US v. Charles Williams, Jr.

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cr-00264-WO-1. [999717445]. [14-4049]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4049

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CHARLES WILLIAMS, JR.,
Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge; Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge.
(1:12-cr-00264-WO-1)

Argued:

September 16, 2015

Decided:

December 14, 2015

Before KING, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge King wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Keenan and Judge Floyd joined.

ARGUED: Amber Rae Will, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM & MARY, Williamsburg,
Virginia, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED
STATES
ATTORNEY,
Greensboro,
North
Carolina,
for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Gregory Davis, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina; Patricia E. Roberts,
Brittany Sadler, Andrew L. Steinberg, WILLIAM & MARY SCHOOL OF
LAW, Williamsburg, Virginia; Tillman J. Breckenridge, Thomas W.
Ports, Jr., REED SMITH LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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KING, Circuit Judge:
Charles Williams, Jr., was convicted and sentenced in the
Middle District of North Carolina for possessing with intent to
distribute crack cocaine.

In this appeal, Williams pursues a

single contention — that the district court erred by denying his
motion

to

suppress

Interstate

85.

evidence

During

that

seized

during

stop,

a

a

traffic

deputy

stop

sheriff

on

issued

Williams a written warning, and Williams thereafter refused to
consent to a vehicle search.

The police then conducted a dog

sniff of the car and seized crack cocaine from it.
maintains

that

contravened

the

extending
Fourth

the

traffic

Amendment

should have been suppressed.

and

stop

for

that

the

the

Williams
dog

crack

sniff

cocaine

As explained below, we vacate and

remand.

I.
A.
While

traveling

by

rental

car

through

central

North

Carolina in the early hours of February 13, 2012, Williams and
his girlfriend Elisabeth MacMullen were stopped for speeding by
a deputy sheriff.

After the deputy issued Williams a written

warning and returned his documentation, another deputy conducted
a dog sniff of the rental vehicle.

The dog alerted, and the

ensuing search revealed crack cocaine in the vehicle’s trunk.
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Williams and MacMullen (together, the “Defendants”) were then
arrested.
Five months thereafter, on July 30, 2012, the federal grand
jury in Greensboro indicted the Defendants for possessing with
intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1).

The Defendants moved separately to suppress the

seized evidence and, on November 20, 2012, the district court
conducted an evidentiary hearing (the “initial hearing”).

At

the initial hearing, the prosecution presented the testimony of
the deputies, Justin Russell and Jerry Soles, as well as a video
of the traffic stop that was recorded from Russell’s patrol car
(the

“Russell

Video”).

By

its

December

11,

2012

opinion, the court denied the motions to suppress.

memorandum
See United

States v. Williams, No. 1:12-cr-00264 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2012),
ECF No. 27 (the “First Opinion”).
About three months later, the government produced a second
video of the traffic stop, which had been recorded from Deputy
Soles’s

patrol

car

(the

“Soles

Video”).

The

Soles

Video

directly contradicted an important aspect of the prosecution’s
evidence at the initial hearing.

The Defendants thus sought

reconsideration of the suppression denial, asserting that the
Soles Video undermined the First Opinion.
the

court

conducted

a

“reconsideration hearing”).

second

On March 21, 2013,

evidentiary

hearing

(the

Deputies Russell and Soles again
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testified and, on April 9, 2013, the court issued a new opinion,
declining again to suppress the evidence.

See United States v.

Williams, No. 1:12-cr-00264 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 9, 2013), ECF No. 45
(the “Superseding Opinion”).
On April 17, 2013, a jury convicted Williams of the offense
charged,

but

acquitted

MacMullen.

district

court

prison.

Williams timely noticed this appeal, and we possess

sentenced

January

to

Williams

On

10,

eighty-four

2014,

the

months

in

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
B.
1.
The pertinent facts are for the most part undisputed.

As

spelled out herein, they are drawn from the First Opinion, the
Superseding Opinion, and other aspects of the record.
Deputies Russell and Soles were separately patrolling I-85
near

Lexington,

North

February 13, 2012.
speeding

southbound

Carolina,

during

the

early

hours

of

Just after midnight, Soles observed two cars
and

traveling

close

together.

At

about

12:37 a.m., Soles stopped the lead vehicle, driven by Williams’s
brother,

and

Russell

stopped

the

second

vehicle,

a

Hyundai

rental car driven by Williams with MacMullen as the passenger. 1

1

The times of day specified with respect to the
interactions of Williams with Deputies Russell and Soles are
drawn from the time display on the Russell Video.

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stopping

the

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Hyundai,

Deputy

Russell

informed

Williams that he was going 80 mph in a 70-mph zone and requested
his driver’s license and vehicle registration.
provided

a

New

York

license

and

the

rental

Williams then
agreement.

The

agreement reflected that MacMullen had rented the Hyundai from
Hertz in Totowa, New Jersey, on February 10, 2012.

According to

the agreement, the car was to be returned there by 2:30 p.m. on
February

13,

2012

(that

afternoon).

Russell

requested

that

Williams exit the Hyundai and sit in his patrol car while he
checked Williams’s documents.

Williams did so, and MacMullen

remained in the Hyundai.
Inside the patrol car, Deputy Russell engaged Williams in
conversation

as

the

license

check

was

conducted.

Williams

related that he and MacMullen had stopped at his mother’s home
in Virginia Beach and were traveling to Charlotte — about sixty
miles southwest of the traffic stop on I-85 — to visit his
brother

for

a

couple

alcohol

and

asked

then

days.

