US v. Michael Palmer

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:14-cr-00031-RGD-DEM-1. [999799923]. [14-4736]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4736

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL JEROME PALMER,
Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Robert G. Doumar, Senior
District Judge. (2:14-cr-00031-RGD-DEM-1)

Argued:

December 10, 2015

Decided:

April 21, 2016

Before WILKINSON, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Wynn joined. Judge Wynn wrote a
separate concurring opinion.

ARGUED: James Orlando Broccoletti, ZOBY, BROCCOLETTI & NORMILE,
PC, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant.
Christopher John
Catizone, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Darryl J. Mitchell, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

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KING, Circuit Judge:
Michael Jerome Palmer appeals the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress drug and firearm evidence seized by
police officers during a traffic stop in Chesapeake, Virginia.
The court conducted an evidentiary hearing and, in early May
2014,

rendered

explained

its

below,

ruling

we

are

in

favor

satisfied

of

that

the
the

government.
officers

As

did

not

contravene the Fourth Amendment and thus affirm.

I.
A.
In April 2014, the federal grand jury in Norfolk, Virginia,
indicted Palmer
distribute

on

crack

two

offenses:

cocaine,

in

possession
contravention

with
of

intent
21

to

U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
the

drug

and

firearm

evidence

Palmer moved to suppress

underlying

the

charges,

which

Chesapeake officers had seized during the October 2013 traffic
stop of a vehicle driven by Palmer.

In May 2014, the district

court denied Palmer’s suppression motion.

See United States v.

Palmer, No. 2:14-cr-00031 (E.D. Va. May 5, 2014), ECF No. 35
(the “Opinion”).

In June 2014, Palmer pleaded guilty to both

offenses in the indictment, but reserved the right to appeal the
suppression ruling.

In September 2014, the court sentenced him
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to sixty-one months in prison.

Palmer timely noted this appeal,

and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
B.
1.
Because

the

district

court

denied

Palmer’s

motion

to

suppress, we recount the facts in the light most favorable to
the government.

See United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 689

(4th Cir. 2013).
Chesapeake

On October 15, 2013, Officer Ring of the

police

neighborhood.

was

patrolling

that

city’s

Ipswich

During his patrol, Ring stopped Palmer, who was

driving a silver Nissan Altima, on Paramont Avenue.

When Ring

exited his patrol car and greeted Palmer through the driver-side
window of the Nissan, he smelled an overwhelming odor of air
freshener.

He saw at least five air fresheners inside the car,

some hanging in the passenger compartment and others plugged
into the air-conditioning vents.

Ring advised Palmer that he

had been stopped because the Nissan’s windows were too darkly
tinted,

in

violation

of

state

law,

and

also

because

the

inspection sticker on the vehicle’s front windshield appeared
fraudulent.

Ring then obtained Palmer’s driver’s license and

the vehicle’s registration card, and returned to his patrol car
to make a database check.
From

the

driver’s

license

and

registration

Officer

Ring

learned that Palmer listed a P.O. box as his address and that
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the

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Nissan

Within

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was

minutes

registered
of

to

beginning

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a

woman

the

who

database

was

not

check,

present.

Ring

also

learned that Palmer was a suspected member of a gang called the
Bounty Hunter Bloods, according to a “caution” notice issued by
the nearby Norfolk Police Department.

See Opinion 2.

Ring

advised his colleague, Officer Blount — who was also on the
scene — of Palmer’s purported gang affiliation, and asked Blount
about the availability of a drug dog.
Officer Ring also sought information on Palmer from another
database called LInX.

Ring could not initially log into the

LInX system because his former partner had changed the password.
He eventually accessed LInX, however — about seven minutes into
the

traffic

credentials.

stop

—

by

utilizing

Officer

Blount’s

login

As Ring was logging into LInX and searching its

database, he called about a drug dog.
information that he had gathered:

Ring relayed by radio the

Palmer was nervous; there was

an overwhelming odor of air freshener from the Nissan; there
were at least five air fresheners in the car; Palmer’s driver’s
license address was a P.O. box, as opposed to a street address;
the Nissan was registered to someone other than the driver; and
Palmer was a suspected member of the Bounty Hunter Bloods.
About eleven minutes into the traffic stop, Officer Ring
identified

Palmer

in

LInX.

