evidence demonstrating a

willingness and ability to bring the mortgage current had CMI
arranged a face-to-face meeting, and sufficiently showed a loss
of

equity

construing

as

a

the

direct

result

evidence

in

of

the

the

foreclosure.

light

most

Thus,

favorable

to

Covarrubias, we conclude that a rational jury could reasonably
conclude

that

a

face-to-face

meeting,

as

required,

may

have

resulted in an outcome other than foreclosure and the consequent
loss of Covarrubias’ equity.
II.
Covarrubias next challenges the district court’s dismissal
of

her

actual

demonstrate

fraud

that

claim.

she

To

relied

on

prevail,
an

Covarrubias

intentional

or

must

knowing

misrepresentation by CMI and suffered harm by such reliance.
Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 776 F.3d 214, 219 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2868 (2015); Station #2, LLC v. Lynch,
695 S.E.2d 537, 540 (Va. 2010).
the

party

“makes

a

promise

A misrepresentation occurs if

that,

when

made,

[it]

has

no

intention of performing.”

Station #2, LLC, 695 S.E.2d at 540

(internal

omitted).

burden

of

evidence.”

quotation
proving

marks
each

element

“by

Covarrubias
clear

and

bears

the

convincing

Richmond Metro. Auth. v. McDevitt St. Bovis, Inc.,

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507 S.E.2d 344, 346 (Va. 1998).

We discern no error by the

district court.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in CMI’s favor as to Covarrubias’ breach of
contract claim involving the requirements to offer or conduct a
face-to-face

meeting

and

remand

consistent with this opinion.
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

further

proceedings

We affirm in all other respects.

argument

adequately

for

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART;
AND REMANDED

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