Williams

response, Williams
Russell

of

said

asked

he

Deputy

if
had

Russell
he

had

been

consumed

Soles,

who

thought

a
had

he

smelled

drinking.

beer

with

stopped

In

supper.

the

lead

vehicle less than 100 yards away, to administer a breathalyzer
test to Williams.

As a result, Soles cut short his traffic stop

of the lead vehicle, gave Williams’s brother a verbal warning,
and went to assist Russell.

At approximately 12:45 a.m., Soles
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moved his patrol car, containing the drug dog Dakota, to a point
along

the

shoulder

of

I-85

behind

Russell’s

patrol

car.

Arriving at Russell’s patrol car, Soles greeted Williams through
the open front-passenger-side window at about 12:46 a.m.

Soles

administered the breathalyzer test as Williams sat in Russell’s
patrol car.
Deputy Russell then approached the Hyundai to speak with
MacMullen.

Russell

asked

MacMullen

about

consumption and the couple’s travel plans.

Williams’s

alcohol

She responded that

Williams had had very little to drink and that they were on
their way to Charlotte.

Russell asked why they were going to

Charlotte, and MacMullen responded, “I don’t know, we are just
on vacation.”

See First Opinion 4.

Back at Deputy Russell’s patrol car, Deputy Soles continued
to

talk

with

Williams

breathalyzer test.

while

awaiting

the

results

of

the

Williams told Soles that he was on vacation

and was going to visit his brother in Charlotte.

He also told

Soles that the driver of the lead vehicle was his brother and
that the two vehicles were traveling together.

At the initial

hearing, Soles testified that Williams’s statement contradicted

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the driver of the lead vehicle, who had told Soles that “he
wasn’t traveling with anybody.”
When

Deputy

Russell

See J.A. 75. 2

returned

to

his

patrol

car,

Deputy

Soles informed him that Williams had passed the breathalyzer
test.

While Soles listened, Russell advised Williams that he

had passed the test and would receive a written warning for
speeding.

When Russell requested an address from Williams to

complete the written warning, Williams gave the post office box
address of his place of employment in New York, which differed
from

the

New

York

post

office

box

address

on

his

driver’s

license.
As Deputy Russell was writing the warning, Deputy Soles
asked Williams where he lived.

Williams responded that he lived

in both New York and New Jersey and that he and MacMullen had a
child and lived together.

When Soles asked where they were

headed, Williams said, “Charlotte.”

See First Opinion 4.

In

response to a question about their planned stay in Charlotte,
Williams said that they would stay at a Wyndham hotel and that
the length of their stay would depend on how his brother’s wife
acted.

When Russell pointed out that the rental car was to be

2

Our citations herein to “J.A. __” refer to the contents of
the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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returned in New Jersey that very afternoon, Williams said he
would renew the rental agreement in Charlotte.
Deputy Russell completed the written warning and gave it to
Williams
exiting

at
the

question.
asked,

12:54:59
patrol
After

“Nothing

a.m.

car,

Seconds

Russell

Williams

illegal

in

asked

responded
the

later,
if

he

Williams
could

affirmatively,

car?”

Williams responded that there was not.

as

See

First

was

pose

a

Russell

Opinion

5.

As Russell and Williams

exited the patrol car, Russell persisted — again asking Williams
if

he

could

equivocated.

search

the

Hyundai

—

and

Williams

initially

Williams then walked towards the Hyundai, opened

the rear-driver-side door, and gestured that the deputies could
look inside.

Deputy Soles then asked for a clear yes-or-no

answer on whether Williams was consenting to a search of the
Hyundai.

Williams firmly replied, “[N]o.”

Id. at 7.

Immediately thereafter, at 12:56:22 a.m. — a minute and
twenty-three

seconds

after

Deputy

Russell

issued

the

written

warning — Deputy Soles advised Williams to “hold on” and that a
dog sniff would be conducted on the vehicle.
First Opinion 7.

See J.A. 130;

As a result, MacMullen was removed from the

car and Soles walked Dakota around it.

Dakota alerted at the

driver’s side of the trunk after completing a full circle of the
vehicle.

The dog’s alert was at 12:59:02 a.m. — two minutes and

forty seconds after Soles instructed Williams to hold on so that
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Soles could conduct the dog sniff.

Crack cocaine was thereafter

found and seized from an unlocked safe in the Hyundai’s trunk.
2.
On

December

Defendants’

11,

motions

to

2012,

the

suppress.

district
By

its

court
First

denied

the

Opinion,

the

court explained that “the Government’s argument for a finding of
reasonable suspicion” rested on five specific factors:
•

The Defendants were traveling “in a rental car”;

•

The Defendants were traveling
corridor at 12:37 a.m.”;

•

“Williams’ stated travel plans
with, and would likely exceed,
return of the rental car”;

•

“Williams was unable to provide a permanent home
address in New York even though he claimed to live
there at least part-time and had a New York driver’s
license”; and

•

“Williams stated that he was traveling with the car
ahead of him, yet that car’s driver denied any
association with Williams.”

See First Opinion 23. 3

“on

a

known

drug

were inconsistent
the due date for

As an alternative ground for denying the

suppression motions, the court ruled that the two-minute-andforty-second

extension

for

the

3

dog

sniff

fell

“within

the

The First Opinion spelled out in paragraph form the
factors on which the district court predicated its suppression
ruling.
We have reformatted those factors into the five
foregoing bullet points.

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general parameters of a de minimis delay that does not offend
the Fourth Amendment.”

Id. at 32.

