US v. Anthony Palomino-Coronado

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:12-cr-00287-RWT-1. [999693715]. [14-4416]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4416

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY PALOMINO-CORONADO,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:12-cr-00287-RWT-1)

Argued:

September 17, 2015

Decided:

November 5, 2015

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and vacated by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge King joined.

ARGUED: Joanna Beth Silver, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Kristi Noel
O’Malley, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.

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GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Anthony

Palomino-Coronado

was

convicted

of

knowingly

employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a
minor in sexually explicit conduct, for the purpose of producing
a visual depiction of that conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a).

On appeal, Palomino-Coronado claims that there was

insufficient evidence to convict him and that the district court
improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.

We agree. 1

I.
In the early morning hours of May 3, 2012, Prince George’s
County

police

officers

were

called

to

a

home

in

Laurel,

Maryland, in response to a report of a missing seven-year-old
child.

Officers eventually found the child, B.H., outside the

house next to a fence adjoining the neighbor’s yard.

B.H. said

that she had been next door hanging out with a friend.
Interviews with B.H. led the police to bring her to the
hospital

for

a

sexual

assault

forensic

exam.

Nurse

Sharon

Rogers performed the exam and found that B.H.’s hymen had been

1

Palomino-Coronado further contends that the district court
erred by failing to take adequate steps to ensure that an
expert’s dual role did not prejudice or confuse the jury and
that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable, issues we do
not reach here.

2

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torn,

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indicating

identified

an

consistent

that
odor,

with

an

it

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had

been

redness,

penetrated.

and

infection.

Rogers

also

which

were

irritation,

Rogers

determined

that

B.H.

likely could not have gotten this type of infection from sexual
activity in the hours preceding the exam, suggesting that sexual
activity had also occurred previously.
B.H.

Rogers also interviewed

During the interview, B.H. said that she had been at

“Anthony’s” house that night, that she had been there about ten
times

previously,

basement.

and

that

Palomino-Coronado,

they

would

then

spend

nineteen

time

his

old,

years

in

was

B.H.’s neighbor.
Following the exam, Detective Cleo Savoy interviewed B.H.
The two first spoke privately for about an hour and a half and
were then joined by B.H.’s guardian; at that point, Savoy began
to record the interview.
interview,

Savoy

During the unrecorded portion of the

testified

Palomino-Coronado’s

house,

that
where

B.H.
they

said

that

played

she
games

went

to

in

the

basement, Palomino-Coronado kissed her, and they had sex.
also

said

that

Palomino-Coronado

took

pictures.

During

B.H.
the

recorded portion of the interview, B.H. denied having any sexual
contact with Palomino-Coronado.
On

May

3,

2012,

Prince

George’s

County

detectives

interviewed Palomino-Coronado and swore out a search warrant on
his residence.

The police also seized Palomino-Coronado’s cell
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phone.

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Later that day, a communications specialist with the

Prince George’s County Police Department extracted deleted and
undeleted images from Palomino-Coronado’s cell phone, including
one picture of a male lying on top of a paisley-patterned sheet
while vaginally penetrating a child.

The extraction revealed

that this particular image had been deleted.
The FBI later conducted its own forensic image extraction
from Palomino-Coronado’s cell phone, finding the same photo of a
man

penetrating

including

a

child.

thousands

of

Other

images

were

Palomino-Coronado’s

also

face

recovered,

and

at

least

three other images of B.H. in non-sexually explicit contexts.
On May 15, 2012, Martha Finnegan, an FBI child forensic
interview specialist, interviewed B.H.
B.H.

told

Finnegan

Palomino-Coronado

and

that

she

had

identified

During that interview,

had

the

sexual

two

contact

individuals

in

with
the

picture as “B” for B.H. and “A” for Anthony.
The government sought to indict Palomino-Coronado on one
count:

knowingly

employing,

using,

persuading,

inducing,

enticing, and coercing a minor to engage in sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such
conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). 2

2

At oral argument, the government acknowledged that an
indictment was pending in state court for various state-law
(Continued)
4

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At trial, B.H. testified that Palomino-Coronado had touched
her private parts on more than one occasion.

