US v. John Watson, Jr.

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cr-00336-TSE-IDD-1. [999622570]. [14-4388]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4388

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN WATSON, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
T. S. Ellis, III, Senior
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00336-TSE-IDD-1)

Argued:

December 11, 2014

Before TRAXLER,
Judges.

Chief

Judge,

Decided:

and

WYNN

and

July 17, 2015

HARRIS,

Circuit

Reversed by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the majority
opinion, in which Judge Wynn joined. Chief Judge Traxler wrote
a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED:
Nicholas John Xenakis, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Julia K.
Martinez, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Michael S. Nachmanoff,
Federal Public Defender, Kenneth P. Troccoli, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, United
States
Attorney,
OFFICE
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
ATTORNEY,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:
Following his arrest for firing a handgun at a Coast Guard
helicopter, appellant John Watson, Jr. (“Watson”), who suffers
from

Delusional

Disorder,

Persecutory

Type,

was

found

incompetent to stand trial and committed to the custody of the
Attorney

General

for

mental

health

treatment

and

evaluation.

After Watson refused to take antipsychotic medication in order
to

render

himself

competent,

the

district

court

granted

government’s request that he be medicated by force.

the

Given the

critical liberty interests at stake, we require the government
to meet a heavy burden to justify forcible medication, and we
require courts to conduct a searching inquiry in order to ensure
that

this

burden

is

met.

In

this

case,

we

conclude,

the

government has not met its burden of proving that involuntary
medication

is

substantially

likely

to

restore

Watson’s

competency, as required by Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003).

Accordingly, we reverse.

I.
“The forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting
person’s body . . . represents a substantial interference with
that person’s liberty.”

Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134

(1992) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).
The interference is “particularly severe” when, as in this case,
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the medication in question is an antipsychotic, Riggins, 504
U.S.

at

134,

for

the

use

of

such

medications

threatens

an

individual’s “mental, as well as physical, integrity,” United
States v. White, 620 F.3d 401, 422 (4th Cir. 2010) (Keenan, J.,
concurring).

On

the

physical

side,

there

is

the

“violence

inherent in forcible medication,” id., compounded when it comes
to antipsychotics by the possibility of “serious, even fatal,
side effects,” Harper, 494 U.S. at 229.
into

a

person’s

mental

state

But it is the invasion

that

truly

distinguishes

antipsychotics, a class of medications expressly intended “to
alter the will and the mind of the subject.”

United States v.

Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 813 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harper, 494
U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
For

those

reasons,

administration

of

deprivation

liberty

of

as

we

have

antipsychotic
in

the

recognized,

medication
most

literal

the

forcible

“constitutes
and

a

fundamental

sense,” Bush, 585 F.3d at 813 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 238
(Stevens,

J.,

concurring

in

part

and

dissenting

in

part)),

justified only by a government interest that rises to the level
of “essential” or “overriding,” Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.
166, 178-79 (2003) (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134, 135).

The

government’s interest in prison safety and security, the Supreme
Court held in Harper, qualifies as such an interest, and may
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justify involuntary medication when an inmate suffering from a
“serious mental illness” is “dangerous to himself or others,”
and “the treatment is in [his] medical interest.”

494 U.S. at

227.
Under certain circumstances, a mentally ill defendant who
is not dangerous to himself or others within the meaning of
Harper

may

nevertheless

be

forcibly

medicated

for

the

purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial.
539 U.S. at 179.

sole

See Sell,

But that is the exception, not the rule.

Forcible medication is not justified every time an incompetent
defendant refuses treatment; on the contrary, “those instances
may be rare.”

Id. at 180.

medication

under

deployed,”

and

orders,

which

“routine.”

Sell

courts
“carry

is

“a

must
an

As we have emphasized, forcible
tool
be

that

vigilant

unsavory

must

not

to

ensure

pedigree,”

do

be

casually

that
not

such

become

United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d 369, 373-74 (4th

Cir. 2013).
To

“minimize[]

the

risk

of

erroneous

decisions

in

this

important context,” we have set a deliberately high standard for
the government to satisfy before it may forcibly medicate solely
to render an inmate competent to stand trial.
814.

Bush, 585 F.3d at

Like other courts of appeals to consider the issue, we

require that the government meet its burden by the “clear and
convincing” standard.

Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Dillon,
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738 F.3d 284, 292 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Holding the government to a
clear and convincing standard of proof affords due regard to the
nature of the liberty interest at stake in forced-medication
cases.”); United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 545 (6th Cir.
2008) (applying clear and convincing standard); United States v.
Gomes, 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004) (same).

That is a heavy

burden, requiring “evidence of such weight that it produces in
the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction,
without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to
be established,” or “evidence that proves the facts at issue to
be highly probable.”

United States v. Heyer, 740 F.3d 284, 292

(4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jimenez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 269
F.3d 439, 450 (4th Cir. 2001)).
In this context, we require that the government prove by
clear and convincing evidence each of four factors.

“First, the

government must show that ‘important governmental interests are
at stake’ and that special circumstances do not sufficiently
mitigate

those

interests.”

Sell, 539 U.S. at 180).
“involuntary

medication

interests,”

which

White,

620

F.3d

at

410

(quoting

Second, the government must show that
.

.

requires

.

significantly

proof

that

the

further[s]

[its]

medication

is

“substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial” and “substantially unlikely to have side effects that
will

interfere

significantly

with
5

the

defendant's

ability

to

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assist counsel at trial.”

Id. (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181)

(internal

omitted).

quotation

medication

must

marks

be

necessary

to

“Third,
further

the
the

involuntary
government's

interests, and less intrusive means must be unlikely to achieve
substantially the same results.”
181).

Id. (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at

Fourth and finally, “the court must conclude that the

administration
patient’s

of

best

condition.”

drugs

medical

is

medically

interests

appropriate

in

light

of

and

[his]

Id. (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 181).

in

the

medical

With this

demanding standard in mind, we now consider whether the district
court properly found that forcible medication is justified in
this case.

United States v. Watson, No. 1:13-cr-366, 2014 WL

1901256, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2014).

II.
A.
On
handgun

September
at

a

28,

Coast

2012,

Guard

Watson

was

helicopter

observed

flying

shooting

overhead.

a

The

helicopter was not damaged, and none of the three Coast Guard
employees on board was injured.
indicted

for

attempted

On August 15, 2013, Watson was

destruction

of

an

aircraft,

18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1), (8); possession of a firearm by a felon,
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and use of a firearm during a crime of
violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
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Days after Watson’s arrest, the magistrate judge granted
the parties’ joint motion for a competency hearing, and Watson
was interviewed by licensed clinical psychologist Dr. Rebecca J.
Peterson (“Peterson”).

Watson told Peterson that he had been a

covert operative for the British special forces since he was
seven years old, that the Coast Guard and Secret Service were
among the government agencies “working to help protect him from
danger and . . . guide him,” that certain “entities . . . ha[d]
‘tapped’ his phones and computer,” and “that someone ha[d] been
on

his

boat

going

through

his

letters

and

papers.”

Watson

further indicated that this delusional system of beliefs had
been guiding his behavior since at least February 2009, when he
arrived

in

protection
Elizabeth’s

the
of

Washington,
the

British

Hospital

(“St.

D.C.,

area

Embassy

in

and

order

was

Elizabeth’s”)

to

seek

the

to

St.

referred

for

mental

health

treatment.
On the basis of this interview, Peterson concluded that
Watson was “unable to participate meaningfully and effectively
in his defense” as a result of his delusions, and in particular
his belief that his status as a covert operative for the United
Kingdom entitles him to diplomatic immunity.

The magistrate

judge agreed, and Watson was transferred to the Federal Medical
Center

in

Butner,

North

Carolina

health evaluation and treatment.
7

(“FMC

Butner”)

for

mental

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Approximately
government
Butner

six

submitted

staff

months

to

the

psychiatrist

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later,

court

Dr.

a

Robert

on

April

report
G.

4,

2013,

completed

Lucking

the

by

FMC

(“Lucking”),

which recommended that Watson be forcibly medicated in order to
render him competent to stand trial.
relies

exclusively

substantial

on

Lucking’s

likelihood

that

Because the government

opinion

forcible

to

show

medication

there
would

is

a

render

Watson competent as required by Sell, we review Lucking’s report
and testimony in some detail.
In

his

report,

Lucking

diagnosed

Watson

with

Delusional

Disorder, Persecutory Type, 1 a rare mental illness characterized
by

“the

presence

of

one

or

more

persist for at least one month.” 2
Watson’s

delusions

had

not

been

nonbizarre

delusions

that

Lucking further reported that
treated

with

antipsychotic

medication at FMC Butner, and that Watson had refused to accept
1

The experts in this case use the terms “Persecutory Type”
and
“Paranoid
Type”
interchangeably.
For
clarity
and
consistency with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, we consistently refer to Watson’s condition as
“Persecutory Type.”
2

A delusion is “nonbizarre” if it involves a situation that
can conceivably occur in real life, such as being followed,
poisoned, infected, conspired against — or, as here, being
recruited to work as a covert operative for a foreign
government.
“Bizarre” delusions, by contrast, are clearly
implausible, not understandable, and not derived from ordinary
life experiences, such as the belief that one’s internal organs
have been removed and replaced by someone else’s organs without
leaving a scar or wound.

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Lucking believed Watson to be neither gravely

disabled nor a danger to himself or other inmates, as would be
required

to

justify

forcible

medication

under

Harper.

Nevertheless, he recommended that Watson be forcibly medicated
with

the

risperidone, 3

antipsychotic

“antipsychotic

medication

is

asserting

substantially

likely

that

to

render

[Watson] competent to stand trial.”
In support of his opinion, Lucking asserted that “there is
extensive support in the psychiatric literature that individuals
with the diagnosis of a psychotic illness obtain substantial
reduction

in

antipsychotic

their

psychotic

medication,”

and

symptoms

when

treated

that

body

of

“a

with

evidence”

supports the related proposition that such individuals “can be
restored

to

medication.”

competency
Lucking

when

also

treated

asserted

with

that

antipsychotic

Watson

had

taken

risperidone during his 2009 admission to St. Elizabeth’s, from
which

Lucking

drew

the

“logical

inference

responded positively to the use” of that drug.

[that

Watson]

However, Lucking

admitted that he did not have the medical records from that

3

The experts in this case use the generic name
“risperidone” and the brand name “Risperdal” interchangeably.
For clarity, we consistently refer to the drug by the generic
name “risperidone.”

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admission, and later testified that he would have recommended
risperidone even if Watson had never received it before.
Finally, during a hearing on the government’s request for
forcible medication, Lucking testified that his past experience
as a psychiatrist supported the use of risperidone.

Lucking

asserted that he had treated approximately ten other patients
suffering

from

medication,

and

Delusional
that

restored to competency.

he

Disorder

“believe[d]

all

with
of

antipsychotic
them”

had

been

Lucking was, however, unable to provide

any further information about the ten other patients, explaining
that he could “not remember details of patients [he] treated
maybe five, six, seven, or eight years ago,” and that it would
in any event be “inappropriate” to share such “treatment [and]
clinical

information”

in

a

public

forum,

“even

with

the

[district court].”
Lucking’s

opinion

regarding

the

efficacy

of

involuntary

medication was challenged on several grounds by the report of
defense expert and licensed psychologist Dr. James H. Hilkey
(“Hilkey”).

With respect to the academic literature, Hilkey

emphasized that “there is little in the literature referencing
well

controlled,

double-blind

research

studies

as

to

the

efficacy of pharmacological treatment of persons suffering from
Delusional Disorders.”

He also pointed out that the studies

that do exist have consistently shown the Persecutory Type of
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the disorder — from which Watson suffers — to be the “most
resistant” to treatment.
With respect to Watson in particular, Hilkey opined that
“[t]he chronic nature of [Watson’s] illness and the fixed, well
established nature of his aberrant thoughts” make his condition
resistant

to

psychological.
treatment

plan

treatment,
He
did

whether

expressed
not

concern

adequately

pharmacological
that

address

the

or

involuntary

Watson’s

“strongly

held beliefs and reported personal experiences with psychotropic
medications,” including “pronounced fears of death,” and opined
that “[f]ailure to compassionately address these fears [would]
only contribute[] to fears of persecution” and thus aggravate
his

condition.

