US v. Phillip Ductan

Filing

PUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:04-cr-00252-RJC-DSC-1. [999652625]. [14-4220]--[Edited by CTH]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4220

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PHILLIP DUCTAN,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:04−cr−00252−RJC−DSC−1)

Argued:

May 13, 2015

Decided:

September 2, 2015

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published per curiam opinion.
Diaz wrote a separate concurring opinion.

Judge

ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant.
William Michael Miller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Ross
Richardson, Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN
NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Erin E. Comerford,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:
Phillip Ductan appeals his convictions for conspiracy to
possess
intent

with
to

intent

to

distribute

distribute

marijuana

marijuana,

(and

aiding

possession

and

abetting

with
the

same), and carrying a firearm during and in relation to those
drug trafficking crimes, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and
846, 18 U.S.C. § 2, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).

Ductan contends

that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel when it (1) required him to proceed pro se after finding
that he had forfeited his right to counsel, and (2) subsequently
removed him from the courtroom and chose a jury in his absence.
We hold that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that
Ductan

forfeited

his

right

to

counsel.

record

supports

the

government’s

And

nothing

alternate

in

contention

Ductan waived—either expressly or impliedly—that right.

the
that

Because

the error is not harmless, we vacate Ductan’s conviction and
remand for a new trial.

I.
A.
In April 2004, a confidential informant told the CharlotteMecklenburg

Police

Department

(the

“CMPD”)

offered to sell him 100 pounds of marijuana.
tip,

the

CMPD

set

up

a

controlled
2

buy

at

that

Ductan

had

In response to the
a

Cracker

Barrel

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restaurant in Charlotte, North Carolina.

When the informant

arrived, he was met by Ductan and two other men, Mark Lowery and
Landis Richardson, who were seated in a Ford SUV.

After Ductan

showed the informant a package of marijuana, CMPD officers moved
in to arrest the three men, prompting Ductan to throw a firearm
on the ground and attempt to flee.

The officers discovered

other firearms at the scene, as well as a significant quantity
of marijuana in Lowery’s nearby SUV.

Ductan was charged in

North Carolina state court with trafficking in marijuana and
carrying a concealed firearm, but the charges were dismissed.
B.
In September 2004, a federal grand jury indicted Ductan and
his co-conspirators on charges of conspiracy to possess with
intent
§ 846),

to

distribute

possession

marijuana

with

intent

(in

violation

to

distribute

of

21

U.S.C.

marijuana

and

aiding and abetting the same (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841
and

18

U.S.C.

§ 2),

and

carrying

a

firearm

during

and

in

relation to a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)).
An arrest warrant issued, but Ductan was not arrested until May
2012.
At

his

initial

appearance

before

the

magistrate

judge,

Ductan indicated that he had retained attorney Charles Brant to
represent him.

Brant, however, soon moved to withdraw, citing

Ductan’s uncooperativeness, refusal to sign a discovery waiver
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as

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a

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precondition

for

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the

government

providing

written

discovery, and lack of communication.
At

the

hearing

on

Brant’s

motion,

the

magistrate

judge

confirmed that Ductan no longer wanted Brant to represent him,
and asked Ductan whether he wished to hire another lawyer or
have the court appoint counsel.

Ductan complained that it was

difficult to find counsel while incarcerated, but insisted that
he “d[id] not want to consent to having a lawyer appointed.”
J.A. 28.

Ductan also told the judge that he did not want to

represent himself.
After the judge explained that Ductan’s options were to
represent himself, hire new counsel, or ask the court to appoint
counsel, Ductan began making nonsense statements, requesting “a
form 226 form” and informing the court that he was “a secured
party

creditor.”

J.A.

29.

The

judge

then

instructed

the

prosecutor to summarize the charges and maximum penalties, but
after

the

prosecutor

finished,

understand what he is saying.
the account.”

J.A. 33.

Ductan

stated,

“I

do

not

I’m only here for settlement of

The judge twice asked Ductan whether he

was “under the influence of any alcohol or drugs,” but Ductan
gave nonsense responses.

J.A. 34.

The judge then told Ductan

that he would not appoint a lawyer because “by making nonsense
statements,” Ductan could “be found to have waived [his] right

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counsel,”

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although

he

appoint standby counsel.

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directed

the

Federal

Defender

to

J.A. 35.

Following the hearing, the magistrate judge issued an order
granting

Brant’s

proceedings.

motion

to

withdraw

and

summarizing

the

United States v. Ductan, No. 3:04-CR-252 (W.D.N.C.

Oct. 5, 2012), ECF No. 142.

Although the judge noted that

Ductan had not “knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel,”

he

held

that

as

a

result

of

Ductan’s

frivolous

arguments and evasive responses, Ductan had “forfeited his right
to counsel in this matter.”

Id. at 2.

A month later, Ductan’s standby counsel Randy Lee moved to
withdraw.

According

represent

him

in

to

any

discovery agreement.

