US v. Truman Lewi
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:12-cr-00507-RMG-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999581584].. [14-4241, 14-4242, 14-4648]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4241
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRUMAN LEVI LEWIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4242
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NORMAN DEVI LEWIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4648
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
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TRUMAN LEVI LEWIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Charleston.
Richard M. Gergel, District
Judge. (2:12-cr-00507-RMG-1; 2:12-cr-00507-RMG-3)
Submitted:
April 30, 2015
Decided:
May 12, 2015
Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jessica Salvini, SALVINI & BENNETT, LLC, Greenville, South
Carolina; Louis H. Lang, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants.
William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, James Hunter May, Winston Holliday,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Truman
health-care
Lewis
(“Truman”)
appeal
(“Norman”)
Levi
their
convictions
fraud,
in
violation
of
and
for
18
Norman
Devi
Lewis
to
commit
conspiracy
U.S.C.
§§
1347,
1349
(2012), four counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1343,
1349,
2
(2012),
and
conspiracy
to
commit
money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h), 1957(a), 2,
(2012),
based
on
their
company’s
overbilling
Truman also appeals his 120-month sentence.
of
Medicaid.
Truman argues that
the district court erred by excluding a certain audio recording,
by finding the evidence sufficient to support his convictions,
by denying his motions for a new trial based on these issues,
and by enhancing his sentence for obstruction of justice based
on his trial testimony. *
Norman argues that the district court
∗
Counsel also purports to raise the following issues
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967):
(1) whether the district court reversibly erred by denying
Truman’s motion to sever; (2) whether the district court erred
by denying Truman’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motions because no
witness made an in-court identification of him; (3) whether the
district court erred by denying Truman’s motions for a new trial
based on the denial of the motion to sever, the denial of a
motion to suppress, a lack of adequate time to review the jury
panel, and ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) whether the
district
court
reversibly
erred
by
overruling
Truman’s
objections to the facts presented at sentencing, the loss
amount, and the leadership-role enhancement, and by ordering
restitution in the amount it did; (5) whether trial counsel was
ineffective; and (6) whether the district court reversibly erred
by denying Truman’s motion to stay forfeiture pending appeal.
(Continued)
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erred by failing to order a second competency evaluation and by
refusing to allow him to represent himself.
We affirm.
I.
Truman
first
argues
that
the
district
court
erred
by
refusing to admit an audio recording of a meeting at which he
reached
“We
an
review
administrative
a
trial
settlement
court’s
rulings
with
on
certain
the
officials.
admissibility
of
evidence for abuse of discretion, and we will only overturn an
evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and irrational.”
United
States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
To the extent Truman challenges the
district court’s ruling that the recording would not be admitted
in its entirety, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion because the recording contained numerous
Anders applies only when “counsel finds his case to be
wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it.” 386
U.S. at 744 (emphasis added). Because Truman’s attorney is able
to raise nonfrivolous issues on appeal, Anders does not permit
her to brief frivolous issues simply because her client so
requests.
Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1983)
(holding that Anders does not mean that “appellate counsel must
raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the client”). While
a defendant “has the ultimate authority to make certain
fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead
guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take
an appeal,” the decision regarding which issues to raise on
appeal lies solely with the professional judgment of counsel.
Id. at 751.
Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, we have
reviewed each of the issues purportedly submitted pursuant to
Anders and conclude that they are without merit.
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inadmissible
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hearsay
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statements
by
Truman.
Moreover,
the
district court allowed Truman to request permission to present
specific facts and statements from the recording.
fact
that
excluded
Truman
is
cites
the
fact
on
of
appeal
the
conclude that
the
district
irrationally
in
excluding
as
having
been
administrative
court
did
not
evidence
of
The only such
improperly
settlement.
act
arbitrarily
this
We
or
settlement,
especially in light of the court’s decision to allow Truman to
testify
regarding
the
general
nature
of
the
meeting.
Accordingly, Truman is entitled to no relief on his evidentiary
claim.
Next,
denying
Truman
his
Rule
argues
29
that
the
motions
district
because
there
court
was
erred
by
insufficient
evidence that he possessed the requisite criminal intent for his
offenses.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a
Rule 29 motion.
Cir. 2015).
United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th
Where, as here, the motion was based on a claim of
insufficient evidence, we will sustain the jury’s verdict “if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it.”
U.S.
60,
80
(1942);
see
Reed,
Glasser v. United States, 315
780
F.3d
at
269-70
(defining
substantial evidence).
The
only
element
of
the
charged
offenses
contests on appeal is the intent requirement.
5
that
Truman
See United States
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v.
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Simpson,
elements
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741
of
F.3d
539,
conspiracy
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to
547,
550
commit
(5th
Cir.)
health-care
(discussing
fraud),
cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2318 (2014); United States v. McLean, 715
F.3d
129,
137-38
offense
substantive
Wynn,
684
(4th
of
F.3d
473,
Cir.