She also testified

that she was scared during her initial interview with the police
and had lied to them.
Coronado

in

the

She then identified herself and Palomino-

pictures

sexually explicit photo.

from

his

cell

phone,

including

the

B.H. also testified that during her

interview with Savoy, Savoy told her that she could not go home
if she kept denying that she and Palomino-Coronado had had sex.
B.H. said that Savoy had taken her teddy bear away from her
during

the

interview

because

she

was

not

answering

Savoy’s

questions.
Finnegan also testified, both as a lay witness and as an
expert

in

child

forensic

interviewing.

As

part

of

her

testimony, she evaluated the interview that Savoy conducted and
explained that it was coercive and did not follow established
protocols.

Finnegan also testified about her own interview of

B.H., during which B.H. disclosed to her that B.H. and PalominoCoronado

had

engaged

in

sexual

conduct

and

identified

the

photograph.
At the close of the government’s case, Palomino-Coronado
made a motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient

crimes, which might well be supported by the unfortunate and
horrific events that are at issue here.

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evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.

The

district court denied the motion.
The jury subsequently found Palomino-Coronado guilty.

The

court sentenced him to thirty years, which was both the maximum
permitted under the statute and the lowest amount of time within
the guidelines range.

Palomino-Coronado timely appealed.

II.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de
novo.

United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th Cir.

2012).

We

must

affirm

the

verdict

if

it

is

supported

by

substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
government.

United States v. Gillion, 704 F.3d 284, 294 (4th

Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th
Cir.

2008)).

reasonable

Substantial

finder

of

fact

evidence
could

is

“evidence

accept

as

that

adequate

a
and

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.”

United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693

(4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
A defendant bringing a sufficiency challenge “must overcome
a heavy burden.”

United States v. Hotye, 51 F.3d 1239, 1245

(4th Cir. 1995).

The Court “may not overturn a substantially

supported

verdict

merely

because

it

finds

the

verdict

unpalatable or determines that another, reasonable verdict would
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be preferable,” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th
Cir. 1996); instead reversal for insufficiency must “be confined
to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear,” Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978).

III.
Palomino-Coronado

contends

that

the

government

failed

to

prove one of the elements of § 2251(a)—namely, that he acted for
the purpose of producing a visual depiction. 3
Section 2251(a) provides, in relevant part,
“Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces,
entices, or coerces any minor to engage in . . . any
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing
any visual depiction of such conduct . . . shall be
punished as provided under subsection (e) . . . if
that visual depiction was produced or transmitted
using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or
transported in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce by any means.”
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).

3

A week prior to oral argument, the government filed a
letter of supplemental authority asserting that PalominoCoronado waived his purpose argument by not raising it during
his Rule 29 motion.
We are entitled to excuse a defendant’s
waiver in the district court if the government fails to properly
and timely raise a waiver contention in its brief.
See United
States v. Ashford, 718 F.3d 377, 381 (4th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 509 n.5 (4th Cir. 2013). In
“the interests of fairness and the integrity” of our procedural
rules, we hold that the government waived its waiver argument.
See Ashford, 718 F.3d at 381.

7

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As the text indicates, § 2251(a) contains a specific intent
element:

the government was required to prove that production

of a visual depiction was a purpose of engaging in the sexually
explicit conduct.

Id.; see United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d

1000, 1013 (11th Cir. 2012).

“It is simply not enough to say

‘the photo speaks for itself and for the defendant and that is
the end of the matter.’”

United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d

122, 129 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing the purpose requirement in
the related cross-reference under U.S.S.G. § 2G2(c)(1)).

That

is, a defendant must engage in the sexual activity with the
specific

intent

to

produce

a

visual

depiction;

it

is

not

sufficient simply to prove that the defendant purposefully took
a picture.

Nonetheless, courts do not require that a defendant

be single-minded in his purpose to support a conviction under
§ 2251(a).

E.g., Lebowitz, 676 F.3d at 1013; United States v.

Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2004); see also
United

States

v.

Cox,

744

F.3d

305,

309

(4th

Cir.