Lee,

Ductan

capacity”

J.A. 42.

and

did
also

not

want

refused

Lee

to

“to

sign

a

Lee explained that he was unable

to adequately prepare for the case and would not be ready if
asked

to

assist

appointment

as

at

trial.

full-time

Lee

said

counsel,

but

that
was

he
not

would

accept

comfortable

continuing as standby counsel.
At

the

complained

hearing

that

he

on

did

Lee’s

“not

motion

feel

to

confident

withdraw,
that

[Lee]

Ductan
would

represent [him] adequately” because Lee had spent little time
meeting with him.

The magistrate judge responded that Lee was

merely standby counsel and was not defending Ductan, because
Ductan had “waived [his] right to having an appointed attorney”
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at

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the

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previous

[him]self.”

hearing

J.A. 49.

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and

was

therefore

“representing

Ductan replied that he did not want Lee

to remain in the case in any capacity, explaining that he was
“seeking

private

contract

with

counsel,”

the

J.A.

government

50,

at

and

all,

“d[id]
as

far

not
as

want

to

counsel’s

concerned,” J.A. 57.
The magistrate judge denied Lee’s motion to withdraw.

The

judge explained that while he understood the difficult position
Lee was in, Lee would not have to try the case because Ductan
“by

his

conduct . . . had

counsel[,

s]o

himself.”

his

option

J.A. 53.

briefly explained

waived
is

to

his

hire

right

a

to

lawyer

appointed

or

represent

Before concluding the hearing, the judge

to

Ductan

the

risks

of

proceeding

pro

se,

emphasizing that Ductan was on his own unless he either “hire[d]
an attorney” or “allow[ed] Mr. Lee to help.”

J.A. 59.

C.
Ductan thereafter appeared before the district court for
calendar call.
professional
waived

his

The court advised Ductan on the advantages of

representation,
right

to

noting

appointed

that

counsel,

although
he

was

Ductan

free

to

had
hire

counsel.

In response, Ductan said that he was a “secured party

creditor”

and

Ductan

also

[him]self.”

was

seeking

stressed

that

private
he

counsel.

“could

Id.
6

not

Supp.
properly

J.A.

41.

represent

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Jury

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selection

began

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the

following

day,

with

Ductan

representing himself and Lee present as standby counsel.

Ductan

told the district court that the “defense is not prepared right
now to move forward with any proceedings.”

J.A. 64.

Ductan

also repeatedly interrupted as the court attempted to call the
venire, demanding to know whether he was “in a contract court or
a criminal court,” asserting that he was “the beneficiary of a
trust,” and making other nonsense statements.

J.A. 65–66.

When

Ductan continued to speak after the court directed him to stop
interrupting,

he

was

held

in

contempt

and

removed

from

the

courtroom.
The
holding

district
cell

remotely.

from

court

directed

which

he

that

could

Ductan
observe

be

placed

the

in

a

proceedings

The court told the potential jurors that Ductan was

representing himself and had opted not to be present for jury
selection.

Although the court had Lee introduce himself, it did

not address his role in the jury selection process.

The court

then continued with voir dire, during which the government moved
to

strike

strikes.

several

jurors

for

cause

and

exercised

peremptory

Lee did not move to strike any jurors or otherwise

participate, except to join the government and the court at a
brief bench conference.
After the jury was empaneled, the district court brought
Ductan back into the courtroom and told him that it “would love
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to have [him] participate” in the trial and would purge the
contempt

citation

directives.

he

J.A. 119.

represent myself.
120.

if

was

willing

to

obey

the

court’s

Ductan responded, “I do not want to

I would like to seek private counsel.”

J.A.

Ductan also confirmed that he did not want Lee to assume

duties

as

trial

concluded

counsel,

that

representation

it

then

at

which

point

the

“appears . . . he’s

because

we’re

ready

to

district

choosing
go.”

court
self-

J.A.

121.

However, when Lee asked Ductan if that was a fair representation
of his choice, Ductan responded, “No, it is not,” and stated
that he “d[id] not want to be represented in this format.”
122.

The

Ductan

district

that

he

court

was

then

began

representing

the

himself

trial,
but

J.A.

instructing
could

seek

assistance from Lee if he wished.
D.
Ductan’s trial proceeded uneventfully.

Ductan waived his

opening statement but cross-examined several of the government’s
witnesses, recalled one witness during his case, and consulted
occasionally with Lee.

Ductan also gave a closing argument,

emphasizing that there was reasonable doubt and arguing his good
character to the jury (over the government’s objections).

The

jury found Ductan guilty on all three counts in the indictment.
At Ductan’s request, the court appointed an attorney to
represent

him

at

sentencing.

The
8

court

imposed

a

within-

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guidelines sentence of 24 months in prison for the two drug
counts, in addition to a mandatory consecutive term of 60 months
for his

conviction

under

18

U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1),

for

a

total

his

Sixth

sentence of 84 months.