In late February or early March of 2013 — almost three
months after the First Opinion — the prosecution provided the
Defendants with the Soles Video, which shows the traffic stop of
the lead vehicle.

The government explained that it had produced

the Soles Video in a tardy fashion because it had only then
realized that the stop of the lead vehicle might be relevant.
The

Soles

Video

was

Brady

material,

however,

and

directly

contradicted Deputy Soles’s evidence at the initial hearing on
the fifth factor identified in the First Opinion.

As a result,

the

the

Defendants

moved

for

reconsideration

of

court’s

suppression denial.
3.
At

the

reconsideration

hearing

on

March

Defendants relied primarily on the Soles Video.

21,

2013,

the

The prosecutor,

seeking to explain the evidentiary contradictions and sustain
the suppression denial, again called both deputies to testify.
Deputy

Soles

acknowledged

that

his

testimony

at

the

initial

hearing — that Williams’s brother had denied any association
with Williams — was “wrong,” and that he had “made a mistake.”
See J.A. 193.

From the bench, the district court recognized

Soles’s earlier testimony as both “wrong” and “not true.”

10

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id. at 252, 271.

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Deputy Russell simply reiterated his earlier

testimony about stopping the Hyundai for speeding.
On April 9, 2013, the district court issued its Superseding
Opinion.

To

the

First

Opinion’s

factual

recitation,

the

Superseding Opinion added the following from the court’s review
of the Soles Video.

Less than a minute after Deputy Soles

radioed Deputy Russell for assistance, Soles stopped the lead
vehicle

for

speeding. 4

Soles

asked

the

driver

traveling with the car behind him (the Hyundai).

if

he

was

Williams’s

brother responded, “[W]e together,” contradicting what Soles had
said at the initial hearing.

See Superseding Opinion 11.

Soles

then instructed Williams’s brother to sit in Soles’s patrol car
as he conducted a license check.

During their conversation in

the patrol car, Soles again asked Williams’s brother who was
traveling with him.
brother

and

his

prior testimony.

Williams’s brother responded, “That’s my

fiancée,”
See id.

which

further

contradicted

Soles’s

After issuing a verbal warning, Soles

advised Williams’s brother that he was free to go.

4

The Superseding Opinion described the exchange that
occurred between the deputies immediately prior to the traffic
stop. Deputy Soles informed Deputy Russell by radio that he was
observing two cars speeding southbound together.
Russell
responded that he would pull behind Soles, and Soles gave him
the license plate information about the Hyundai.
Soles then
told Russell to “see if you can get a violation on your own, and
if not we’ll use one of mine.”
See Superseding Opinion 10.
Russell responded, “[A]lright.” Id.

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Because Deputy Soles’s discredited testimony was the basis
for the First Opinion’s fifth factor, the Superseding Opinion
recited

that

“the

Government’s

argument

for

a

finding

of

reasonable suspicion” depended on only four of the five factors
previously

identified.

See

Superseding

Opinion

31.

The

Superseding Opinion recited the four factors and again denied
the suppression motions, concluding that those factors,
when presented to a reasonable officer, provide
reasonable,
articulable
suspicion
that
criminal
activity may be afoot to justify [Deputy] Soles’
limited detention for the purpose of deploying the
drug dog, which was already on the scene.
Id. at 32.

The court again ruled, in the alternative, that the

“dog sniff [fell] within the general parameters of a de minimis
delay that does not offend the Fourth Amendment.”

Id. at 40.

II.
A district court’s ultimate determination of a reasonablesuspicion question is assessed de novo.

See United States v.

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
disturb

factual

Absent clear error, however, we will not

findings

made

by

a

district

evidentiary hearing on suppression issues.
Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 473 (4th Cir. 2012).

court

after

an

See United States v.
When a district court

has denied a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the

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light most favorable to the government.

See United States v.

Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 689 (4th Cir. 2013).

III.
On

appeal,

Williams

reiterates

his

contention

that

the

deputies lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to extend the
traffic stop beyond its initial purpose. 5

As the Supreme Court

made clear in Illinois v. Wardlow, an officer must possess “a
reasonable,

articulable

suspicion

that

criminal

activity

afoot” to execute a brief “investigatory detention.”

is

See 528

U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
The government now concedes that the de minimis ground for
denying
result,

the
the

suppression
prosecutors

motions

is

recognize

5

legally
that

untenable.
their

only

As

a

viable

The Superseding Opinion specified that the district court
would focus only on Deputy Soles’s knowledge in its reasonablesuspicion inquiry because Soles had “decided to conduct the drug
dog sniff on his own order, and there is no evidence that Deputy
Russell did so or participated in the decision.”
See
Superseding Opinion 19. For that proposition, the court relied
on our explanation in United States v. Massenburg that “the
collective knowledge doctrine ‘does not permit [a court] to
aggregate bits and pieces of information from among myriad
officers.’”
Id. (quoting Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 493 (4th
Cir. 2011)).
On appeal, however, Williams and the government
both frame the issue in terms of whether the deputies together
had reasonable suspicion. We accept the parties’ articulation,
but observe that — on this record — it matters not whether we
look only to Soles’s knowledge or to the two deputies’ knowledge
collectively.

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contention is that the district court correctly ruled that — on
this record — reasonable, articulable suspicion justified the
dog sniff of the Hyundai.