Ring

learned

that

Palmer

had

a

criminal record that included four arrests on drug charges plus
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an arrest for illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.

As a result, Ring radioed again about a drug dog, but

was unable to confirm its availability.

After completing his

LInX search, Ring returned to the Nissan from his patrol car.
Because he suspected the inspection sticker was fraudulent, Ring
decided to verify the sticker’s authenticity by looking at the
back of it, which would enable him to determine whether it was
legitimate.

After asking Palmer to exit the Nissan, Ring leaned

through the open driver-side door and examined the back of the
inspection

sticker.

While

reading

the

sticker

—

which

he

concluded was legitimate — Ring smelled marijuana.
Officer Ring immediately advised Palmer that he had grounds
to search the Nissan.

Because Ring wanted to be “110% sure”

that the Nissan contained drugs before searching the vehicle,
however, he again checked on the drug dog’s availability.

See

At that point — approximately seventeen minutes

Opinion 3.

after the traffic stop had been initiated — Ring called Officer
Duncan, who had a drug dog.

About ten minutes later, Duncan

arrived with the drug dog Boomer.

Duncan walked Boomer around

the Nissan, and the dog alerted twice.
Officers Ring and Duncan thereafter entered and searched
the Nissan.

They

discovered

a

clear

plastic

bag

containing

crack cocaine in the center front console and a 40-caliber Smith
&

Wesson

pistol

wedged

between
5

the

driver’s

seat

and

the

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console.
and

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As a result, Palmer was arrested.

arrest,

Ring

measurements

measured

confirmed

the

Nissan’s

Ring’s

initial

After the search

window

tint.

suspicion

Those

that

the

Nissan’s windows were illegally tinted. 1
2.
On

April

29,

2014,

the

district

court

conducted

evidentiary hearing on Palmer’s suppression motion.
hearing,

Officer

Ring

—

the

prosecution’s

only

an

During the
witness

—

recounted his actions and observations during the traffic stop.
Officer Ring explained that, before the traffic stop, he
knew of numerous citizen complaints to the authorities about the
sale and use of illegal drugs in the Ipswich area.

He also

described his familiarity with Virginia’s legal limits on window
tinting and said that he “could barely see into the vehicle”
that Palmer was driving.

See J.A. 71-74. 2

Aside from the window

tint, Ring suspected that the Nissan’s inspection sticker was
illegal, based on his experience and having stopped numerous
vehicles with fraudulent stickers.

Ring explained that he could

1

Officer Ring found that the side-front and side-rear
windows of the Nissan violated Virginia law by allowing light
transmittance of only 40% and 25%, respectively.
Virginia
requires side-front windows to permit light transmittance of at
least 50%, and side-rear windows to permit light transmittance
of at least 35%. See Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-1052(C).
2

Citations herein to “J.A. __” refer to the contents of
the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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not see the perforated portion that should be observable on a
legitimate
sticker,

he

sticker.
said,

The
shows

back

the

of

a

legitimate

perforated

portion

inspection

and

contains

information identifying the vehicle.
Although it is understandable for any person to be nervous
when interacting with the police, Officer Ring said that Palmer
“appeared to be more nervous than normal” during the traffic
stop.

See J.A. 79.

“being

overly

demeanor.”
fresheners,

Specifically, Ring observed that Palmer was

cooperative
Id.

Ring

but

Regarding
explained

still

very

Palmer’s

that

drug

nervous

liberal

in

his

of

air

often

use

use

traffickers

“heavy air freshening” to mask the “pungent odor” of marijuana.
See id. at 80.

Ring also explained that drug traffickers often

operate vehicles registered to others.

That is so because, when

the police apprehend a drug trafficker, they tend not to seize
the

vehicle

if

it

is

registered

to

someone

not

present.

Similarly, when Ring was asked — in light of the thousand-plus
drug investigations in which he had participated — whether a
P.O. box on a driver’s license can be indicative of involvement
in drug trafficking, he responded affirmatively.
Officer Ring also emphasized that he developed a concern
for officer safety after learning of Palmer’s suspected gang
affiliation

and

prior

criminal

record.

Ring

stated

that

“[c]riminal street gangs are known for violence” and that his
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department had received “intelligence reports of threats against
law enforcement specifically from the Blood gang.”

See J.A. 86.

