Alfredo Prieto v. Keith Davi

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cv-00849-HEH. [999611947]. [14-4]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4

ALFREDO PRIETO,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
DAVID ZOOK, Warden, Sussex I State Prison,
Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:13-cv-00849-HEH)

Argued:

May 13, 2015

Decided:

June 30, 2015

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Shedd and Judge Diaz joined.

ARGUED: Miriam Bamberger Airington, BOWEN, CHAMPLIN, FOREMAN &
ROCKECHARLIE PLLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Alice
Theresa Armstrong, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Cary B. Bowen,
BOWEN,
CHAMPLIN,
FOREMAN
&
ROCKECHARLIE
PLLC,
Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant.
Mark R. Herring, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.

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DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
Alfredo Rolando Prieto appeals the district court’s denial
of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§

2254.

He

contends

that

the

Eighth

Amendment

prohibition on the execution of intellectually disabled persons,
as set forth in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), renders his two death
sentences unconstitutional.

We affirm.

I.
In 2007, a Virginia jury convicted Prieto of two counts of
capital murder, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission
of murder, grand larceny, and rape.

Prieto v. Commonwealth, 682

S.E.2d 910, 914 (Va. 2009) (“Prieto I”). 1

Discovery of juror

misconduct at the sentencing phase of the 2007 trial led to a
mistrial, but in 2008, a second jury convicted Prieto on all
counts.

Id. at 913.

During the sentencing phase of his second

trial, Prieto argued that he was intellectually disabled and
therefore ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins.
introduced

substantial

intellectual

disability,

evidence
but

the

1

in

support

jury

found

of

his

that

he

Prieto

claim
was

of
not

The crimes for which Prieto was convicted occurred in
1988, but Prieto was not linked to the murders until 2005, when
DNA testing led police to identify him as a suspect. Prieto I,
682 S.E.2d at 915-16.
2

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intellectually disabled and imposed the death penalty on the two
murder counts.

Id. at 914, 916-17.

On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
Prieto’s

convictions

but

vacated

his

death

sentences

due

defects in the jury verdict forms at the penalty phase.
935-36.
murder
death

to

Id. at

In 2010, on remand for resentencing of the capital
convictions,

penalty

for

a
both

third

jury

murder

unanimously

convictions.

recommended
(Prieto

did

the
not

argue that he was intellectually disabled at the resentencing.)
The

state

trial

court

entered

an

order

imposing

the

death

penalty on both capital murder counts, and the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed both sentences.

Prieto v. Commonwealth, 721

S.E.2d 484, 489 (Va.) (“Prieto II”), cert. denied, Prieto v.
Virginia, 133 S. Ct. 244 (2012).
Prieto next filed a habeas petition with the Supreme Court
of Virginia, raising several claims, including contentions that
his

counsel

was

constitutionally

execution was barred by Atkins.

ineffective

and

that

his

See Prieto v. Warden of Sussex

I State Prison, 748 S.E.2d 94, 105 (Va. 2013) (“Prieto III”).
As relevant here, that court held that Prieto could not raise
his Atkins claim in his state habeas petition because he had
failed to raise the claim on direct appeal of the 2010 order
imposing the death sentences.

Id.

Under Virginia law, that

failure meant his Atkins claim had been procedurally defaulted.
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Id.

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The state habeas court dismissed the remainder of Prieto’s

claims.

Id. at 98.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Prieto then filed the present
habeas application in federal court, again raising a number of
claims.

The district court dismissed most of Prieto’s claims as

meritless;

it

dismissed

his

Atkins

claim

as

procedurally

defaulted.

We granted a certificate of appealability as to the

Atkins claim.

II.
“Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light
of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’” the Supreme Court in
Atkins

held

mentally
omitted).

that

“death

retarded 2

is

not

criminal.”

a

suitable

536

U.S.

punishment
at

321

for

a

(citation

However, acknowledging the difficulty “in determining

which offenders are in fact retarded,” the Court “le[ft] to the
State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional

restriction”

announced in Atkins.

on

the

death

penalty

that

it

Id. at 317 (second alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2

Later,
the
Supreme
Court
substituted
the
term
“intellectual disability” for “mental retardation.”
Hall, 134
S. Ct. at 1990. We do the same, except when quoting from cases,
statutes, and testimony that use the term “mentally retarded”
and pre-date the Court’s guidance in Hall.