Finally,

Hilkey

indicated

that

it

was

his

“strongly held opinion” that supportive and cognitive behavioral
therapy
could

would
be

“capacity

“increase

sufficiently
to

form

a

the

likelihood

restored,”
degree

of

[Watson’s]

given

Watson’s

therapeutic

competency
apparent

alliance,”

as

demonstrated by his trusting relationship with his attorneys.
B.
On March 7, 2014, the magistrate judge recommended that
Watson be forcibly medicated in order to restore his competency.
Watson, 2014 WL 1901256, at *1, *4.

The magistrate judge’s

findings with respect to the first two Sell factors are relevant
to Watson’s arguments on appeal.
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With respect to the first Sell factor, the magistrate judge
found “that an important government interest is at stake in the
prosecution of the defendant,” rejecting Watson’s argument that
that

interest

was

mitigated

by

“the

possibility

of

affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.”
at *12, *14-15.

an
Id.

In reaching this conclusion, the magistrate

judge assumed that such a defense could constitute a mitigating
special circumstance, but found that Watson had failed to prove
that the defense was “likely [to] be successful” because he had
not proffered expert testimony to that effect.
With

respect

to

the

second

Sell

Id. at *15.

factor,

the

magistrate

judge found that the proposed treatment plan was substantially
likely

to

restore

Watson’s

competency.

To

reach

this

conclusion, the magistrate judge relied entirely on Lucking’s
testimony and report, which, he noted, referenced the academic
literature and the experiences of Lucking’s other patients with
Delusional
Hilkey’s

Disorder.
forensic

Id.

evaluation

The
did

magistrate
not

judge

“undermine”

held

that

Lucking’s

conclusion, solely on the ground that Hilkey’s report nowhere
“directly discredit[ed]” Lucking’s treatment plan.

Id. at *16.

On April 29, 2014, the district court issued a brief order
adopting
judge

the

and

medication.

recommendations

granting

the

and

findings

government’s

of

motion

the
for

Watson, 2014 WL 1901256, at *1, *4.
12

magistrate
involuntary

The order has

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been stayed pending resolution of this appeal.

Order, United

States v. Watson, No. 1:13-cr-366 (E.D. Va. May 27, 2014), ECF
No. 76.

III.
On appeal, Watson challenges the district court’s findings
with respect to the first and second prongs of Sell.

Because we

conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that
the government had met its burden under the second prong of Sell
—

and

in

particular,

its

burden

of

proving,

by

clear

and

convincing evidence, that forcible medication is substantially
likely

to

restore

Watson

to

competence 4

—

we

do

not

decide

whether a possible insanity defense is a special circumstance
that may mitigate the government interest in prosecution, or

4

The dissent objects that this issue is not properly before
us, and that Watson’s argument on appeal is limited to the
district court’s failure to order that the government provide
supportive therapy in addition to forcible medication.
We
respectfully disagree. While it is true that Watson emphasizes
Hilkey’s view that medication “must be combined with supportive
therapy in order to be successful,” he does so only in support
of his ultimate argument: that the only proposed treatment plan
actually before the court “will be unsuccessful,” and that “the
district court’s finding otherwise is clear error.” Watson Br.
26.

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whether the district court otherwise erred in finding that the
government met its burden under the first prong of Sell. 5
A.
We have said that the second Sell factor involves factual
determinations subject to clear error review, see White, 620
F.3d at 410, and we recognize that our role is not to secondguess a district court’s factual findings, see United States v.
Francis, 686 F.3d 265, 273 (4th Cir. 2012).

We are, however,

charged with ensuring that the district court actually makes the
necessary
proper

findings,

legal

and

standard

—

that

it

makes

that

it

asks

them
and

pursuant

answers

questions — in light of the record as a whole.

to

the

the

right

See Jiminez v.

Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 1995) (“We
reverse

a

factual

finding

as

being

clearly

erroneous

if,

‘although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
on

the

entire

evidence

is

left

5

with

the

definite

and

firm

In the decision below, the district court assumed that a
possible insanity defense could be considered in the special
circumstances analysis under the first prong of Sell, see
Watson, 2014 WL 1901256, at *2, as have other courts within this
circuit, see, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 968 F. Supp. 2d
753, 765-66 (E.D. Va. 2013); United States v. Rodman, 446
F. Supp. 2d 487, 496-97 (D.S.C. 2006).
There is, however,
division among the courts of appeals on the question.
Compare
United States v. Morrison, 415 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 2005)
(likely insanity defense diminishes government interest in
trial), with United States v. Mikulich, 732 F.3d 692, 699-701
(6th Cir. 2013) (potential insanity defense does not undermine
government interest).

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conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” (quoting United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948))).
And in this highly sensitive context, governed by the exacting
clear and convincing standard, it is especially important that a
district court consider and contend with substantial evidence
that would undermine the case for forcible medication, and that
it ensure that the government’s burden actually has been met.
See

id.

(clear

“disregard[s]

error

may

substantial

conclusion

contrary

conclusion

“contrary

to

occur

when

a

evidence

that

would

that

to

reached”

the

clear

or

district

militate

otherwise

weight

considered in light of the entire record”).

of

court

the

reaches

a
a

evidence

On the basis of our

review of the entire record, we conclude that the district court
clearly erred in finding that the government had met its burden
of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the proposed
treatment
competency.

is

substantially

likely

to

restore

Watson’s

We further conclude that on the record before us,

that exacting standard cannot be met.
B.
Under the second prong of Sell, the government must prove,
by clear and convincing evidence, that involuntary medication
significantly furthers its interests.
374.

And

as

part

of

that

See Chatmon, 718 F.3d at

showing,

the

government

must

“demonstrat[e] that the proposed treatment plan, as applied to
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this particular defendant, is ‘substantially likely’ to render
the

defendant

competent

to

stand

trial.”

United

States

v.

Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 242 (4th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original).
Merely showing a proposed treatment to be “generally effective”
against

the

defendant’s

meet this burden.

medical

condition

is

insufficient

to

Id. at 241-42; see Bush, 585 F.3d at 816

(“[I]n order to satisfy this second factor of the Sell test, the
government must not only show that a treatment plan works on a
defendant’s type of mental disease in general, but that it is
likely to work on this defendant in particular.”) (emphasis in
original); see also United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684,
700

(9th

Cir.

2010)

(finding

this

burden

unmet

where

the

government’s “experts rely on generalities and fail to apply
their views to [the defendant’s] condition with specificity”).
Instead, the government must “relate the proposed treatment plan
to

the

individual

defendant’s

particular

medical

condition,”

Evans, 404 F.3d at 242, which requires consideration of factors
specific to the defendant in question, including not only his
medical condition, but also his age and the nature and duration
of his delusions, see id. at 241.
What is missing from the proceedings below is any finding
assessing

the

likely

success

of

the

government’s

proposed

treatment plan in relation to Watson’s particular condition and
particular

circumstances.

The
16

district

court

did

find

that

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record

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convincingly

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reflects

satisfied” the second prong of Sell.
at *3.

that

the

government

has

Watson, 2014 WL 1901256,

But nothing in the district court’s decision indicates

that it actually considered whether the evidence proffered by
the

government

sufficiently

medical situation.

addressed

Watson’s

particular

Rather, the district court appears to have

concluded that the “substantially likely” requirement had been
met

merely

because

Lucking

testified

that

it

was.

See

id.

(finding that government had shown involuntary medication to be
“substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial” because “Lucking . . . testified that the treatment plan
he designed for defendant . . . satisfies these requirements”).
And if we go behind the district court’s order to the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, the result is no better:

In

adopting Lucking’s conclusion, the magistrate judge pointed for
support only to Lucking’s reliance on the academic literature
and

his

experience

with

his

own

patients,

see

id.

at

*15,

neither of which bears on Watson’s particular medical condition
or circumstances.
It is critical that in evaluating the government’s case for
forcible

medication

under

Sell,

courts

engage

in

the

proper

inquiry: not whether a proposed treatment plan is likely to work
in general, but whether it is likely to work as applied to a
particular defendant.

Permitting the government to meet its
17

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burden

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through

generalized

Pg: 18 of 79

evidence

alone

would

effectively

allow it to prevail in every case involving the same condition
or course of treatment.
are

obligated

exceptional

to

to

See Evans, 404 F.3d at 241.

ensure

warrant

that

the

a

given

case

extraordinary

is

Because we

“sufficiently

measure

medication,” we cannot permit such deference here.

of

forcible

White, 620

F.3d at 413; see also Evans, 404 F.3d at 241.
C.
In this case, the requirement that the court assess the
efficacy

of

antipsychotics

as

applied

“with

specificity”

to

Watson’s circumstances, Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 700, is more
than a formality.

The district court’s failure to look beyond

Lucking’s conclusory assertion that the government’s burden had
been met is problematic precisely because there is a near total
absence

of

evidence

in

Lucking’s

report

or

testimony

that

“relate[s] the proposed treatment plan to [Watson’s] particular
medical condition.”
case,

in

other

Evans, 404 F.3d at 242.

words,

where

the

district

This is not a

court’s

failure

to

properly synthesize or distill the evidence is harmless because
we can see for ourselves that the government has met its burden
under

the

virtually
entirety

second

Sell

nothing

in

of

the

prong.

On

Lucking’s

government’s

the

report
case

—

contrary:
or
that

There

testimony
is

—

is
the

sufficiently

specific to Watson that it could satisfy the government’s burden
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of showing that Watson is substantially likely to be rendered
competent by forcible medication, let alone meet the rigorous
clear and convincing standard. 6
Lucking, for example, argues that risperidone is likely to
restore Watson’s competency because “there is extensive support
in

the

psychiatric

literature

that

individuals

with

the

diagnosis of a psychotic illness obtain substantial reduction in
their

psychotic

medication.”

In

symptoms
other

when

words,

treated
he

with

asserts:

antipsychotic

(1) antipsychotic

medication effectively treats psychotic symptoms; (2) Watson has
psychotic symptoms; (3) therefore, antipsychotic medication will
effectively
(Lucking

treat

his

testifying

psychotic

that

Watson

symptoms.
“has

a

See

also

J.A.

75

psychotic

symptom;

therefore, he needs treatment with an antipsychotic”).

This is

exactly the kind of nonspecific, syllogistic reasoning we deemed
insufficient in Evans, see 404 F.3d at 241, and it has not
become any more persuasive over time.

6

The dissent takes the position that the only question
before us is whether the district court properly synthesized the
record evidence, and not whether that evidence supports the
district court’s holding.
In our view, however, those issues
are so closely interrelated in the context of this case that we
are justified in addressing them together. As Watson argues on
appeal, the district court’s synthesis errors matter precisely
because the evidence that the proposed treatment plan will
succeed is so thin.

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The insubstantiality of that reasoning is exacerbated here
by the weaknesses in the studies actually cited in Lucking’s
report.

For

one

thing,

many

of

those

studies

concern

the

efficacy of antipsychotics in general, rather than risperidone
in particular, against psychotic illness in general, rather than
Delusional Disorder in particular.
(discounting
experience

and

probative

value

expertise,”

Cf. White, 620 F.3d at 421
of

where

doctor’s

doctor’s

“professional

“area

of

[was] schizophrenia, not delusional disorders”).

expertise

Because they

do not address the specifics of either the proposed treatment
plan or Watson’s condition, these studies cannot satisfy the
government’s burden of “relat[ing] the proposed treatment plan
to

the

individual

defendant’s

particular

medical

condition.”

Evans, 404 F.3d at 242.
Moreover, the cited studies that do specifically address
Delusional Disorder are equivocal at best.

One study, Lucking

reports, finds a positive response to medication in fewer than
half of the cases reviewed, while another places the positive
response rate at less than 15%.

Still another study identifies

Watson’s particular condition — the Persecutory Type — as having
an especially “poor response rate (50% improvement rate with no
reported

complete

recovery).”

The

one

study

cited

by

the

government that does unequivocally support the involuntary use
of

antipsychotic

medication

to
20

restore

the

competency

of

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defendants with the Persecutory Type of Delusional Disorder is,
by its own terms, vulnerable to “bias[] in favor of finding a
positive response to treatment” due to its experimental design.
Byron

L.

Treatment

Herbel
for

Delusional

&

Hans

Competency

Disorder,

Stelmach,

Involuntary

Restoration

35

J.

Am.

of

Acad.

22

Medication

Defendants

Psychiatry

L.