Ring explained that Palmer’s history of multiple drug arrests,
as well as his arrest for possessing a firearm as a convicted
felon, caused Ring to believe Palmer “would potentially still
have a firearm on him.”

Id.

According to Officer Ring, Palmer was initially hesitant to
get out of the Nissan, and Palmer had thereafter lingered near
the vehicle’s front door until Ring requested that he move to
the car’s rear.

Shortly thereafter, while Ring was inside the

passenger

compartment

“smell[ed]

the

checking

marijuana

very

the

inspection

faintly”

before

smell [was] overwhelmed with the air freshener.”

sticker,
his

he

“sense

of

See J.A. 90.

Ring confirmed that Officer Blount smelled marijuana as well.
Officer

Ring

made

at

least

two

other

observations

strengthened his suspicion of criminal activity.
“had two cell phones on his hip.”

that

First, Palmer

See J.A. 93.

According to

Ring, “[i]t’s common for people who distribute narcotics to have
more than one cell phone in their possession.”

Id.

He said

that those involved in drug trafficking often rely on one phone
to store contacts and pictures while utilizing the other phone
to arrange drug deals.
seeking to

divert

Second, Ring believed that Palmer was

suspicion

from

Officer Duncan and the drug dog.
8

himself

as

they

waited

for

Palmer “kept telling us that

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he helps the police and that he ha[d] a contact [in] the police
department.”
As

the

See id. at 95.
hearing

ended,

the

district

court

remarked

that

Officer Ring had “presented to this Court a very, very careful
appearance, one of a person who is very seriously trying to
abide by what the requirements of the law are.”
Although

it

lawfully,

was

the

inclined
court

took

to

believe
the

that

See J.A. 210.

Ring

suppression

had

acted

motion

under

advisement.
C.
On May 5, 2014, within a week of the evidentiary hearing,
the district court filed its Opinion denying the suppression
motion. 3
stopped

The Opinion concluded that Officer Ring had properly

violation

the
and

Nissan,
a

based

fraudulent

on

suspicions

inspection

of

sticker.

a

window
The

tint

Opinion

explained that Ring also possessed the reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity necessary to extend the traffic
stop, identifying eight supporting factors in that regard:

3

Officer Ring made a video recording of the traffic stop
from a camera he was wearing on his uniform. After viewing the
video during the evidentiary hearing as Ring testified, the
district court observed that Ring presented “a very truthful
appearance.” See J.A. 206. The court later reviewed the video
“at a slow pace in chambers, stopping to analyze the footage
from time to time to be doubly sure of its interpretation.” See
Opinion 1.

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•

Palmer was in a high crime area where citizens
were complaining about drug dealing;

•

Ring believed that
illegally tinted;

•

Palmer was nervous;

•

The Nissan emitted an “overwhelming” scent of air
freshener from the multiple air fresheners;

•

Palmer was a suspected member of a violent gang
called the Bounty Hunter Bloods; 4

•

Palmer’s driver’s license listed
address, rather than a residence;

•

Palmer was driving a vehicle
another person’s name; and

•

Palmer had “a criminal record that included four
previous arrests for narcotics charges as well as
a charge of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon.”

See Opinion 9.

the

Nissan’s

windows

a

P.O.

were

box

registered

in

The Opinion explained that those factors, “when

taken together, [gave] rise to reasonable suspicion because they
eliminate[d]

a

substantial

portion

of

innocent

indicate[d] that criminal activity [was] afoot.”

travelers
Id.

and

That is,

Ring possessed the “reasonable suspicion necessary to extend the
stop

beyond

its

original

scope

completed the computer checks.”

and

duration

as

soon

as

he

Id.

4

The district court observed that it was “very familiar
with the Bloods and their propensity for violence,” based on
“its prior cases involving members of th[at] gang.” See Opinion
9 n.3.

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The Opinion also explained that Officer Ring had probable
cause to search the vehicle when he first smelled marijuana and
also after the drug dog alerted.
Ring’s

entry

search

of

“reasonable
sticker’s

to

the

Without specifying whether

check

the

inspection

Nissan,

the

Opinion

suspicion

. . .

authenticity,”

and

to

sticker

concluded

investigate

that

he

had

constituted
that
the

Ring

a

had

inspection

dispelled

that

suspicion by “the least intrusive means in a short period of
time.”

See Opinion 12-13.

Ring’s detection of a marijuana odor

while in the car, in turn, supplied ample cause for a search of
the Nissan.

