US v. Alvis Damon William

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cr-00758-JFA-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999711222].. [14-4502]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4502

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ALVIS DAMON WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia.
Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00758-JFA-1)

Argued:

September 17, 2015

Decided:

December 3, 2015

Before WYNN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, ELIZABETH FRANKLIN-BEST,
LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Julius Ness
Richardson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Alvis Damon Williams was indicted on charges of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine and related firearms offenses.
Although represented by a public defender during most of the
pretrial proceedings, Williams elected to represent himself at
his trial.

A jury convicted Williams on all counts.

On appeal, Williams argues that the district court erred by
permitting
error

to

decisions.

him

to

represent

several

of

the

himself.

district

Williams
court’s

also

trial

assigns

management

For the reasons below, we affirm.

I.
A.
On June 26, 2013, a Sumter County Sheriff’s Office employee
pulled over a black Chevrolet Impala driven by Williams.

The

ostensible

the

Impala

reason

appeared

for
to

Carolina state law.1

the

be
The

stop

was

overly-tinted
officer

that
in

asked

the

windows

violation
Williams,

occupant of the car, for his license and registration.

on

of
the

South
lone

Noting a

strong smell of marijuana, the officer asked Williams to step

1

In fact, the Sheriff’s Office had been alerted by Sumter
County narcotics officers that Williams had just sold drugs to a
confidential informant as part of a controlled drug buy.
The
narcotics officers requested that the traffic stop be based, if
possible, on probable cause independent of the controlled drug
buy so as to protect the identity of the confidential informant.
2

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out of the car.

Williams consented to a search of his person,

which

approximately

turned

up

$1,600

in

cash

in

Williams’s

pockets.

The officer then conducted a probable cause search of

the car.

The search revealed a handgun between the driver’s

seat and center console and plastic bags with crack and powder
cocaine, marijuana, and assorted paraphernalia on the passengerside floor.
A

federal

grand

jury

subsequently

indicted

Williams

for

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, being a felon in
possession

of

a

firearm,

and

possession

furtherance of drug trafficking.2

of

a

firearm

in

In September 2013 the district

court appointed a federal public defender to represent Williams,
and Williams entered a plea of not guilty.
counsel

represented

him

in

various

Williams’s appointed

pretrial

proceedings,

including an unsuccessful suppression hearing in October 2013.

B.
In

December

2013,

Williams

filed

a

pro

se

motion

that

stated his desire to represent himself and requested that the
court

replace

his

appointed

counsel.

Construing

the

motion

principally as a request for new counsel, the district court

2

The grand jury also indicted Williams for possession with
intent to distribute marijuana, but the government moved to
dismiss that count prior to the completion of the jury trial.
3

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denied

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Williams’s

request

for

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alternate

representation.

The

district court noted that Williams would be allowed to represent
himself if he so desired.

During jury selection on January 7,

2014, Williams made an oral motion to appoint new counsel.

The

district

for

court

again

denied

his

motion

and

set

trial

February 11, 2014.
On January 30, 2014, Williams again filed a pro se motion
to

relieve

his

Williams’s

appointed

appointed

representation

on

counsel,

counsel

Williams’s

and

filed

on
a

February
motion

behalf.

4,

2014,
self-

district

The

for

court

addressed Williams’s representation at a pretrial conference on
February 6, 2014.
After
the

confirming

district

court

Williams’s
proceeded

desire

to

ask

to

represent

Williams

a

himself,

number

of

questions about his legal experience and his understanding of
the

charges

against

him

and

his

potential

sentence.

