US v. Montoyua Waller
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:06-cr-00303-NCT-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999624473].. [14-4497]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4497
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MONTOYUA WALLER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:06-cr-00303-NCT-1)
Submitted:
June 30, 2015
Decided:
July 21, 2015
Before GREGORY and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr.,
Kathleen
A.
Gleason,
Assistant
Federal
Public
Defenders,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United States
Attorney, Alena K. Baker, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Montoyua
Waller
appeals
the
district
court’s
judgment
revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to a
term of 48 months’ imprisonment.
Waller’s counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning
whether
Waller
committed
had
the
a
district
court
Grade
violation
A
properly
48-month sentence is substantively reasonable.
a
pro
counsel.
se
supplemental
reiterating
and
that
whether
his
Waller has filed
issues
raised
by
At our request, counsel and the government submitted
supplemental
plainly
brief
found
briefs
addressing
unreasonable
because
whether
the
Waller’s
district
adequately explain its chosen sentence.
sentence
court
failed
was
to
For the reasons that
follow, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part for
resentencing.
To revoke supervised release, a district court need only
find a violation of a condition of release by a preponderance of
the evidence.
district
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012).
court’s
ultimate
decision
to
revoke
“We review a
a
defendant’s
supervised release for abuse of discretion” and its “factual
findings
underlying
a
revocation
States v. Padgett, ___ F.3d ___,
for
clear
error.”
, Nos. 14-4625, 14-4627,
2015 WL 3561289, at *1 (4th Cir. June 9, 2015).
2
United
Credibility
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determinations made by the district court at revocation hearings
rarely are reversed on appeal.
F.3d
856,
858
(8th
Cir.
See United States v. Cates, 613
2010)
(“Witness
credibility
is
quintessentially a judgment call and virtually unassailable on
appeal.”
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted)).
Because
the
standard of proof is less than that required for a criminal
conviction, the district court may find that the defendant has
violated a condition of his supervised release based on its own
finding
of
new
criminal
conduct,
even
if
the
defendant
is
acquitted on criminal charges arising from the same conduct, or
if
the
charges
against
him
are
dropped.
United
States
v.
Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 1991).
Counsel
questions
whether
the
district
court
properly
found a Grade A violation based on Waller’s new criminal charges
of
felony
second
degree
kidnapping
and
felony
extortion.
Counsel argues that the court failed to give any weight to the
fact that Waller himself called the police during the offense,
and failed to consider how this bolstered Waller’s credibility.
Additionally, counsel argues that the district court erred in
denying Waller’s request that the government take more exemplars
of
the
victim’s
reopened
the
handwriting,
evidentiary
and
portion
that
of
the
the
court
should
hearing.
have
Counsel
further asserts that because all of the criminal charges upon
which
the
supervised
release
violation
3
was
based
were
later
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dismissed
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or
acquitted,
the
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finding
of
a
supervised
release
violation should be reversed.
We have thoroughly considered these claims in light of the
record, including the transcript of the revocation hearing at
which both Waller and the victim testified.
We find no clear
error in the district court’s factual findings, and that the
government proved the Grade A violation by a preponderance of
the
evidence.
Accordingly,
the
claims
lack
merit,
and
revocation of Waller’s supervised release was not an abuse of
discretion.
We now turn to the reasonableness of Waller’s sentence.
“A
district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence
upon revocation of supervised release.”
738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).
sentence
if
it
is
within
plainly unreasonable.”
“When
reviewing
the
United States v. Webb,
“We will affirm a revocation
statutory
maximum
and
is
not
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
whether
a
revocation
sentence
is
plainly
unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable
at all.”
2010).
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir.
A sentence is plainly unreasonable if it “run[s] afoul
of clearly settled law.”
A
revocation
district
considering
court
the
Id. at 548.
sentence
adequately
Sentencing
is
procedurally
explains
Guidelines’
4
the
reasonable
sentence
Chapter
Seven
if
the
after
policy
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statements
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and
the
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applicable
18
U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)
(2012)
factors.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Thompson, 595 F.3d at
546-47.
“Regardless of whether the district court imposes an
above, below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on
the
record
particular
Carter,
an
‘individualized
facts
564
of
F.3d
the
325,
case
330
assessment’
before
(4th
Cir.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).
it.”
2009)
based
United
on
States
(quoting
Gall
the
v.
v.
“A court need not be as
detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it
must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still
must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.”
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Counsel and Waller argued at sentencing that a sentence
below
the
policy
circumstances
statement
of
the
range
offense,
was
appropriate
specifically
due
the
to
the
victim’s
provocation of the offense conduct by stealing and abandoning
Waller’s
befriended
ex-wife’s
and
car.
mentored
Waller
the
pointed
victim,
that
out
he
that
himself
he
had
called
police multiple times as the offense was taking place, and that
he needed to stay out of prison in order to support his family.
Waller asserted that it was the victim’s idea to attempt to
extort money from his girlfriend to pay for the damage to the
car and the lost keys.
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When the court pronounced the sentence of 48 months, which
was at the low end of the policy statement range of 46 to 52
months, the court did not cite or track the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors, explain what factors had been considered, or otherwise
articulate how it had weighed the parties’ arguments.
revocation
sentences
within
the
policy
statement
Even for
range,
“a
district court may not simply impose sentence without giving any
indication of its reasons for doing so.”
court
asked
questions
and
made
Id. at 547.
comments
at
the
While the
sentencing
hearing and was clearly very engaged, the court was cut off by
Waller after pronouncing the sentence, and thereafter did not
provide any explanation of its chosen sentence.
Accordingly, being mindful that a sufficient explanation is
necessary
“to
allow
for
meaningful
appellate
review
and
to
promote the perception of fair sentencing,” Gall, 552 U.S. at
50, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
We
express no opinion regarding the merits of Waller’s request for
a lower sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed
the entire record and have found no other meritorious issues for
review.
court’s
We therefore affirm all other aspects of the district
judgment.
This
court
requires
that
counsel
inform
Waller, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review.
that
a
petition
be
filed,
but
6
counsel
If Waller requests
believes
that
such
a
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petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Waller.
We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately
presented
in
the
materials
before
this
court
and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED
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