With

47,

58

(2007).
This is not to say that these and other studies mentioned
in Lucking’s report are of no evidentiary weight at all.

They

fairly

that

could

antipsychotic

be

understood

medication

Disorder in general.

to

may

provide

some

be

effective

evidence

against

Delusional

But standing alone, without explanation or

analysis applying their findings to Watson as an individual, we
do

not

believe

they

can

provide

the

requisite

clear

and

convincing proof that the forcible injection of risperidone is
substantially likely to succeed in treating Watson’s specific
persecutory delusions.

Cf. Evans, 404 F.3d at 241-42 (finding

government report inadequate to prove that proposed treatment
plan

was

“substantially

likely”

to

restore

defendant’s

competency where it stated only that “such medication is the
‘primary’ way to treat Schizophrenia” and “nowhere addressed”
defendant’s individual concerns).
Lucking’s testimony regarding his past experience treating
patients with Delusional Disorder also fails to take account of
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Watson’s

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particular

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condition

and

circumstances.

The

experiences of similar patients treated with antipsychotics of
course

could

be

relevant

to

Watson

specifically

—

but

here,

Lucking was unable to provide any information demonstrating that
his patients in fact were similarly situated to Watson.

There

is, for instance, no evidence that they suffered from the same
type

of

Delusional

Disorder,

that

they

received

the

same

medication, that the medication was administered involuntarily,
or that their delusions were meaningfully similar in nature and
persistence.

Indeed, Lucking indicated that he was unable to

recall any information about these patients, testifying that he
could “not remember details of patients [he] treated maybe five,
six, seven, or eight years ago,” and that it would, in any case,
be

“inappropriate

to

share

other

people’s

treatment

[and]

clinical information,” “even with the [district court].”
without

information

relating

his

patients’

experiences

But
to

Watson’s own circumstances, that data set is just another form
of generalized evidence.
Nor do we think this gap can be filled with evidence that
is particularized to Watson but goes to an entirely different
question:

not

whether

forcible

medication

is

substantially

likely to render Watson competent to stand trial, but whether it
is

substantially

unlikely

to

have

side

effects

interfere with his ability to assist counsel.
22

that

will

Those are two

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separate and independent showings, each of which the government
must make under Sell’s second prong, 539 U.S. at 181, by clear
and convincing evidence, see Bush, 585 F.3d at 815; one cannot
substitute for the other.
must

be

made

government]

“with

seeks

to

And as we have held, both showings

respect

to

medicate

the

particular

defendant

involuntarily,”

id.

at

[the

815-16,

with the same “exacting focus on the personal characteristics of
the

individual

defendant

and

the

particular

drugs

the

[g]overnment seeks to administer,” id. at 816 (quoting United
States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 240 n.5 (4th Cir. 2006)).
In

this

case,

however,

individualized

analysis

counterproductive
highlights
analysis

its
of

while

side
failure

the

the

of

Watson’s

effects
to

likelihood

government

from

provide
that

does

provide

vulnerability

risperidone,
comparable

risperidone

that

an
to

only

individualized
will

actually

succeed in rendering Watson competent.
Finally, Lucking himself undermines the one section of his
report that purports to explain why risperidone was recommended
for Watson in particular.

In that section, Lucking asserts that

risperidone is likely to be effective because Watson was treated
with risperidone during his 2009 admission to St. Elizabeth’s.
The report itself qualifies this assertion in at least two ways:
It admits that Lucking had not reviewed the hospital records
from that admission, and also that the mere fact that Watson
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“was treated and released” by St. Elizabeth’s constitutes only
“indirect

evidence

medication.”

of

a

positive

response

to

antipsychotic

More importantly, the assertion was deprived of

significance during an April 30, 2013, hearing on the motion for
involuntary medication, when Lucking admitted that he would have
recommended risperidone even if he learned that Watson had never
taken

it

before.

As

Lucking

made

clear,

his

recommendation

rested not on any individualized assessment of Watson, but on
the belief that “antipsychotics are the treatment of choice for
psychotic

symptoms”

—

the

same

nonspecific,

reasoning we have previously rejected.

syllogistic

See Evans, 404 F.3d at

241.
D.
We are concerned here not only with the deficiencies in the
government’s affirmative case for forcible medication, but also
with

the

substantial

questions

raised

about

the

government’s

proposed treatment plan by Hilkey — questions never addressed by
the magistrate judge or district court.

As we have recognized,

careful scrutiny by courts of proposed forcible administration
of antipsychotics is necessary to minimize the risk of error
where such important liberty interests are at stake.
585

F.3d

at

consideration

814.
of

any

That

scrutiny

substantial

24

and

necessarily
credible

See Bush,
requires

evidence

that

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undermines the case for forcible medication.

But there is no

indication that such consideration occurred here.
The magistrate judge and district court did not examine and
then reject the concerns raised by Hilkey in his report, making
subsidiary

factual

normal deference.

determinations

to

which

we

would

owe

the

Instead, they summarily disregarded Hilkey’s

report in its entirety, solely because Hilkey failed to state
expressly that the proposed treatment plan would not succeed.
Watson,

2014

WL

1901256,

at

*3,

*16

(“As

the

Report

and

Recommendation correctly notes, defendant’s medical expert, Dr.
Hilkey, did not state in his report that Dr. Lucking’s plan will
not succeed.”).

But it is the government’s burden to prove, by

clear and convincing evidence, that its proposed treatment plan
is “substantially likely to render [Watson] competent to stand
trial,” White, 620 F.3d at 410 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 181),
and not Watson’s burden to prove that it is not.
And
district

by

perfunctorily

court

here

disregarding

excluded

from

Hilkey’s

consideration

report,

the

significant

evidence that does indeed call into question whether forcible
medication

is

competency.

likely

to

“succeed”

by

restoring

Watson’s

For example, Hilkey disputes Lucking’s reading of

the scientific literature, asserting that “little is known about
[Delusional
and

that

Disorder]

what

compared

research

does

to

other

exist

as

25

psychotic
to

disorders,”

Delusional

Disorder

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indicates that individuals suffering from the Persecutory Type
are “most resistant” to treatment.

Hilkey’s objections to the

scientific literature on the use of antipsychotic medication to
treat Delusional Disorder are particularly concerning in light
of Lucking’s heavy reliance on this research in his own report
and the magistrate judge’s second-order reliance on the same
research.

Yet these concerns are barely acknowledged, let alone

adequately addressed, in the district court order.
The

decisions

consideration
persecutory
treatment.

to

below

also

Hilkey’s

delusions

are

failed

concern

that

especially

to

give

adequate

Watson’s

unlikely

to

particular
respond

to

Hilkey opines that: (1) due to “[t]he chronic nature

of [Watson’s] illness and the fixed, well established nature of
his

aberrant

thoughts,”

Watson’s

condition

is

likely

to

be

“resistant to change,” and (2) without supportive therapy to
address Watson’s “strongly held beliefs and reported personal
experiences
pronounced

with
fears

psychotropic
of

death,”

medications,”

involuntary

which

treatment

contribute[] to [Watson’s] fears of persecution.”

“include

will

“only

Those are

exactly the kind of individualized concerns that we have said
must be addressed by the government in order to meet its burden
of proving that the proposed treatment is substantially likely
to restore the defendant’s competency, see Evans, 404 F.3d at
241

(finding

second-factor

burden
26

unmet

where

government

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“nowhere addressed [the defense expert’s] concern that Evans’s
delusions
longer

of

governmental

than

40

years

conspiracies

[would]

resist

that

ha[d]

involuntary

persisted
medication

precisely because the government administers the medication”) —
and yet they were summarily dismissed by the district court, see
Watson, 2014 WL 1901256, at *2-3, *16.
E.
In sum, the district court in this case did not undertake
the searching and individualized assessment of Watson’s likely
susceptibility to forcible medication that is required by our
case law.

It took the government at its word when it argued

that the requirements of Sell had been met, without considering
whether

the

government

had

produced

evidence

“relat[ing]

the

proposed treatment plan to the individual defendant’s particular
medical condition.”

Evans, 404 F.3d at 242.

This failure to

apply the proper legal standard exacerbated the district court’s
apparent failure to consider the concerns raised by Hilkey’s
report, which did relate to Watson specifically.

See Chatmon,

718 F.3d at 376 (finding clear error where the district court
failed to “offer some reason why it did not” credit contrary
arguments).

Perhaps as a result of these errors of synthesis,

the district court overlooked the issue lying at the heart of
this

case:

treatment

the
is

meagerness
substantially

of

the
likely

27

evidence
to

that

restore

forcible
Watson’s

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competency, when his particular medical situation is taken into
account — especially as evaluated under the requisite clear and
convincing standard of proof.
Any one of these problems would raise questions under the
clear error standard of review, whether for misapprehension of
the

relevant

legal

standard,

failure

to

consider

contrary

evidence, or reaching a conclusion against the clear weight of
the record.
enough

to

See Jiminez, 57 F.3d at 379.
say

that

cumulatively,

they

In this case, it is
leave

us

with

“the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,”
Francis, 686 F.3d at 273 (quoting United States v. Hall, 664
F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2012)), in a context where the costs of
error are exceedingly high.

We therefore hold that the district

court clearly erred in finding that the government has met its
burden

of

proving

by

clear

and

convincing

evidence

—

i.e.,

evidence of a sufficient weight to produce a “firm belief or
conviction,

without

hesitancy,

as

to

the

truth

of

the

allegations sought to be established,” Heyer, 740 F.3d at 292 —
“that the proposed treatment plan, as applied to this particular
defendant,

is

‘substantially

likely’

to

render

the

defendant

competent to stand trial,” Evans, 404 F.3d at 242 (emphasis in
original).
We further conclude that this is the rare case in which a
remand is inappropriate because “the record permits only one
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resolution of the factual issue”: that this burden cannot be
met.

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 (1982); see,

e.g., Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d at 696 (declining to remand where
“[t]here

is

no

explanation

that

the

court

could

provide

on

remand and no findings consistent with the record before us that
would

allow

us

to

conclude

that

the

government

burden under the second Sell factor”).

has

met

its

In Bush, 585 F.3d at

817, 818, and Evans, 404 F.3d at 242-43, we remanded rather than
reversing
forced

after

finding

medication

under

the

record

Sell.

insufficient

But

in

to

those

support

cases,

we

articulated new legal standards, Bush, 585 F.3d at 817; Evans,
404 F.3d at 241-42, and our remands, at least in part, afforded
the parties their first opportunities to present evidence and
make arguments under those standards.

The standard we apply

today, by contrast, was established over ten years ago in Evans,
and we believe that the government has had ample opportunity to
assemble and defend the evidence necessary to meet it.
Because the government must prove that it has satisfied
each of the four Sell prongs before it may forcibly medicate a
defendant, we need not reach Watson’s remaining arguments to
conclude

that

the

government

medication in this case.

29

has

not

justified

forcible

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IV.
Accordingly, the order of the district court is
REVERSED.

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TRAXLER, Chief Judge, dissenting:
The

district

involuntarily

court

medicate

granted
John

competency to stand trial.

the

Watson

government’s
in

order

petition

to

restore

to
his

The majority reverses that order,

concluding that the government’s evidence was insufficient to
prove that the proposed treatment plan was substantially likely
to render Watson competent.
not

challenge

the

In his appeal, however, Watson does

sufficiency

of

the

government’s

establishing the necessity of medication.
that

the

district

court

erred

by

not

evidence

Instead, he argues
requiring

supportive

therapy in addition to medication, which Watson contends would
increase the likelihood that he would be restored to competency.
This court generally does not address issues not raised by the
parties, and I believe it inappropriate in this case for the
majority to reverse the district court on an issue raised sua
sponte, particularly without giving the government notice of the
change in issues or an opportunity to address it.

If the issue

were properly before us, however, I would find the evidence in
the record sufficient to support the district court’s order.
As

to

the

issues

actually

raised

by

Watson,

I

conclude

that, as to one narrow issue, the district court failed to make
the necessary findings.
this

circumstance

is

However, I believe the proper course in
to

vacate

31

and

remand

for

additional

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findings,

Filed: 07/17/2015

not

simply

reverse

Pg: 32 of 79

the

district

court

outright.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I.
When seeking to involuntarily medicate a defendant for the
purpose

of

restoring

his

competency

to

stand

trial,

the

government must establish four factors by clear and convincing
evidence.