The

district court told Williams it thought his appointed counsel
was

“a

very

competent,

capable

attorney”

Williams not to try to represent himself.

and

strongly

J.A. 91-92.

urged

Williams

re-confirmed his desire to proceed pro se, telling the district
court that his appointed counsel had refused to subpoena two
witnesses that Williams thought should be called at trial.
the

request

Williams

of

that

the
he

government,

might

be

the

shackled
4

district
at

trial

court
based

At

informed
on

his

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criminal record and the charges against him, and if the jury
realized he was shackled it would likely hurt his case.
The district court then asked the government attorneys to
step

out

of

Williams

the

wished

courtroom,
to

subpoena

and

enquired

and

discontent with appointed counsel.

the

into

source

the
of

witnesses
Williams’s

Williams and his appointed

counsel informed the district court of a number of strategic
disagreements and communication problems between the pair.
district

court

then

recalled

the

government

attorneys,

The
and,

after opining that Williams was making “a huge mistake,” granted
Williams’s request to represent himself.

J.A. 98-99.

C.
Trial

commenced

on

February

11,

2014.

In

light

of

Williams’s past criminal record and potential sentence, the U.S.
Marshals Service recommended that Williams be shackled and wear
an electronic stun device on his leg.

Williams wore street

clothes during his trial, along with padded shackles and the
stun device.
After opening statements, the government called the Sumter
County officer who had conducted the traffic stop.

On direct

examination, the government did not elicit testimony concerning
the

controlled

drug

buy,

instead

presenting

the

pretextual

window-tint violation as the lone impetus for stopping the car
5

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Williams

had

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been

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driving.

On

cross-examination,

however,

Williams immediately asked the officer about the earlier drug
transaction.

The government’s remaining witnesses were experts

on drugs and firearms.
At the beginning of the second day of trial, the district
court asked Williams if he had had any second thoughts about
representing

himself.

Williams

confirmed

that

he

wished

to

continue to do so, and the trial continued with the balance of
the

government’s

Williams

sought

case-in-chief.
to

recall

When

the

Sumter

the

government

County

officer

rested,
to

the

stand.

Noting that Williams had had an opportunity to cross-

examine

the

officer

already,

the

district

court

denied

the

request.
Williams called no other witnesses, but chose to testify on
his own behalf.

The district court had Williams take and leave

the stand with the jury out of the courtroom so that the jury
would not observe Williams’s shackles.

During his testimony,

Williams asked (himself) “did I carry guns when I was out?” and
answered “[n]o, I didn’t carry no gun because I know I was a
convicted felon and I know what could happen to me.”

J.A. 273.

The government argued successfully that this “broad denial” of
firearm

possession

Williams’s

prior

opened
firearm

the

door

to

possessions,

proceeded to question Williams about them.
6

introduce
and

the

J.A. 275.

evidence

of

government

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Williams also testified on re-direct that he had not been
involved

in

any

pulled over.

drug

transaction

shortly

before

he

had

been

After Williams rested, the government called a

rebuttal witness, a Sumter County narcotics officer, to testify
about

the

controlled

testimony

that

some

drug
of

buy.

the

cash

The

government

recovered

from

elicited
Williams’s

pockets during the traffic stop was the same marked cash that
had

been

provided

to

the

confidential

informant

to

purchase

cocaine from Williams during the controlled buy.
The jury deliberated for less than an hour, returning a
verdict of guilty on all counts.

On June 20, 2014, the district

court sentenced Williams to the statutory mandatory minimum term
of 15 years in prison.

This appeal followed, with Williams

represented by appointed appellate counsel.

II.
We review arguments raised for the first time on appeal for
plain error.

United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th

Cir. 2013).
To establish plain error, [the appellant] must show
that the district court erred, that the error was
plain, and that it affected his substantial rights.
With regard to the third element of that standard,
[the appellant] must show that the alleged error
actually “affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.”

7

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Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Olano,
507

U.S.

725,

734

(1993)).

We

review

a

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

district

court’s

United States v.

Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir. 1996).

III.
Williams argues that the district court erred by permitting
him to represent himself.

It is “fundamental” that “a criminal

defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.”
Bernard, 708 F.3d at 588 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 819, 821 (1975)).

However, a defendant’s request to waive

the right to counsel and proceed pro se must be “(1) clear and
unequivocal, (2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and (3)
timely.”