According to the Opinion, the officers were also

entitled to delay searching the vehicle and wait for a drug dog. 5
In sum, the Opinion ruled that Officer Ring had made a
legitimate traffic stop, that he had sound reasons for extending
the stop, and that his subsequent actions did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.

Palmer’s motion to suppress the evidence was

therefore denied.

The constitutionality of Ring’s search-and-

seizure activities is the sole question preserved by Palmer’s
conditional guilty plea.
5

The Opinion reasoned in the alternative that, even if
Officer Ring’s entry into the vehicle to examine the inspection
sticker was somehow improper, the drug and firearm evidence
could not be suppressed.
That was so because “Ring’s actions
demonstrate conclusively that he would have brought the [drug
dog] to the [traffic] stop to perform the [dog sniff] test
irrespective of his entrance into the vehicle.” See Opinion 17.

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II.
We review de novo a district court’s rulings with respect
to

reasonable

suspicion

and

probable

cause.

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

See

Ornelas

v.

Absent clear error, we

will not disturb factual findings made by a district court after
an evidentiary hearing on suppression issues.

See United States

v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 473 (4th Cir. 2012).

When a district

court has denied a suppression motion, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government.

See United States

v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 689 (4th Cir. 2013).

III.
On appeal, Palmer contends that Officer Ring did not have
any objectively reasonable basis for initiating the traffic stop
of the Nissan, and that Ring unreasonably expanded the scope of
the stop shortly after it began.
entry

into

the

constitutionally
Ring

Nissan

to

view

impermissible.

legitimately

stopped

Palmer also labels Ring’s
the
The

Palmer

inspection
government
for

sticker

counters

suspected

as
that

traffic

violations, and that Ring’s subsequent actions were consistent
with the Fourth Amendment.
A.
Before assessing the parties’ contentions, we identify some
pertinent legal principles.

The Fourth Amendment guards against
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“unreasonable searches and seizures.”
IV.

See U.S. Const. amend.

A traffic stop is a “seizure” within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment and must be reasonable under the circumstances.
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979).

In that

regard, the courts assess the constitutionality of a traffic
stop under the two-prong standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
(2009).

See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330-31

Pursuant

thereto,

we

first

assess

whether

articulated bases for the traffic stop were legitimate.

the
See

United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 875 (4th Cir. 1992).
Second, we examine whether the actions of the authorities during
the traffic stop were “reasonably related in scope” to the bases
for the seizure.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
1.

As the Supreme Court has explained, Terry’s first prong is
satisfied

“whenever

it

is

lawful

for

police

to

detain

an

automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular
violation.”
such
laws.
(4th

a

See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327.

violation

may

include

failure

to

Without question,

comply

with

traffic

See, e.g., United States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275, 279 n.1
Cir.

2014)

(concluding

that

windows

“illegally

tinted”

under Virginia law “justif[ied] the stop”); United States v.
Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2011) (observing that
officer made traffic stop on basis of perceived violation of
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Maryland

law

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that

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prohibits

following

another

vehicle

too

closely).
In assessing the legitimacy of a traffic stop, we do not
attempt to discern an officer’s subjective intent for stopping
the vehicle.
(4th

Cir.

See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 340

2008).

We

simply

ask

whether

viewed objectively, justify th[e] action.”
States,

517

U.S.

806,

813

(1996)

“the

circumstances,

See Whren v. United

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted); United States v. Johnson, 734 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir.
2013)

(observing

that

a

traffic

stop

is

legitimate

“when

officers observe a traffic violation, regardless of their true,
subjective motives for stopping the vehicle”).
2.
Terry’s
actions

second

that

a

traffic stop.

prong

police

restricts

officer

may

the
take

range
after

of

permissible

initiating

a

An officer is entitled to conduct safety-related

checks that do not bear directly on the reasons for the stop,
such as requesting a driver’s license and vehicle registration,
or

checking

warrants.

for

criminal

records

and

outstanding

arrest

See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609,

1615-16 (2015).

Generally, however, an officer’s focus must

remain on the bases for the traffic stop, in that the stop must
be “sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the
conditions of an investigative seizure.”
14

See United States v.

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Guijon-Ortiz,

660

F.3d

757,

Pg: 15 of 30

764

(4th

Cir.