See

Sell

v.

United

States,

539

U.S.

166,

180-81

(2003); United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d 806, 813-14 (4th Cir.
2009).

First,

the

government

must

prove

that

“important

governmental interests are at stake” that are not mitigated by
“[s]pecial circumstances.”

Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.

Second, the

government must establish that forced medication “significantly
further[s]”

the

government’s

interests

because

it

is

“substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial” and “substantially unlikely” to have side effects that
would undermine the fairness of a trial.

Id. at 181.

Third, it

must show that forced medication is “necessary to further” the
government’s

interests

unlikely

achieve

to

because

“less

substantially

the

intrusive
same

means

results.”

are
Id.

Fourth, the government must prove that the administration of the
requested drug is “medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s
best medical interest in light of his medical condition.”

Id.

To carry its burden under Sell, the government must submit
a proposed treatment plan specifying the particular drug and
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dosage it intends to administer.

See United States v. Evans,

404 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005).

For the treatment plan to

satisfy the requirements of the second factor, the government
must show that the plan relates
to the individual defendant’s particular medical
condition.
In
other
words,
the
government,
considering all of the particular characteristics of
the
individual
defendant
relevant
to
such
a
determination, must first show that the treatment plan
will significantly further its interests.
It must do
so by demonstrating that the proposed treatment plan,
as
applied
to
this
particular
defendant,
is
substantially likely to render the defendant competent
to stand trial and substantially unlikely to produce
side effects so significant as to interfere with the
defendant’s ability to assist counsel in preparing a
defense.
Id.

at

242

(first

emphasis

added;

footnote

and

internal

quotation marks omitted).
The question posed by the first Sell factor is a legal one,
and we therefore review the district court’s ultimate answer de
novo and any subsidiary factual determinations for clear error.
The remaining three factors pose factual questions subject to
clear error review.

See United States v. White, 620 F.3d 401,

410 (4th Cir. 2010).
Clear error, of course, is a very deferential standard.

“A

court reviewing for clear error may not reverse a lower court’s
finding of fact simply because it would have decided the case
differently.
entire

Rather, a reviewing court must ask whether, on the

evidence,

it

is

left
33

with

the

definite

and

firm

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conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

United States v.

Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted).

“If the district court’s account

of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in
its

entirety,

the

court

of

appeals

may

not

reverse

it

even

though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact,
it would have weighed the evidence differently.”

Anderson v.

City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).

“In cases

in which a district court’s factual findings turn on assessments
of witness credibility or the weighing of conflicting evidence
during a bench trial, such findings are entitled to even greater
deference.”

Helton v. AT & T, Inc., 709 F.3d 343, 350 (4th Cir.

2013).
II.
Given the fact-bound nature of this appeal, I will first
summarize the primary evidence before the district court:

the

report and testimony of Dr. Robert Lucking, the government’s
expert witness and staff psychiatrist at the Federal Medical
Center in Butner, North Carolina, the facility where Watson is
housed;

a

study

by

Byron

L.

Herbel

and

Hans

Stelmach

(the

“Herbel Study”) 1 that was relied upon by Lucking; and the report

1

See Byron L. Herbel & Hans Stelmach, Involuntary
Medication Treatment for Competency Restoration of 22 Defendants
With Delusional Disorder, 35 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 47
34

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of

Doc: 33

Dr.

Filed: 07/17/2015

James

Hilkey,

a

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psychologist

who

served

as

Watson’s

expert witness.
A.
Dr.

Lucking

submitted

a

report

detailing

his

views

and

testified at the two Sell hearings conducted by the magistrate
judge.

In his report, Lucking diagnosed Watson as suffering

from delusional disorder, paranoid (or persecutory) type and a
“substantial thought disorder.”

J.A. 357.

Lucking described

the nature of delusional disorder and stated his opinion that
Watson

was

incompetent

to

stand

trial

because

his

“paranoid

delusional beliefs” prevented Watson from “understand[ing] the
nature

and

prevented
Lucking

consequences
him

from

stated

probability

Mr.

his

of

the

proceedings

assisting

his

opinion

that

Watson’s

attorney.

competency

there
can

treatment with an antipsychotic medication.
Lucking

explained

that

against
J.A.

was
be

a

him”
359,

and
360.

“substantial

restored”

through

J.A. 376.

antipsychotic

medications

can

restore the competency of those with active psychotic illnesses,
and

he

summarized

principle.

various

studies

supporting

this

general

As to delusional disorder more specifically, Lucking

(2007). The Herbel Study was submitted to the district court as
part of Watson’s opposition to the government’s petition.

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noted in his report that “[p]ast opinion of the treatment of
delusional

disorder

pessimistic.

with

antipsychotic

medication

was

The prevailing opinion was that only a fraction of

individuals with delusional disorder would respond to treatment
(approximately
explained,

10%).”

however,

J.A.

that

371

“more

(emphasis

recent

added).

literature

Lucking

indicates

a

significantly better response rate,” J.A. 372, and he summarized
those more recent studies, which included several with rates of
successful

treatment

(i.e.,

symptoms) 2 exceeding 75%.
“no

double-blind

full

or

partial

remission

of

Lucking acknowledged that there are

placebo-controlled

or

non-blinded

placebo-

controlled trials in the literature related to the treatment of
delusional

disorder,”

and

that

the

more

recent

literature

involved case studies, which yield “lower quality” evidence than
the evidence obtained through placebo-controlled trials.
372.

J.A.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, Lucking believed the

more recent studies “indicate delusional disorder can be treated
effectively with antipsychotic medication.”

2

J.A. 374.

Lucking explained that “it is generally psychotic symptoms
which render an individual incompetent,” and that “the fewer
psychotic symptoms present, and the less intense the symptoms,
the more likely that individual is to be competent. Therefore,
even a partial response to antipsychotic medication can result
in a restoration of competency.” J.A. 370.

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The

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report

explained

second-generation

the

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difference

between

drugs

noted

antipsychotic

and

first-

that

and

second-

generation antipsychotics “are considered to be the first line
treatment for psychotic conditions due to [their] less onerous
side effect profile.”
antipsychotic

J.A. 376.

medications

The report discussed the three

that

could

be

administered

involuntarily and noted that risperidone is the only secondgeneration antipsychotic that could practicably be administered
involuntarily.

Lucking stated in the report that Watson had

previously

admitted

been

to

a

hospital

where he was treated with risperidone.

in

Washington,

D.C.,

Lucking inferred from

the fact that Watson was released from the hospital that he
responded positively to the drug, and his treatment plan for
Watson recommended the use of risperidone.
Lucking’s

report

antipsychotic

would

stated

not

that

produce

side

treatment
effects

with
that

an
would

interfere with Watson’s ability to assist his attorney; that
Watson

had

no

underlying

disease

that

would

preclude

the

standard treatment of any side effects or make him susceptible
to particular side effects; that risperidone would not interact
with any of the other medications prescribed for Watson; and
that Watson had no “underlying medical illness or conditions
which would preclude or be worsened by the use of antipsychotic
medication.”

J.A. 375.
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the

Lucking

In

report,

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explained

that

no

less-intrusive

treatments were likely to achieve the same results as treatment
with risperidone.
beneficial

as

While acknowledging that psychotherapy can be

an

adjunct

to

treatment

with

antipsychotics,

Lucking noted that there is “no evidence that psychotherapeutic
techniques alone are effective alternatives for treatment with
antipsychotic agents.”

J.A. 375 (emphasis added).

Lucking also

indicated that therapy would not succeed in this case because
Watson does not understand that he has a mental illness, does
not believe he needs treatment, and would not participate in any
form of therapy.
During the Sell hearings held before the magistrate judge,
Lucking testified about the matters set out in his report and
reiterated his views that Watson’s delusional disorder rendered
him

incompetent

antipsychotic

to

medication

Watson’s competency.
“[o]n

an

disorder

stand

successfully. 3

was

and

that

substantially

treatment
likely

to

with

an

restore

Lucking also testified that he had treated

involuntary
patients

trial

with

J.A. 32.

basis”

approximately

antipsychotic

ten

medication,

delusionalall

of

them

Lucking’s testimony also elaborated on

3

The majority questions whether Lucking’s testimony
establishes that the ten patients were treated involuntarily.
In my view, it clearly does. See J.A. 32 (“Q. How many patients
suffering from delusional disorder have you treated with
antipsychotic medication? A. On an involuntary basis, it’s not
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the position expressed in the report that therapy would not be
helpful

for

disorders

Watson.

and

Lucking

delusions

explained

respond

that

positively

because
to

thought

antipsychotic

medications but are not helped by therapy, he did not believe
therapy would be effective to restore Watson’s competency to
stand trial.
Although Lucking’s report recommended risperidone because
Watson

had

previously

been

treated

with

it

and

apparently

responded positively to it, Lucking testified at the hearing
that he would recommend risperidone even if Watson had never
taken the drug.

As Lucking explained,

[t]he reason the risperidone was chosen is because we
are very limited.
The fact that he had received it
before is a fraction of the reason for choosing that
medication.
That medication is chosen, one, because
it’s appropriate to treat his delusional disorder;
two, the side effects are more tolerable than ones
from the 1st generation; the medicine is effective;
and I use it a lot, and I get [a] good response [to]
it. The fact that he had been on it is not the main
reason I chose it for the treatment plan.
J.A.

64-65;

see

also

J.A.

76

(“[C]linically,

I

believe

[risperidone] is the best choice for treatment at this point in
time for Mr. Watson.”).

a lot of them because many of them – it’s a rather rare disorder
that you don’t see very often. So probably somewhere around ten
patients over the course of my career here I've treated with
antipsychotics.” (emphasis added)).

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B.
Dr.

James

Hilkey,

Watson’s

expert

witness,

prepared

a

report after interviewing Watson for nearly ten hours over the
course of four separate interviews.

Hilkey agreed that Watson

was suffering from delusional disorder, persecutory type, and
that Watson was incompetent to stand trial.
Hilkey’s report confirmed that Watson had been previously
treated with risperidone during an inpatient hospital stay.

The

hospital records reviewed by Hilkey noted that Watson had an
adverse reaction to higher dosages of lithium but mentioned no
adverse

reaction

Hilkey

that

to

he

the

was

risperidone.

“terrified”

of

Watson,
the

however,

side

told

effects

of

antipsychotic medications and that he had “severe reactions” to
the single dose of risperidone he took under court order.
381.

In

Hilkey’s

view,

Watson’s

fears

about

the

“interfaced with his conspiratorial belief system.”
As

to

treatment

“pharmacological
efficacious

than

Schizophrenia.”

with

treatment
with
Id.

antipsychotics,
of

Delusional

typical

psychotic

Hilkey

J.A.

medication

Id.
stated

Disorders

[is]

disorder[s]

that
less

such

as

Hilkey noted the “paucity of controlled,

double-blind studies on treatment of individuals with delusional
disorders,” id., and observed that the “existing studies” show
that the persecutory type of the delusional disorder is the most
resistant to treatment, J.A. 382.
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Hilkey

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had

pharmacological
that

“[t]he

“some

question

treatment

chronic

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with

nature

Mr.

of

Mr.

about

the

Watson,”

efficacy

J.A.

Watson’s

383,

illness

of

noting

and

the

fixed, well established nature of his aberrant thoughts make
response

to

treatment

(pharmacological

resistant to change,” J.A. 383.

and

psychological)

However, Hilkey never directly

stated an opinion on the likely success of the treatment plan
proposed by Lucking.

Hilkey instead focused on the need for

“[s]upportive therapy,” which “has been shown to be an effective
treatment.”

J.A. 382.

As Hilkey explained,

[t]he general goals of supportive therapy are to
facilitate the treatment adherence and develop a
therapeutic alliance, to provide education about the
disorder, to improve social skills (i.e. not talking
about delusional systems in social places) and to
manage
behavioral
and
psychological
problems
associated with the delusions.
This is a slow
process; failure to offer this type of supportive
treatment in lieu of more aggressive therapy only
reinforces the established fears that characterize
persecutory delusional disorders.
J.A. 382-83 (footnote omitted).
beliefs

and

medications

reported
to

personal

include

Given Watson’s “strongly held
experiences

pronounced

fears

with
of

psychotropic

death,”

Hilkey

believed that “any treatment approach be it pharmacological or
psychological must be offered in a supportive manner designed to
mitigate the fears of the individual being treated.

