US v. Bryan Huntley
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 0:13-cr-00555-TLW-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999485008].. [14-4325]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4325
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
BRYAN YARNELL HUNTLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill.
Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (0:13-cr-00555-TLW-1)
Submitted:
October 31, 2014
Decided:
December 2, 2014
Before KING, GREGORY, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kimberly H. Albro, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Jamie Lea Nabors Schoen, Assistant United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Bryan
Yarnell
Huntley
pled
guilty
to
failure
to
register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)
(2012).
In addition to a term of imprisonment, the district
court sentenced Huntley to fifteen years of supervised release.
The court also ordered that Huntley comply with certain special
conditions of supervised release, notably including vocational
training,
substance
abuse
treatment,
and
mental
health
treatment, to include sex offender evaluation and polygraph as
deemed
appeals,
necessary
by
challenging
conditions.
the
mental
only
his
health
evaluator.
supervised
release
Huntley
term
and
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a
deferential
States,
552
abuse
U.S.
of
discretion
38,
51
standard.
(2007).
We
Gall
first
v.
United
review
for
“significant procedural error,” such as improperly calculating
the
Guidelines
range,
inadequately
considering
the
18
U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, and providing insufficient explanation
for the sentence imposed.
575 (4th Cir. 2010).
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
If we find no such procedural error, we
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under
the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at 578.
The sentence
must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the purposes” of sentencing.
2
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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We generally review conditions of supervised release
for abuse of discretion.
407 (4th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Worley, 685 F.3d 404,
However, conditions not challenged by the
defendant in the district court are reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Wesley, 81 F.3d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1996).
establish
district
plain
court
error,
erred,
Huntley
the
must
error
affected his substantial rights.
133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013).
was
demonstrate
plain,
and
that
the
To
the
error
Henderson v. United States,
If these requirements are met, we
will exercise our discretion to correct the error only if it
“seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.”
Id. at 1126-27 (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted).
“District courts have broad latitude with regard to
special
conditions
of
supervised
release
.
.
.
.”
United
States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
The
court
may
impose
any
special
condition that is “reasonably related” to the factors set forth
in
18
U.S.C.
circumstances
§ 3583(d)(1)
of
the
(2012),
offenses
including
and
the
“the
nature
history
and
and
characteristics of the defendant; providing adequate deterrence;
protecting the public from further crimes; and providing the
defendant with training, medical care, or treatment.”
United
States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal
3
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quotation marks and citations omitted).
The condition also must
“‘involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary’
United
to
States
(quoting
18
consistent
achieve
v.
Armel,
U.S.C.
with
the
goals
585
enumerated
F.3d
182,
186
§ 3583(d)(2)
Sentencing
Commission
related to supervised release.
§ 3553(a).”
(4th
(2012)).
the
in
It
Cir.
also
policy
2009)
must
be
statements
Dotson, 324 F.3d at 260-61.
The sentencing court must explain its reasons for the
conditions
it
imposes,
supported
justify those conditions.
by
factual
findings
Armel, 585 F.3d at 186.
that
The court’s
explanation must at least be adequate “to allow for meaningful
appellate
review
sentencing.”
and
to
promote
the
perception
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
of
fair
Nevertheless, those
reasons need not establish “an offense-specific nexus,” as long
as the court’s rationale is adequate to support the condition
imposed in light of the applicable § 3553(a) factors.
685
F.3d
at
407
(4th
Cir.
2012)
(internal
Huntley
first
asserts
Worley,
quotation
marks
omitted).
On
appeal,
that
the
district
court failed to provide adequate reasons to enable appellate
review
or
to
justify
release it imposed.
the
special
conditions
of
supervised
He focuses particularly on the conditions
of substance abuse treatment and mental health treatment with
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sex offender evaluation. 1
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The Guidelines recommend a substance
abuse treatment condition where “the court has reason to believe
that the defendant is an abuser of narcotics, other controlled
substances
or
alcohol.”