II.
On

appeal,

Ductan

argues

that

he

was

Amendment right to counsel on two occasions.

denied

First, he contends

that the magistrate judge erred by finding that he forfeited his
right to counsel by his conduct, and he also maintains that he
did not effectively waive that right, either expressly or by
implication.

Second,

he

claims

the

district

court

further

deprived him of his right to counsel by removing him from the
courtroom

during

jury

selection

without

appointing

counsel,

leaving him unrepresented during a critical stage of his trial.
We agree with Ductan as to his first claim, which alone is
sufficient to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.
A.
1.
We

begin

our

analysis

by

determining

the

appropriate

standard of review.
Ductan did not explicitly object to the magistrate judge’s
ruling that he had forfeited his right to counsel.

Although

Ductan repeated throughout the proceedings that he planned to
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hire private counsel, did not want to represent himself, and did
“not

want

to

waive

[his]

Sixth

Amendment

right

to

private

counsel,” J.A. 123, we do not find that any of those comments,
even

liberally

construed,

magistrate judge’s ruling.

constitute

an

objection

to

the

This is particularly so in light of

Ductan’s insistence that he did not want appointed counsel.
A defendant's failure to object in the district court to an
alleged error would normally bar appellate review absent plain
error.

United States v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350, 358 (4th Cir.

2012).

As we explain, however, the circumstances here warrant

that

we

consider

de

novo

the

magistrate

judge’s

forfeiture

finding.
2.
The proper standard of review when a defendant fails to
object

to

a

right-to-counsel

divided our sister circuits.

waiver 1

is

a

question

that

has

See United States v. Stanley, 739

1

The magistrate judge found that Ductan had forfeited his
right to counsel because of his misconduct.
The parties,
however, alternatively describe the question before us as one
involving waiver of the right to counsel. The concepts are, of
course, quite different.
“A waiver is an intentional and
voluntary relinquishment of a known right.”
United States v.
Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099 (3d Cir. 1995).
In contrast,
“forfeiture results in the loss of a right regardless of the
defendant's knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether the
defendant intended to relinquish the right.”
Id. at 1100.
While we will take care to distinguish between forfeiture and
waiver when considering the parties’ contentions, we think the
standard of review is the same in either case.
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F.3d 633, 644–45 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases and
explaining that “[a]pproaches to this question differ across,
and even within, other circuits”); United States v. McBride, 362
F.3d 360, 365–66 (6th Cir. 2004) (observing an intra-circuit
conflict but stating that other circuits “uniformly apply a de
novo standard of review”).
Our

approach

has

varied.

Most

recently,

we

have

acknowledged the uncertainty surrounding the issue but declined
to determine the appropriate standard of review.

See United

States v. McAtee, 598 F. App’x 185, 186 n.* (4th Cir. 2015);
United States v. Parker, 576 F. App’x 157, 162 (4th Cir. 2014).
However,

we

have

also

applied

de

novo

review

without

elaboration, see, e.g., United States v. Curry, 575 F. App’x
143, 145 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hickson, 506 F. App’x
227, 233 (4th Cir. 2013), as well as plain error review in our
lone published decision on the issue, United States v. Bernard,
708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2013).
Although

the

facts

in

Bernard

are

reminiscent

circumstances of this case, they are not analogous.

of

the

In Bernard,

the defendant sought to discharge his counsel and proceed pro se
despite having a history of mental illness and initially being
found incompetent to stand trial.

The district court held a

hearing to consider defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and the
defendant’s competency to waive counsel and represent himself.
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At the time of the hearing, the defendant was represented
by counsel, who was advocating for the defendant’s ability to
represent himself.

708 F.3d at 586 (quoting defense counsel’s

argument that “since th[e] standard has been met . . . you could
find that he is competent to waive counsel”).

Even after the

court found the defendant competent and granted his counsel’s
motion to withdraw, counsel remained as standby and participated
in a bench conference with the court and the government on the
subject of the defendant’s competency.
In assessing whether there was a Sixth Amendment violation,
we stated that “we look to not only the defendant, but to his
counsel, who for much of the hearing actively participated with
full

representational

counsel

bore

authority.”

at

588

responsibility

“substantial

Id.

n.7.

for

Because

allowing

the

alleged error to pass without objection,” we concluded that “his
failure to preserve the claim of invalid waiver warrants plain
error review.”
In

Id.

Bernard,

(internal quotation mark omitted).
the

court

made

“no

decision

on

defense

counsel’s motion to withdraw” until “late in the hearing,” after
the court had already undertaken the competency evaluation.

Id.

In contrast, the magistrate judge here granted counsel’s motion
to

withdraw

early

in

the

hearing,

before

Ductan forfeited his right to counsel.

12

later

finding

See J.A. 27–28.

that
Thus,

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at the point the judge found a forfeiture, Ductan was very much
left “to his own devices.” 708 F.3d at 588 n.7.
As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “we do not expect pro
se defendants to know the perils of self-representation, and
consequently, we cannot expect defendants to recognize that they
have not been correctly and fully advised, let alone to point
out the court’s errors.”
1161,

1166

(9th

Cir.