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Responding to this directive, Virginia enacted a statute
defining “mentally retarded” as
a disability, originating before the age of 18 years,
characterized concurrently by
(i) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning
as demonstrated by performance on a standardized
measure of intellectual functioning administered in
conformity with accepted professional practice, that
is at least two standard deviations below the mean and
(ii) significant limitations in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social and practical adaptive
skills.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A).
Virginia’s highest court interpreted this “two-fold test”
to require, under the first prong, an IQ score of 70, “below
which

one

may

be

classified

as

being

mentally

retarded.”

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d 47, 59 (Va. 2004), vacated
and remanded on other grounds sub. nom., Johnson v. Virginia,
544 U.S. 901 (2005).

In other words, the state court held that

a

IQ

defendant

with

an

score

of

71

or

higher

could

not

be

“mentally retarded” under Virginia law.
Last year, however, the Supreme Court clarified in Hall
that a state that “seeks to execute a man because he scored a 71
instead of 70 on an IQ test. . . . misconstrues the Court’s
statements in Atkins.”
unconstitutional

a

134 S. Ct. at 2001.

Florida

statute

The Court deemed

containing

imposing IQ cutoffs for intellectual disability.

5

a

“rigid
Id.

rule”

The Hall

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explained

that

a

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state’s

assessment

of

a

defendant’s

intellectual disability should focus on whether he evidenced,
beginning

“during

“significantly

the

developmental

subaverage

intellectual

period,”

both

functioning,”

and

(1)
(2)

“deficits in adaptive functioning (the inability to learn basic
skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances).”
1994.

The

Court

“interrelated”
Id. at 2001.

and

emphasized
that

no

that

“single

these
factor

two
[is]

Id. at

criteria

are

dispositive.”

Accordingly, “an individual with an IQ test score

between 70 and 75 or lower may show intellectual disability by
presenting

additional

adaptive functioning.”

evidence

regarding

difficulties

in

Id. at 2000 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).
After

Hall,

it

is

clear

Virginia’s

prior

interpretation

that
of

the

the

Supreme

first

Virginia statute violates the Eighth Amendment.

Court

prong

of

of
the

The Hall Court

said as much, identifying Virginia as one of only two states to
“have adopted a fixed [IQ] score cutoff identical to Florida’s.”
Id. at 1996.
defendant
disability

the

Hall established that a state may not deny a
opportunity

based

on

to

evidence

establish
of

his

“deficits

intellectual
in

adaptive

functioning over his lifetime,” simply because that defendant
has an IQ score above 70.
Virginia

operated

under

Id. at 2001.
an

But the fact that

unconstitutional
6

definition

of

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“intellectual

disability”

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at

the

time

of

Prieto’s

sentencing

does not resolve the Atkins inquiry if, as the state habeas
court

and

the

district

defaulted that claim.

court

held,

Prieto

has

procedurally

We therefore turn first to that question.

III.
A.
Federal courts “will not review a question of federal law
decided by a state court” if the state court’s decision rests on
an

independent

and

adequate

state

law

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991).

ground.

Coleman

v.

When a state habeas

court declines to address a prisoner’s federal constitutional
claims

“because

procedural

the

prisoner

requirement[,]

.

.

had
.

failed

the

state

to

meet

judgment

a

state

rests

on

independent and adequate state procedural grounds.”

Id. at 730.

In

federalism”

these

circumstances,

“concerns

of

comity

and

dictate against a federal court’s review of that judgment.

Id.

In reviewing Prieto’s state habeas petition, the Supreme
Court of Virginia determined that he had procedurally defaulted
his

Atkins

claim

because

he

could

have

raised

it

review of his 2010 sentence but had failed to do so.
III, 748 S.E.2d at 105.

on

direct

See Prieto

The court explained that, under the

procedural rule established by Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d
680, 682 (Va. 1974), a “non-jurisdictional issue [that] could
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have been raised during the direct appeal process . . . is not
cognizable in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”
III, 748 S.E.2d at 105.
precise

Virginia

Prieto

We previously have held that this

procedural

default

rule

constitutes

an

independent and adequate state ground for a denial of a state
habeas petition.

See Mu’Min v. Pruett, 125 F.3d 192, 196-97

(4th Cir. 1997).
In this appeal, Prieto does not challenge the Supreme Court
of Virginia’s determination that he defaulted his Atkins claim.
That is, he does not argue that he actually did raise his Atkins
claim

on

direct

review.