Id.

The record makes plain that Williams’s request was “clear
and unequivocal” and “timely,” such that only his competency to
knowingly,

intelligently,

counsel is at issue.
had

the

district

and

voluntarily

waive

his

right

to

Williams’s overarching argument is that

court

asked

more

about

his

educational

background, it would have learned facts establishing that he was
not competent to represent himself.

These facts include that

Williams had a history of being in learning-disabled classes,
had

failed

in

his

first

attempt

8

to

secure

a

GED,

and

that

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Williams had stated that as a child he had threatened to kill
himself to avoid being beaten by his mother.3
Williams’s
standard.

argument

misapprehends

the

Faretta

competency

“[T]he competence that is required of a defendant

seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive
the right, not the competence to represent himself.”

Bernard,

708 F.3d at 589 (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399
(1993)).

As we explained in Bernard, “it is constitutional for

a state to allow a defendant to conduct trial proceedings on his
own behalf when he has been found competent to stand trial.”
708 F.3d at 589 (citing Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 172-73
(2008)).

There is no suggestion that Williams was incompetent

to stand trial, and Williams does not argue otherwise on appeal.
Nor

does

Williams

point

to

any

authority

requiring

a

district court to elicit particular educational or background
information from a defendant seeking to represent themselves.
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has “prescribed any
formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he
elects to proceed without counsel.”

Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77,

88 (2004); accord Spates v. Clarke, 547 F. App’x 289, 293 (4th

3

Other facts cut against Williams’s argument, including
that an IQ test placed his overall intellectual functioning in
the average range, that he eventually earned his GED (apparently
on the second attempt), and that he was taking classes in auto
mechanics at a state technical college.
9

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Cir. 2013).

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The defendant must only “be made aware of the

dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” such that “he
knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 183 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835); see
also, e.g., United States v. Parker, 576 F. App’x 157, 162 (4th
Cir. 2014).
The record makes clear that the district court went out of
its way to make Williams aware of the “dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation,” including repeatedly advising Williams
that the court thought his interests would be better served by
not

attempting

to

represent

himself.

In

other

words,

the

district court made sure Williams’s choice was made with “eyes
open.”

We

affirm

the

district

court’s

decision

to

allow

Williams to represent himself.

IV.
Williams also contends that the district court erred by not
reinstating appointed counsel after observing Williams’s trial
performance.
mistakes

he

The gist of Williams’s argument is that certain
made

during

trial,

such

as

opening

the

door

to

evidence of his prior firearms offenses, should have led the
district court to conclude that he was incompetent to continue
representing

himself.

This

argument

appropriate competency standard.
10

again

misapprehends

the

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It

is

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true

that

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competency

can

change

over

time.

For

example, a mentally-ill defendant may be rendered competent to
stand trial through medication, but become incompetent during
the

trial

if

the

medication

ceases

Bernard, 708 F.3d at 586-87.

to

be

effective.

Cf.

But the competency standard does

not change over the course of the trial.

Williams’s missteps at

trial simply do not call into question his mental competency to
stand

trial

or

to

choose

self-representation.

“‘[I]t

is

undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could
better

defend

unskilled

with

efforts,’

counsel’s
[but]

a

guidance

criminal

than

by

defendant’s

their
ability

own
to

represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose
self-representation.”

Godinez,

509

U.S.

at

400

(quoting

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834); see also, e.g., Bernard, 708 F.3d at
593 (“[Defendant’s] failure to object during the Government’s
case-in-chief, question two of the witnesses, call witnesses on
his

own

behalf,

or

otherwise

‘think

render him mentally incompetent.”).
district

court’s

decision

to

allow

like

a

lawyer’

did

not

We therefore affirm the
Williams

to

continue

to

represent himself.