United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d
2004).

In

Erskine,

the

defendant

challenged the validity of his waiver of counsel after failing
to object to the district court’s Faretta inquiry below.
contrast

to

Bernard,

the

district

court

in

Erskine

In
had

determined that the defendant validly waived counsel while he
was completely unrepresented.
held

that

“plain

error

As a result, the Ninth Circuit

review

would

be

reviewed the validity of the waiver de novo.
We

find

the

Ninth

Circuit’s

inappropriate”

and

Id. at 1165–67.

reasoning

persuasive,

and

conclude that its holding applies equally to cases in which a
pro se defendant fails to object to a district court’s finding
of

forfeiture.

judge’s

We

therefore

determination

that

review

Ductan

de

novo

the

forfeited

his

magistrate
right

to

counsel.
3.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to a criminal defendant the
right to the assistance of counsel before he can be convicted
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and punished by a term of imprisonment.

U.S. Const. amend. VI;

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963).
counsel

is

fundamental

to

our

system

of

The right to

justice;

beyond

protecting individual defendants, it is “critical to the ability
of the adversarial system to produce just results.”

Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
Nonetheless, it is equally clear that the Sixth Amendment
also

protects

a

representation.

defendant’s
As

the

affirmative

Court

explained

right
in

to

self-

Faretta

v.

California, “[t]o thrust counsel upon the accused, against his
considered

wish,

thus

Amendment. . . . Unless
representation,

the

violates
the

defense

the

accused

logic
has

presented

of

the

acquiesced
is

not

the

[Sixth]
in

such

defense

guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense,
it is not his defense.”
We

have

said

that

422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).
the

right

to

self-representation

inescapably in tension with the right to counsel.

is

This is so

because invocation of the former “poses a peculiar problem: it
requires that the defendant waive his right to counsel.”

Fields

v. Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1028 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see
also United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“Th[e right to self-representation] . . . is mutually exclusive
of the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”);
United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997)
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(explaining that the two rights are “essentially inverse aspects
of

the

Sixth

Amendment

and

thus . . . assertion

constitutes a de facto waiver of the other”).
tension,

we

have

clarified

that

because

of

one

Recognizing this

access

to

counsel

“affects [a defendant’s] ability to assert any other rights he
may

have,”

Fields,

49

F.3d

at

1028

(internal

quotation

mark

omitted), “the right to counsel is preeminent and hence, the
default position,”

Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1096.

Although other courts have held that the right to counsel
may be relinquished either intentionally or unintentionally, see
United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 249–50 (3d Cir. 1998)
(explaining that the right to counsel can be waived by a knowing
and voluntary waiver or unintentionally forfeited as a result of
“extremely serious misconduct”), we have never held that counsel
can be relinquished by means short of waiver.
our

view

that

representation

by

counsel

Consistent with
is

the

“default

position,” we have instead instructed lower courts to “indulge
in every reasonable presumption” against the relinquishment of
the right to counsel.
v.

Williams,

effective

430

assertion

U.S.
of

Fields, 49 F.3d at 1029 (quoting Brewer
387,
the

404

right

(1977)).
to

Accordingly,

self-representation

an
(and

thus a waiver of the right to counsel) requires that a defendant
“knowingly

and

intelligently”

forgo

15

the

benefits

of

counsel

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after being made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation.

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.

The Supreme Court has not established precise guidelines
for determining whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent.

We

have held that a “searching or formal inquiry,” while required
by some of our sister circuits, 2 is not necessary.
107

F.3d

represent

at

1097.

Still,

himself,

a

before

district

allowing

court

must

a

Singleton,

defendant

find

that

to
the

defendant’s background, appreciation of the charges against him
and

their

potential

penalties,

and

understanding

of

the

advantages and disadvantages of self-representation support the
conclusion

that

intelligent.
In

his

waiver

of

counsel

is

knowing

and

Id. at 1098–99.

addition

to

requiring

that

a

waiver

be

knowing

and

intelligent as a constitutional minimum, we have imposed one
other requirement.

In Fields, we noted the “thin line between

improperly allowing the defendant to proceed pro se, thereby
violating

his

right

to

counsel,

and

improperly

having

the

defendant proceed with counsel, thereby violating his right to
self-representation.”
omitted).

49 F.3d at 1029 (internal quotation mark

Acknowledging

that

“[a]

2

skillful

defendant

could

See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 452 F.3d 223, 228 & n.2
(3d Cir. 2006) (requiring a “penetrating and comprehensive
examination of all the circumstances” but acknowledging that
such an inquiry “is not required in every court”).
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manipulate this dilemma to create reversible error,” we held
that

a

waiver

of

counsel

through

the

election

of

self-

representation must be more than knowing and intelligent: it
must also be “clear[] and unequivocal[].”

Id.

We explained

that this requirement “greatly aids the trial court in resolving
this

dilemma”

defendant

by

should

allowing
proceed

the

with

court

counsel

to

presume

absent

an

that

“the

unmistakable

expression by the defendant that so to proceed is contrary to
his wishes.”

