US v. Marnae Snead

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:08-cr-00297-REP-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999653455]. [14-4628]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4628

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARNAE DEVON SNEAD,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00297-REP-1)

Submitted:

July 29, 2015

Before KEENAN and
Circuit Judge.

HARRIS,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

September 3, 2015

and

DAVIS,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S.
Platt, Appellate Attorney, Mary E. Maguire, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Olivia L.
Norman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Marnae

Devon

Snead

appeals

the

eighteen-month

term

of

imprisonment imposed by the district court upon revocation of
his term of supervised release.

On appeal, counsel has filed a

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning

whether

Snead’s

sentence

is

plainly

unreasonable.

Snead was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief, but he has not filed one.

Finding no reversible error,

we affirm.
The
sentence

district
after

court

revoking

has

broad

a

discretion

defendant’s

to

impose

supervised

a

release.

United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).

Thus,

we assume “a deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of [that] discretion.”

United States v.

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In reviewing a revocation sentence, we must “first decide
whether the sentence is unreasonable.”
so,

“we

follow

generally

the

Id. at 438.

procedural

and

In doing
substantive

considerations” employed in reviewing original sentences.

Id.

A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court has
considered the advisory policy statements contained in Chapter 7
of

the

Sentencing

Guidelines

and
2

the

applicable

18

U.S.C.

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§ 3553(a)

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(2012)

factors,

id.

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at

439,

explanation for the sentence chosen.
595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).

and

has

provided

some

United States v. Thompson,
A sentence is substantively

reasonable if the court states a proper basis for concluding
that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to
the statutory maximum.

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.

Only if we

find a sentence to be procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will we consider whether the sentence is “plainly” unreasonable.
Id. at 439.
Upon review, we conclude that the revocation sentence is
procedurally
indicate

unreasonable

that

it

because

considered

the

the

district

applicable

court
advisory

did

not

policy

statement range from Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Because Snead did not object to the district court’s omission,
we review for plain error.
170, 172 (4th Cir. 2015).

United States v. Lemon, 777 F.3d
To establish plain error, Snead must

demonstrate that (1) the district court committed an error; (2)
the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial
rights.

Henderson

v.

United

States,

133

S.

Ct.

1121,

1126

(2013).

“To demonstrate that a sentencing error affected his

substantial rights, [the defendant] would have to show that,
absent the error, a different sentence might have been imposed.”
United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 273 (4th Cir. 2010).
We conclude that Snead has not demonstrated that, had the court
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more thoroughly considered the applicable policy statement range
resulting

from

his

Grade

B

supervised

release

might have received a more favorable sentence.

violation,

he

Accordingly, we

find no reversible procedural error.
Substantively, the court stated a proper basis for imposing
the sentence, which fell within the statutory maximum.

See 18

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (stating
that court has “broad discretion to . . . impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).

Given the facts of this case, we conclude that

the district court did not abuse its broad discretion.
In

accordance

with

Anders,

we

have

reviewed

the

entire

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal.

We

therefore

affirm

the

district

court’s

judgment.

This Court requires that counsel inform Snead, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review.

If Snead requests that a petition be filed, but

counsel

believes

that

counsel

may

in

move

representation.

and

legal

this

a

petition

Court

for

would

leave

to

be

frivolous,

withdraw

from

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Snead.
facts

such

We dispense with oral argument because the

conclusions

are

4

adequately

presented

in

the

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materials

before

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this

Court

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and

argument

would

not

aid

the

decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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