2011)

(internal

quotation marks omitted).
Thus,

when

following

up

on

the

initial

reasons

for

a

traffic stop, the officer must employ “the least intrusive means
reasonably available to verify or dispel [his] suspicion in a
short

period

of

time.”

See

Digiovanni,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

650

F.3d

at

507

To be clear, the law does

not require that the officer employ the least intrusive means
conceivable.
(1985)

(“A

See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87
creative

judge

engaged

in

post

hoc

evaluation

of

police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means
by

which

the

accomplished.”).

objectives

of

the

police

might

have

been

If an officer acts unreasonably in attempting

to confirm his suspicions during a traffic stop, however, he
runs afoul of Terry’s second prong.
Relatedly, a legitimate traffic stop may “become unlawful
if

it

is

prolonged

beyond

the

complete its initial objectives.
U.S.

405,

407

(2005).

Put

time

reasonably

required”

to

See Illinois v. Caballes, 543

differently,

an

officer

cannot

investigate “a matter outside the scope of the initial stop”
unless

he

receives

the

motorist’s

consent

or

develops

reasonable, articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity.
See Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507.

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Reasonable
standard

that

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suspicion
relies

is

on

Pg: 16 of 30

a

the

“commonsense,
judgment

of

experienced

enforcement officers, “not legal technicians.”
United

States,

517

U.S.

690,

695

(1996)

nontechnical”
law

See Ornelas v.

(internal

quotation

marks omitted).

As we recently explained in United States v.

Williams,

articulated

the

factors

supporting

reasonable

suspicion during a traffic stop “must in their totality serve to
eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers,” and also
demonstrate a connection to criminal activity.

See 808 F.3d

238, 246 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, although an officer may extend a traffic stop when
he possesses reasonable suspicion, he cannot search the stopped
vehicle

unless

he

obtains

consent,

secures

a

warrant,

or

develops probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence
of criminal activity.

See United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313,

319 (4th Cir. 2013).

An officer’s detection of marijuana odor

is

sufficient

to

establish

such

probable

cause,

see

United

States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 422 (4th Cir. 2002), as is a
trained drug dog’s alert on the vehicle, see United States v.
Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 592 (4th Cir. 2010).

With the foregoing

principles in mind, we turn to the issues presented in Palmer’s
appeal.

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B.
1.
With

respect

to

Terry’s

first

prong

—

whether

Officer

Ring’s articulated bases for the traffic stop were legitimate —
Palmer

asserts

that

Ring

lacked

grounds for stopping the Nissan.

any

objectively

reasonable

That contention is meritless.

Ring was familiar with the limits on window tint under Virginia
law

and,

Palmer

in

his

points

to

view,

the

nothing

Nissan’s

that

windows

indicates

were

dark.

district

the

too

court

clearly erred in crediting Ring’s testimony on that issue.
United

States

(concluding
testimony

v.

McGee,

that

district

regarding

erroneous).

736

F.3d

263,

court’s

inoperative

271

(4th

reliance

brake

light

Cir.

on

was

See
2013)

officer’s

not

clearly

As we have recognized, illegally tinted windows are

alone “sufficient to justify” a traffic stop.
F.3d at 279 n.1.

See Green, 740

We thus reject Palmer’s contention that Ring

lacked any objectively reasonable basis for stopping the Nissan.
2.
Turning to the events that transpired after the Nissan had
been

stopped,

Palmer

acknowledges

that

when

an

officer

has

probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband, the
Fourth Amendment “permits police to search the vehicle without
more.”
omitted).

See

Br.
While

of

Appellant

checking

the
17

31

(internal

Nissan’s

quotation

inspection

marks

sticker,

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Officer Ring smelled marijuana.
cause

to

believe

the

At that point, he had probable

vehicle

contained

therefore entitled to search it.
Thus,

unless

Palmer

can

contraband,

and

was

See Carter, 300 F.3d at 422.

demonstrate

some

constitutional

violation between the time the stop began and the point that
Ring smelled marijuana, the evidence cannot be suppressed. 6
that

regard,

Palmer

asserts

that

Ring

transgressed

In

Terry’s

second prong by taking actions during the traffic stop that were
not reasonably related in scope to the initial bases for the
stop.
a.
According to Palmer, Officer Ring unreasonably expanded the
scope

of

the

investigation.

stop

by

beginning

an

unjustified

drug

The government contends, however, that Ring’s

actions were supported by reasonable suspicion.
A

motorist

stopped

by

the

police

is

obliged

to

endure

“certain negligibly burdensome precautions” that may not relate
directly to the reason for the traffic stop, such as checking
whether
warrants.

the

driver

has

a

criminal

record

or

outstanding

See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616; see also Muehler

6

Rather than search immediately after smelling marijuana,
Officer Ring waited about ten minutes for the drug dog Boomer to
arrive. The dog’s alerts provided strong additional support for
the proposition that the Nissan contained contraband.
See
Kelly, 592 F.3d at 592.