Id. (emphasis added). 3

Since our en banc decision in Fields, we have consistently
held that as between counsel and self-representation, counsel is
the “default position” unless and until a defendant explicitly
asserts his desire to proceed pro se.

3

See, e.g., Bernard, 708

Other courts have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 389 (1st Cir. 2015)
(“[T]he court must make certain that the defendant states his
intent to relinquish his right to counsel in unequivocal
language.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v.
Campbell, 659 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, remanded,
and affirmed on other grounds, 488 F. App’x 152 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[T]he requirement that a waiver of counsel be unequivocal is
necessary lest a defendant attempt to play one constitutional
right against another.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 2010)
(finding no valid waiver where the defendant “made a request to
fire his appointed attorney, but not a clear and unequivocal
request to represent himself”); Jones, 452 F.3d at 231
(requiring a “clear and unequivocal” selection of selfrepresentation in order to validly waive counsel).
But see
United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2001)
(allowing waiver of the right to counsel by conduct in the
absence of an express waiver).
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F.3d at 588 (“[A] person may waive the right to counsel and
proceed at trial pro se only if the waiver is (1) clear and
unequivocal, (2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and (3)
timely.”); Bush, 404 F.3d at 271 (noting that invocation of the
right to self-representation, and thus waiver of the right to
counsel, must be clear and unequivocal); Singleton, 107 F.3d at
1096 (“[T]he

right

to

counsel

may

be

knowingly, and intelligently . . . .”).
have

found

that

a

defendant

can

waived

only

expressly,

And while some courts

validly

waive

the

right

to

counsel by conduct or implication, see, e.g., King v. Bobby, 433
F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2006), Fields and its progeny preclude
such a result in our circuit, see United States v. Frazier-El,
204 F.3d 553, 558–59 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining that because it
necessitates

a

waiver

of

counsel,

selection

of

self-

representation must be clear and unequivocal “to protect against
an inadvertent waiver of the right to counsel” and to create a
presumption “[i]n ambiguous situations created by a defendant’s
vacillation or manipulation”).
4.
It is against this backdrop that we turn to Ductan’s first
claim.
forfeited

Ductan
by

argues

that

misconduct,

and

the

right

also

to

counsel

maintains

that

cannot
no

be

waiver

occurred because he did not “clearly and unequivocally” elect to
proceed pro se and waive counsel as required under our case law.
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Ductan also contends that even if he had expressed a desire to
represent himself, his waiver was not knowing and intelligent
because

the

magistrate

judge

did

not

complete

the

inquiry

required by Faretta.
Ductan stresses that at no point in the initial hearing
before the magistrate judge did he clearly and unequivocally
elect

to

represent

himself

or

waive

his

right

to

counsel.

Indeed, throughout the proceedings, Ductan never wavered in his
desire to retain counsel, while complaining that it was “almost
impossible to do that being incarcerated.”

J.A. 28.

When the

magistrate judge asked Ductan if he wanted to represent himself,
he responded “No.”

J.A. 28. 4

But Ductan also adamantly refused

appointed counsel, repeatedly stating that he did “not want an
attorney appointed to [him],” J.A. 30, and did “not want to
contract

with

the

government

at

all,

as

far

as

counsel’s

concerned,” J.A. 57.
4

Ductan remained steadfast in his opposition to proceeding
pro se.
At a later docket call, Ductan stated that he was
seeking private counsel and added that he “could not properly
represent [him]self” and that “it would be impossible for me to
prepare a case tomorrow.” Supp. J.A. 41. On the first day of
trial, Ductan continued to object to proceeding pro se, telling
the district court that the “defense is not prepared right now
to move forward with any proceedings.”
J.A. 64.
After being
returned
to
the
courtroom
following
jury
selection,
he
reiterated, “I do not want to represent myself. I would like to
seek private counsel,” J.A. 120, “I do not want to waive my
Sixth Amendment right to private counsel,” J.A. 123, and he
responded
“No”
when
asked
if
he
was
choosing
selfrepresentation, J.A. 122.
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Based

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on

determined

this

that

record,
Ductan

Pg: 20 of 32

the

magistrate

had

judge

correctly

“not . . . knowingly

and

intentionally waived his right to counsel,” citing Frazier-El
for the proposition that an assertion of the right to selfrepresentation must be “(1) clear and unequivocal; (2) knowing,
intelligent and voluntary; and (3) timely.”

Ductan, No. 3:04-

CR-252, ECF No. 142, at 2 (emphasis added).

But the judge

concluded nonetheless that Ductan had “forfeited his right to
counsel in this matter” by his “frivolous arguments and answers
to questions.”

Id.

We hold that this was error.

While some circuits have held that a defendant can forfeit
the right to counsel, see, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 53
F.3d 322, 325–26 (11th Cir. 1995), we have never endorsed that
notion.

