US v. Samuel Mamudu

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cr-00227-HEH-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999523360].. [14-4596]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4596

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL G. MAMUDU,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:13-cr-00227-HEH-1)

Submitted:

January 29, 2015

Before AGEE and
Circuit Judge.

KEENAN,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

February 4, 2015

DAVIS,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S.
Platt, Appellate Attorney, Carolyn V. Grady, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J.
Boente, United States Attorney, Erik S. Siebert, Assistant
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Samuel G. Mamudu appeals the 216-month upward variant
sentence

imposed

conviction

for

violation

of

18

by

the

district

interference
U.S.C.

§

court

with

following

commerce

1951(a)

(2012),

by
and

a

jury

robbery,

in

brandishing

a

firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012).

On appeal, Mamudu contends that the

upward variant sentence is unreasonable.

Finding no error, we

affirm.
We review sentences for reasonableness under an abuse
of discretion standard.

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,

576 (4th Cir. 2010); see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46
(2007).

“In reviewing a variant sentence, we consider whether

the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its
decision

to

impose

such

a

sentence

and

with

respect

extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.”
States

v.

Washington,

743

F.3d

938,

944

(4th

the

district

to

the

United

Cir.

2014)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
Mamudu
decision

to

first

impose

an

contends
upward

that

variance

is

court’s

unreasonable.

In

imposing a variance, the district court must adequately explain
its decision; that explanation “must be tied to the factors set
forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] and must be accompanied
by findings of fact as necessary.”
2

United States v. Hernandez-

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Villanueva,
citation

Filed: 02/04/2015

473

F.3d

omitted).

118,
The

Pg: 3 of 4

122-23

court

is

(4th

Cir.

2007)

not,

however,

(internal

required

to

“explicitly discuss each factor on the record or robotically
tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection.”
Rivera-Santana,

668

F.3d

95,

105

(4th

United States v.

Cir.

2012)

(internal

quotation marks omitted).
We

discern

determination
case.

The

no

that

upward

an

district

court

error

in

the

district

court’s

variance

was

warranted

in

considered

the

§ 3553(a)

factors,

this

explained the basis for the upward variance, and clearly tied
the variance to several of the § 3553(a) factors.

Thus, we

conclude that the district court’s decision to impose an upward
variance was reasonable.
Mamudu also contends that the extent of the district
court’s upward variance is unreasonable.

Any sentence imposed

by the district court “must be sufficient, but not greater than
necessary,” to satisfy the purposes of sentencing.
§ 3553(a).

18 U.S.C.

“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion

when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors.”

United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.

2011); see Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d at 105 (stating that “it was
well within the court’s discretion to accord more weight to the
host

of

aggravating

factors”).

This

Court

must

“give

due

deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
3

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factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”

Gall,

552 U.S. at 51.
We conclude that, given the broad discretion afforded
to the district court, the extent of the upward variance is
reasonable.

Upon balancing several of the § 3553(a) factors,

the court found the extent of the variance to be adequate but
not greater than necessary to satisfy the § 3553(a) factors, and
we defer to that determination under the circumstances.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

4