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v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (concluding that questioning
unrelated to basis for traffic stop was not unlawful because it
did not extend detention).

Those routine checks reflect the

reality that traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger
to police officers,” and further the strong interest in allowing
an officer to complete his traffic mission safely.
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983).

See Michigan

Indeed, in Terry itself,

the Supreme Court — describing “[t]he crux of th[e] case” —
emphasized

the

“immediate

interest

of

the

police

officer

in

taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against him.”

See 392 U.S. at 23.

Palmer suggests that it was unreasonable for Officer Ring —
after learning of the “gang alert” indicating that Palmer was
associated with the Bounty Hunter Bloods — “to delve into [his]
prior criminal record,” because it had “absolutely nothing to do
with

investigating

violation.”

See

a
Br.

window
of

tint

or

Appellant

18.

contention is to discard it.

inspection
To

sticker

describe

that

A police officer is entitled to

inquire into a motorist’s criminal record after initiating a
traffic stop, and we cannot fault Ring — faced with a suspected
member of a violent gang — for doing so here.
F.3d

at

281

(observing

that

“concern

justified “criminal history check”).
19

for

See Green, 740
officer

safety”

In short, Ring’s brief

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investigation into Palmer’s criminal record fell squarely within
the range of actions permitted under Terry’s second prong.
Nor

did

Officer

Ring’s

detention

of

Palmer

prior

to

smelling marijuana unreasonably expand the scope or duration of
the

traffic

stop.

We

are

satisfied

that,

after

accessing

Palmer’s criminal record in LInX, Ring possessed a reasonable,
articulable
activity.

suspicion

that

Palmer

was

engaged

in

criminal

In other words, the information on which Ring relied

eliminated

a

substantial

portion

of

innocent

travelers

logically demonstrated a connection to unlawful conduct.
Opinion identified eight factors in that regard:

and
The

Palmer was in

a high crime area where citizens were complaining about drug
dealing; Ring believed that the Nissan’s windows were illegally
tinted; Palmer was nervous; the Nissan emitted an “overwhelming”
scent of air freshener from multiple air fresheners; Palmer was
a

suspected

driver’s

member

license

of

listed

the
a

Bounty
P.O.

box

Hunter

Bloods;

address,

rather

Palmer’s
than

a

residence; Palmer was driving a vehicle registered in another
person’s name; and Palmer had “a criminal record that included
four previous arrests for narcotics charges as well as a charge
of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.”

See Opinion

9.
Palmer

insists

that

most

of

those

factors

“relate[]

to

perfectly innocent behavior and are not indicative of criminal
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See Br. of Appellant 19.

He fails to appreciate,

however, that reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of
the

circumstances,

and

may

well

“exist

even

if

each

fact

standing alone is susceptible to an innocent explanation.”

See

United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 413-14 (4th Cir. 2008)
(footnote omitted).
Resolving
whether

the

the

reasonable-suspicion

articulated

factors,

question
together,

taken

connection to ongoing criminal activity.

turns
showed

on
a

Palmer maintains that

the various factors evince Officer Ring’s “attempt to take a
series

of

perfectly

behaviors

and

deception.”
omitted).

mundane,

circumstances

innocent,
and

weave

and

easily

them

into

explained
a

web

of

See Br. of Appellant 24 (internal quotation marks
The government counters that Ring described how those

factors were connected to suspected criminal conduct.
As

we

have

recognized

with

respect

to

a

reasonable-

suspicion inquiry, “it is entirely appropriate for courts to
credit the practical experience of officers who observe on a
daily basis what transpires on the street.”

See Branch, 537

F.3d at 336-37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
however, credit that experience blindly.
at 253.