Failure to

compassionately address these fears only contributes to fears of
persecution.” J.A. 383.

In Hilkey’s view, Watson’s relationship
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with his attorneys showed his ability to form some degree of the
“therapeutic
Hilkey
increase

alliance”

“strongly
the

restored.”

required

believed”

likelihood

for

that

his

therapy

to

supportive

competency

succeed,

therapy

could

be

and

“could

sufficiently

J.A. 384.
C.

The Herbel Study reported findings from an evaluation of
the case files of twenty-two men involuntarily medicated at FMCButner, the same facility where Watson is housed and Dr. Lucking
works.
suffered

Of the twenty-two cases studied, sixteen of the patients
from

delusional
persecutory

delusional

disorder,
and

disorder,

grandiose

grandiose

persecutory

type;

type.

and

Overall,

type;

five

one

were

seventeen

had

mixed
of

the

twenty-two patients (77%) were reported restored to competency.
And of the sixteen patients diagnosed with delusional disorder,
persecutory

type,

eleven

competency.

Of

the

competency,

one

was

five

(69%)

were

patients

mixed

type

who
and

reported
were
the

not
other

restored

to

restored
four

to

were

persecutory type.
The information reviewed was sufficient in nineteen cases
for the authors of the Herbel Study to determine how long before
treatment the symptoms had begun.

The symptoms had been present

for five years or less for nine patients, seven of whom were
restored to competency.

Six patients had had symptoms for seven
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to ten years, and all six of those patients were restored to
competency.

Of the four patients who were symptomatic for a

much longer period of time (thirteen to twenty-four years), only
one was restored to competency. 4
The study reported that seven patients were restored to
competency within six weeks of beginning treatment, but that the
other ten who were restored to competency did not shows signs of
improvement until undergoing at least three months of continuous
treatment, and that some of the patients required five months of
treatment

before

regaining

competency.

The

authors

thus

recommended treatment trials of at least four months, and noted
that

many

previous

medication trials.
of

medication

in

studies

involved

significantly

shorter

In the authors’ view, the too-short duration
the

previous

studies

provided

a

“plausible

explanation” for the incorrect “conventional wisdom that these
patients

are

medication.”
“empirically

refractory
J.A.

to

147;

see

unsupported”

the

treatment
also

with

J.A.

opinion

141

antipsychotic
(describing

asserted

in

as

forensic

psychiatric literature that “Delusional Disorder is notoriously
treatment resistant”).

4

The evidence in the record establishes that Watson had
been suffering from delusions since 2008 or 2009.
Thus, when
the district court issued its order in April 2014, Watson had
been suffering from the disorder for five to six years.

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The authors noted that some experts have expressed concern
that patients whose core delusion involves a belief that they
are

victims

of

a

governmental

conspiracy

were

not

likely

to

respond to forced medication “‘precisely because the government
administers the medication.’”

J.A. 149 (quoting United States

v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005)).
two

cases

studied,

sixteen

had

delusions

As to the twentyof

governmental

persecution, eleven of whom (65%) were restored to competency;
the five patients who were not restored to competency all had
such delusions.

In light of that data, the authors concluded

that “the presence of delusions involving themes of persecution
by

the

same

medication

government

does

not

appear

nonresponse to treatment.”
The

authors

that

noted

to

is

implementing

be

a

useful

study

was

involuntary
predictor

of

J.A. 149.

that

their

subject

to

the

“usual limitations” inherent in “retrospective inpatient chart
review,”

including

the

“lack

of

standardized

clinical

assessments with rating scales and diagnostic instruments, as
well as lack of interrater reliability studies.”

Id.

Because

of those limitations,
some patients may have been misdiagnosed and wrongly
included or excluded from this study population.
Standard research methods to reduce bias, such as
random assortment to assigned treatment groups, the
use of a placebo control group, and blinded outcome
measures, were not possible in this study.
Without
these
safeguards, the
opinions
of
the
forensic
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examiners may have been biased in favor of finding a
positive response to treatment.
J.A. 149-50.

The authors, however, also pointed out a strength

of the study:
[T]he patient cohort was selected in a real-world
manner by criminal prosecution, after which they were
assessed and involuntarily treated in a real-world
manner at a forensic mental health facility. The main
contribution of this study was the observation of
treatment
response
in
patients
with
delusional
disorder who, in contrast to the usual protocols in
community research studies, were not permitted to drop
out of treatment.
That 10 of the 17 patients who
responded
to
treatment
required
continuous
antipsychotic treatment for at least three months, and
some up to five months, was unexpected.
This result
provides a plausible explanation for the presumed
refractory nature of delusional disorder symptoms.
The real obstacle to a positive treatment response in
delusional
disorder
may
not
be
the
intrinsic
biological features of the illness, but may instead be
the difficulties in convincing these patients to
adhere to an adequate trial of medication.
J.A. 150 (emphasis added).
III.
When

considering

whether

the

government’s

proposed

treatment plan was “substantially likely to render the defendant
competent to stand trial,” Sell, 539 U.S. at 181, the district
court concluded that Dr. Hilkey strongly recommended supportive
therapy but that he never opined that medication alone would not
restore Watson’s competency.
the

district

court’s

On appeal, Watson contends that

analysis

reflects

understanding of Hilkey’s testimony.

45

a

clearly

erroneous

See Brief of Appellant at

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2 (“[T]he district court clearly err[ed] by misunderstanding the
opinion of the defense expert about the necessity of holistic
treatment.”); id. at 25 (“The district court’s misunderstanding
of

Dr.

Hilkey’s

Acknowledging

conclusions

that

Hilkey

constitutes

never

clear

directly

error.”).

stated

that

the

proposed treatment plan would not work, Watson contends that
when Hilkey’s report is considered in its entirety, its meaning
is clear:

“Dr. Hilkey does not disagree with Dr. Lucking that

Mr. Watson should be medicated.

To the contrary, Dr. Hilkey

agrees that medication is necessary, but it must be combined
with supportive therapy in order to be successful.”
Appellant at 24.

Brief of

Watson thus argues the district court clearly

erred by misinterpreting Hilkey’s report and by not requiring
the

government

to

provide

supportive

therapy

as

part

of

the

treatment plan.
Rather than focusing on the need for supportive therapy,
however, the majority reverses the district court’s order after
concluding

that

the

government’s

evidence

was

insufficiently

related to Watson himself and his particular medical condition,
and

that

insufficient

the
to

government’s
carry

its

“generalized”

burden

of

proof

evidence

under

Sell.

was
See

Majority Op. at 2 (“[T]he government has not met its burden of
proving that involuntary medication is substantially likely to
restore Watson’s competency . . . .”); id. at 17-18 (“Permitting
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the government to meet its burden through generalized evidence
alone

would

effectively

allow

it

to

prevail

in

every

case

involving the same condition or course of treatment.”).
A challenge to the overall sufficiency of the evidence,
however, is very different from a challenge to the sufficiency
of

the

district

court’s

distillation

of

the

evidence.

A

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence asks whether there
is any plausible view of the evidence that supports the district
court’s

decision.

See

Anderson,

470

U.S.

at

573-74;

United

States v. Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 545 (4th Cir. 2013); see also
VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 283 (3d
Cir. 2014) (“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it is
completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some
hue

of

credibility

or

bears

no

rational

data.”

relationship

(internal

to

quotation

the

supportive

evidentiary

marks

omitted)).

A challenge to sufficiency of the district court’s

distillation of the evidence, however, asks whether the district
court as factfinder properly “synthesize[d] the evidence in a
manner that accounts for conflicting evidence or the gaps in a
party’s evidentiary presentation.”
147,

164

(2d

Cir.

2004)

Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d

(Sotomayor,

Circuit

Judge);

accord

Miller v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 720 F.2d 356, 361 (4th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that clear error may be found where “the findings
under

review

.

.

.

were

made
47

without

properly

taking

into

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account substantial evidence to the contrary”).

An insufficient

distillation of the evidence is an error that can be corrected
by the district court, through an order on remand that considers
all

evidence

and

properly

accounts

for

contrary

evidence.

Insufficient evidence, by contrast, cannot be corrected by the
district

court

--

insufficient

evidence

is

insufficient,

regardless of the thoroughness of the order evaluating it.
In

this

case,

Watson

simply

does

sufficiency of the government’s evidence.

not

challenge

the

Watson does not argue

on appeal that the government’s evidence, standing alone, was
insufficient
contend

that

to
the

satisfy

the

Sell

government’s

requirements,

evidence

was

individualized to him and his condition.

not

nor

does

he

sufficiently

Instead, by arguing

that the district court failed to grasp the import of Hilkey’s
report,

Watson

is

challenging

only

the

district

court’s

synthesis of the evidence, not the existence of the evidence.
Indeed, Watson’s argument that Hilkey’s report establishes the
need for medication and supportive therapy effectively concedes
that the record contains evidence sufficient to establish that
Watson’s competency can be restored.
Thus, without acknowledging what it is doing, the majority
disregards the argument actually made by Watson and resolves the
appeal

on

an

entirely

different

basis

involving

an

entirely

different kind of error -- the government’s failure to carry its
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burden of proof, rather than the district court’s failure to
properly synthesize the evidence. 5
district

court’s

order

without

Moreover, by reversing the
remanding,

the

majority

is

granting relief that no one has sought, as Watson does not seek
a reversal, but instead asks this court to vacate and remand for
further proceedings. 6
It is well-settled that this court may affirm a district
court’s order on any basis appearing in the record.

See, e.g.,

Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 n.5 (1982) (“[A]n appellee may
rely upon any matter appearing in the record in support of the
judgment below.”); Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 137
(4th Cir. 2003) (“We are, of course, entitled to affirm on any
ground appearing in the record, including theories not relied
5

While the majority does note some deficiencies in the
district court’s order and briefly mentions the cumulative
effect of the errors it identifies, the opinion nonetheless
makes it clear that the majority is reversing for insufficient
evidence.
See Majority Op. at 2 (“In this case, we conclude,
the government has not met its burden of proving that
involuntary medication is substantially likely to restore
Watson’s competency.”); id. at 25 (“We therefore hold that the
district court clearly erred in finding that the government has
met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, . .
. that the proposed treatment plan, as applied to this
particular defendant, is substantially likely to render the
defendant competent to stand trial.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
6

Although Watson’s opening and reply briefs ask us to
vacate without mentioning remand, counsel made clear at oral
argument that Watson is asking us to vacate the district court’s
order and remand for further proceedings.

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upon or rejected by the district court.”).

When it comes to

reversing a district court’s order, however, our discretion is
much more constrained.
consider

As a general rule, this court does not

non-jurisdictional

issues

that

are

not

properly

presented in an appellant’s opening brief, see, e.g., SuarezValenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2013), much
less issues that the appellant never even attempts to raise.
While we have the power to address issues not raised by the
appellant, see A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore Cnty, 515 F.3d
356, 369 (4th Cir. 2008), we do not exercise that power in civil
cases

unless

the

issue

“establishes

fundamental

error

or

a

denial of fundamental justice,” In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276,
285-86 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7
The majority does not contend that the error it identifies
rises to the level of a fundamental error, nor does it otherwise
attempt to explain why the facts of this case justify such a
departure from our settled practice.

This court should not be

in the business of re-writing the parties’ briefs and raising
7

Of course, “[w]hen an issue or claim is properly before
the court,” a reviewing court “is not limited to the particular
legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the
independent power to identify and apply the proper construction
of governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S.
90, 99 (1991) (emphasis added). This rule has no application in
this case because Watson does not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence, and the sufficiency issue thus is not properly
before this court.

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issues

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we

challenge

Filed: 07/17/2015

think
the

they

should

sufficiency

of

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have

raised.

the

Watson

evidence

on

does

appeal,

not

and

I

believe it is improper in this case for the majority to reverse
the

district

sponte,

court

particularly

on

an

where

issue
the

the

majority

government

has

has

raised

been

given

sua
no

notice of the change in the direction of this appeal nor an
opportunity to address the issue the majority finds dispositive.
IV.
As discussed above, I do not believe the sufficiency-ofthe-evidence question is properly before us.

But if it were, I

would disagree with the majority’s analysis.

In my view, the

evidence before the district court was sufficient to support the
court’s

factual

determination

that

involuntary

medication

was

“substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand
trial.”

Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
A.