U.S.
Sentencing
(“USSG”) § 5D1.3(d)(4) (2013) (p.s.).
health
believe
treatment
that
condition
the
where
defendant
psychiatric treatment.”
is
Manual
It recommends a mental
“the
in
Guidelines
need
court
of
has
reason
to
psychological
or
USSG § 5D1.3(d)(5) (p.s.).
Our review of the record reveals no plain error in the
special
conditions
of
supervised
release.
First,
although
little of the court’s explanation was applicable only to the
supervised release conditions, we find the court’s explanation
of the sentence as a whole was adequate to support appellate
review of all special conditions of supervised release.
We also
conclude that these conditions are reasonably related to the
applicable sentencing factors and involve no greater deprivation
of liberty than reasonably necessary.
Huntley
Springston,
650
analogizes
F.3d
1153
his
(8th
1
case
Cir.
to
2011),
United
vacated
States
on
v.
other
For the first time in reply, Huntley argues that the court
improperly delegated to the probation office the final decision
about whether sex offender treatment was appropriate, thereby
violating the separation of powers principle.
(Reply at 5-6).
This argument is not properly before us.
See United States v.
Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 556 & n.11 (4th Cir. 2008) (deeming claim
raised for first time in reply brief abandoned).
5
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grounds, 132 S. Ct. 1905 (2012) (non delegation challenge to
offense), reissued in relevant part, 534 F. App’x 576 (8th Cir.
2013) (No. 13-1624), in which the court vacated a supervised
release condition requiring the defendant to submit to mental
health counseling, after concluding that the condition was not
sufficiently related to the specific facts of the defendant’s
criminal history or particular offense.
650 F.3d at 1156-57.
The court recognized that a sentencing court is authorized to
impose
a
special
condition
related
to
a
defendant’s
prior
offense, but “may not impose a special condition on all those
found
guilty
of
a
particular
offense,”
as
it
must
“make
a
particularized showing of the need for the condition in each
case.”
while
Id. at 1156 (internal quotation marks omitted).
special
conditions
requiring
mental
health
Thus,
testing
and
treatment—including sex offender treatment as necessary—could be
warranted in certain failure-to-register cases, “such as when
there
is
evidences
reason
to
believe
recalcitrance
and
that
an
the
ongoing
failure
to
proclivity
register
to
commit
sexual crimes,” no such conditions warranted such conditions in
Springston’s case.
Contrary
factors
were
specifically
Id. at 1157.
to
present
referred
Huntley’s
in
to
his
assertions,
case.
Huntley’s
The
numerous
such
additional
sentencing
prior
court
convictions
and violations of his release terms, his multiple failures to
6
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comply
with
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with
sex
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sex
offender
offender
Additionally,
registration,
treatment
Huntley
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had
a
mandated
history
of
and
by
his
the
noncompliance
state
substance
court.
abuse
and
multiple convictions of offenses related to the distribution and
possession of controlled substances.
Based on these facts, we
find the substance abuse and mental health conditions adequately
supported by both the court’s analysis and the record.
See,
e.g., United States v. Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71, 72-75 (1st
Cir. 2013); United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 1139 (11th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Kreitinger, 576 F.3d 500, 505-06
(8th Cir. 2009).
Huntley also asserts that the supervised release term
imposed by the court was procedurally unreasonable because the
court did not calculate the Guidelines range, and thus did not
have an appropriate starting point from which to calculate its
variance
sentence.
In
sentencing
a
defendant,
the
court
is
first required to calculate the applicable Guidelines range, as
this range is to be used as “the starting point and the initial
benchmark” in selecting a sentence.
603
F.3d
omitted).
267,
The
270
(4th
parties
Cir.
United States v. Hernandez,
2010)
agree
that
supervised release is five years.