2014)

(considering “purpose” in the context of the application of a
cross-reference under § 2G2.1(c)(1) of the sentencing guidelines
governing production of some child pornography offenses).
We

have

not

previously

considered

a

challenge

to

the

sufficiency of the evidence in a conviction under § 2251(a).
Courts

have

sometimes

been

able

indicating a defendant’s purpose.
8

to

rely

on

direct

evidence

E.g., Lebowitz, 676 F.3d at

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1013.

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In Lebowitz, for example, the minor testified that he and

the defendant “discussed videotaping a sexual encounter prior to
the recording.”
904,

918

Id.; see also United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d

(11th

Cir.

2010)

(holding

that

the

defendant’s

description of “how many photographs he wanted of each girl” and
“how

he

wanted

the

girls

to

pose”

contributed

to

the

reasonableness of the jury’s finding that he intended to use the
minors in the production of child pornography).
More

often,

circumstantial
purpose.

however,

evidence

to

courts
show

are

that

a

presented

only

with

defendant

acted

with

For example, defendants’ actions, instructions, and

descriptions of the visual depictions produced or to be produced
might indicate purpose.
22.

E.g., Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d at 21–

In Morales-de Jesus, finding the evidence sufficient, the

First Circuit pointed to the fact that the defendant “actively
concealed from the minor the fact that he was videotaping her.”
Id.

at

21.

The

defendant

also

gave

“specific

instructions

regarding certain positions he wanted her to assume relative to
the

camera,

instructed

her

on

what

to

say

while

the

camera

recorded their activities, and used a remote control to zoom the
camera in and out while they were having sex.”

Id. at 21–22;

see also United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 42 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that the jury could have inferred intent in part based
on the defendant’s “direct[ing] the participants to move their
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sexual activity to different parts of the lean-to, so that he
could more easily videotape them”).
Courts

have

also

found

the

number

of

sexually

recordings or depictions indicative of purpose.

explicit

E.g., United

States v. Ortiz-Graulau, 526 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2008).
Ortiz-Gralau,

the

defendant

had

taken

over

fifty

In

pictures

depicting sexual contact between him and a minor or of the minor
in a sexually explicit position.

Id. at 18.

The First Circuit

found that the “number of photographs, many of sexually explicit
poses, permit[ted] a strong inference that some of the conduct
occurred in order to make the photographs.”

Id. at 19 (citing

Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d at 22); see also Morales-de Jesus,
372 F.3d at 22 (“[A] reasonable jury also could infer that since
Morales taped sexual encounters with the minor more than once,
he induced the girl to engage in sex acts for the purpose of
creating videotapes of their encounters.”).
Finally,

courts

have

considered

evidence

of

“purposeful

conduct” surrounding the photographic or video equipment used.
E.g., Lebowitz, 676 F.3d at 1013; see also Morales-de Jesus, 372
F.3d at 22.

In Lebowitz, the Eleventh Circuit cited evidence

that the defendant brought the camera and a tripod with him,
carried them through the minor’s bedroom window, and set them
up.

676 F.3d at 1013.

Moreover, evidence showed that “[t]he

sexual encounter occurred in [the minor’s] bedroom only because
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there was not room for the recording equipment in Lebowitz’s
car.”

Id.

Meanwhile,

in

Morales-de

Jesus,

“[a]fter

the

defendant had taken the minor to a motel room to have sex for
the

fourth

time,

he

returned

to

his

car

recording equipment that he kept there.”

and

retrieved

372 F.3d at 22.

the
The

First Circuit also found that the fact that the defendant “kept
sexual aids in the same bag with the camera” might also have
been enough for the jury to find that the defendant had planned
to videotape the encounters.

Id.; see also Sirois, 87 F.3d at

37, 42 (finding relevant that both actors had brought recording
equipment:

one

a

camera

and

a

videorecorder

and

the

other

another camera).
Here, the evidence produced at trial does not support the
conclusion

that

Palomino-Coronado

engaged

in

sexual

with B.H. for the purpose of producing a picture.

activity
No direct

evidence or statements indicating intent were offered.

