US v. Wendy Moore

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:13-cr-00330-RMG-1. [999738474]. [14-4645, 14-4646]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4645

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WENDY ANNETTE MOORE,
Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4646

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER AUSTIN LATHAM,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Charleston.
Richard M. Gergel, District
Judge. (2:13-cr-00330-RMG-1; 2:13-cr-00330-RMG-5)

Argued:

December 10, 2015

Before TRAXLER,
Judges.

Chief

Judge,

Decided:

and

MOTZ

and

January 20, 2016

HARRIS,

Circuit

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Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion,
in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Motz joined.

ARGUED:
Andrew Mackenzie, BARRETT-MACKENZIE, LLC, Greenville,
South Carolina; James Arthur Brown, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF JIM
BROWN, PA, Beaufort, South Carolina, for Appellants.
Rhett
DeHart, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Nathan S. Williams,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Wendy Annette Moore and Christopher Austin
Latham

of

participating

Latham’s estranged wife.

in

a

murder-for-hire

plot

targeting

In this consolidated appeal, Moore and

Latham challenge their convictions, arguing that the district
court

constructively

amended

the

indictment

through

erroneous

jury instructions and improperly admitted hearsay and character
evidence.

We disagree, and affirm the convictions.

I.
A.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, see
United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2008), the
evidence at trial established the following.

On April 5, 2013,

police officers stopped Aaron Wilkinson as he drove through the
city of Charleston, South Carolina.

Wilkinson revealed to the

police that he and his former prison cellmate, Samuel Yenawine,
were involved in a murder-for-hire plot targeting Nancy Latham.
The planned murder had not yet occurred.
Investigators
Latham

and

Wendy

later
Moore

learned
also

that
were

appellants
involved

in

Christopher
the

plot.

Christopher Latham, a banking executive in Charleston, was in
the process of divorcing the targeted victim, Nancy Latham, now
known as Nancy Cannon.

Moore was Latham’s assistant at the
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bank, as well as his girlfriend.

Moore is also the ex-wife of

Samuel Yenawine.
Wilkinson explained to the police that a few days before
the April 5 stop, Yenawine had suggested to him that they travel
together from Louisville, Kentucky to Nashville, Tennessee to
buy drugs.

Wilkinson agreed, and Yenawine’s girlfriend, Rachel

Palmer, rented a car for them – the car that Wilkinson was
driving when the police stopped him.

Once the two men were on

the road, Yenawine told Wilkinson that they actually were headed
to South Carolina, where Yenawine planned to kill a person he
described as a witness in a RICO case.
After arriving in Charleston, Yenawine purchased a pay-asyou-go cell phone and Wilkinson heard him use it to speak to a
woman.

Yenawine told Wilkinson that the woman would meet them

at a hotel in North Charleston and that she would be driving a
white 2001 Dodge Durango.

Appellant Moore, who drove a white

Dodge Durango at the time, arrived at the hotel, and Wilkinson
observed

Yenawine

meet

with

her.

Moore

rented

a

room

for

Yenawine and Wilkinson, and Yenawine returned from the meeting
with

$5,000

cash

and

other

items.

Yenawine

gave

Wilkinson

$2,500 for himself and another $2,000 to wire to Rachel Palmer
in Kentucky.
Wilkinson observed Yenawine meet with Moore a second time
in

a

different

location,

returning
4

this

time

with

a

manila

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envelope.

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Investigators determined that the envelope contained

a “hit packet” with information related to the plot to murder
Nancy

Cannon,

including

printed

maps

with

handwritten

notes;

personal information about Cannon, her family, her schedule, her
vehicle, and her daily routine; and photographs of Cannon, her
residence, and one of her daughters.
Investigators later linked the contents of the hit packet
to appellants Latham and Moore.

The hit packet’s photograph of

Cannon’s house, for instance, was found on Latham’s personal
cell phone.
the

Handwriting analysis revealed that notes on some of

materials

were

written

by

Moore.

And

the

government’s

evidence connected other contents of the hit packet to activity
on

Latham’s

phone

and

the

appellants’

office

computers

and

individual office printers.
Investigators
including

cell

also

phone

uncovered

tower

evidence

independent
and

bank

evidence

records

–

–

that

further corroborated Wilkinson’s story.

And the government’s

evidence

parents

suggested

that

Latham

and

his

had

provided

funds to pay Moore’s lawyers, and that Moore and her parents had
provided funds to pay Yenawine’s lawyer.
Moore, Yenawine, and Wilkinson were arrested in April 2013
and charged with crimes related to the murder-for-hire plot.
June 2013, Yenawine committed suicide in jail.

