US v. Joseph Patterson, III

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:05-cr-00196-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999468612].. [14-4406]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4406

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH IRA PATTERSON, III,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington.
Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00196-1)

Submitted:

October 23, 2014

Before NIEMEYER
Circuit Judge.

and

MOTZ,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

November 4, 2014

and

DAVIS,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian J. Kornbrath, Acting Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D.
Byrne, Appellate Counsel, Mary Lou Newberger, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R.
Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, Joseph F. Adams,
Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, West Virginia, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Joseph

Ira

Patterson,

III,

appeals

from

his

thirty-month sentence entered pursuant to the revocation of his
supervised

release.

On

appeal,

Patterson

argues

that

his

sentence is longer than necessary to address the purposes of
supervised release, was improperly based upon the seriousness of
his criminal conduct while on supervised release, and is, thus,
plainly unreasonable.

We affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence

upon

revocation

of

supervised

release.”

United

States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).

We will

affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if

it

is

within

the

applicable

“plainly unreasonable.”
438 (4th Cir. 2006).

statutory

maximum

and

not

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,

In exercising its discretion, the district

court “is guided by the Chapter Seven policy statements in the
federal

Guidelines

manual,

as

well

applicable to revocation sentences.”
“Chapter

Seven

instructs

as

the

statutory

factors

Webb, 738 F.3d at 641.
that,

in

fashioning

a

revocation sentence, ‘the court should sanction primarily the
defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a
limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and
the

criminal

history

of

the

violator.’”

Id.

(quoting

Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2012)).
2

U.S.
In

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determining the length of a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised

release,

18

U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)

(2012)

requires

a

sentencing court to consider all but two of the factors listed
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).

One of the excluded factors is

the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense.”
461 F.3d at 439.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), Crudup,

We have recognized that “[a]lthough § 3583(e)

enumerates the factors a district court should consider when
formulating

a

revocation

sentence,

it

does

not

expressly

prohibit a court from referencing other relevant factors omitted
from the statute.”

Webb, 738 F.3d at 641.

As long as a court

does not base a revocation sentence predominately on the omitted
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to such considerations
does not render a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable
when

those

factors

are

relevant

to,

and

considered

conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.”

in

Id. at

642.
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
the

district

defendant

court

should

statutory maximum.

states

receive

a

proper

the

basis

sentence

for

concluding

imposed,

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.

up

to

the
the

Only if a sentence

is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this
court

“then

decide

whether
3

the

sentence

is

plainly

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unreasonable.”

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Id. at 439.

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A sentence is plainly unreasonable

if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable.
Patterson

argues

that

his

Id.

sentence

was

longer

than

necessary, based in part on the fact that the district court
placed

undue

weight

on

the

seriousness

of

his

armed

robbery

offense, which led to the revocation of his supervised release.
In addition, Patterson avers that the district court failed to
give appropriate consideration to the four years he spent in
state prison for that offense.

Because Patterson challenges the

district court’s reliance on an inappropriate factor and did not
argue for a sentence below the Policy Statement range, review is
for plain error.

Webb, 738 F.3d at 640.

Under plain error

review, Patterson must show that (1) the court erred, (2) the
error

was

clear

or

substantial rights.

obvious,

and

(3)

Id. at 640-41.

the

error

affected

his

Even if Patterson meets his

burden, we retain discretion to recognize the error and will
deny relief unless the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Id. at

641 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In

this

instance,

the

district

court

directly

addressed Patterson’s argument that he had already been punished
for the robbery by noting that Patterson had not yet served a
sentence or otherwise been punished for violating the conditions
of

supervised

release.

The

court
4

observed

that

Patterson’s

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order of supervision specifically prohibited him from engaging
in criminal conduct and that Patterson engaged in such conduct
within

a

year

of

his

release.

The

court

also

noted

that

Patterson had been given a lenient original sentence and that
his breach of trust was very serious.
It is clear from the district court’s statement that
Patterson’s

breach

of

trust

was

the

main

reason

district court imposed the sentence it did.
did

rely

while

on

on

the

seriousness

supervised

of

release,

the

Although the court

Patterson’s
this

that

factor

criminal
is

conduct

essentially

“redundant with matters courts are already permitted to take
into consideration.”
(6th

Cir.

2007).

United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 400

Further,

the

court’s

consideration

of

the

seriousness of the crime was consistent with recognizing the
magnitude of Patterson’s breach of trust.
642

(approving

references

to

omitted

See Webb, 738 F.3d at

sentencing

factors

that

were related to references to permissible sentencing factors).
Thus,

there

was

no

error,

much

less

Accordingly, we affirm Patterson’s sentence.
oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

materials

legal
before

plain

error.

We dispense with
contentions
this

court

are
and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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