In

finding

the

government’s

evidence

insufficient,

the

majority focuses on our requirement that the government “show
that a treatment plan works on a defendant’s type of mental
disease in general, [and] that it is likely to work on this
defendant in particular.”

Bush, 585 F.3d at 816.

To show the

appropriate consideration of the defendant “as an individual,”
Evans, 404 F.3d at 240, the evidence must establish that the
experts recommending involuntary medication “actually considered
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[the defendant’s] particular mental and physical condition in
reaching

[their]

report,

fairly

consideration

conclusions,”
read,

of

is

Watson

id.

In

replete

himself

my

view,

Lucking’s

with

and

evidence

of

his

particular

his

medical

condition.
According
analysis

to

the

justifying

“(1) antipsychotic
symptoms;

(2)

antipsychotic
symptoms,”

majority,

the

has

medication

an

analysis

Lucking

entirety

treatment

effectively

psychotic

will
the

syllogistic reasoning.”
While

proposed

medication

Watson

the

symptoms;

effectively

majority

note

in

plan
treats

rejects

his

Lucking’s
was

that

psychotic

(3) therefore,

treat

Majority Op. at 19.

did

of

his

as

psychotic

“nonspecific,

I disagree.

report

that

“there

is

extensive support in the psychiatric literature that individuals
with the diagnosis of a psychotic illness obtain substantial
reduction

in

their

psychotic

symptoms

when

treated

with

antipsychotic medication,” J.A. 369, that was not the entirety
of his analysis when recommending medication.

Lucking’s report

discussed delusional disorder in general, but also described how
the

disorder

presented

Watson’s delusions.

itself

in

Watson

and

the

nature

of

Lucking considered the general efficacy of

antipsychotic medications on psychotic illnesses generally, but
he

then

went

medications

on

on

to

consider

Watson’s

the

specific
52

efficacy

condition

of
by

antipsychotic
discussing

the

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limited

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scientific

Pg: 53 of 79

literature

addressing

the

treatment

of

delusional disorder, acknowledging studies to the contrary, but
noting that the more recent literature shows a high rate of
improvement in response to medication.
report

indicates,

response

rate

restored

to

whose

with

patients
require.

Herbel

patients

competency)

delusions

Watson’s. 8
plan

by

the

had

Study

with

and

persisted

shows

the

high

Indeed, as Lucking’s
high

persecutory

response

for

a

treatment

subtype

(69%

rates

by

patients

approximately

as

long

as

Lucking therefore supported his proposed treatment
scientific
suffering

literature

from

involving

Watson’s

similarly

specific

situated

disorder,

as

we

See Bush, 585 F.3d at 816 (concluding that Herbel

Study did not “relate[] to the particular circumstances” of the
defendant with 13-year history of untreated persecutory type of
delusional disorder, because Herbel Study showed 25% recovery
rate

for

defendants

with

“duration

of

untreated

psychosis

greater than 13 years”); White, 620 F.3d at 421 (finding Herbel
Study to be of “limited assistance” in case involving female
defendant suffering from grandiose type of delusional disorder

8

As noted, Watson had been delusional for five or six years
prior to the district court’s ruling.
Nine patients in the
Herbel Study had been symptomatic for five years or less, seven
of whom (77%) were restored to competency.
Six patients been
symptomatic for seven to ten years before treatment, all of whom
(100%) were restored to competency.

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because Herbel Study involved male defendants, only one of whom
had the grandiose form of the disorder).
In addition, Lucking considered whether Watson was taking
medication

that

would

adversely

interact

with

his

proposed

treatment or had other medical conditions that would place him
at special risk for developing the more serious side effects or
preclude the standard treatment for managing any side effects.
Lucking also considered Watson’s beliefs about himself and his
illness when concluding that therapy would not be beneficial.
Cf.

Bush,

inadequate
diabetes

585

F.3d

where
without

it

at

818

(finding

recommended

acknowledging

proposed

medication

that

treatment
that

defendant

can

had

plan
cause

diabetes,

addressing how the medications would affect his diabetes, or
outlining a plan for controlling his condition).
And

after

considering

all

the

circumstances,

Lucking

determined, in his expert opinion, that treating Watson with
risperidone was substantially likely to restore his competence.
As Lucking explained, it was the delusional beliefs that were
rendering Watson incompetent, and risperidone
produces
beneficial
clinical
effects
such
as
decreasing delusional beliefs. . . .
By decreasing
delusional beliefs this decreases the influence they
have on decisions, judgements, and perceptions.
This
will allow Mr. Watson to make reasonable, rational,
reality based decisions regarding the processing of
his legal charges.
By decreasing delusional beliefs
and
restoring
more
normal
thought
processes,

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risperidone can improve the level
between the client and his attorney.
J.A. 369.

of

communication

Given the amount of detailed information contained in

Lucking’s report and testimony, I fail to understand how the
majority

can

reject

Lucking’s

analysis

as

“nonspecific,

syllogistic reasoning.”
The

majority

contends

that

its

rejection

of

Lucking’s

evidence is warranted because his report and testimony failed to
relate[] the proposed treatment plan to Watson’s
particular medical condition. . . .
There is
virtually nothing in Lucking’s report or testimony . .
. that is sufficiently specific to Watson that it
could satisfy the government’s burden of showing that
Watson
is
substantially
likely
to
be
rendered
competent by forcible medication, let alone meet the
rigorous clear and convincing standard.
Majority
finds

Op.

the

at

17-18

(emphasis

government’s

added).

evidence

While

insufficiently

the

majority

specific,

it

provides no concrete example of how the evidence is inadequate
or

what

other

information

should

have

been

presented.

The

closest the majority comes to actually identifying the perceived
deficiencies

is

its

connect

the

proposed

medical

condition

but

suggestion

that

the

treatment

plan

“not

also

duration of his delusions.”

[to]

his

age

evidence
only
and

[to
the

failed

to

Watson’s]
nature

and

Majority Op. at 16.

As recounted above, however, the evidence in the record
does precisely that.

The government’s evidence addresses the

efficacy of involuntary treatment of those with the persecutory
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form

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of

delusional

condition.”
Study,

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shows

disorder,

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which

is

Watson’s

“medical

The government’s evidence, particularly the Herbel
success

in

treating

the

persecutory

subtype

of

delusional disorder and thus addresses the “nature” of Watson’s
delusions.

The

Herbel

Study

likewise

shows

success

in

involuntarily treated defendants whose delusions have persisted
approximately

as

long

as

Watson’s,

thus

addressing

the

“duration” of Watson’s illness. 9
While the majority contends that the district court did not
explicitly address questions raised by Dr. Hilkey about whether
Watson’s

“particular

persecutory

delusions”

would

respond

to

medication, Majority Op. at 26, a failure by the district court
to address a given issue cannot be equated to a failure of
proof.

The evidence presented by the government provided bases

for the district court to conclude, despite the questions raised
by Hilkey, that the government’s proposed treatment plan was
substantially likely to restore Watson’s competency.

Given the

wealth of information showing the government’s consideration of
9

As to age, the record shows that the government properly
recorded and reported Watson’s age in the relevant forms and
reports. Beyond the possible connection of age to the duration
of symptoms, however, there is nothing in the record suggesting
that a patient’s age is relevant to issues in this case.
That
is, nothing in the record suggests, for example, that older
patients are more prone to suffer from the side effects of
antipsychotics, or that patients of a particular age
are more
or less responsive to antipsychotic drugs.

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Watson’s specific diagnosed psychological condition as well as
his

physical

condition,

the

majority’s

rejection

of

the

government’s evidence simply cannot be squared with our highly
deferential standard of review.
B.
The majority draws support for its conclusion on Lucking’s
testimony at the Sell hearing that he would have recommended
risperidone

for

taken it.

In the majority’s view, this testimony shows that

Lucking’s

Watson

whether

recommendation

or

“rested

not

not

Watson

on

had

any

previously

individualized

assessment of Watson, but on the belief that ‘antipsychotics are
the

treatment

of

choice

for

psychotic

symptoms’

--

the

same

nonspecific, syllogistic reasoning we have previously rejected.”
Majority Op. at 24.
Lucking’s risperidone recommendation was based on Lucking’s
belief that Watson had previously taken it without incident and,
as

discussed

particular
Watson

was

above,

disorder
taking,

on

an

individualized

affecting
and

Watson,

whether

assessment

the

Watson

other

had

of

the

medications

any

underlying

conditions that would cause or complicate the treatment of any
side effects.
relying

on

Moreover, Lucking reached his recommendation by

studies

involving

treatment

from Watson’s specific disorder.
therefore

based

on

a

patients

suffering

Lucking’s recommendation was

consideration
57

of

of

Watson’s

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diagnosis and physical condition.
generalized

reasons

negate

individualized

the

to

That Lucking also had more

risperidone 10

chose

aspects

of

does

Lucking’s

not

somehow

analysis

and

render it insufficient as a matter of law.
C.
The majority also suggests that the government’s evidence
is insufficient because the academic literature relied upon by
Lucking

does

not

“bear[]

on

Watson’s

particular

medical

condition or circumstances,” Majority Op. at 17, and because of
“weaknesses” the majority perceives in the studies that support
Lucking’s conclusions, id. at 20.

Again, I disagree.

1.
As noted by the majority, not all of the studies cited in
Lucking’s

report

specifically

delusional

disorder,

addressing

delusional

and

not

disorder

address

the

all

those

show

of
a

treatment by a majority of the patients.

positive

treatment

of

specifically
response

to

Nonetheless, Lucking’s

report discusses several studies, including the Herbel Study,
that provide clear support for the use of antipsychotic drugs in
the

treatment

of

delusional

disorder

10

generally

and

more

As Lucking’s report and testimony established, secondgeneration antipsychotics are preferred over first-generation
antipsychotics because of their less-severe side-effect profile,
and risperidone is the only second-generation medication that
can practicably be administered involuntarily.

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specifically in the treatment of the persecutory form of the
disorder. 11
While

the

studies

that

discuss

the

general

efficacy

of

antipsychotics in the treatment of psychotic illnesses may not
bear on Watson’s particular medical condition, I am perplexed by
the

majority’s

claim

Watson’s condition.

that

the

other

studies

do

not

bear

on

The issue in this case is whether Watson,

who suffers from delusional disorder, should be involuntarily
treated

with

antipsychotic

medication.

Lucking

relied

on

literature addressing the treatment of delusional disorder with
antipsychotic

medication,

including

11

the

Herbel

Study,

which

As the majority concedes, the Herbel Study “unequivocally
support[s] the involuntary use of antipsychotic medication to
restore the competency of defendants with the Persecutory Type
of Delusional Disorder.” Majority Op. at 20-21. In addition to
the Herbel Study, Lucking’s report discusses a 1995 article
reviewing 209 cases of delusional disorder being treated with
antipsychotics, which determined that 53% of the patients fully
recovered, 28% partially recovered, and 20% did not improve.
While there is no indication of how many of the patients
suffered from the persecutory form of the disorder, the study
revealed that “[t]reatment was positive regardless of delusional
content,” J.A 372 (emphasis added), thus indicating that the
persecutory form of the disorder is no less responsive to
medication.
And since the record establishes that “even a
partial response to antipsychotic medication can result in a
restoration of competency,” J.A. 370, the study’s 81% full-orpartial recovery rate clearly supports Lucking’s opinion that
delusional
disorder
can
be
successfully
treated
with
antipsychotics.
Lucking’s report also discusses a 2006 study
involving eleven patients with delusional disorder, ten of whom
had a complete remission of symptoms after being treated with a
first-generation antipsychotic.

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studied

the

medication
from

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efficacy

to

in

restore

delusional

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the

the

prison

context

competency

disorder.

The

of

of

involuntary

defendants

scientific

suffering

literature

thus

directly addresses Watson’s specific condition and was properly
relied on by Lucking and the district court.

Indeed, if these

studies do not bear on Watson’s particular medical condition, it
seems unlikely that any academic literature short of a paper
devoted entirely to the treatment of the actual defendant in
question

would

“bearing”

on

meet
an

the

majority’s

incompetent

unexplained

defendant’s

standard

particular

for

medical

condition.
2.
More troubling than the majority’s claim that the academic
literature

does

not

bear

on

Watson’s

particular

condition,

however, is the majority’s failure to give any weight to the
supportive

studies

when

determining

evidence before the district court.
the

Herbel

government’s

Study

provides

proposed

the

of

the

The majority concedes that

unequivocal

treatment

sufficiency

plan,

but

support
it

for

the

dismisses

that

study as “vulnerable to bias in favor of finding a positive
response

to

treatment.”

internal

quotation

marks

Majority
omitted).