As

such,

Prieto’s

Atkins

claim

is

procedurally defaulted, and he is ineligible for relief unless
one of the two exceptions to procedural default applies.
Hedrick v. True, 443 F.3d 342, 366 (4th Cir. 2006).

See

Prieto

asserts that an exception to procedural default saves his Atkins
claim.
B.
A
from

habeas

petitioner

procedural

default

can
if

rescue

he

his

constitutional

establishes

either

claim

“cause

and

prejudice” for the default or that the default would yield a
“fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Mackall v. Angelone, 131

F.3d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S.
255, 262 (1989)).

In his § 2254 petition before the district

court, Prieto argued that both exceptions applied to his case.
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Because constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
may provide “cause” for a procedural default, Prieto argued that
his counsel’s failure to present evidence of his intellectual
disability at his 2010 resentencing constituted such ineffective
assistance.
The

See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).

district

court,

however,

found

Prieto’s

ineffective

assistance claim meritless, and so held that Prieto had failed
to show “cause and prejudice” excusing the procedural default.
Prieto does not challenge that ruling in this appeal.
result,

the

procedural

only

default

way

Prieto’s

is

through

a

Atkins

As a

claim

his

that

showing

survives
enforcing

the

default would result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986).
The

Supreme

Court

has

explained

that

a

“fundamental

miscarriage of justice” occurs “where a constitutional violation
has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent.”

Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496.

The Court later clarified

in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992), that “actual
innocence” may also mean “innocent of death” in the sentencing
context.

This means that in a capital case, a habeas petitioner

can make a showing of “actual innocence,” and qualify for the
exception,

by

proving

through

“clear

and

convincing

evidence

that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would

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have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under
the applicable state law.”

Id. at 336.

Prieto does not argue that he is actually innocent of the
crimes for which he was convicted.
he

is

“innocent

procedural

of

default,

death.”
Prieto

Rather, he argues only that

Thus,
must

for

show

us

that,

to
if

excuse

his

instructed

properly under Hall and Atkins, “no reasonable juror” could have
found him eligible for the death penalty under Virginia law.
This presents an extremely high bar. 3

IV.
Prieto rests his claim of actual innocence on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hall.

Neither we nor the Supreme Court has

determined

applies

whether

collateral review. 4

Hall

retroactively

to

cases

on

For purposes of Prieto’s “actual innocence”

inquiry we will assume without deciding, as the district court
3

Indeed, the “clear and convincing evidence” standard for
establishing “actual innocence” in the capital sentencing
context is “more stringent” than the standard for establishing
“actual innocence” of the conviction itself.
Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1995). The latter requires only a showing
that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent.”
Id. at 327
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
4

The two federal appellate courts that have ruled on this
question to date have held, over dissents, that Hall does not
apply retroactively on collateral review. See In re: Henry, 757
F.3d 1151, 1161 (11th Cir. 2014); Goodwin v. Steele, 2014 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23149 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
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did, that Hall does apply retroactively on collateral review.
Under this assumption, the district court concluded that “Prieto
has

not

shown

by

clear

and

convincing

evidence

that

no

reasonable juror would have sentenced him to death because he is
intellectually

disabled.”

We

habeas application de novo.

review

the

denial

of

Prieto’s

Hedrick, 443 F.3d at 349.

The only evidence that Prieto points to in support of his
“actual

innocence”

sentencing

hearing

claim

is

the

evidence

following

his

2008

introduced

conviction. 5

at
At

the
that

hearing, both Prieto and the Commonwealth offered a good deal of
evidence as to both prongs of Virginia’s statute:
functioning and adaptive functioning.

intellectual

In his § 2254 petition,

Prieto focuses on the adaptive functioning evidence.
That
witnesses.

evidence

included

the

testimony

of

multiple

expert

Prieto’s chief witness, Dr. Ricardo Weinstein, a

forensic neuropsychologist with expertise in brain development,
conducted

“a

comprehensive

neuropsychological
explained

that

evaluation

functioning”
adaptive

and

adaptive

functioning

5

Prieto and the Commonwealth
Prieto’s direct appeal of his 2008
Prieto I. We quote from and rely on
appendix in discussing the evidence
sentencing.
11

of

Mr.

Prieto’s

functioning.

includes

He

occupational

filed a joint appendix in
conviction and sentencing,
the materials in that joint
presented at Prieto’s 2008

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skills, activities of daily living, self-esteem, interpersonal
abilities, self-direction, language, and academic abilities.
Dr. Weinstein’s evaluation of Prieto’s adaptive functioning
included interviews with Prieto’s relatives in California and El
Salvador.