We do not,

See Williams, 808 F.3d

Instead, we expect police officers to articulate how

that experience applies to the facts at hand.

See United States

v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[A]n officer and
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the Government must do more than simply label a behavior as
‘suspicious’ to make it so.”).
Officer Ring knew that the Ipswich neighborhood was a highcrime area and that the police had received complaints about
illegal

drug

activity

there.

See

Branch,

537

F.3d

at

338

(observing that “an area’s propensity toward criminal activity
is something that an officer may consider” in forming reasonable
suspicion (internal quotation marks omitted)).

It is compelling

that, when Ring approached the darkly tinted Nissan, he smelled
an overwhelming odor from the air fresheners that he could see
in the vehicle, suggesting an effort to conceal the scent of
drugs.

See United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 785 (4th

Cir. 2004) (concluding that air fresheners on rearview mirror
supported reasonable suspicion because they are “commonly used
to mask the smell of narcotics”).
Significantly, Officer Ring learned, early in the traffic
stop, that Palmer was a suspected member of the Bounty Hunter
Bloods.

Ring

knew

that

the

Bloods

had

threatened

law

enforcement during his service as a police officer and that such
gangs
such

are
as

frequently

“narcotics

involved

in

distribution.”

organized
See

criminal

J.A.

86.

activity
Ring

also

ascertained that Palmer had at least four earlier arrests on
drug charges and was probably a convicted felon.

Indeed, he had

been charged previously as a felon in possession of a firearm.
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As we explained in United States v. Sprinkle, “an officer can
couple

knowledge

of

prior

criminal

involvement

with

more

concrete factors in reaching a reasonable suspicion of current
criminal activity.”

See 106 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1997).

At

minimum, such “concrete factors” in this situation included the
overwhelming

odor

from

multiple

air

fresheners

and

Palmer’s

apparent gang membership.
Put succinctly, the factors identified by the Opinion —
viewed in their totality — eliminated a substantial portion of
innocent

travelers

criminal activity. 7

and

demonstrated

a

connection

to

possible

We are thus satisfied that Ring’s actions

prior to examining the Nissan’s inspection sticker were entirely
permissible under Terry’s second prong, because Ring did not
unreasonably expand the scope of the traffic stop.

7

Some of the factors identified by the district court,
when viewed in isolation, provide somewhat weaker support for
reasonable suspicion.
First, a driver’s nervousness is not a
particularly good indicator of criminal activity, because most
everyone is nervous when interacting with the police.
See
Williams, 808 F.3d at 248. Second, the listing of a P.O. box as
an address on a driver’s license, as opposed to a residential
address, is not a strong indicator of suspicious conduct.
See
id. at 250-51. Finally, simply driving a vehicle registered to
an absent third party is also not a strong factor, but could, in
the proper situation, indicate the possibility of a “stolen
vehicle or drug trafficking.” See United States v. Ludwig, 641
F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

23

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b.
Palmer

also

maintains

that

Officer

Ring

conducted

a

warrantless search of the Nissan without probable cause when he
stuck his head inside the car to examine its inspection sticker.
According

to

Palmer,

Ring’s

actions

constituted

“the

most

intrusive means of confirming or dispelling the validity of the
sticker.”

See Br. of Appellant 33.

The government counters

that Ring did not conduct a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and argues that Ring was simply seeking “a
better look” at “an item that a motorist is legally required to
display

on

enforcement.”

[his]

vehicle

for

ready

inspection

by

law

See Br. of Appellee 38.
i.

Palmer
examination

frames
of

his
the

contention

regarding

Officer

sticker

in

inspection

Ring’s

terms

of

“reasonableness.”

Under the applicable principles, to contest

Ring’s

the

illegal

entry

into

search,

Palmer

Nissan
must

on

the

show

ground

that

he

had

expectation of privacy in the area searched.”
Castellanos,

716

F.3d

828,

832

(4th

Cir.

that

it

“a

was

an

legitimate

See United v.

2013)

Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980)).

(relying

on

Palmer has

not asserted, much less shown, any legitimate expectation of
privacy that was unreasonably infringed.

