US v. Shawn Greene

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:09-cr-00089-F-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999463690].. [14-4170]

Appeal: 14-4170

Doc: 24

Filed: 10/28/2014

Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4170

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAWN PATRICK GREENE,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:09-cr-00089-F-1)

Submitted:

October 20, 2014

Before GREGORY
Circuit Judge.

and

DIAZ,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

October 28, 2014

and

DAVIS,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 14-4170

Doc: 24

Filed: 10/28/2014

Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:
Shawn
sentence

Patrick

imposed

following

supervised release.
bases

for

his

Greene

appeals

the

the

revocation

twenty-four-month
of

his

term

of

Before this court, Greene asserts several

contention

substantively unreasonable.

that

this

sentence

is

plainly

For the reasons that follow, we

reject his arguments and affirm the revocation judgment.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.”
v.

Webb,

738

F.3d

638,

640

(4th

Cir.

United States

2013).

A

revocation

sentence that is both within the applicable statutory maximum
and

not

“plainly

unreasonable”

will

be

affirmed

on

appeal.

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-38 (4th Cir. 2006).
In

determining

whether

a

revocation

sentence

is

plainly

unreasonable, we first assess the sentence for reasonableness,
utilizing

“the

procedural

and

substantive

considerations”

employed in evaluating an original criminal sentence.

Id. at

438.
A

revocation

sentence

is

procedurally

reasonable

if

the district court has considered both the policy statements
contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
18

U.S.C.

§

3553(a)

§ 3583(e) (2012).

(2012)

factors

Id. at 439.

identified

in

18

U.S.C.

The district court must also

explain the chosen sentence, although this explanation “need not
2

Appeal: 14-4170

be

Doc: 24

as

detailed

sentence.
Cir.

Filed: 10/28/2014

or

specific”

Pg: 3 of 5

as

is

required

for

an

original

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th

2010).

A

sentence

is

substantively

reasonable

if

the

district court states a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed.

Crudup, 461 F.3d

at 440.
If, after considering the above, we decide that the
sentence is reasonable, we will affirm.
find

the

sentence

to

be

Id. at 439.

procedurally

or

Only if we

substantively

unreasonable will we evaluate whether it is “plainly” so.
Against

these

principles,

Greene’s sentence is reasonable.

we

readily

Id.

conclude

that

The sentence is within the

two-year statutory maximum authorized for the underlying Class C
felony offense that resulted in the supervised release order.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 472, 3559(a)(3), 3583(e)(3) (2012).

Our review

of the record confirms that the district court considered the
advisory

policy

statement

range

of

five

to

eleven

months’

imprisonment, the calculation of which was not disputed in the
district court and is not challenged on appeal, and heard the
parties’

arguments

regarding

the

appropriate

sentence

to

be

imposed.
Furthermore,

the

district

court

drew

upon

the

§ 3553(a) factors enumerated in § 3583(e) in sentencing Greene.
The

record

makes

patently

clear
3

that,

despite

the

district

Appeal: 14-4170

Doc: 24

Filed: 10/28/2014

Pg: 4 of 5

court’s prior lenient treatment, Greene simply could not (or
would not) abide by the terms of his supervised release in that
he frequently smoked marijuana.

There is no doubt that Greene’s

repeated and unabated drug use was at the cornerstone of the
district

court’s

decision

sentence

in

case.

this

to
We

impose

do

not

the
find

statutory
persuasive

maximum
Greene’s

contention that the sentence is excessive because he is unable
to

manage

his

marijuana

endanger the public.
imposition

of

substantively

addiction

and

his

conduct

did

not

See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440 (holding that

statutory

maximum

term

of

imprisonment

reasonable,

given

that

the

district

was
court

expressly relied on defendant’s “admitted pattern of violating
numerous

conditions

of

his

supervised

release[,]”

despite

several extensions of leniency by the district court).
Greene’s next contention — that a two-year sentence is
greater than necessary to allow Greene to accept that he has a
serious drug problem — is likewise unavailing.

To the contrary,

the probation office did everything in its power to help Greene
conquer

his

addiction

without

seeking

an

additional

term

of

incarceration, but it was incumbent upon Greene to avail himself
of the treatment options secured for and provided to him.
he

simply

would

not

do,

thus

confirming

lengthy term of incarceration.

4

the

necessity

This
of

a

Appeal: 14-4170

Doc: 24

Filed: 10/28/2014

Pg: 5 of 5

Finally, Greene maintains that the two-year sentence
is contrary to one of the purposes of imposing a revocation
sentence:

to provide the defendant with education or vocational

training.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D).

Greene points out

that serving a two-year prison term will waylay his efforts to
graduate from a technical college.

But the revocation sentence

is designed to punish the defendant’s failure to abide by the
terms

of

(“‘[T]he

his

supervised

sentence

imposed

release,
upon

Crudup,

revocation

461

F.3d

[is]

at

intended

438
to

sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of
the court-ordered supervision.’” (second alteration in original)
(quoting

U.S.

Sentencing

Guidelines

Manual

ch.

7,

pt.

A,

introductory cmt. 3(b))), and the district court’s comments make
plain that it chose the twenty-four-month sentence to sanction
Greene’s substantial breach of the trust and leniency that the
court previously afforded him.
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

5