There

was no testimony that Palomino-Coronado gave any instruction or
direction to B.H. as part of their sexual encounter that would
indicate purpose.

See, e.g., Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d at 21–

22; Sirois, 87 F.3d at 42.
All that the record shows is that Palomino-Coronado had
engaged in sexual activity with B.H. on more than one occasion;
that he had taken several non-sexually explicit pictures of her
with

his

cell

phone

in

his

basement;
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and

that

one

sexually

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explicit picture was taken, in which B.H. identified herself and
Palomino-Coronado as the two people depicted.

Without more,

these facts do not support the conclusion that Palomino-Coronado
engaged in sexual activity with B.H. in order to take a picture.
To

hold

otherwise

would

eliminate

the

specific

intent

requirement, turning § 2251(a) into a strict liability offense.
We find it significant here that only one photograph was
taken and subsequently deleted. 4

The government argues that

there is no requirement that a defendant take a certain quantity
of

images

or

engage

in

a

certain

amount

of

preparation

to

determine whether he has acted for the purpose of producing a
visual depiction.

We agree as a general matter.

Although, when

pressed at oral argument, the government could not provide any
authority upholding a conviction challenging the specific intent
element where only one photograph was taken.
In this instance, where Palomino-Coronado engaged in sexual
activity with B.H. over many months, the fact that only one
image was produced militates against finding that his intent in
doing

so

was

to

take

a

picture.

The

single

photo

is

not

evidence that Palomino-Coronado engaged in sexual activity with
B.H. to take a picture, only that he engaged in sexual activity

4

We note that the record did not indicate at what point the
photograph was deleted, whether it was immediately after it was
taken or sometime later.

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with B.H. and took a picture.
(acknowledging

that

“[s]et

Cf. Crandon, 173 F.3d at 130

in

context,”

the

fact

that

the

defendant had taken close to fifty pictures of the minor, only
two

of

which

were

sexual

in

nature,

“could

support

[the

defendant’s] contention that his purpose in taking the photos
was the memorialization of their time together or his love for
her—a purpose other than producing sexually explicit material”).
To be sure, a situation might well present itself where only one
photograph

was

taken

but

where

there

was

other

evidence

of

purpose, and we do not hold that a sufficiency challenge would
necessarily fail in that instance.

But that is not this case.

The government contends that Palomino-Coronado’s frequent
use of the camera on his cell phone showed that he “regularly
and intentionally used his phone to take pictures of all aspects
of his life.”

The government also asserts that the fact that

the photo at issue focused on Palomino-Coronado’s genital area
as he engaged in sexual activity with B.H. demonstrates that the
photo was not unintentionally or inadvertently captured.
But

the

government

does

little

to

explain

how

these

conclusory statements indicate that Palomino-Coronado initiated
the sexual activity with B.H. for the purpose of producing the
picture.

Instead,

the

government

appears

to

conflate

the

voluntary act of taking the picture with the specific intent
required under the statute.
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The fact that Palomino-Coronado brought his cell phone with
him

to

the

basement

does

not

support

a

finding

of

purpose.

Palomino-Coronado’s use of his cell phone to take pictures is a
far cry from the tripod and other recording equipment used to
support purpose in other cases.

See, e.g., Lebowitz, 676 F.3d

at

F.3d

1013;

devices

Morales-de
demonstrate

Jesus,
some

372

sort

of

at

22.

Whereas

forethought,

those

planning,

or

intent, the mere presence of a cell phone is not evidence of
purpose.

Cell

phones

are

now

ubiquitous,

teenagers, and almost always within reach.

especially

for

We do not conclude

that use of a cell phone will never be evidence of purpose under
§ 2251(a); instead, we simply hold that Palomino-Coronado’s use
of his cell phone in this instance does not meet the specific
intent requirement under the statute.

IV.
For

these

reasons,

we

hold

that

the

government

adduced

insufficient evidence to show that Palomino-Coronado acted for
the purpose of producing a visual depiction.

The district court

thus erred in denying Palomino-Coronado’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.

Therefore, we reverse the district court’s ruling

and vacate Palomino-Coronado’s conviction.
REVERSED AND VACATED

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