To that end, they rely solely on the

factors identified by the court in the Superseding Opinion.
A.
1.
Before evaluating the reasonable-suspicion contention, we
identify

some

resolution.
Fourth

pertinent

requirement.

detention

principles

that

bear

on

its

A traffic stop constitutes a “seizure” under the

Amendment

(1996).

legal

and

is

thus

subject

to

a

reasonableness

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810

Because a traffic stop is more akin to an investigative
than

a

custodial

arrest,

we

analyze

the

constitutionality of such a stop under the two-prong standard
enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Johnson,

555

U.S.

323,

330-31

(2009).

See Arizona v.

Pursuant

thereto,

we

first determine whether the officer’s reason for the traffic
stop was legitimate.
875 (4th Cir. 1992).

See United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868,
Second, we examine whether the officer’s

actions during the seizure were “reasonably related in scope” to
the basis for the traffic stop.

Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).
In April of this year — while this appeal was pending —
the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
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(2015).

Rodriguez

Pg: 15 of 35

held

that,

absent

reasonable,

articulable suspicion of criminal activity, a detaining officer
may not extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop in order to
conduct a dog sniff.

See id. at 1614-16.

that,

second

under

Terry’s

prong,

the

The Court emphasized
“[a]uthority

for

the

seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are
— or reasonably should have been — completed.”

Id. at 1614.

In other words, to extend the detention of a motorist beyond the
time

necessary

to

accomplish

a

traffic

stop’s

purpose,

the

authorities must either possess “reasonable suspicion or receive
the driver’s consent.”

See United States v. Digiovanni, 650

F.3d 498, 507 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d
328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008).
2.
With respect to Terry’s first prong — whether the reason
for the traffic stop was legitimate — Williams does not dispute
that

Deputy

speeding.

Russell
On

was

Terry’s

entitled

second

prong

to
—

stop

the

whether

Hyundai
the

for

officers’

actions were reasonably related in scope to the basis for the
traffic

stop

—

it

is

similarly

undisputed

that

Russell

had

accomplished the purpose of the stop before Deputy Soles decided
to conduct the dog sniff of the Hyundai.
did not consent to a search of the vehicle.

Furthermore, Williams
Thus, the propriety

of extending Williams’s detention beyond the completion of the
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traffic stop turns on whether reasonable, articulable suspicion
existed

when

Soles

decided

to

conduct

a

dog

sniff

of

the

Hyundai.
Reasonable
standard

that

suspicion
relies

is

on

a

the

“commonsense,
judgment

of

experienced

enforcement officers, “not legal technicians.”
United

States,

517

marks omitted).

U.S.

690,

695

(1996)

nontechnical”
law

See Ornelas v.

(internal

quotation

To support a finding of reasonable suspicion,

we require the detaining officer “to either articulate why a
particular

behavior

is

suspicious

or

logically

demonstrate,

given the surrounding circumstances, that the behavior is likely
to be indicative of some more sinister activity than may appear
at first glance.”

See United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243,

248 (4th Cir. 2011).
Under

the

applicable

principles,

the

relevant

facts

articulated by the officers and found by the trial court, after
an

appropriate

hearing,

must

“in

their

totality

serve

to

eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers.”

See

United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 413 (4th Cir. 2008).
our

McCoy

decision

explained,

however,

each

As

articulated

fact

need not “on its own eliminate every innocent traveler.”

Id.

Rather, we “must look at the totality of the circumstances of
each

case

to

particularized

see
and

whether

the

objective

detaining

basis
16

for

officer
suspecting

has

a

legal

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wrongdoing.”

Pg: 17 of 35

See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273

(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B.
With

this

framework

in

mind,

we

briefly

address

the

de

minimis contention and then turn to a comprehensive analysis of
the reasonable-suspicion question.

The prosecution contended in

both hearings in the district court that the officers’ nearly
three-minute

extension

of

Williams’s

—

detention

after

completion of the traffic stop — was for a constitutionally
permissible de minimis period of time.

In each of its opinions,

the district court agreed with that proposition.

In so ruling,

each opinion relied on our decision in United States v. Farrior,
where we recognized that a de minimis extension of the traffic
stop

—

during

which

an

officer

conducted

a

dog

sniff

of

Farrior’s vehicle — was not “a violation of [Farrior’s] Fourth
Amendment rights,” regardless of whether the officer possessed
reasonable suspicion.

See 535 F.3d 210, 220 (4th Cir. 2008).

As the government now properly concedes, Rodriguez forecloses
the de minimis ground.
In

rejecting

the

“de

minimis

rule”

for

a

dog

sniff

conducted after a completed traffic stop, the Rodriguez Court
distinguished
“[h]ighway

and

those
officer

practices
safety”

directed
—

such

as

towards

ensuring

checking

drivers’

licenses for outstanding warrants — from those animated by “the
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Government’s

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endeavor

to

Pg: 18 of 35

detect

crime

in

general

or

drug

trafficking in particular” — such as conducting a dog sniff for
evidence of narcotics.

See 135 S. Ct. at 1615-16.

Put simply,

the possibility that a dog sniff might reveal drug possession is
not — absent a showing of reasonable, articulable suspicion — a
valid basis for extending a traffic stop.

Cf. id. at 1615

(“Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the
ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as
part of the officer’s traffic mission.”).
C.
We

thus

whether,

on

turn
this

to

the

record,

dispositive
Deputies

issue

Russell

in

and

this
Soles

appeal:
had

the

reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity necessary
to extend the traffic stop and conduct the dog sniff of the
Hyundai.

The district court, for its part, acknowledged that

reasonable suspicion “must rest” on four factors:
•

The Defendants were traveling “in a rental car”;

•

The Defendants were traveling “on a known drug
corridor at 12:37 a.m.”;

•

“Williams’ stated travel plans were inconsistent
with, and would likely exceed, the due date for
return of the rental car”; and

•

“Williams was unable to provide a permanent home
address in New York even though he claimed to
live there at least part-time and had a New York
driver’s license.”

