US v. Steven William
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:12-cr-00278-RWT-2 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999617502].. [14-4690]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4690
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEVEN VONDELL WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:12-cr-00278-RWT-2)
Submitted:
June 30, 2015
Decided:
July 9, 2015
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Marc Gregory Hall, LAW OFFICES OF MARC G. HALL, P.C., Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Leah Jo Bressack, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Steven
Vondell
Williams
was
convicted,
following
a
jury
trial, on four counts: interference, and conspiracy to interfere,
with interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§
1951
(2012);
possession
and
brandishing
of
a
firearm
in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (2012); and possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
The district court
sentenced him to an aggregate term of 324 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Williams challenges several evidentiary rulings and the
reasonableness of his sentence.
Williams
admitting
first
into
claims
evidence
We affirm.
that
the
transcripts
district
court
from
coconspirator’s
his
erred
by
sentencing hearing and thereby violated his rights under the
Confrontation
Clause.
“[A]
violation
[of
the
Confrontation
Clause] may be found harmless on appeal if the beneficiary of the
constitutional error can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained[.]”
United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __
(U.S. June 11, 2015) (No. 14-10176), and petition for cert. filed,
__ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. June 12, 2015) (No. 14-10190); see United
States
v.
Johnson,
400
F.3d
187,
2
197
(4th
Cir.
2005).
A
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statement’s unconstitutional admission may be “harmless when the
[G]overnment introduced an abundance of other evidence and proved
parts of the defendant’s involvement without any use of [the
challenged] statement.”
293
(4th
Cir.
omitted).
2012)
United States v. Gillion, 704 F.3d 284,
(emphasis
and
internal
quotation
marks
We can assume the error occurred and “should avoid
deciding whether there was a violation of the Confrontation Clause
if any error was harmless.”
Reed, 780 F.3d at 269.
Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Williams
guilty based solely on the unchallenged evidence presented by the
Government.
An abundance of unchallenged evidence established
that Williams was one of the perpetrators of the robbery at issue,
and further evidence identifying him was unnecessary.
if
the
district
contravention
of
court
the
erred
by
admitting
Confrontation
the
Clause,
Thus, even
transcript
such
error
in
was
harmless.
Next,
Williams
permitting
hearsay
impermissible
claims
testimony
expert
the
and
testimony.
nonconstitutional
error,
demonstrates
the
that
that
such
error
3
unqualified
We
as
was
district
this,
harmless.
will
if
court
erred
or
otherwise
not
the
United
by
reverse
Government
States
v.
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Ibisevic, 675 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir. 2012).
In the context of
nonconstitutional error,
the Government must demonstrate that the error did not
have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict. An appellate court does
not inquire into whether absent the error sufficient
evidence existed to convict, but rather whether we
believe it highly probable that the error did not affect
the judgment. Thus, we must be able to say, with fair
assurance, after pondering all that happened without
stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the
judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.
We have identified three decisive factors in making
this determination: (1) the centrality of the issue
affected by the error; (2) the steps taken to mitigate
the effects of the error; and (3) the closeness of the
case.
Id. at 349-50 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the first two of these factors weigh in Williams’
favor, “[t]he final factor—the closeness of the case—is the single
most
important
inquiry.”
factor
in
a
nonconstitutional
harmless-error
Id. at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321, 1326 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The
closeness
inquiry
involves
assessing
whether
the
[unchallenged] evidence is not only sufficient to convict, but
whether it is sufficiently powerful in relation to the [challenged
evidence]
to
ensure
the
error
did
not
affect
the
outcome.”
Ibisevic, 675 F.3d at 354 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks
omitted).
4
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We conclude that the Government’s unchallenged evidence was
not only sufficient to find Williams guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, but also sufficiently powerful in relation to the evidence
Williams challenges that any error in the challenged rulings did
not affect the outcome.
Thus, it is highly probable that any error
in admitting the challenged evidence did not sway the jury or
affect the outcome of the judgment.
Because Williams’ claims of
erroneous evidentiary rulings necessarily would be only harmless
error, we affirm his conviction.
Lastly,
sentence.
Williams
challenges
the
reasonableness
of
his
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”
Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111
(4th Cir. 2015).
“First, we must determine whether the district
court committed any procedural error . . . .”
111.
Lymas, 781 F.3d at
“Only if we determine that the district court has not
committed procedural error do we proceed to assess ‘the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed,’” id. at 112 (quoting Gall,
552 U.S. at 51), under “the totality of the circumstances,” Gall,
552 U.S. at 51.
“[A]
sentence
[Sentencing]
appeal.
within
Guidelines
range
a
properly
is
calculated
presumptively
advisory
reasonable”
on
United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2014)
5
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(internal quotation marks omitted).
“A defendant can only rebut
the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.”
Id.
(alteration
and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
In
evaluating the sentence, we give due deference to the district
court because the district court need only “set forth enough to
satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for [its decision].”
Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
Williams
contends
that
the
district
court
committed
procedural error by failing to consider the application of the
§ 3553 factors to his case.
record.
This contention is belied by the
The district court specified § 3553 as the controlling
statute;
stated
sufficient,
but
that
not
it
was
greater
obliged
than
to
impose
necessary,
to
a
sentence
comply
with
§ 3553(a)’s factors; and specifically referred to each factor
listed in § 3553(a) that was relevant to the instant case.
See
United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
In applying
the § 3553(a) factors, the court individually assessed Williams’
case and the arguments he raised.
We perceive no procedural
unreasonableness,
that
and
we
conclude
meritless.
6
Williams’
claim
is
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Williams’ claim of substantive unreasonableness is likewise
without merit.
The district court heard Williams’ arguments
concerning application of the § 3553(a) factors to his case and
determined that those factors warranted a sentence at the high end
of Williams’ Guidelines range that ran consecutively to Williams’
existing sentence for an unrelated crime.
Absent substantive
unreasonableness in the district court’s assessment, Williams’
mere disagreement with it is no basis for vacating his sentence.
See United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 531 (4th Cir. 2014).
Because Williams has pointed to no procedural or substantive error
that is not flatly contradicted by the record or otherwise without
merit, he has not overcome the presumption of reasonableness
accorded his within-Guidelines sentence.
Accordingly we affirm
his sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
7
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