He

also

interviewed

individuals

from

the

El

Salvadorian government “to understand more about what was going
on

in

the

country”

when

Prieto

was

a

child.

Prieto

“was

described as a shy and withdrawn child in adolescence,” and “as
having

problems

learning

simple

tasks.”

Interviewees

told

Dr. Weinstein that Prieto “was easily manipulated by relatives
and

friends”;

kids

his

age

“did

not

like

to

play

with

him

because . . . he couldn’t understand the rules”; and he had
“problems acquiring academic skills” and “problems controlling
his emotions.”

Dr. Weinstein also spent “between twenty and

thirty hours” over a number of visits with Prieto, administered
tests to assess Prieto’s behavioral skills, and examined the
records kept by California prisons on Prieto.
Dr. Weinstein stated that his research uncovered many risk
factors

for

childhood.

adaptive

functioning

deficits

throughout

Prieto’s

In El Salvador, Prieto grew up in extreme poverty,

characterized by poor nutrition, a lack of running water, and
little

cognitive

stimulation.

He

suffered

abuse

from

his

alcoholic father and abandonment by his mother, and he had to
contend with uncertainty as a result of wars in El Salvador, as
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well

as

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witnessing

his

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grandfather’s

shooting

death.

After

Prieto moved to California as a teenager, he began abusing drugs
and alcohol, was often in trouble with the law, and married his
pregnant girlfriend at a young age.

Ultimately, Dr. Weinstein

opined that Prieto “had adaptive behavior deficits . . . during
his

developmental

neurological

years.”

testing

He

revealed

also

“a

brain

opined

that

Prieto’s

dysfunction”

affecting

areas of the brain “that deal with judgment, deal with being
able to foresee consequences of behaviors, control sexuality,
control aggression, . . . [and] are responsible[] for . . .
empathy.”
Other

witnesses

for

Prieto

offered

similar

testimony.

Psychiatrist Dr. Pablo Stewart testified that after meeting with
Prieto,

he

concluded

that

Prieto

“suffers

from

post

trauma

stress disorder[,] . . . has impaired cognitive functioning, and
.

.

.

has

a

history

of

chronic

polysubstance

dependence.”

Neuropsychiatrist Dr. James Merikangas testified that Prieto’s
brain

scans

revealed

damage

to

the

areas

of

the

brain

“control one’s emotions, [and] control one’s impulses.”

that

Members

of Prieto’s family, including his mother and siblings, testified
about the harsh conditions of Prieto’s childhood and about his
early

development.

Hence,

Prieto’s

defense

at

his

2008

sentencing included testimony from a wide array of sources about
the limits of his adaptive functioning.
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At the same time, however, the Commonwealth also presented
extensive evidence that Prieto’s adaptive functioning was not
deficient.
prison

The

jury

heard

psychologists

had

from

the

evaluated

prosecution
Prieto

that

when

three

he

was

incarcerated in California and that each had concluded that he
was not intellectually disabled.
reported

that

developed,
reasoning
[sic].”

Prieto’s

and
were

that

One of these psychologists

“cognitive

his

adequate

level

for

the

functions

of

were

conceptual

formation

of

adequately

thinking
good

and

judgement

The jury learned that Prieto had written his own prison

grievances challenging his lack of access to recreation and had
filed

a

pro

se

legal

challenge

to

the

conditions

of

his

confinement on Virginia’s death row.

In these documents, Prieto

employed

and

accurate

conducted
copies

of

legal

self-directed

terminology

Prieto’s

legal

to

research.

elementary

and

prepare
The

high

school

jury

them,

he

received

report

cards

indicating that he mostly received grades of “good” and ”very
good.”

The jury was reminded that Prieto acted alone in his

crimes,

and

that

he

had

exhibited

leadership

abilities

when

committing prior crimes.
The prosecution offered its own key witness, clinical and
forensic psychologist Dr. Leigh Hagan, who interviewed Prieto
and

reviewed

past

reports

on

Dr. Weinstein, and Dr. Merikangas.
14

him

by

prison

officials,

Dr. Hagan testified that

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Prieto

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understood

the

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structure

of

jail,

had

a

fairly

sophisticated vocabulary, could cogently discuss foreign policy
and political issues, could speak both English and Spanish, and
did not exhibit significant limitations in his conceptual or
social

skills.

engage

respectfully

networks,

had

relationships,

The

doctor
with

been
and

cited

others,

involved
could

evidence
could
in

perform

that

work

intimate
daily

Prieto
within

could
social

interpersonal

mathematical

and

analytical tasks without difficulty.
Dr. Hagan further highlighted evidence that Prieto had been
able to obtain driver’s licenses in Virginia and California,
secure employment, operate power equipment, fly cross-country,
arrange his own housing, negotiate the purchase of a car, and
employ aliases to avoid detection.

