US v. Charles Naumann
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cr-00829-TLW-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999472069].. [14-4323]
Appeal: 14-4323
Doc: 26
Filed: 11/10/2014
Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4323
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES W. NAUMANN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia.
Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (3:13-cr-00829-TLW-1)
Submitted:
October 29, 2014
Decided:
November 10, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kimberly H. Albro, Research and Writing Specialist, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Jamie
Lea Nabors Schoen, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
Appeal: 14-4323
Doc: 26
Filed: 11/10/2014
Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Charles
agreement,
to
W.
Naumann
failure
to
pled
guilty,
register
under
without
the
Sex
a
plea
Offender
Registration and Notification Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2250(a)
(2012).
The
district
court
sentenced
him
to
a
Guidelines term of imprisonment of thirty-five months and an
above-Guidelines term of supervised release of fifteen years.
Naumann appeals, claiming that his sentence is procedurally and
substantively unreasonable.
In
reviewing
a
We affirm.
district
court’s
sentence,
we
first
determine whether “the district court committed [a] significant
procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider the
[18
U.S.C.]
based
on
§ 3553(a)
clearly
[(2012)]
erroneous
facts,
explain the chosen sentence.”
38, 51 (2007).
factors,
or
selecting
failing
a
to
sentence
adequately
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
If there is no significant procedural error, the
court must then review the sentence imposed, “whether inside,
just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range[,]”
for substantive
reasonableness
discretion standard.”
“under
Id. at 41.
a
deferential
abuse-of-
Substantive reasonableness is
determined by considering “the totality of the circumstances,
including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.”
Id. at 51.
The court “must give due deference to the district
2
Appeal: 14-4323
Doc: 26
Filed: 11/10/2014
Pg: 3 of 6
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify
the extent of the variance,” and the fact that we might have
imposed
a
different
sentence
“is
reversal of the district court.”
Id.
Naumann
failing
to
argues
address
the
that
the
§ 3553(a)
insufficient
district
factors
to
court
when
it
justify
erred
denied
by
his
request for a downward variance.
We conclude that the record
belies
did
his
claim,
and
the
court
adequately
address
the
sentencing factors.
Next,
Naumann
asserts
that
the
district
court
improperly relied on erroneous factual findings to impose an
above-Guidelines term of supervised release.
A court’s factual
findings at sentencing must be supported by the preponderance of
the evidence and will be reversed only for clear error.
United
States v. Grubbs, 585 F.3d 793, 798-99, 803 (4th Cir. 2009).
First, Naumann argues that the district court erroneously relied
on a disputed Facebook post without finding it reliable.
Any
perceived error in this regard is harmless, however, because the
district court did not rely the Facebook post when delivering
Naumann’s sentence.
See United States v. Juarez-Gomez, 750 F.3d
379,
Cir.
379
(4th
2014)
(In
reviewing
sentencing
determinations, we “must reverse if we find error, unless we can
conclude that the error was harmless.”).
3
Appeal: 14-4323
Doc: 26
Filed: 11/10/2014
Naumann
also
Pg: 4 of 6
argues
that
the
district
court
erroneously found that he previously failed to register as a sex
offender.
Although
the
district
court
did
misspeak
by
referencing Naumann’s past failures to register, in view of the
entirety of the court’s discussion, we conclude that the court
was alluding to part of the conduct underlying the offense of
conviction.
Naumann further asserts that the district court erred
by failing to explain why it imposed certain special conditions
of supervision.
While the need to explain the chosen sentence
includes any special conditions of supervised release, United
States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009), here the
sentencing transcript reveals that the district court adequately
explained
its
reasons.
Accordingly,
Naumann’s
sentence
is
procedurally reasonable.
Naumann also claims that the length of his term of
supervised release is substantively unreasonable, alleging that
the district court based its decision to vary upward solely on
other cases and not on an individualized assessment of his case.
This assertion is contradicted by the record, which shows that,
while the district court relied on precedent in determining its
authority
to
vary,
it
properly
conducted
an
assessment before selecting a variance sentence.
4
individualized
Appeal: 14-4323
Doc: 26
Filed: 11/10/2014
Pg: 5 of 6
Naumann next argues that the district court improperly
relied
upon
the
severity
of
his
offense
and
the
need
for
punishment under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2012).
Having reviewed the statements cited
by Naumann, we conclude that the district court mentioned the
severity
of
the
offense
consideration
of
Although
district
the
solely
deterrence
with
and
court’s
respect
protection
written
to
of
its
proper
the
public.
of
reasons
statement
supporting the variance briefly cites § 3553(a)(2)(A) as one of
the
factors
statements
district
considered
at
court
the
by
the
sentencing
did
not
district
hearing
improperly
court,
make
it
the
consider
clear
the
court’s
that
need
the
for
punishment in imposing a variance term of supervised release.
Finally,
Naumann
argues
that
the
supervised
release
requirements of mental health treatment and polygraph testing
are substantively unreasonable.
to
these
error.
conditions
at
Because Naumann did not object
sentencing,
we
review
them
for
plain
United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir.
2009); see Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27
(2013) (discussing plain error standard).
stated
that
it
was
imposing
the
mental
The district court
health
treatment
and
polygraph requirements so that experts could determine whether
Naumann needed sex offender treatment.
This court has held that
a twelve-year-old sex offense against a minor does not, standing
5
Appeal: 14-4323
alone,
Doc: 26
justify
Filed: 11/10/2014
special
Pg: 6 of 6
conditions
related
to
sex
offenders.
United States v. Worley, 685 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2012); see
also United States v. Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir.
2013) (distinguishing cases involving recent sex offenses from
cases where sex offenses were more remote).
In this case, the
sex offense was less than five years old, and the district court
did
not
impose
measured
sex
approach
offender
of
having
conditions
Naumann
but
took
monitored
whether sex offender treatment is necessary.
to
the
more
determine
Therefore, any
error in the district court’s imposition of these requirements
was not plain.
Accordingly, we hold that the sentence imposed by the
district court is procedurally and substantively reasonable, and
we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with
oral
legal
contentions
are
before
this
and
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
the
facts
and
materials
court
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?