2013)
health-care
477-78
(stating
fraud);
(4th
Cir.
elements
United
2012)
States
(setting
of
v.
forth
elements of wire fraud); United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360,
371 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing elements of conspiracy to commit
money laundering).
the
ample
provide
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that
testimony
Medicaid
that
with
Truman
instructed
information
he
his
knew
employees
was
false
to
was
sufficient for the jury to infer that he intended to deceive
Medicaid and knew that these actions were criminal.
States
v.
Wilson,
115
F.3d
1185,
1189-90
(4th
Cir.
(discussing resolution of conflicting evidence).
the
district
court
did
not
err
in
denying
See United
1997)
Accordingly,
Truman’s
Rule
29
motions.
Truman also argues that the district court erred by denying
his
motions
for
aforementioned
evidence.
a
new
audio
Because
trial
based
recording
the
discretion
in
excluding
sufficient
to
convict
and
district
the
Truman
on
the
court
recording
of
the
the
exclusion
of
the
of
the
abuse
its
evidence
was
offenses,
the
sufficiency
did
and
not
the
charged
district court did not err in denying Truman’s motions for a new
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trial on these bases.
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See United States v. Bartko, 728 F.3d
327, 334 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that appellate court reviews
denial of motion for new trial for abuse of discretion), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1043 (2014).
Finally, Truman argues that the district court erred by
applying
Sentencing
testimony
an
obstruction-of-justice
Guidelines
at
trial.
Manual
We
§ 3C1.1
review
enhancement for clear error.
enhancement
(2012),
the
under
based
imposition
U.S.
on
of
his
this
United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d
540, 560 (4th Cir. 2005).
This enhancement is appropriate if
the defendant gave “false testimony concerning a material matter
with the willful intent to provide false testimony.”
United
States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993); United States v.
Perez, 661 F.3d 189, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing “degree
of specificity Dunnigan requires”).
The district court found that Truman testified falsely that
he was unaware that his employees signed notes falsely stating
that they worked on weekends.
On appeal, Truman argues that his
testimony was not false because he admitted on cross-examination
that he was in charge of the company’s billing.
However, this
general admission does not remedy his prior testimony that he
was unaware of the deceptive notes.
Truman does not challenge
on appeal the district court’s findings that this testimony was
false,
material,
and
made
with
7
the
intent
to
provide
false
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testimony.
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Accordingly,
we
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discern
no
clear
error
in
the
application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.
II.
Norman
order
a
during
first
second
jury
challenges
competency
the
district
evaluation
selection.
In
court’s
based
determining
on
refusal
his
whether
to
behavior
there
is
reasonable cause to order a competency hearing, a trial court
must consider “evidence of irrational behavior, the defendant’s
demeanor
at
trial,
and
defendant’s competence.”
medical
opinions
concerning
the
United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d
583, 592-93 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013).
The fact that an individual
possesses questionable beliefs about the law or makes frivolous
or
nonsensical
legal
arguments
competence to stand trial.
does
not
mean
that
he
lacks
United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d
733, 743 (4th Cir. 2007).
Norman’s psychological report indicated that, although he
had personality disorders and below-average intelligence, he was
competent to stand trial.
1286,
1290
persuasive
doubt
(4th
Cir.
evidence
exists
as
to
on
See United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d
1995)
the
the
quotation marks omitted)).
(“Medical
question
defendant’s
of
opinions
whether
are
a
competence.”
usually
sufficient
(internal
After observing Norman’s behavior,
the district court concluded that he was not delusional but was
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deliberately behaving obstructively.
consistent
with
Norman
Lewis’s
Because this finding was
behavior
and
psychological
report, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion
in
evaluation.
declining
to
conduct
a
second
competency
See Bernard, 708 F.3d at 589-90 (stating standard
of review).
Norman also argues that the district court erred by finding
him
incompetent
to
represent
himself.
The
Sixth
Amendment
guarantees not only the right to be represented by counsel but
also the right to self-representation.
422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
finds
the
defendant
Faretta v. California,
Where, as here, the district court
competent
to
stand
trial,
the
court
may
nevertheless find him incompetent to represent himself at trial
if a mental illness renders him “unable to carry out the basic
tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of
counsel.”
Bernard,
708
F.3d
at
589-90;
accord
Indiana
v.
Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175-76 (2008).
The
district
court
found
that,
although
Norman
was
competent to stand trial, his disordered thinking prevented him
from
personally
managing
evidence in this case.
Norman’s
refusal
to
the
large
amount
of
documentary
This finding was adequately supported by
review
the
documents
presented
by
the
Government or even acknowledge that they formed the evidence in
this case, by the psychological report indicating that he had a
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intelligence,
district court.
discretion
Edwards.
in
and
by
his
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demeanor
as
observed
by
the
Thus, the district court did not abuse its
terminating
Norman’s
self-representation
under
United States v. Barefoot, 754 F.3d 226, 233 (4th
Cir.) (stating standard of review), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 502
(2014).
III.
Because the claims raised on appeal do not warrant relief,
we affirm the judgments of the district court.
We dispense with
oral
legal
contentions
are
before
this
and
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
the
facts
and
materials
court
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
10
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