Moreover, at least four Justices of the Supreme Court

have concluded that while “[s]ome rights may be forfeited by
means short of waiver . . . others may not,” and identified the
right

to

counsel

intentionally.

as

one

that

can

only

be

relinquished

Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S.

868, 894 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

And even those circuits

holding that a defendant may forfeit his right to counsel have
done

so

only

in

truly

egregious

circumstances.

See,

e.g.,

McLeod, 53 F.3d at 325–26 (finding that defendant forfeited the
right to counsel by threatening to harm his counsel, verbally
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abusing him, and ordering him to engage in unethical conduct).
This is not such a case.
To be sure, Ductan was uncooperative when discussing the
issue of counsel with the court.

By resisting both appointed

counsel and self-representation, he essentially rejected all of
his

options,

difficult

putting

position.

the

magistrate

However,

judge

despite

in

an

Ductan’s

undeniably
obstructive

behavior, he never engaged in the type of egregious conduct that
other courts have concluded justifies a finding of forfeiture.
See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th
Cir. 2003) (death threat); Leggett, 162 F.3d at 250 (unprovoked
physical assault).
Nor do the facts support a finding that Ductan waived his
right to counsel.

In Frazier-El, we considered a situation in

which the defendant sought to fire his court-appointed attorney
because

the

Frazier-El

attorney

also

said

refused

to

that

would

he

make

a

frivolous

continue

to

argument.

request

the

removal of any attorney who so refused, and even stated that he
would prefer to represent himself in order to make the argument.
204 F.3d at 557.

The district court denied Frazier-El’s request

to fire his attorney and proceed pro se, and we affirmed.
Confirming

that

invocation

of

the

right

of

self-

representation must be “clear and unequivocal,” we found that
the district court acted appropriately by forcing the defendant
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to

Doc: 53

continue

between

a

Filed: 09/02/2015

with
desire

representation.
arguably

appointed
for

Pg: 22 of 32

counsel

counsel

and

204 F.3d at 559–60.

stronger

than

when
a

he

“vacillat[ed]”

desire

for

self-

Although Ductan’s case is

Frazier-El’s

because

Ductan

never

expressed any desire to proceed pro se, Frazier-El counsels that
a court must insist on appointed counsel against a defendant’s
wishes in the absence of an unequivocal request to proceed pro
se, or when the basis for the defendant’s objection to counsel
is frivolous.
The government contends that Ductan’s waiver of counsel was
constitutionally

adequate,

citing

to

our

decision

States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1988).

in

United

In Gallop, the

defendant sought to fire his court-appointed lawyer but also
objected to proceeding pro se.

When the district court found

that there was no cause to replace the defendant’s appointed
lawyer, the defendant indicated that he had “no choice” but to
fire his lawyer and represent himself.

Id. at 107.

We found that the defendant validly waived counsel because
“[a] refusal without good cause to proceed with able appointed
counsel is a voluntary waiver.”
seizes

upon

this

holding

to

Id. at 109.
conclude

that

The government
“a

defendant’s

unjustified, dilatory tactics can result in an implied waiver
even

absent

an

representation.”

express

assertion

Appellee’s Br. at 30.
22

of

the

right

to

self-

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Gallop,

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however,

Pg: 23 of 32

predated

the

“clear

and

unequivocal”

requirement that the en banc court adopted in Fields.

Thus,

although we have continued to rely on Gallop for its approach to
Faretta

inquiries

“intelligent,

and

knowing,

the
and

determination
voluntary,”

whether
it

does

a

waiver

not

is

provide

correct guidance on whether a waiver of counsel is clear and
unequivocal.
In this case, there was no clear and unequivocal waiver of
counsel
Gallop

or
nor

election
the

of

self-representation.

out-of-circuit

cases

cited

Because
by

the

neither

government

account for this post-Fields requirement, we do not find them
controlling or persuasive here, except as they relate to the
issue of whether Ductan’s waiver was intelligent, knowing, and
voluntary. 5
In any event, even if Ductan had clearly and unequivocally
elected self-representation, no valid waiver of counsel occurred
because

the

magistrate

judge

did

5

not

complete

the

Faretta

For the proposition that counsel can be waived by
implication, the government also cites United States v. Davis,
958 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1992).
Like Gallop, Davis predates
Fields, but is also readily distinguishable.
In Davis, the
defendant refused to allow the court to inquire into his
financial status, preventing the court from determining whether
he was even eligible for court-appointed counsel.
Because the
defendant bears the burden of proving that he lacks the means to
retain counsel, id. at 48, Davis has no bearing on this case, in
which there is no debate that Ductan is indigent and eligible
for appointed counsel.
23

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inquiry.

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Although

the

Pg: 24 of 32

judge

attempted

to

conduct

such

an

inquiry, directing the government to summarize the charges and
potential penalties for Ductan and asking whether Ductan was
under

the

responses

influence
prevented

of

drugs

him

or

alcohol,

from

fully

Ductan’s

exploring

nonsense
Ductan’s

understanding of the proceedings and the dangers of proceeding
pro se.