18

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See Superseding

Opinion

31.

Pg: 19 of 35

We

evaluate

those

factors

both

separately and in the aggregate, recognizing that our inquiry
must account for the “totality of the circumstances,” rather
than employ a “divide-and-conquer analysis.”

See Arvizu, 534

U.S. at 274.
1.
a.
The first factor identified in the Superseding Opinion —
the Defendants’ use of a rental car — is of minimal value to the
reasonable-suspicion

evaluation.

Neither

Deputy

Russell

nor

Deputy Soles explained any connection between use of a rental
car and criminal activity.

We will nevertheless accept that, as

a general proposition, some drug traffickers use rental cars.
See, e.g., United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1277 (7th Cir.
1996)

(noting

that

officer

was

concerned

about

rental

car

because he knew “drug couriers often used rental cars to avoid
asset forfeiture laws”); United States v. Thomas, 913 F.2d 1111,
1116

(4th

Cir.

1990)

(“[I]llegal

transport

of

drugs

often

involves the use of rental cars traveling from source cities
such as Miami.”).
that

the

nation’s

It is similarly beyond peradventure, however,

overwhelming
highways

majority

are

of

innocent

legitimate purposes.

19

rental

car

travelers

drivers
with

on

our

entirely

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b.
The second factor relied on in the Superseding Opinion —
that the Defendants were traveling “on a known drug corridor at
12:37 a.m.” — is the only factor that, on its face, makes any
reference

to

criminal

activity.

Similar

to

traveling

in

a

rental car, however, the number of persons using the interstate
highways as drug corridors pales in comparison to the number of
innocent travelers

on

those

roads.

Furthermore,

we

are

not

persuaded by the proposition that traveling south on I-85 late
at night helps narrow the identification of travelers to those
involved in drug activity.
i.
Undoubtedly, many drug traffickers use interstate highways
such as I-85, but so do many more innocent motorists.

Put

simply, the interstate highways are the most efficient way to
drive between two points in this country, particularly large
cities.

Thus, although we have recognized that law enforcement

officers
motorist’s

and

the

use

trial

of

an

courts

are

interstate

entitled
highway

as

to
a

consider
factor

a
in

determining reasonable suspicion, we are entirely satisfied that
such an observation, standing alone, is entitled to very little
weight.

See,

e.g.,

Digiovanni,

650

F.3d

at

512-13;

accord

United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005)
(observing that prosecution had acknowledged that travel between
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known drug source and known drug destination was weak factor in
reasonable-suspicion analysis).
Because

there

is

nothing

inherently

suspicious

about

driving at night on an interstate highway, police officers must
rely on their training and experience to link interstate-highway
travel

to

more

trafficking.

specific

characteristics

of

narcotics

See, e.g., United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353,

359-60 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (observing
that

officer

experience,

“testified
drug

that,

couriers

fly

based
to

on

his

Miami

knowledge

from

a

and

northern

destination, such as New York, to obtain drugs, rent a vehicle,
and return north with the drugs”); United States v. Foreman, 369
F.3d

776,

784-85

(4th

Cir.

2004)

(explaining

that

officer’s

experience with drug interdiction showed that particular highway
was regular corridor for illegal drugs from New York City area
to Tidewater Virginia).

Deputies Russell and Soles, however,

offered

either

no

evidence

in

of

the

suppression

hearings

linking travel on an interstate highway with drug trafficking. 6

6

At trial, Deputy Soles identified the New York City area
as a “source city” for narcotics trafficking. See J.A. 452. He
conceded, however, that “any big city [could] be considered a
source city.”
Id. at 457.
The Superseding Opinion did not
identify New York as a source city.

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ii.
There is simply no basis on this record for assigning some
nefarious significance to the 12:37 a.m. time of the traffic
stop.

Neither Deputy Russell nor Deputy Soles asserted that

drug traffickers have some disproportionate tendency to travel
on the interstate highways late at night.
for

the

proposition

combination

with

that

other

nighttime

factors

Nor is there support

travel

identified

in

—

alone

the

or

in

Superseding

Opinion — is an indicator of drug trafficking.
Due to the fact-specific nature of the reasonable-suspicion
inquiry, see United States v. Demoss, 279 F.3d 632, 636 (8th
Cir. 2002), it would be inappropriate for us to peruse appellate
decisions for connections that Deputies Russell and Soles failed
to draw.

As we observed in Branch, “context matters” in the

reasonable-suspicion

inquiry

because

“actions

that

may

appear

innocuous at a certain time or in a certain place may very well
serve

as

a

harbinger

circumstances.”

See

of
537

criminal
F.3d

at

activity
336.

It

under

different

follows

that

a

determination that a certain fact is suspicious in one case does
not compel the conclusion that the same fact is suspicious in
other cases.

See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d

625, 630 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that, although nervousness
has sometimes been utilized in finding reasonable suspicion, “it

22

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is

an

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unreliable

indicator,

Pg: 23 of 35

especially

in

the

context

of

a

traffic stop”).
The

Superseding

Opinion

relied

on

two

Tenth

Circuit

decisions in deeming the midnight hour of the traffic stop a
relevant
United

factor

States

in

v.

its

reasonable-suspicion

Clarkson,

551

F.3d

1196

analysis.

(10th

Cir.

See
2009);

Gallegos v. City of Colo. Springs, 114 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir.
1997).