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B.
On

August

indictment

6,

2013,

against

the

grand

appellants

Wilkinson and Palmer.
here,

a

indictment

Moore

use

interstate

returned

and

a

Latham,

superseding
as

well

as

In the two counts principally at issue
charged

Moore

crimes involving murder for hire:
to

jury

commerce

and

Latham

with

federal

Count One charged conspiracy

facilities

in

the

commission

of

murder for hire, and Count Three, the use of interstate commerce
facilities

in

the

commission

of

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a).

murder

for

hire,

both

in

Moore alone was charged in

Count Two with solicitation of murder for hire in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 373 and 1958, and both appellants were charged in
Count

Four

with

illegal

firearm

possession

under

18

U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1) and (2).
Moore and Latham were tried before a jury in the District
of South Carolina in February of 2014. 1
on all four counts against her.

The jury convicted Moore

Latham was convicted only on

Count Three, with the jury unable to agree on Counts One and
Four.

The district court declared a mistrial on Counts One and

Four as

to

Latham,

and

the

government

later

dismissed

those

charges.

1

Wilkinson pled
diversion program.

guilty

and

6

Palmer

entered

a

pretrial

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Latham was sentenced to 120 months in prison, and Moore was
sentenced to 180 months.

The district court denied appellants’

post-trial motions, and this timely appeal followed.

II.
Moore and Latham’s first contention is that their Fifth
Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury was violated when
the

district

court,

through

its

instructions

to

the

jury,

constructively amended Counts One and Three of the indictment
against them.
allowed

the

According to Moore and Latham, those instructions
jury

to

convict

them

under

one

provision

of

§ 1958(a), which prohibits the use of a “facility” of interstate
commerce in connection with a murder for hire, while they were
charged

only

commerce.

under

another,

covering

“travel”

in

interstate

For the reasons discussed below, we disagree.
A.

We begin with the background principles that govern a claim
of constructive amendment.

The Fifth Amendment of the United

States Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”

And it is “the

exclusive province of the grand jury” to alter or broaden the
charges set out in an indictment.

United States v. Whitfield,

695 F.3d 288, 309 (4th Cir. 2012).
7

Accordingly, it is well

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established that “a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried
on charges that are not made in the indictment against him.”
United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 711 (4th Cir. 1994) (en
banc)

(quoting

Stirone

v.

United

States,

361

U.S.

212,

217

(1960)).
An impermissible constructive amendment – also referred to
as

a

“fatal

through

variance”

its

–

presentation

occurs
of

when

the

evidence

government,

or

argument,

usually
or

the

district court, usually through its jury instructions, “broadens
the possible bases for conviction beyond those presented by the
grand jury.”

Floresca, 38 F.3d at 710; see also United States

v. Randall, 171 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 1999).

The key inquiry

is whether a defendant has been tried on charges other than
those listed in the indictment.

United States v. Allmendinger,

706 F.3d 330, 339 (4th Cir. 2013).
Of

particular

importance

here,

when

a

constructive

amendment claim rests on allegedly erroneous jury instructions,
a

reviewing

court

circumstances
indictment

–

but

is

including
also

the

to

consider

not

only

arguments

the

the
of

totality

instructions
the

parties

of

the

and

the

and

the

evidence presented at trial – to determine whether a jury could
have

“reasonably

interpreted”

the

challenged

“license to convict” on an unindicted charge.
at 514-15.

instructions

as

Lentz, 524 F.3d

If not – if a reasonable jury, in light of the full
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context, would not have thought that it was permitted to convict
on

a

ground

not

included

in

the

constructive amendment has occurred.

indictment

–

then

Id. at 515-16.

no

Whether,

under that standard, appellants’ indictment was constructively
amended

is

a

question

of

law

that

we

review

de

novo.

See

Whitfield, 695 F.3d at 306.
B.
To support federal criminal liability, 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)
enumerates two distinct and alternative jurisdictional elements,
or links to interstate commerce.

Under the “travel prong,” a

defendant may be convicted if he or she “travels in or causes
another . . . to travel in interstate or foreign commerce” in
connection

with

a

murder

for

hire.

Or,

alternatively,

a

defendant may be convicted under the “facilities prong” if he or
she

“uses

facility
§ 1958(a).
the

or
of

causes

another . . .

interstate

or

to

foreign

use

the

mail

commerce.”

18

or

any

U.S.C.

Under either prong, the government must prove that

defendant’s

conduct

was

undertaken

murder be committed” for compensation.

“with

intent

that

a

Id.

In this case, the government charged Moore and Latham only
under

the

indictment

travel
alleged

prong
that

of

§

1958(a).

Moore

and

Count

Latham

One

“did

of

the

knowingly

conspire, confederate, agree and have a tacit understanding with
each other and with others . . . to travel in, and cause another
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to travel in, interstate commerce, with the intent that a murder
be committed” for compensation.
charged

that

the

J.A. 41.

appellants,

“as

Likewise, Count Three

principals,

aiders

and

abettors, and as co-participants in jointly undertaken criminal
activity,

unlawfully

and

willfully

traveled

in

and

caused

another to travel in interstate and foreign commerce, to wit,
travel between Kentucky and South Carolina, with intent that a
murder be committed” for compensation.