Op.

at
The

21

(alteration

majority

does

and
not

mention the other supportive studies, presumably because of the
unidentified “weaknesses” perceived by the majority.
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The majority’s treatment of these studies, particularly its
rejection of the Herbel Study, fails to respect the limited role
of an appellate court applying clear-error review.

The question

in this case is not whether the majority itself is persuaded by
Dr. Lucking and the studies he relied on, but whether there is
any plausible view of the record that clearly and convincingly
establishes the propriety of the proposed treatment plan.
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573–74.

See

And when answering that question,

we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government, the prevailing party.
Antone,

742

F.3d

151,

155

n.1

(4th

See United States v.
Cir.

2014)

(reviewing

district court’s order finding defendant subject to indefinite
civil commitment as a sexually violent predator).
As

noted

above,

Lucking’s

concluded

that

delusional

subtype,

can

be

report

disorder,

successfully

discussed

including

treated

studies

the

with

that

persecutory

antipsychotic

medications, and he also discussed studies reaching the opposite
conclusion.

The

district

court

was

thus

presented

with

conflicting evidence about the efficacy of treating delusional
disorder

with

antipsychotic

medications,

a

conflict

that

the

court implicitly, but nonetheless undeniably, resolved in the
government’s

favor.

And

under

our

standard

of

review,

this

court is obliged to defer to the district court’s resolution of
the conflict.

See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 (explaining that
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deference to district court’s factual findings is required “even
when the district court’s findings do not rest on credibility
determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary
evidence or inferences from other facts”).
Rather

than

treating

the

positive

studies

as

evidence

supporting the proposed treatment plan, however, the majority
treats

the

conflict

factfinding.

The

in

the

majority

evidence
weighs

as

the

an

opportunity

conflicting

for

scientific

literature and declares it “equivocal,” and then rejects the
equivocal evidence as insufficient to support Lucking’s opinion.
This

approach

court,

“for

is
our

inconsistent

with

our

function

not

to

is

presented to the district court.”

role

as

reweigh

a

reviewing

the

evidence

United States v. Charleston

County, 365 F.3d 341, 349 (4th Cir. 2004); see Ceraso v. Motiva
Enters., LLC, 326 F.3d 303, 316 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The weight of
the evidence is not a ground for reversal on appeal, and the
fact that there may have been evidence to support an inference
contrary to that drawn by the trial court does not mean that the
findings are clearly erroneous.” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, the majority’s specific criticism of the Herbel
Study -- that it is vulnerable to bias -- provides no basis for
removing
equation.

the
As

Study
noted

from
above,

the
the

sufficiency-of-the-evidence
authors

of

the

Herbel

Study

acknowledged that “[s]tandard research methods to reduce bias,
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such as random assortment to assigned treatment groups, the use
of a placebo control group, and blinded outcome measures, were
not possible” given that the study consisted of a “retrospective
inpatient

chart

review.”

J.A.

149-50.

These

criticisms,

however, could be levelled against all of the studies, positive
or negative, addressing the treatment of delusional disorder.
As the record makes clear, delusional disorder is very rare, and
there

are

no

medication

controlled

to

treat

studies

delusional

of

the

use

disorder,

of

antipsychotic

only

case

studies,

which yield “lower quality” evidence than do controlled studies.
Notwithstanding

the

limitations

inherent

in

the

limited

available scientific literature, both Dr. Lucking and Dr. Hilkey
relied

on

the

conclusions.

available

literature

when

reaching

their

There is no evidence in the record raising any

question about the propriety of that reliance, nor is there any
other

evidence

that

otherwise

would

permit

us

to

reject

the

Herbel Study or the other studies supporting Lucking’s position
and

exclude

them

from

consideration

when

evaluating

the

sufficiency of the evidence.
The majority suggests that the supportive studies would be
entitled

to

some

evidentiary

weight

if

there

had

been

some

“explanation or analysis applying their findings to Watson as an
individual.”

Majority

Op.

at

21.

However,

all

of

the

information necessary to apply to the findings of these studies
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to Watson is found in Lucking’s report, which makes it clear
that the studies involved the use of antipsychotic medications
to treat those suffering from delusional disorder, including the
persecutory subtype of the disorder.

Lucking’s report does not

use impenetrable scientific jargon when describing the studies,
and the district court was thus more than capable of reading
Lucking’s
various

report

studies

and

drawing

discussed

in

its
the

own

conclusions

report.

See,

about

e.g.,

the

United

States v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289, 1293 (4th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that where the district court acts as factfinder, “the judge
weighs

the

evidence,

determines

the

credibility

of

the

witnesses, and finds the facts . . . [and] may select among
conflicting inferences to be drawn from the testimony”).

While

it perhaps would have been helpful if Lucking had explicitly
testified

that

the

studies

addressed

the

very

condition

affecting Watson, his failure to do so cannot be grounds for
reversal when that information was otherwise presented to the
district court.
When
Lucking’s

the

scientific

report

and

evidence

testimony

is

and

considered

viewed

in

along

the

with

light

most

favorable to the government, see Antone, 742 F.3d at 155 n.1, I
believe

that

evidence

is

sufficient

court’s order.

64

to

support

the

district

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D.
To the extent the majority’s real complaint is that the
government’s

evidence

is

not

compelling

enough

to

constitute

clear and convincing evidence as a matter of law, then I again
disagree.
Evidence crosses the clear and convincing threshold if it
is “of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of
fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the
truth of the allegations sought to be established, and, as well,
as

evidence

probable.”

that

proves

the

facts

at

issue

to

be

highly

Springer, 715 F.3d at 538 (internal quotation marks

omitted).
In my view, a factfinder could reasonably find the Herbel
Study more compelling and its conclusions more persuasive than
the earlier studies questioning the efficacy of medication for
delusional disorder.

As previously noted, ten of the seventeen

Herbel-Study patients restored to competency took three months
or longer to respond to the medication, a period significantly
longer than the medication trials involved in the earlier, more
pessimistic studies.
who

responded

to

See J.A. 150 (“That 10 of the 17 patients

treatment

required

continuous

antipsychotic

treatment for at least three months, and some up to five months,
was unexpected.
for

the

presumed

This result provides a plausible explanation
refractory

nature
65

of

delusional

disorder

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symptoms.”).

Moreover,

Pg: 66 of 79

unlike

earlier

studies

of

voluntary

treatment for delusional disorder, the Herbel Study demonstrates
the efficacy of medication when the subjects are not permitted
to drop out of treatment.
success

of

Because the Herbel Study assessed the

involuntary

treatment

administered

under

circumstances largely identical to those at issue in this case
and

provides

a

reasonable

basis

for

discounting

the

more

pessimistic conclusions of other studies, I believe a factfinder
could

reasonably

convincingly

find

supports

that

the

the

Herbel

government’s

Study

clearly

position.

Cf.

and

United

States v. Gillenwater, 749 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir.) (O’Connor,
J.) (finding district court did not clearly err in accepting
testimony

of

exclusively
recent

Dr.

on

Lucking

older

studies

over

studies,”

indicating

defense

expert

when
the

that

Lucking
older

who

“relied

“relied

negative

on

more

view

was

making

it

mistaken”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 222 (2014).
Similarly,

there

is

evidence

in

the

record

reasonable for the factfinder to assign significant weight to
Lucking’s
that

he

recommendation.
had

As

noted

involuntarily

above,

medicated

Lucking

testified

approximately

ten

defendants suffering from delusional disorder, all of whom were
restored to competency.

His personal success in treating the

same disorder as Watson’s, under the same circumstances that
Watson

would

be

treated,

could
66

reasonably

be

viewed

by

the

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factfinder as strong evidence that the treatment plan proposed
by the government was substantially likely to restore Watson’s
competency.
The majority, however, dismisses the evidence of Lucking’s
experience

because

Lucking

provided

no

details

about

those

patients and we therefore do not know how many of his patients
suffered from the persecutory type of disorder or what type of
medication was used.
not

believe

the

While more detail would be helpful, I do

lack

of

detail

somehow

renders

Lucking’s

experience irrelevant, particularly since the Herbel Study shows
a

high

response

rate

for

all

delusional-disorder

patients,

including those with the persecutory subtype, and finds that the
presence

of

delusions

of

governmental

persecution

“does

not

appear to be a useful predictor of nonresponse to treatment.”
J.A. 149.

Because the factfinder would be entitled to consider

Lucking’s testimony in light of the other evidence presented at
trial, see, e.g., Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
R.R. Co., 803 F.2d 1322, 1327 (4th Cir. 1986), the findings of
the Herbel Study make the lack of detail in Lucking’s testimony
less

significant

circumstances,
refuse

to

treating

I

than

the

believe

consider

defendants

majority

it

Lucking’s
with

is

suggests.

improper

testimony

delusional

for
about

disorder

evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence.
67

Under

the

majority

his
as

these
to

experience

part

of

its

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In
basis

my

for

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view,
the

then,

the

factfinder

Pg: 68 of 79

record

to

thus

slide

provides

extra

weight

a

plausible

over

to

the

government’s side of the scale and conclude that the evidence
clearly

and

convincingly

proposed treatment plan.
a

contrary

aspects

conclusion

of

the

establishes

the

propriety

of

the

Although there is evidence supporting
and

raising

government’s

questions

proposed

plan,

about
that

certain
contrary

evidence does not raise such substantial questions about the
government’s evidence as to render it insufficient as a matter
of

law,

but

resolution
Heyer,

740

by

instead
the

F.3d

simply

creates

factfinder.

284,

292

See,

(4th

Cir.

questions
e.g.,
2014)

of

United

fact

for

States

(“[E]valuating

v.
the

credibility of experts and the value of their opinions is a
function best committed to the district courts, and one to which
appellate
omitted)).

courts

must

defer.”

(internal

quotation

marks

I therefore disagree with the majority’s conclusion

that the government’s evidence was insufficient to carry its
burden of proof.
V.
I now turn to the merits of Watson’s argument that the
district court clearly erred by misinterpreting Hilkey’s report
and the need for supportive therapy in addition to medication.

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Pg: 69 of 79

A.
In its order, the district court acknowledged that while
Hilkey

“strongly

support[ed]

the

use

of

supportive

.

.

.

psychotherapy alongside pharmacological treatments, Hilkey “did
not

opine

treatment

in

his

plan

forensic

will

be

evaluation

that

unsuccessful.”

J.A.

Dr.

Lucking’s

340.

Citing

Lucking’s report and testimony, the district court held that the
proposed
Watson

treatment

competent

government’s

plan

to

motion

was

stand
to

substantially

trial,

and

involuntarily

likely

the

court

medicate

to

render

granted

Watson

the

without

requiring the government to provide supportive therapy.
On appeal, Watson argues that the district court erred by
finding

that

Hilkey

only

addition to medication.

suggested

supportive

therapy

in

Watson contends that Hilkey’s report

made it clear that medication must be combined with supportive
therapy

for

the

medication

competency.

Watson

misunderstood

Hilkey’s

proper

consideration

argues

to

succeed

in

that

because

the

report,

to

the

the

district

evidence

evidence and thus clearly erred. 12

12

restoring
district

court

contradicting

never

his
court
gave

Lucking’s

See, e.g., Wooden, 693 F.3d

The majority touches on this issue in the course of
identifying various deficiencies in the district court’s order.
According to the majority, the district court “summarily
disregarded Hilkey’s report in its entirety, solely because
Hilkey failed to state expressly that the proposed treatment
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at

Doc: 33

454

Filed: 07/17/2015

(finding

clear

error

Pg: 70 of 79

where

district

court

substantial amount of contradictory evidence).
his

argument,

Watson

points

to

Hilkey’s

ignored

In support of

statement

that

“any

treatment approach be it pharmacological or psychological must
be offered in a supportive manner designed to mitigate the fears
of the individual being treated.”
According

to

Watson,

Hilkey’s

view

that

supportive

J.A. 383 (emphasis added).

this

statement

“unequivocal[ly]”

shows

“[a]ny

treatment

must

in

manner.

Otherwise,

reinforces fears of persecution.”

be

forcible

offered

medication

a

just

Brief of Appellant at 24.