Our examination of those cases illustrates the problem

with relying mainly on court decisions, as opposed to testimony
from officers in the particular case, to identify certain facts
as suspicious.

First, the Clarkson decision involved a late-

night stop of a vehicle that the police had just seen parked in
front of a house that was under surveillance for suspected drug
dealing, violent crime, prostitution, and gang activity.
551

F.3d

at

1198.

After

stopping

the

vehicle,

an

See

officer

observed that the passenger appeared to be under the influence
of narcotics.

Id. at 1199.

Second, in the Gallegos case,

police officers had responded to calls reporting a “prowler” and
an inebriated man arguing with a woman.

See 114 F.3d at 1029.

Those officers then observed Gallegos, who reeked of alcohol and
was “acting in a very unusual fashion.”

Id.

In each of those decisions, the Tenth Circuit relied on the
nighttime hour as one of several factors that — taken together
—

established

reasonable,

articulable
23

suspicion

of

ongoing

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criminal activity.
114

F.3d

at

Pg: 24 of 35

See Clarkson, 551 F.3d at 1202; Gallegos,

1029.

We

agree

that

street

crime

and

public

drunkenness are plainly more prevalent at night than during the
day.

By contrast, it is far from self-evident that interstate

trafficking
night.

of

This

drugs
record

or

other

does

not

contraband
make

an

is

more

evidentiary

common

at

connection

between nocturnal travel and drug trafficking, either alone or
in

combination

with

Superseding Opinion.
stop

of

Williams

the

other

factors

identified

in

the

Absent such a connection, that the traffic
occurred

at

about

12:37

a.m.

does

not

contribute to a reasonable, articulable suspicion for extending
the otherwise-completed traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff.
c.
The
focused

Superseding
on

what

Opinion’s

the

district

analysis
court

of

its

third

characterized

factor
as

the

“inconsisten[cy]” between Williams’s travel plans and the due
date for return of the rented Hyundai.

Williams had advised the

deputies that he and his girlfriend were planning to stay in
Charlotte for a few days, but the rental agreement reflected
that the Hyundai was due to be returned that afternoon in New
Jersey.

Williams also said that he would extend the rental

agreement when he arrived in Charlotte.

We therefore assess how

the expiring rental agreement, and Williams’s explanation of it,
impact the reasonable-suspicion analysis.
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In the Tenth Circuit’s Santos decision, the defendant had
“rented a car in California on January 10, was in Wyoming on
January 13, and proposed to drive to New York and back despite a
January 17 ‘due date’ in his rental agreement for returning the
car to California.”
agreed

that

reasonable

See 403 F.3d at 1129.

“[i]mplausible
suspicion,”

travel

but

The court of appeals

plans

prudently

can

contribute

emphasized

that

to
the

prosecution had “presented no evidence that extending the car
rental period would entail any financial penalty, or even any
increase

in

the

rate.”

Id.

(footnote

omitted).

“Common

experience suggests,” the Santos decision recognized, that lawabiding rental car users frequently “extend the rental without
incurring

a

Superseding

penalty
Opinion

or

paying

similarly

a

higher

acknowledged

rate.”
that

Id.

The

“[t]here

are

certainly a ‘large number of innocent travelers who extend their
trips beyond the time originally provided for in their rental
agreements.’”

See

Superseding

Opinion

25-26

(quoting

United

States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1110 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003)).
agree with that proposition.

We

Put simply, planning to extend a

rental agreement “may suggest that the driver’s travel plans are
uncertain or subject to change, but, without more, not that they
are implausible.”
Mindful

that

See Santos, 403 F.3d at 1129.
innocent

travelers

frequently

agreements, we turn to the record in this case.
25

extend

rental

Deputy Soles

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did not mention the rental agreement at either hearing.

Deputy

Russell testified at the initial hearing that the Hyundai was
“due back [in New Jersey] that same day, and [Williams] was
traveling away from there.

That seemed odd to me.”

J.A. 39.

As in Santos, Russell failed to explain how the rental car’s due
date was suspicious.
the

Hyundai

was

When Russell mentioned to Williams that

due

in

New

Jersey

later

that

day,

Williams

replied promptly that he and MacMullen would renew the rental
agreement in Charlotte.

Cf. United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d

1528, 1535 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that McRae’s “evident lack
of concern,” “unusually cavalier attitude,” and “vague response”
regarding

how

contributed

he

to

a

would

return

reasonable

experienced officer”).

his

rental

suspicion

in

car
a

“correctly

trained

and

Moreover, as Russell knew during the

traffic stop, the Hyundai had been rented through Hertz, a wellknown car rental business with locations most everywhere.
We do not doubt that the third factor, if it had been
“keyed

to

contribute

other
to

an

compelling
experienced

suspicious
officer’s

See Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 513.
suspicion
Williams’s

of

criminality

travel

plans

reasonable

might

suspicion.

But no reasonable, articulable

arises
were

behavior,”

from

likely

duration of the rental agreement.

26

the
to

mere

exceed

fact
the

that

initial

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d.
The

Superseding

Opinion’s

fourth

factor

specified

that

“Williams was unable to provide a permanent home address in New
York even though he claimed to live there at least part-time and
had a New York driver’s license.”
not

fully

describe

what

That assertion, however, does

occurred

during

the

traffic

stop.