J.A. 42.

In its closing instructions, the district court first read
the indictment to the jury, advising that the appellants were
charged under the travel prong in Counts One and Three.

But –

and here is where the question in this case arises – as it went
on to describe § 1958(a), the court made two references to the
uncharged facilities prong.

Specifically, the court stated:

To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1958(a), the
Government must prove a defendant, one, traveled or
caused another to travel in interstate commerce [or]
use[d], or cause[d] another person to use the mail or
any facility in interstate commerce; second, with the
intent
that
a
murder
be
committed;
third,
as
consideration for the receipt or promise to pay
anything of pecuniary value.
J.A. 1670-71 (emphasis added); see also J.A. 1672-73.

The court

also provided the jurors a written copy of its instructions,
including the two references to the facilities prong.
objected.

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No party

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Latham and Moore both filed post-trial motions in which
they

argued

for

constructively

the

first

amended

time

the

that

the

indictment

district
by

facilities prong in its jury instructions.

court

mentioning

had
the

The district court

denied the motions, finding that no constructive amendment had
occurred.
C.
Latham

and

Moore

again

urge

that

the

district

court

constructively amended Counts One and Three of the indictment
against them by adverting to the facilities prong of § 1958(a)
in

its

instructions.

instructing
charged

in

amendment.

a
an

jury

We

on

acknowledge

the

facilities

indictment

could

that

in

prong

some

when

constitute

a

it

cases,
is

not

constructive

But under the totality of the circumstances here,

including the jury instructions, the verdict form provided to
the jury, the arguments of the parties, and the evidence, see
Lentz, 524 F.3d at 514–15, we find that the district court’s two
references

to

the

“use

of

facilities”

did

not

constitute

a

constructive amendment.
First, the bulk of the jury instructions properly tracked
the indictment and omitted any mention of the facilities prong.
The

court’s

travel.

opening

instructions

to

the

jury

described

only

In its closing instructions, the court read aloud the

critical portions of the indictment, which charged only travel,
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expressly

cautioned

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that

the

appellants

were

“not

on

trial for any act or crime not contained in the indictment,”
J.A. 1665.

The court provided a written copy of its accurate

summary of the indictment to the jurors, as well as a verdict
form that correctly set forth the charges in the indictment.
And

the

court

called

special

attention

to

the

verdict

form,

instructing the jury to use the verdict form, along with the
jury charges, “in a methodical way” to reach its decision.

J.A.

1680.
Second, the parties’ arguments focused solely on the travel
prong.

Neither

the

government

nor

counsel

for

Moore

ever

mentioned “use of facilities” of interstate commerce in opening
or

closing

arguments.

The

only

reference

to

“facilitating

interstate commerce” came from counsel for Latham who, in his
closing

argument,

used

that

term

–

Wilkinson’s travel across state lines.

but

only

J.A. 1618.

to

describe

And in its

closing argument, the government made clear that it was relying
on the travel prong:

“[W]hat the law requires is travel in

interstate commerce, and the judge will tell you driving from
Kentucky down to South Carolina covers your interstate commerce.
Sounds like a strange term, but really is crossing state lines.”
J.A.

1554;

see

also

J.A.

1555

(government

explaining

that

“whether you’re the one that traveled or whether you assist the
people that are traveling . . . you’re equally responsible”).
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It

is

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true,

as

the

Pg: 13 of 17

government

acknowledges,

that

the

evidence at trial involved “extensive testimony regarding items
that could be considered facilities of interstate commerce –
that is, phones and computers.”
original).
to

Response Br. at 35 (emphasis in

But the appellants’ use of cell phones and computers

communicate

about

the

plot

against

Nancy

Cannon

and

to

prepare the hit packet was presented as substantive evidence
that Latham and Moore were involved in the murder-for-hire plan,
not in a way that tied it to the facilities prong of § 1958(a).
Indeed, the term “facilities of interstate commerce” was never
defined for the jury, and the government never suggested that
mere use of technology, independent of its effect on interstate
travel, was a basis for convicting the appellants.
In sum, when the jury instructions, the verdict form, and
the

arguments

and

evidence

presented

at

trial

are

viewed

in

their totality, we find that the jury could not reasonably have
concluded that it was free to convict the appellants under the
uncharged,
statute.
706

F.3d

undefined

facilities

prong

of

the

murder-for-hire

See Lentz, 524 F.3d at 514–15; see also Allmendinger,
at

339.

Accordingly,

we

hold

that

the

jury

instructions did not constructively amend the indictment in this
case.

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III.
We can dispose of the appellants’ evidentiary challenges
more briefly.

