US v. Ramon Hope

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 0:05-cr-00095-MBS-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999615542]. [14-4671]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4671

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAMON R. HOPE,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District
Judge. (0:05-cr-00095-MBS-1)

Submitted:

May 21, 2015

Decided:

July 7, 2015

Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

W. Michael Duncan, AUSTIN & ROGERS, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Jimmie
Ewing, William E. Day, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Ramon R. Hope appeals the district court’s order revoking his
supervised release.

Hope contends that the evidence supporting

the supervised release revocation was seized in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights and that the district court erred in
declining to apply the exclusionary rule.

Finding no reversible

error, we affirm.
A district court’s decision to revoke supervised release is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999).

United States v. Pregent, 190
In considering the denial of a

motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings
for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.

United States

v. Brown, 757 F.3d 183, 190 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
229 (2014).
Hope’s claim that the evidence should have been suppressed
fails because the exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised
release revocation proceedings.

See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v.

Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998) (stating that “exclusionary rule
.

.

.

is

incompatible

with

the

traditionally

flexible,

administrative procedures of parole revocation”); United States v.
Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 393-95 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying Scott in
context of federal supervised release revocation proceedings).
Other circuits have recognized an exception to this rule in the
case of police harassment.

See, e.g., United States v. Charles,
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531 F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Montez, 952
F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d
160, 162 (6th Cir. 1975).

We conclude that the facts of this case

do not support the application of such an exception.
We therefore affirm the district court’s order.

We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately

presented

in

the

materials

before

this

court

and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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