(internal
the
quotation
appropriate
marks
term
of
See United States v. Segura,
747 F.3d 323, 329-31 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Goodwin,
717 F.3d 511 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 334 (2013).
7
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Because we are satisfied, despite any ambiguity in the court’s
explanation and written statement of reasons, that the court
adopted a Guidelines range of five years, we discern no error
based
on
the
court’s
failure
to
calculate
this
range
before
district
court
determining the extent of its variance.
Huntley
further
asserts
that
the
considered an improper factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A),
and
reasons
not
particular
to
Huntley,
when
imposing
the
sentence, and thus failed to provide an explanation adequate to
justify
the
extent
considering
the
required
“make
to
facts presented.”
of
the
upward
§ 3553(a)
an
variance
factors,
the
individualized
he
received.
sentencing
assessment
be
court
based
on
is
the
United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
may
In
substantively
unreasonable
if
the
court
“A sentence
relies
on
an
improper factor or rejects policies articulated by Congress or
the Sentencing Commission.”
F.3d
375,
omitted).
§ 3553(a)
378
(4th
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445
Cir.
2006)
Additionally,
factors
without
“a
(internal
talismanic
application
to
quotation
recitation
the
of
defendant
marks
the
being
sentenced” is inadequate to support a sentence because it “does
not demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking or provide an adequate
basis for appellate review.”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 329 (4th Cir. 2009).
8
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“The court, in determining whether to include a term
of supervised release, and . . . the length of the term . . . ,
shall
consider
(a)(2)(B),
(a)(7).”
the
factors
(a)(2)(C),
18
set
forth
(a)(2)(D),
U.S.C.
in
(a)(4),
§ 3583(c)
(2012).
section
3553(a)(1),
(a)(5),
Not
(a)(6),
among
and
these
enumerated factors is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which includes “the need
for
the
sentence
.
.
.
to
reflect
the
seriousness
of
the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense.”
in
the
imposed
context
under
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)]
sentence
of
18
However, as we recently concluded
supervised
U.S.C.
§ 3583,
considerations
procedurally
release
“mere
does
unreasonable
not
when
revocation
reference
render
those
a
sentences
to
[the
revocation
factors
are
relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated
§ 3553(a)
factors,”
as
long
as
the
sentence
“predominately on the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors.”
is
not
based
United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 2013). 2
2
Although Huntley claims that Webb is not persuasive
authority because it conflicts with United States v. Crudup, 461
F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006), we find any conflicting language in
Crudup to be dictum and thus not binding on subsequent panels of
this court. See Webb, 738 F.3d at 641 (“[I]n Crudup, we stated,
without analysis or explanation, that a district court is not
permitted to impose a revocation sentence based upon these
omitted conditions.”).
9
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Here,
although
the
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court
relied
in
part
on
the
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in justifying Huntley’s sentence, it did
not
primarily
rely
on
these
factors,
but
instead
explicitly
considered Huntley’s history and characteristics, the need for
deterrence
and
protection
of
the
public,
and
the
need
for
treatment, when selecting the length of his supervised release
term.
Thus,
we
discern
no
procedural
error
in
Huntley’s
sentence.
Turning
to
substantive
reasonableness,
we
conclude
that the court’s explanation adequately supported the extent of
its variance.
and
serious
supervision,
The court specifically cited Huntley’s lengthy
criminal
his
history,
failure
to
his
comply
repeated
with
violations
court-mandated
of
sex
offender treatment, his repeated noncompliance with sex offender
registration requirements, his age, and the circumstances of his
underlying sex offense.
criminal
history
and
The court described at length Huntley’s
the
seriousness
of
that
conduct.
We
conclude this explanation was more than sufficient to justify
the court’s decision to impose a fifteen-year term of supervised
release,
and
was
sufficiently
grounded
in
Huntley’s
personal
circumstances to support the court’s sentence.
Because we discern no abuse of discretion, plain or
otherwise, in Huntley’s supervised release term and conditions,
we affirm the district court’s judgment.
10
We dispense with oral
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argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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