Although the district court related that Williams had failed to
provide

either

Deputy

Russell

or

Deputy

Soles

with

his

home

address, the record shows that neither deputy asked Williams for
it.
Distilled

from

the

Superseding

Opinion’s

unwarranted

inference that Williams was unable to provide a home address,
the fourth factor has three aspects:
address,
address

Williams

gave

Williams

a

provided

post

(1) when asked for an

office

differed

box

from

address;

the

address

(2) the
on

his

driver’s license; and (3) Williams told the deputies that he
lived in both New York and New Jersey.

Neither Deputy Russell

nor Deputy Soles explained how using a post office box address,
or living in New York and New Jersey, raised some suspicion of
criminal
aspect

of

activity.
the

fourth

In

fact,

factor

neither
as

officer

suspicious.

identified
Although

it

any
is

somewhat ambiguous, the only evidence regarding the significance
of the post office box address suggests that the address did not
raise suspicion.

In response to a question on whether the post
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office box address “affect[ed] [Russell] in the performance of
[his] duties to issue a warning ticket,” Russell said, “I put
[the post office box address] there because I could not get
[Williams’s] formal address.

That’s where he received mail, so

I still wrote that for the warning.
It was just obscure.”

. . .

It didn’t affect.

J.A. 54.

Despite the deputies’ failure to draw any suspicion from
Williams’s

post

office

hypothesized

that

explanations”

Williams

raised suspicion.”

the

box

address,

“different

gave

for

the

district

addresses

them

“may

have

court

and

[the]

legitimately

See Superseding Opinion 22 (emphasis added).

In connecting Williams’s use of a post office box address with
possible suspicion, the court relied on our unpublished decision
in United States v. Newland, 246 F. App’x 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
As with the second factor, cherry-picking “relevant factor”
findings from inapposite factual contexts bears little fruit.
Newland had furnished a driver’s license from the U.S. Virgin
Islands

and

a

rental

agreement

in

his

name

with

a

Maryland

address, but advised the officers that he lived in Washington,
D.C.

See Newland, 246 F. App’x at 182-83, 189.

The officers

suspected immediately — and correctly — that the Virgin Islands
license

was

fraudulent.

Id.

at

182-83.

Newland

was

also

visibly nervous, and when asked why he had used the Maryland
address

on

the

rental

agreement,
28

he

“hesitated”

before

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explaining that the address was his girlfriend’s.
189.

Id. at 182,

In those circumstances, we concluded that three different
—

addresses
reasonably

including

aroused

the

one

on

a

officers’

fake

driver’s

suspicion.

license

Id.

at

—

189.

Moreover, at the suppression hearing, the officers “described in
some detail the reasons for their suspicions about Mr. Newland’s
license.”

Id. at 188.

Nothing in Newland suggests, however,

that receiving mail at a different address from that shown on
the recipient’s driver’s license provides a reasonable basis for
suspicion.
Put

succinctly,

Deputies

Russell

and

Soles

failed

to

develop the fourth factor with Williams during the traffic stop
and offered no explanation of how that factor contributed to any
reasonable

suspicion.

Absent

some

factual

underpinning,

the

significance of the fourth factor collapses.
2.
As explained above, each of the factors relied on in the
Superseding Opinion — standing alone — fails to support any
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

That

analysis does not end our inquiry, however, because, as we have
recognized, “reasonable suspicion may exist even if each fact
standing alone is susceptible to an innocent explanation.”
McCoy, 513 F.3d at 413-14.
facts,

“in

their

totality,”

See

Under the applicable standard, the
should
29

“eliminate

a

substantial

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portion of innocent travelers.”

Pg: 30 of 35

Id. at 413.

Furthermore, an

officer must “either articulate why a particular behavior is
suspicious

or

logically

demonstrate,

given

the

surrounding

circumstances, that the behavior is likely to be indicative of
some more sinister activity than may appear at first glance.”
See Foster, 634 F.3d at 248.
a.
According to the Superseding Opinion, reasonable suspicion
existed

because

the

four

factors,

“taken

together[,]

. . .

eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers.”

See

Superseding Opinion 31.

In pressing the contrary conclusion,

Williams

relies

decision

rejected

the

on

our

government’s

appeal

in

Digiovanni.

and

affirmed

ruling based on a Fourth Amendment violation.

a

There,

we

suppression

The officer in

Digiovanni sought to rely on ten factors, including some that
are similar to those in the Superseding Opinion.
Digiovanni

was

driving

a

rental

car

characterized as “a known drug corridor.”
13.

on

I–95,

For example,
which

was

See 650 F.3d at 512-

When asked about his travel itinerary, Digiovanni described

an “unusual” route that included various stops to visit family
members.

Id. at 502-03, 512-13.

To be fair, Digiovanni’s plan to ride the “Auto Train” for
part of his trip, which would have temporarily separated him
from his vehicle, “cut[] against the government’s argument” for
30

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reasonable suspicion.
importance,

however,

Pg: 31 of 35

See Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 513.
the

officer

specified

two

other

Of

factors

that — in context — were relevant to the reasonable-suspicion
analysis.

First, Digiovanni had flown one-way into Florida — “a

known drug source state” — and rented a car for the return trip
to the northeast.

Id. at 512-13.

Second, “Digiovanni’s hands

were trembling when he handed over his driver’s license and the
rental [car] contract.”

Id. at 512.

Our Digiovanni decision

observed that the officer was “entitled to rely to some degree”
on those two factors, in addition to others.

Id. at 512-13.

Nonetheless, Judge Hamilton concluded that “reasonable suspicion
was not present to turn [Digiovanni’s] routine traffic stop into
a

drug

investigation.”

Id.

at

513.