Thus, as the magistrate judge acknowledged, Ductan did

“not . . . knowingly
counsel.”

and

intentionally

waive[]

his

Ductan, No. 3:04-CR-252, ECF No. 142, at 2.

circumstances,

our

default

rule

required

that

right

to

In these

counsel

be

appointed for Ductan until he either effected a proper waiver or
retained a lawyer.
In sum, the magistrate judge erred in finding that Ductan
forfeited

his

right

to

counsel,

and

we

decline

effective waiver of that right on this record.
magistrate

judge’s

error

is

not

subject

to

to

find

an

Because the

harmless

error

review, see United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148–
50

(2006)

(holding

that

denial

of

counsel

is

a

“structural

error . . . bear[ing] directly on the framework within which the
trial proceeds”), we vacate Ductan’s conviction and remand for a
new trial.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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DIAZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:
The court correctly grants Ductan a new trial based on his
first claim of error.
view,

what

occurred

I write separately to explain why, in my
during

jury

independent ground for that relief.

selection

provides

an

Ductan asserts that the

district court erred by removing him from the courtroom for his
disruptive behavior while he was proceeding pro se and selecting
a jury in his absence.
in

his

absence,

the

He argues that by not appointing counsel
court

critical stage of his trial.

left

him

unrepresented

during

a

I believe he is correct.

I.
Because Ductan failed to make a specific objection to the
district court’s action, I review his claim for plain error. 1
See United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 n.7
(4th Cir. 2014) (holding that forfeited errors are subject to
plain error review in this circuit, even when those errors are
1

Ductan says that he lodged a proper objection when, while
being removed from the courtroom, he shouted, “Does anybody have
any claims against me? I object to this whole proceeding.” J.A.
67. We, however, have consistently held that general objections
are insufficient to preserve claims for appeal.
See, e.g.,
United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2008).
Because Ductan’s statement that he “object[ed] to this whole
proceeding” was typical of his consistent viewpoint that the
court had no jurisdiction over him, it did not “reasonably . . .
alert the district court of the true ground for the objection,”
id., and thus was not sufficiently specific to preserve his
claim.
25

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structural).

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Pg: 26 of 32

Thus, to warrant relief, Ductan must demonstrate

that there was error, the error was plain, and it affected his
substantial rights.
(4th

Cir.

2011).

United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 190
An

error

is

plain

when

it

is

“clear

or

obvious,” meaning that “the settled law of the Supreme Court or
this [Court] establishes that an error has occurred,” or in rare
cases, when authority from other circuits is unanimous.

United

States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 516 & n.14 (4th Cir. 2013).
Even then, we will only notice the error if it affects the
“fairness,

integrity,

proceedings.”

or

public

reputation

of

judicial

Slade, 631 F.3d at 192 (quoting United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).

I conclude that Ductan has

met his burden.

II.
I

begin

by

emphasizing

that

the

district

court

appropriately by removing Ductan from the courtroom.

acted

Although

the Supreme Court has held that removal of a defendant from his
own trial is “not pleasant” and even “[d]eplorable,” Illinois v.
Allen,

397

refused

to

U.S.
obey

337,
the

346–47

(1970),

court’s

Ductan

instructions,

was
and

disruptive,
repeatedly

interrupted the court as it attempted to begin jury selection.
Under those circumstances, the court had discretion to address
Ductan’s

“disruptive,

contumacious,
26

[and]

stubbornly

defiant”

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conduct by removing him from the courtroom.

Id. at 343.

Ductan

does not contend otherwise, but he does say that the district
court’s failure to appoint counsel in his absence constitutes
plain error.

I agree.

It is well established that jury selection is a “critical
stage”

of

a

attaches.

criminal

trial

to

which

the

right

to

counsel

Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989).

Thus, the absence of counsel during jury selection constitutes a
“breakdown in the adversarial process,” James v. Harrison, 389
F.3d 450, 456 (4th Cir. 2004), and we have made clear that
“[t]he presumption that counsel’s presence is essential requires
us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied
counsel” at jury selection, United States v. Hanno, 21 F.3d 42,
47 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 659 (1984)).
force

when

a

Pennsylvania,

This fundamental principle applies with equal

defendant
400

U.S.

represents
455,

himself.

468

(1971)

Cf.

Mayberry

(Burger,

v.

C.J.,

concurring) (explaining that “the presence and participation of
counsel,

even

when

opposed

by

the

accused,”

protects

a

defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights “when the accused has refused
legal assistance and then [brings] about his own removal from
the proceedings”).
Of

course,

absolute.”

the

right

to

self-representation

Fields, 49 F.3d at 1035.
27

is

“not

Thus, a pro se defendant

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who is disruptive in the courtroom may forfeit his right to
self-representation.

Faretta,

422

U.S.

at

834

n.46

(“[T]he

trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who
deliberately

engages

in

serious

and

obstructionist

misconduct.”).