In my view, Hilkey’s report is much less conclusive on this
point

than

Watson

contends.

Regarding

supportive

therapy,

Hilkey stated that “[s]upportive therapy has been shown to be an
effective treatment” for delusional disorder, J.A. 382, and that
“[t]he

literature

[disorder]

strongly

on

treatment
encourages

of
the

persons
use

of

with

delusional

supportive

and

plan would not succeed.”
Majority Op. at 25.
The majority
contends that the district court thus failed to address Hilkey’s
questions about Lucking’s reading of the scientific literature,
Hilkey’s view that “the fixed, well established nature” of
Watson’s delusions made them “resistant to change,” J.A. 383, or
Hilkey’s belief that supportive therapy was required to maximize
the likelihood that medication would be effective.
As
previously noted, however, insufficiency of the government’s
evidence, not inadequacy of the district court’s findings, is
the basis for the majority’s reversal of the district court’s
order.

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cognitive

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behavioral

Pg: 71 of 79

psychotherapy

Delusional Disorder,” J.A. 384.

for

the

treatment

of

Noting that “Watson has the

capacity to form a degree of therapeutic alliance should someone
attempt to do so,” Hilkey stated his “strongly held opinion”
that such supportive therapy “could increase the likelihood his
competency

could

be

sufficiently

restored.”

Id.

(emphasis

added).
While it is apparent that Hilkey thought supportive therapy
was very important, the district court correctly observed that
Hilkey never directly stated that the proposed treatment plan of
medication without therapy would not work.

Indeed, Hilkey’s

statement that supportive therapy could increase the likelihood
of

success

suggests

that

likelihood of success.
--

that

“any

medication

alone

has

at

least

some

And the statement that Watson emphasizes

treatment

approach

be

it

pharmacological

or

psychological must be offered in a supportive manner,” J.A. 383
(emphasis added) -- seems to implicitly acknowledge that there
are

supportive

approach

to

and

non-supportive

treatment,

medication

ways
or

to

administer

therapy.

either

Under

this

reading, Hilkey’s recommendation that medication be administered
in

a

supportive

manner

does

not

amount

to

a

statement

that

supportive therapy is required.

Given the lack of clarity in

Hilkey’s

clear

report,

I

cannot

find

error

in

the

district

court’s conclusion that Hilkey did not opine that medication
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alone would not be effective to restore Watson’s competency.
See

Anderson,

clearly

470

erroneous

evidence

is

U.S.
“[i]f

plausible

entirety”);

at

id.

the

in

at

573-74

district

light

579

(factual

of

findings

the

not

account

court’s

are
of

the

viewed

in

its

record

(deferring

to

trial

court’s

interpretation of ambiguous testimony).
Although

I

interpretation

do
of

not

believe

Hilkey’s

that

report

is

the

district

clearly

court’s

erroneous,

I

nonetheless agree with Watson that the district court’s findings
are inadequate to show that it properly considered the entire
range

of

evidence

relating

to

supportive

therapy.

While

Hilkey’s report is ambiguous as to whether supportive therapy is
required, the report unambiguously establishes that supportive
therapy is beneficial as an adjunct to medication in that it
can, inter alia, encourage compliance with the treatment plan
and help mitigate the persecutory fears that might otherwise be
exacerbated
medication.
noting

by

the

government

forcibly

administering

the

Dr. Lucking made the same point in his report,

that

“there

is

evidence”

that

psychotherapy

is

“beneficial to an individual with psychotic symptoms . . . as an
adjunctive treatment to the antipsychotic agents to improve such
things as insight, compliance, or coping skills.”

J.A. 375.

The district court thus had before it evidence from both
the

government

and

the

defense
72

establishing

that

supportive

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therapy is a beneficial addition to a medication-based treatment
plan for patients suffering from delusional disorder, with no
evidence raising any doubts about that conclusion.
also

had

including

before

it

therapy

undisputed 13

Dr.

in

Hilkey’s

the

treatment

plan

would

The court

opinion

that

increase

the

likelihood that the plan would succeed in restoring Watson’s
competency to stand trial.

The district court noted Hilkey’s

strong preference for using therapy along with medication, but
it did not acknowledge the additional benefits obtained when
supportive

therapy

is

added

to

a

medication

plan

or

medication-success-enhancing nature of supportive therapy.

the
And

while the district court noted Lucking’s view that therapy alone
would

not

help

Watson,

the

court

did

not

explain

why

it

determined that therapy should not be required in addition to
medication. 14

13

Lucking did not affirmatively state that therapy
increases the likelihood that medication will be successful, but
nothing in his report or testimony contradicts or raises
questions about Hilkey’s view.
14

Lucking testified that therapy alone would be ineffective
because delusions respond to medication, but not therapy, and
because Watson did not agree that he was mentally ill and would
not participate in therapy.
While using therapy as an adjunct
to medication would seem to eliminate at least a portion of
these concerns, Lucking did not address whether adjunctive
therapy would be appropriate in this case.

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In

my

supportive

Filed: 07/17/2015

view,

the

therapy

Pg: 74 of 79

evidence

is,

at

of

the

the

very

benefits
least,

of

adjunctive

relevant

to

the

factual question of whether the government’s medication-withouttherapy plan was not merely likely, but “substantially likely,”
Sell, 539

U.S.

competency.

at

181

Given

(emphasis

the

added),

sensitive

to

nature

restore

of

“an

Watson’s

involuntary

medication order, which trenches upon the elemental individual
liberty

interest

in

refusing

the

invasive

administration

of

mind-altering medication,” United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d
369, 376 (4th Cir. 2013), it is important for the district court
to fully consider treatment options that maximize the likelihood
the treatment will succeed.
disagreement

over

the

And in this case, where there is

medication-success-rates

in

the

limited

available scientific literature, but agreement among the expert
witnesses

that

adjunctive

therapy

can

increase

treatment

compliance, it seems especially important for the district court
to

give

explicit

therapy.

consideration

to

the

value

of

adjunctive

Cf. Herbel Study, J.A. 150 (“The real obstacle to

positive treatment response in delusional disorder may not be
the

intrinsic

instead

be

the

biological

features

difficulties

in

of

the

convincing

illness,
these

but

patients

may
to

adhere to an adequate trial of medication.”).
While I do not suggest that the district court was required
to order adjunctive supportive therapy, the court was at least
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required to acknowledge the evidence establishing its benefits.
See Chatmon, 718 F.3d at 376 (“Of course, a district court need
not credit a defendant’s evidence or accept his arguments, but
its findings should offer some reason why it did not.”); Wooden,
693 F.3d at 454 (“Although the district court might not have
been required to accept that the evidence recounted above proved
Wooden’s ongoing pedophilia, the court was required to at least
consider

the

evidence,

otherwise.”).
evidence

and

account

for

it,

when

concluding

The district court’s failure to consider relevant

when

determining

that

the

government’s

plan

was

substantially likely to succeed means that the court’s factual
finding cannot be sustained.

See United States v. Francis, 686

F.3d 265, 273 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A court commits clear error when
it

makes

findings

without

properly

taking

into

account

substantial evidence to the contrary.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 379
(4th Cir. 1995) (explaining that district court clearly errs
when it “disregard[s] substantial evidence that would militate a
conclusion contrary to that reached”).
B.
I

turn

finding
district

the

now

the

question

government’s

evidence

court’s

proceedings.

to

order

without

of

remedy.

The

insufficient,
remanding

majority,

reverses

for

the

additional

As I have explained, however, the sufficiency of
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the government’s evidence is not properly before this court.
Instead, the only issue properly before this court is whether
the district court’s factual findings are sufficient to support
the court’s substantially-likely-to-succeed conclusion.
When an appeal turns on an error by the district court, the
proper remedy would normally be to vacate the district court’s
order and remand for further proceedings, so as to give the
district court the opportunity to reconsider the issue; only in
unusual cases would this court render judgment for a party after
identifying

an

error

by

the

district

court.

See

Pullman-

Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291-92 (1982) (noting that when
a district court fails to make required factual findings, “a
remand is the proper course unless the record permits only one
resolution of the factual issue”); aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson,
296 F.3d 227, 235 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting, after finding error
by district court, that “[o]rdinarily, the proper course would
be to vacate the district court’s judgment and to remand,” but
concluding that “special circumstances allow us to put aside the
district court’s procedural error and render a decision on the
merits” (emphasis added)); see generally Chatmon, 718 F.3d at
376 (“Because the district court erred in its analysis of the
third Sell factor, we vacate the involuntary medication order
and

remand

for

further

findings.”);

76

Wooden,

693

F.3d

at

463

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(vacating

and

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remanding

for

Pg: 77 of 79

reconsideration

after

identifying

numerous deficiencies in district court’s factual findings).
In

this

case,

the

record

is

not

so

one-sided

that

it

renders the district court’s error harmless, nor is there any
other reason to bypass the usual remand route. 15

Accordingly,

because

case

district

I

believe
court’s

that

the

failure

to

only

error

address

in

the

this

issue

of

is

the

adjunctive

supportive therapy, I would vacate the district court’s order
and remand for further proceedings to permit the district court
reconsider the issue and make the findings necessary to support
its ultimate conclusion.
VI.
For

the

reasons

set

out

above,

I

believe

that

the

sufficiency of the government’s evidence is not properly before

15

In the majority’s view, “remand is inappropriate because
the record permits only one resolution of the factual issue:
that this burden cannot be met.”
Majority Op. at 28-29
(internal quotation marks omitted).
For the reasons previously
discussed, I strongly disagree with the majority’s assessment of
the record.
Even if the evidence were insufficient, however,
this court in such circumstances has previously remanded rather
than reversed.
See Bush, 585 F.3d at 817-18 (finding
government’s
proof
deficient
in
several
respects
and
“remand[ing] this issue for consideration of further evidence,
if it is deemed appropriate, and findings by the court”); Evans,
404 F.3d at 242-43 (finding government’s evidence insufficient
to carry Sell burden and “remand[ing] with instructions for the
district court to reassess the motion after affording the
parties the opportunity to supplement the record in a manner
consistent with this opinion”).

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this court and that it is improper for the majority to reverse
the

district

sponte.

court

on

an

issue

the

majority

has

raised

sua

The majority’s reversal is particularly inappropriate

since the government has had no opportunity to brief the issue
or defend the sufficiency of its evidence before this court.
Indeed, counsel for the government will surely be surprised by
the outright reversal in this case, given that the only relief
sought

by

the

reconsideration

appellant
of

the

was

the

district

vacating

court’s

and

order.

remanding

for

Nonetheless,

even if the sufficiency of the evidence were properly before us,
I believe that the evidence is more than sufficient to survive
appellate

review.

And

as

to

the

issues

actually

raised

by

Watson, 16 I would vacate the district court’s order and remand

16

Watson also challenges the district court’s analysis of
the first Sell factor, which requires the government to show
that important interests are at stake that are not mitigated by
special circumstances. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166,
180 (2003).
Watson contends that he would likely succeed in
establishing an insanity defense, which would subject him to
civil commitment, see 18 U.S.C. § 4243(a), and that the district
court therefore erred by not treating that defense as a special
circumstance
that
mitigated
the
government’s
interest
in
prosecution. As the district court noted, however, an insanity
defense and the competency-to-stand-trial inquiry focus on
different questions, and there is nothing in the record
establishing or even suggesting that the delusions prevented
Watson from recognizing the wrongfulness of his actions.
See
United States v. Mackey, 717 F.3d 569, 574 (8th Cir. 2013)
(“That Mackey was delusional at the time of his arrest does not
necessarily mean that he could mount a successful insanity
defense.”).
I see no error in the district court’s conclusion
that the record established only the possibility that Watson
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reconsideration

and

Pg: 79 of 79

additional

findings

by

the

district

court on the necessity of adjunctive therapy.
Accordingly,
majority’s
granting

I

decision

the

hereby
to

respectfully

reverse

government’s

the

petition

to

dissent

district

from

court’s

involuntarily

the
order

medicate

Watson.

would assert and ultimately succeed on an insanity defense, and
that the mere possibility of establishing the defense did not
substantially undermine the government’s strong interest in
prosecuting Watson.
Cf. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227,
239-40 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the “unlikely future
civil confinement” of the defendant does not “make unimportant
the Government’s interest in prosecuting [the defendant] on the
serious charges against him”).

79