US v. Jayad Conteh

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:12-cr-00306-GLR-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999467451]. [14-4224]

Appeal: 14-4224

Doc: 43

Filed: 11/03/2014

Pg: 1 of 7

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4224

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAYAD ZAINAB ESTER CONTEH,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. George L. Russell, III, District Judge.
(8:12-cr-00306-GLR-1)

Submitted:

October 20, 2014

Decided:

November 3, 2014

Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marc Gregory Hall, LAW OFFICE OF MARC G. HALL, P.C., Rockville,
Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Thomas P. Windom, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 14-4224

Doc: 43

Filed: 11/03/2014

Pg: 2 of 7

PER CURIAM:
Jayad

Zainab

Ester

Conteh

(“Conteh”)

appeals

her

convictions after a jury trial for conspiracy to commit bank
fraud,

in

violation

of

18

U.S.C.

§§ 1344,

1349

(2012),

bank

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1344 (2012), aggravated
identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1028A (2012),
and two counts of exceeding authorized access to a computer and
thereby obtaining information contained in a financial record of
a

financial

institution,

1030(a)(2)(A) (2012).
court

erred

in

in

violation

of

18

U.S.C.

§§ 2,

Conteh argues on appeal that the district

denying

her

motions

to

suppress

evidence

and

statements because the sworn application supporting her arrest
warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause and that
the officer executing the warrant did not act in reasonable good
faith

reliance

on

the

state

commissioner’s

determination

of

probable cause.

Conteh also challenges the district court’s

qualification

a

of

witness

as

an

expert

in

Sierra

Leoneon

Creole, arguing that the court abused its discretion because it
so qualified him, even though he is not a federally certified
interpreter, does not possess degrees in the language, never
acted

as

a

translator

previously,

teacher in another field.
We

review

the

and

currently

works

as

a

We affirm.
district

court’s

factual

findings

underlying its denial of a motion to suppress for clear error
2

Appeal: 14-4224

Doc: 43

Filed: 11/03/2014

Pg: 3 of 7

and its legal conclusions de novo.

United States v. McGee,

736 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1572
(2014).

“Probable

existence

of]

cause

facts

to

and

justify

an

circumstances

arrest

means

within

[a

[the

police]

officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent
person,

or

one

circumstances
offense.”

of

reasonable

shown,

that

caution,

the

in

suspect

believing

has

in

the

committed . . . an

United States v. Dickey-Bey, 393 F.3d 449, 453 (4th

Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

A

“fluid concept that turns on the assessment of probabilities,
not

on

any

formula

such

as

is

applied

to

proof

at

trial,”

probable cause “is judged by an analysis of the totality of the
circumstances.”
omitted).

Id.

at

453-54

(internal

quotation

marks

In reviewing the state commissioner’s probable cause

determination,

we

“must

accord

great

deference

to

the

[commissioner]’s assessment of the facts presented to him” and
“may ask only whether the [commissioner] had a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed.”

United States v.

Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation
marks, ellipsis, and alteration omitted).
The
clear

that

application

law

supporting

enforcement

agents

the

arrest

learned

that

warrant
several

makes
bank

accounts had been compromised when information for the accounts
was

changed

and

checks

were

ordered
3

without

authorization.

Appeal: 14-4224

Doc: 43

Filed: 11/03/2014

Pg: 4 of 7

Conteh — in her position as a teller for the bank — had accessed
the compromised accounts with information personally identifying
the

account

holders

in

a

manner

suggesting

her

access

was

unauthorized.

Additionally, the owner of a vehicle observed

being

an

used

in

attempt

to

retrieve

checks

ordered

without

authorization from one of the compromised accounts was relying
on

a

bank

totality

insider

of

provide

him

circumstances,

the

to

the

information.
state

Under

commissioner

the

had

a

substantial basis to conclude that the supporting application
established probable cause, and we reject as unsupported by the
record Conteh’s assertion that probable cause is lacking because
the application contains a “significant misstatement” that she
was the individual who changed account information.
In
determined

addition,

that,

even

the
if

district

the

supporting

court

alternatively

application

did

not

establish probable cause, suppression of the warrant and the
fruits from Conteh’s arrest was not warranted in light of the
arresting officer’s good faith reliance on the commissioner’s
determination

of

probable

468 U.S. 897 (1984).

United

States

v.

Leon,

Pursuant to the good faith exception under

Leon, evidence

obtained

suppressed

the

if

cause.

from

an

officer’s

“‘objectively reasonable.’”

invalid

reliance

warrant
on

the

will

not

warrant

be
was

United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d

457, 461 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922).
4

Leon

Appeal: 14-4224

Doc: 43

Filed: 11/03/2014

Pg: 5 of 7

identifies four circumstances in which an officer’s reliance on
a warrant would not so qualify, only one of which Conteh invokes
here.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (noting that an officer’s reliance

on a warrant would not so qualify if the warrant was so facially
deficient

that

validity).

no

reasonable

officer

could

presume

its

We reject, however, as unsupported by the record

Conteh’s claim that the arrest warrant was facially deficient
because law enforcement agents knew she did not change account
information for the bank accounts.
Conteh
qualification
Creole.
expert

also

of

a

challenges

witness

as

an

the

district

expert

court’s

in

Leoneon

Sierra

We review a district court’s decision to qualify an
witness

for

abuse

of

discretion.

United

States

v.

Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 390 (4th Cir. 2014).
We

reject

Conteh’s

contention

that

the

unqualified as an expert in Sierra Leoneon Creole.

witness

was

Conteh takes

issue with the fact that the witness — who testified regarding
messages in Sierra Leoneon Creole extracted from the cellular
phone

seized

from

her

incident

to

her

arrest

—

is

not

a

federally certified interpreter, does not hold degrees in the
language, never acted as a translator previously, and currently
works as a teacher in another field.
In

undertaking

its

gatekeeper

role

to

ensure

that

evidence is reliable under Fed. R. Evid. 702, a district court
5

Appeal: 14-4224

“must

Doc: 43

Filed: 11/03/2014

decide

whether

the

Pg: 6 of 7

expert

has

‘sufficient

specialized

knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the particular issues
in the case.’”

Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., U.S., 679 F.3d 146,

162 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 156 (1999)).

In making this decision, the court

should “consider the proposed expert’s full range of experience
and training.”

United States v. Pansier, 576 F.3d 726, 737

(7th Cir. 2009).
Although the witness here is not a federally certified
interpreter,

lack

organization

—

dispositive;
imprimatur.”

of

formal

although

Rule

relevant

702

United

certification

“does

States

to

not

v.

his

by

a

professional

expertise

require

Gutierrez,

—

any

757

is

not

particular

F.3d

785,

788

(8th Cir. 2014); see United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013,
1024 (6th Cir. 1977).
teacher

in

another

Leoneon

Creole,

and

Further, although the witness works as a
field,
had

does

not

not

acted

hold
as

a

degrees

in

translator

Sierra
for

any

government agency prior to his involvement in Conteh’s case, we
conclude he was properly qualified as an expert in the language
based

on

his

education

and

experience

with

the

language - including familiarity with its slang terms - and his
daily use of the language.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument
6

because

the

facts

and

legal

Appeal: 14-4224

Doc: 43

contentions

are

Filed: 11/03/2014

adequately

Pg: 7 of 7

presented

in

the

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

7