In these cases, the proper course of action is

to

defendant’s

revoke

the

appoint counsel.

right

to

self-representation

and

See, e.g., United States v. Mack, 362 F.3d

597, 601 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A defendant does not forfeit his
right to representation at trial when he acts out.

He merely

forfeits his right to represent himself in the proceeding.”);
United

States

v.

Pina,

844

F.2d

1,

15

(1st

Cir.

1988)

(suggesting that a trial judge “employ his or her wisdom to
appoint standby counsel” to represent a defendant who is removed
or discharges counsel); see also United States v. West, 877 F.2d
281, 287 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming the defendant’s conviction
where

the

district

court

found

him

incompetent

to

represent

himself and immediately appointed his standby counsel to replace
him). 2

2

The parties cite to two post-conviction cases that
affirmed convictions after a pro se defendant was removed from
the courtroom and not replaced by appointed counsel, but both
explicitly did so because of the highly deferential standard of
review in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas cases. See Thomas v. Carroll,
581 F.3d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2009) (“If this appeal had come
before us on a direct appeal from a federal court presented with
a defendant who waived his right to counsel and then absented
himself from the courtroom, we might hold differently.”); Davis
(Continued)
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When the district court held Ductan in contempt and removed
him from the courtroom, Ductan was representing himself.

He was

placed in a holding cell from which he could see and hear the
proceedings, but could not participate in any way.

Moreover,

nothing in the record supports the government’s assertion that
standby

counsel

Lee

was

Appellee’s Br. at 43.

thereafter

“representing

[Ductan].”

Although Lee was in the courtroom and

present for a brief bench conference, he did not move to strike
any

jurors,

object

to

any

of

the

government’s

otherwise participate in jury selection.

strikes,

or

Nor did the district

court appoint Lee as counsel, or otherwise indicate that Lee was
in any way authorized to act on Ductan’s behalf.

See United

States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining
the

“limited

role”

of

standby

counsel

and

clarifying

that

“standby counsel is not counsel at all, at least not as that
term is used in the Sixth Amendment”).

v. Grant, 532 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[I]f we were
reviewing the issue on a blank slate, we might be inclined to
conclude
that . . . the
Sixth
Amendment
requires
that
a
defendant who is involuntarily removed from the courtroom must
be provided with replacement counsel during his absence.”).
The government argues that our decision in James v.
Harrison, 389 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2004) reaches a similar
conclusion, but I find the deprivation in James—in which the
defendant was represented by co-defendant’s counsel instead of
his own during voir dire and jury selection—significantly less
severe and thus distinguishable from what happened here.
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Because

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Ductan

was

Pg: 30 of 32

entirely

unrepresented

during

jury

selection, conducting this critical stage of his trial in his
absence

and

without

appointed

counsel

was

plain

error.

The

principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gomez and followed
by this court in Hanno and James makes it “clear” and “obvious”
that

complete

denial

of

counsel

during

jury

selection

is

a

constitutional violation, and no Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit
case

suggests

that

this

general

defendants proceeding pro se.
the

cases

makes

it

plain

rule

does

not

apply

to

To the contrary, the weight of

that

when

a

pro

se

defendant

is

involuntarily removed from the courtroom, no “critical stage” of
the

trial

may

be

conducted

in

his

absence

without

the

appointment of counsel.
I also conclude that the other prongs of the Olano test are
satisfied.
constitutes

The
a

absence

of

counsel

“breakdown

in

the

during

jury

adversarial

process”

necessarily affects a defendant’s substantial rights.
389 F.3d at 456.

selection
that
James,

Moreover, because errors that result in a

“breakdown of the adversarial process” are precisely the types
of

deprivations

that

affect

the

fairness

and

integrity

of

judicial proceedings, the error provides an independent ground
for vacating Ductan’s conviction and remanding for a new trial.

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III.
I do not take lightly the predicament that district courts
face when confronted by a contumacious criminal defendant.

But

in these admittedly challenging situations, a court may not, as
the first choice, find forfeiture or waiver of the right to
counsel

on

the

basis

of

a

defendant’s

dilatory

conduct

otherwise by implication or process of elimination.

or

Instead, as

the court reasserts today, “[i]n ambiguous situations created by
a defendant’s vacillation or manipulation, we must ascribe a
constitutional

primacy

to

the

right

to

counsel

because

this

right serves both the individual and the collective good, as
opposed to only the individual interests served by protecting
the right of self-representation.”

Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 559

(internal quotation mark omitted).
Of course, when a defendant does assert his right to selfrepresentation,

that

right

dignity of the courtroom.”

“is

not

a

license

to

abuse

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.

the
When

a pro se defendant acts out or engages in serious misconduct
such that his choice to represent himself cannot be reconciled
with

the

need

proceedings,

to

the

maintain
district

the
court

efficiency
enjoys

and

ample

order

of

discretion

terminate that self-representation and appoint counsel.

the
to

But in

no case may a critical stage of a defendant’s trial take place
after he is removed, in the absence of any representation.
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I therefore join the court’s decision to vacate Ductan’s
conviction and remand for a new trial.

32