First, Moore and Latham assert that the district

court improperly admitted out-of-court statements made by Samuel
Yenawine.

And

second,

they

argue

that

the

district

court

erroneously admitted “character evidence” as to appellant Moore.
We find no fault with the district court’s evidentiary rulings.
A.
At trial, the government called Tyler Lee Tudor to testify
about

statements

suicide.
and

Yenawine

had

made

to

him

before

committing

After Yenawine was arrested in April of 2013, Tudor

Yenawine

testified

became

that

involvement

in

cellmates

and

friends

he

and

Yenawine

had

a

murder-for-hire

in

jail.

discussed

plot

Tudor

Yenawine’s

targeting

someone

affiliated with the South Carolina Lottery – as Nancy Cannon was
at the time, serving on the South Carolina Lottery Commission.
According to Tudor, Yenawine also had stated that the operation
involved his ex-wife and a banker.
Moore

filed

a

motion

Yenawine’s statements.

in

limine

seeking

to

exclude

The district court denied the motion,

holding that the statements were admissible under the “statement
against
evidence.

interest”

exception

to

the

See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).

14

rule

against

hearsay

We review the district

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court’s

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admission

of

this

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evidence

for

abuse

of

discretion.

United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 351 (4th Cir. 2010).
“[A]

statement

admissible

if

it

made

is

by

an

one

that

unavailable

‘a

reasonable

declarant
person

in

is
the

declarant’s position would have made only if the person believed
it to be true’” because it “‘had so great a tendency to . . .
expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability.’”

United

States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 649 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A)).
by

corroborating

trustworthiness.”

The statement must be “supported

circumstances

that

clearly

indicate

its

Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(B).

Moore and Latham contend that the district court abused its
discretion

in

admitting

Yenawine’s

statements

“trustworthiness” portion of this standard.
appellants,

Yenawine’s

statements

were

under

the

According to the

inherently

unreliable,

given that Yenawine might have thought he could “cut a deal to
tell his story” and Tudor may have hoped that his testimony
would result in leniency in his own case.

Opening Br. at 44.

But as the district court explained, Yenawine had no reason to
shade the story he told a cellmate, and the appellants cannot
establish

that

the

district

court

abused

its

discretion

in

finding sufficient corroboration of Yenawine’s statements.
Moore

and

Latham’s

suggestion

that

the

admission

of

Yenawine’s statements implicated the Sixth Amendment is likewise
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without

merit.

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Only

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“testimonial”

statements

are

excludable

under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, Dargan, 738
F.3d at 650, and we have held that statements by one prisoner to
another are “clearly nontestimonial.”
Davis

v.

Washington,

547

U.S.

813,

Id. at 650-51 (quoting
825

(2006)).

The

Sixth

Amendment adds nothing to the appellants’ claim, and we find no
error in the admission of Yenawine’s out-of-court statements.
B.
Moore and Latham’s final contention is that the district
court

admitted

certain

“character

evidence”

in

violation

of

Federal Rule of Evidence 404, which prohibits use of character
evidence to prove a propensity to engage in particular conduct. 2
Because the appellants did not raise that objection at trial, we
review it only for plain error.
F.3d 184, 189 (4th Cir. 2014).
finding

that

(3) that
“seriously

(1) there

“affect[ed]
affect[ed]

was

United States v. Keita, 742
Thus, we may reverse only on a

“error,”

substantial
the

rights,”

fairness,

reputation of judicial proceedings.”

(2) that

was
and

integrity,

“plain,”
(4) that

or

public

Johnson v. United States,

520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
2

Specifically, Rule 404(a)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of
a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character or trait.”
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The testimony to which Moore and Latham object primarily
related to Yenawine’s prior conviction for arson, his alleged
involvement in a murder, and Moore’s role as a witness in the
related

proceedings.

In

addition,

they

contend

that

the

government improperly alluded to the crime of money laundering
when eliciting testimony related to Latham’s payment of Moore’s
attorney’s

fees,

and

Moore’s

parents’

payment

of

Yenawine’s

attorney’s fees.
Moore
testimony

and
to

Latham

which

alone “plain error.”

have

they

not

established

object

was

that

admitted

in

any

of

the

“error,”

let

Indeed, some of the testimony was elicited

by the appellants themselves, through counsel.

Moreover, the

record reflects that the district court required the government
to

correct

any

misperceptions

engendered

by

its

evidence

relating to Yenawine’s past and the money laundering comment.
So even assuming, arguendo, the existence of plain error, we
could

not

integrity,

find
or

the

“serious[]

public

[e]ffect[]”

reputation”

of

on

the

judicial

required for reversal under plain error review.

“fairness,
proceedings

See Johnson,

520 U.S. at 467; Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the appellants’ convictions are
AFFIRMED.
17