V.
Finally, Williams assigns error to a number of the district
court’s

trial

management

decisions.
11

Specifically,

Williams

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argues that the district court erred by: (1) ordering that he be
shackled during trial; (2) denying his request to take certain
discovery materials with him to the detention center prior to
trial;

(3)

suggesting

that

he

could

not

subpoena

witnesses

unless he could personally pay the witness fee; and (4) denying
his request to recall a government witness to the stand.

We

find each of these contentions to be without merit.

A.
Williams argues that the district court’s shackling order
was

unjustified

exercise

his

and

Sixth

impermissibly
Amendment

impeded

right

to

his

ability

to

self-representation.

Williams relies primarily on Deck v. Missouri, which established
that “where a court, without adequate justification, orders the
defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the
defendant
“[t]he

need

State

not

must

demonstrate
prove

beyond

actual
a

prejudice”

reasonable

but

doubt

instead

that

the

[shackling] . . . did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”
544

U.S.

(internal

622,

635

(2005)

quotation

marks

(final
omitted).

alteration

in

However,

original)
Williams’s

premise, that the district court ordered him shackled without
adequate justification, is not supported by the record.
district

court

had

a

shackling

recommendation

from

the

The
U.S.

Marshals Service, a recommendation based on, among other things,
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Williams’s extensive criminal record and the seriousness of the
current

charges.

Further,

the

district

court

(and

the

government), took reasonable measures to minimize the impact of
the shackles and stun device.

See, e.g., J.A. 114 (indicating

Williams was provided street clothing and that shackles were
padded to prevent noise that might alert the jury); J.A. 219
(indicating the government questioned witnesses from its counsel
desk to be consistent with Williams); J.A. 281-82 (indicating
Williams took the stand and stood down outside the presence of
the jury).

We find no error in the district court’s shackling

decision.

B.
Williams
represent

himself

restricted
disagree.
because

also

contends
because

discovery

that

he

materials

did
at

he
not
the

could
have

not

effectively

access

detention

to

certain

center.

We

The record indicates that the material was restricted
of

confidential
reasonably

potentially
informant,
barred

such

identifying
and

a

material

information

standing
from

the

about

discovery
detention

a

order
center.

Williams was fully aware of the information contained in the
material, as his appointed counsel had previously discussed it
with him.
courthouse.

Williams also had access to the material while at the
Williams does not point to any discovery material
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that would have been relevant to his defense and has made no
showing “that the alleged error actually ‘affected the outcome
of the district court proceedings.’”

Bernard, 708 F.3d at 588

(quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).

C.
Williams further contends that the district court impeded
his ability to represent himself by requiring him, an indigent
defendant, to pay the witness fees for any witnesses he wished
to subpoena.
record.

Again, this contention is not supported by the

Williams’s motion to proceed pro se stemmed from his

desire to subpoena certain witnesses that his appointed counsel
had refused to subpoena.

As part of the Faretta colloquy, the

district court asked Williams about his knowledge of subpoena
procedures, including the ordinary need to pay a witness fee.
This appears to us plainly part of the district court’s effort
to

make

Williams

“aware

self-representation.”

of

the

dangers

and

disadvantages

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.

of

Immediately

after the district court’s discussion of subpoena procedures,
the government clarified that the witness fee would not be an
issue.

In any event, at the time the exchange took place,

Williams was still represented by counsel, and his counsel did
not object at any point.

There is simply no indication from the

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district

court

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in

fact

placed

any

financial

impediment in the way of Williams’s self-representation.

D.
Finally, Williams argues that the district court erred by
not allowing him to recall the officer who searched his car to
the stand.
had

the

We disagree.

authority

to

The district court recognized that it

allow

the

officer

to

be

recalled,

but

reasoned that Williams had already had a chance to thoroughly
cross-examine

the

witness,

refuse Williams’s request.

and

exercised

its

discretion

to

We find no abuse of discretion here.

Cf. Ford, 88 F.3d at 1362 (finding no abuse of discretion where
district

court

refused

to

allow

recall

of

a

cross-examined

witness where defendant could make proposed point to jury via
closing arguments).

VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED

15