At

bottom,

all

the

authorities could “link to the unusual travel itinerary” was
that “Digiovanni rented a car from a source state, was stopped
on I–95, and was initially nervous.”
Our

Digiovanni

decision

Circuit’s decision in Boyce.
circumstances

that

are

is

Id.

consistent

with

the

Eleventh

In that case, the court evaluated

materially

indistinguishable

from

first three factors relied on in the Superseding Opinion:

the

Boyce

was “driving a rental car on a known drug corridor [I-95],” and
“planning to return the car two days late,” that is, his stated
travel plans exceeded the duration of the rental agreement.

31

See

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at

factors,

1109. 7

in

F.3d

their

reasonable

suspicion

The

Pg: 32 of 35

Eleventh

totality,
because

Circuit

were
they

ruled

insufficient

“would

likely

that
to

those
create

apply

to

a

considerable number of those traveling for perfectly legitimate
purposes.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Neither Digiovanni nor Boyce dealt with the fourth factor
specified

in

the

Superseding

Opinion

—

dual

residency

and

differing addresses.

On this record, however, that factor does

not tip the balance.

It is not atypical for a person to receive

mail at an address other than the one on his driver’s license,
nor

is

it

uncommon

employer’s address.

for

a

person

to

receive

mail

at

his

And many businesses receive their mail at

post office box addresses — one need only leaf through the
nearest magazine or journal for a subscription insert.

Finally,

the fact that Williams was splitting time between residences in
New York and New Jersey is unremarkable.
Stated simply, the Superseding Opinion’s four factors — in
the

aggregate

—

fail

innocent travelers.

to

eliminate

a

substantial

portion

of

Because the applicable standard requires

7

A police officer stopped Boyce on I-95 shortly before
midnight.
See Boyce, 351 F.3d at 1104.
In its reasonablesuspicion analysis, the Eleventh Circuit did not rely on the
late hour of the traffic stop.

32

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a

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showing,

the

Pg: 33 of 35

government’s

contention

fails

to

pass

constitutional muster. 8
b.
Even

if

the

Superseding

Opinion’s

four

factors

were

to

eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers, Williams
would

yet

Williams’s
demonstrated

prevail.

The

particular

behavior

that

his

deputies

behavior

was
was

neither

articulated

suspicious

nor

indicative

of

how

logically
some

more

sinister activity than appeared at first glance, as our Foster
decision requires.
It

is

well

settled

that,

in

the

reasonable-suspicion

inquiry, we “credit the practical experience of officers who
observe on a daily basis what transpires on the street.”

See

Branch, 537 F.3d at 336-37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, officers must apply their experience so that the
courts can make informed decisions on whether their suspicions
are reasonable.

See Foster, 634 F.3d at 248 (explaining that

8

We observe that the First Opinion’s discarded fifth factor
— “Williams stated that he was traveling with the car ahead of
him, yet that car’s driver denied any association with Williams”
— supported the presence of reasonable suspicion in this case.
See First Opinion 23.
That factor, however, was entirely
undermined by the Soles Video and the evidence at the
reconsideration hearing.
Indeed, the trial court characterized
Deputy Soles’s earlier testimony with respect to the fifth
factor as “not true.” See J.A. 271. If the fifth factor were
viable, our conclusion today might well be different.

33

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“an officer and the Government must do more than simply label a
behavior as ‘suspicious’ to make it so”).

Were it otherwise, an

experienced police officer’s recitation of some facts, followed
simply by a legal catchphrase, would allow the infringement of
individual rights with impunity.
512

(cautioning

against

“the

See Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at

inclination

of

the

Government

toward using whatever facts are present, no matter how innocent,
as

indicia

omitted)).

of

suspicious
Put

authorities

simply,

articulate

or

activity”
our

(internal

precedent

logically

quotation

requires

demonstrate

that

a

between the relevant facts and criminal activity.

marks
the

connection
See Foster,

634 F.3d at 248.
This record fails to show how the four factors — separately
or cumulatively — reasonably pointed to criminal activity.
the

initial

hearing,

Deputy

Soles

testified

generally

At

that,

prior to ordering the dog sniff, “I had already kn[own] and seen
for myself indicators commonly associated with those that are
involved

in

criminal

activity.”

See

J.A.

86.

He

later

explained, in a conclusory fashion, that officers may “ask for
consent

to

search”

or

“conduct

a

K-9

scan”

when

“we

see

indicators commonly associated with those that are involved in
criminal

activity,

and[,]

due

to

the

totality

of

those

circumstances that we see during that stop[,] [we believe] that
criminal activity may be afoot.”
34

See id. at 92.

Deputy Russell

Appeal: 14-4049

Doc: 59

testified

Filed: 12/14/2015

in

the

Pg: 35 of 35

reconsideration

hearing

that

the

factors

mentioned in his police report “drew [his] suspicion,” but he
did not identify those factors or further elaborate on how they
were connected to criminal activity.
not

question

prosecution

the
is

experience

obliged

of

to

See id. at 227-28.
these

present

officers,

evidence

but

We do
the

articulating

reasonable suspicion.
Having assessed de novo the reasonable-suspicion question,
we

are

simply

possessed

a

not

convinced

reasonable,

activity

during

completed

stop

the
of

Deputies

articulable

traffic

the

that

stop.

Hyundai

to

Russell

suspicion
Extending

conduct

a

of

the
dog

and

Soles

criminal
otherwise-

sniff

thus

contravened the Fourth Amendment.

IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate Williams’s conviction
and sentence and remand for such other and further proceedings
as may be appropriate.
VACATED AND REMANDED

35