He noted that Prieto could

explain “why it was important to have his hair cut for court,”
because “he understood the value of creating a good impression,”
reflecting

his

social

awareness.

Ultimately,

Dr.

Hagan

concluded that Prieto’s “adaptive functioning falls above the
threshold

of

significant

limitations,”

because

of

his

“conceptual reasoning, [his] social capacity, and his practical
skill.”
In short, although Prieto offered evidence of poor adaptive
functioning, the Commonwealth also offered compelling evidence
refuting the existence of any adaptive deficits.
15

Prieto does

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not contend that, were he resentenced, he would seek to present
additional evidence of deficits in his adaptive functioning that
he did not present at his 2008 sentencing.

As a result, we are

left to conclude that a jury at resentencing would face much of
the same evidence.

Absent some new “smoking gun,” evidence of

Prieto’s adaptive functioning deficits is at best inconclusive.
Consequently, Prieto cannot clear the high “actual innocence”
threshold.
juror,

faced

Prieto simply cannot establish that no reasonable
with

all

of

this

evidence

as

to

his

adaptive

functioning, would find him eligible for the death penalty –even if the jury were instructed properly under Hall.
Perhaps because of this, Prieto argues that the evidence he
has already presented is similar to the evidence Hall offered to
prove his intellectual disability.
First,

the

Hall

Court

never

But that comparison fails.
concluded

that

Hall

was

intellectually disabled, so it is unclear how any similarities
aid

Prieto

in

establishing

his

own

disability.

In

fact,

instructing that, on remand, Hall should be permitted to present
evidence of defects in his adaptive functioning, the Supreme
Court

expressly

noted

intellectually disabled.”

that

Hall

“may

or

may

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001.

not

be

Moreover,

even were Prieto’s case like Hall’s, Prieto is subject to a much
higher burden of proof because of his procedural default.

Hall

did not have to prove he was “actually innocent” of the death
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penalty before the Court could consider the merits of his Eighth
Amendment claim; Prieto does.
On

the

record

before

us,

we

cannot

conclude

that

after

Hall, no reasonable juror would find Prieto eligible for the
death penalty.

For, “[t]o say that no reasonable juror” would

have found Prieto eligible for a death sentence, “we would have
to ignore the totality of evidence,” which included significant
evidence

that

his

adaptive

functioning

is

not

Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 565 (1998).

deficient.

And absent a

showing that he is “actually innocent” of the death penalty,
Prieto

cannot

overcome

the

procedural

default

that

bars

consideration on the merits of his Atkins claim. 6

6

Brumfield v. Cain, No. 13-1433, 576 U.S. –- (June 18,
2015), issued after oral argument in this case, does not affect
our holding. The Supreme Court limited its holding in Brumfield
to an application of Louisiana law to the evidence presented in
that case.
The Court did not purport to alter its prior
teachings about intellectual disability, procedural default, or
the actual innocence exception.
Rather, the Court simply held
that the state habeas court’s refusal to grant Brumfield an
evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim, as
permitted by Louisiana law, was based on “an unreasonable
determination of the facts” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2).
Brumfield,
however,
had
not
procedurally
defaulted his claim of intellectual disability under Atkins.
Thus, unlike Prieto, he did not have to prove that he was
actually innocent of the death penalty before a federal habeas
court could consider the merits of that claim.
Prieto’s
procedural default forces him to satisfy this high standard of
proof, and Brumfield in no way disturbs our conclusion that he
has failed to do so.
17

Appeal: 14-4

Doc: 46

Filed: 06/30/2015

Pg: 18 of 18

V.
The
procedural

“fundamental
default

miscarriage

imposes

a

of

justice”

“demanding”

exception

burden

petitioners challenging their death sentences.

on

to

habeas

Id. at 559.

It

provides a basis for relief only in “extraordinary instances.”
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991).

Prieto has failed

to establish that this path around procedural default is open to
him.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

18