US v. Ider Mato

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cr-00337-TDS-1 and 1:14-cr-00004-TDS-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999586634]. [14-4513, 14-4514]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4513

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
IDER VAZQUEZ MATOS,
Cono, a/k/a Compa,

a/k/a

The

Cuban,

a/k/a

I.D.,

a/k/a

a/k/a

I.D.,

a/k/a

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4514

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
IDER VAZQUEZ MATOS,
Cono, a/k/a Compa,

a/k/a

The

Cuban,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00337-TDS-1; 1:14-cr-00004-TDS-1)

Submitted:

April 24, 2015

Decided:

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

May 20, 2015

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cindy H. Popkin-Bradley, CINDY H. POPKIN-BRADLEY ATTORNEY AT
LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, First Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Ider Vazquez Matos appeals
his

conviction

and

60-month

sentence

imposed

following

his

guilty plea to bulk cash smuggling and aiding and abetting, in
violation

of

31

U.S.C.

§ 5332(a)(1)

(2012),

18

U.S.C.

§ 2

(2012), and the concurrent 130-month sentence imposed following
his

guilty

plea

distribute

5

to

conspiracy

kilograms

or

more

to

possess

of

cocaine

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012).

with

intent

to

hydrochloride,

in

Matos raises two arguments

on appeal: (1) that the district court erred in accepting his
guilty
because

plea
the

to

bulk

record

cash

failed

smuggling
to

and

provide

aiding

an

and

independent

abetting
factual

basis for this count, and (2) that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Matos’ request for a downward variance and
in imposing an unduly harsh sentence.

Finding no reversible

error, we affirm.
“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”
Crim.

P.

determining

11(b)(3).
whether

The
a

court

factual

has

basis

broad

exists

and

Fed. R.

discretion
may

rely

in
on

anything appearing in the record.

United States v. Ketchum, 550

F.3d 363, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2008).

The court is not required to

“satisfy itself that a jury would find the defendant guilty, or
even that [the] defendant is guilty by a preponderance of the
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evidence,” but “must assure itself simply that the conduct to
which

the

defendant

admits

is

in

fact

an

offense

under

statutory provision under which he is pleading guilty.”
States

v.

Carr,

271

F.3d

172,

178-79

(internal quotation marks omitted).

n.6

(4th

the

United

Cir.

2001)

The court “need only be

subjectively satisfied that there is a sufficient factual basis
for

a

conclusion

that

the

elements of the offense.”

defendant

committed

all

of

the

United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d

649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997).
Because Matos did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea or
timely assert any infirmity in the plea colloquy, we review his
challenge to the plea’s factual basis for plain error.

United

States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007).

To

establish plain error, Matos must demonstrate that (1) an error
occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected
his substantial rights.
732 (1993).

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

Even if Matos meets these requirements, we will

correct the error only if it “seriously affects the fairness,
integrity
Henderson

or
v.

public
United

reputation
States,

133

of
S.

judicial
Ct.

1121,

proceedings.”
1126-27

(2013)

(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the guilty plea context, a defendant establishes that an
error affected his substantial rights if he shows “a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered
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the plea.”
(2013)

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United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2147

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

To

meet

this

standard, the defendant “must . . . satisfy the judgment of the
reviewing

court,

informed

by

the

entire

record,

that

the

probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.”

United States v.

Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Assuming,

without

deciding,

that

the

presentence

report

failed to provide an adequate factual basis for Matos’ plea to
the

bulk

cash

smuggling

offense,

we

conclude

Matos

fails

establish that his substantial rights were affected.
our

review

of

the

record

in

its

entirety

—

to

Rather,

including

the

presentence report and Matos’ statements during the plea and
sentencing hearings — establishes no reasonable probability that
Matos would not have pled guilty but for the alleged error.
We

review

deferential

a

sentence

for

abuse-of-discretion

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).

reasonableness,
standard.”

Gall

applying
v.

“a

United

Because Matos does not argue

that the district court committed procedural error, our review
is limited to the substantive reasonableness of Matos’ sentence. *

*

The Government asserts that we lack the authority to
review the sentencing court’s denial of Matos’ request for a
below-Guidelines sentence.
Because Matos sought a downward
(Continued)
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United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 528 (4th Cir. 2014).

A

sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,”
to satisfy the purposes of sentencing.
(2012).

In

consider

evaluating

whether,

substantive

viewing

the

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
reasonableness,

totality

of

the

we

must

circumstances,

“the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that
the

sentence

§ 3553(a).”

it

chose

satisfied

the

standards

set

forth

in

United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216

(4th Cir. 2010).
We “can reverse a sentence only if it is unreasonable, even
if

the

States

sentence
v.

(internal

Yooho

would
Weon,

not

quotation

722

marks

have

been

F.3d

[our]

583,

omitted).

590
A

sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal.

choice.”
(4th

United

Cir.

2013)

within-Guidelines
United States v.

Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
421 (2014).
“by

showing

Matos bears the burden to rebut this presumption
that

the

sentence

is

unreasonable

against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”

when

measured

Id.

variance, not a departure, we retain authority to review the
court’s denial of that request.
See United States v. Brewer,
520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008). That inquiry is encompassed
in Matos’ overarching argument that the court imposed an unduly
harsh sentence.

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We conclude that Matos fails to make such a showing.

Matos

does not demonstrate that any deficiency in the factual basis
for his guilty plea had an appreciable impact on the court’s
sentencing calculus.
squarely

in

the

The district court grounded the sentence

relevant

§ 3553(a)

factors,

including

Matos’

history and characteristics and the legitimate need to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
to

provide

conduct,

just

and

punishment,

to

protect

the

to

deter

public.

others
While

from

Matos

similar

identified

numerous mitigating facts related to his personal history and
characteristics
facts

are

not

and

his

acceptance

sufficiently

of

compelling

responsibility,
to

require

lower than that imposed by the district court.
not

rebutted

the

presumption

within-Guidelines sentence.

of

a

these

sentence

Thus, Matos has

reasonableness

accorded

See Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

his

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

7