He therefore cannot

rely merely on Ring’s examination of the inspection sticker as a
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basis for suppressing the cocaine and firearm evidence.
at

834-35

(recognizing

that

defendant

who

fails

See id.
to

show

reasonable expectation of privacy cannot challenge warrantless
search of vehicle).
ii.
Although Palmer has failed to establish any expectation of
privacy, he also asserts that the district court clearly erred
in its findings regarding the inspection sticker’s appearance
and,

consequently,

that

Officer

Ring

lacked

suspicion that the sticker was fraudulent.

a

reasonable

Palmer also contends

that Ring failed to utilize the least intrusive means reasonably
available

to

investigate

the

sticker.

contentions under Terry’s second prong.

We

evaluate

those

See Guijon-Ortiz, 660

F.3d at 764.
When

reviewing

particularly

factual

defer

to

a

findings

for

district

clear

error,

court’s

“[w]e

credibility

determinations, for it is the role of the district court to
observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial
motion to suppress.”

See United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d

210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The

Opinion

credited

Officer

Ring’s

testimony

regarding

the

appearance of the inspection sticker during the traffic stop,
explicitly

relying

on

Ring’s

observations

that

he

“had

seen

numerous fraudulent stickers” and that the Nissan’s inspection
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sticker “looked like those fraudulent stickers he had seen in
the past.”

See Opinion 11.

The district court also found that

Ring could not see, from outside the Nissan, “the perforated
portion that sits in the middle of the sticker and is designed
to prevent sticker theft by detaching.”

Id.

Moreover, the

court itself “examined the sticker both in the video [of the
traffic stop] and in a photograph” that Palmer introduced into
evidence.

See id. at 12.

Based on Officer Ring’s testimony and the district court’s
examination

of

the

evidence,

the

Opinion

found

that

the

inspection sticker was lighter in color than normal and that
“the perforated middle portion [was] not visible from the car’s
outside.”

See Opinion 12.

Palmer characterizes the evidence

differently, but points to nothing that contradicts the court’s
findings.

In such circumstances, we cannot say that the court

clearly erred.

See McGee, 736 F.3d at 271.

Because Ring had a

legitimate basis for believing that the inspection sticker was
fraudulent,
“coupled

with

inspection
required

we

agree
Officer

stickers,”
to

that

the

facts

Ring’s
support

investigate

the

recited

training
the

“reasonable

sticker’s

Opinion 12.

26

and

by

the

court,

experience

with

suspicion

Ring

authenticity.”

See

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iii.
Finally, Palmer argues that, even if Officer Ring possessed
a

reasonable

suspicion

that

the

inspection

sticker

fraudulent, his means of investigation were improper.
posits two alternatives in that regard:

was

Palmer

Ring could have “run

the number on the sticker through the State Police database”; or
he could have “asked for the inspection certificate.”

See Br.

of

we

Appellant

33.

In

assessing

those

alternatives,

must

decide whether the district court correctly concluded that Ring
employed

“the

least

intrusive

means

reasonably

available

to

verify or dispel [his] suspicion in a short period of time.”
See

Digiovanni,

650

F.3d

at

507

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
The burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of Officer
Ring’s conduct is on the government.

See Florida v. Royer, 460

U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion).

We are mindful, of

course, that the “scope of the intrusion permitted will vary,”
depending on the specific facts and circumstances.

Id.

Again,

we are bound by the findings of the district court unless they
are

clearly

erroneous.

See

Abu

Ali,

528

F.3d

at

232.

In

rejecting Palmer’s theories for less intrusive alternatives, the
Opinion explained that it was not clear that Officer Ring — a
city police officer — had access to a state police database of
vehicle

registration

information.
27

The

Opinion

also

observed

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that there was no indication that the inspection certificate was
in the Nissan during the traffic stop.
We cannot doubt Officer Ring’s statement that he was not
familiar with any state database such as Palmer describes.

Nor

are we persuaded that the presence or absence of the inspection
certificate

has

any

significance.

Ring

was

entitled

to

ask

Palmer to step out of the vehicle, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (per curiam), and it does not give us
pause — in light of Palmer’s affiliation with a violent gang,
his prior criminal charges, and his apparent felony conviction —
that Ring would request that Palmer exit the Nissan rather than
have

him

reach

compartment.

for

something

out

of

sight

in

the

passenger

Finally, neither of Palmer’s proposals would have

been more expeditious, because Ring — in examining the back of
the inspection sticker — was promptly in and out of the Nissan.
The

government

showing

that

has
Ring’s

therefore
means

satisfied

of

its

investigating

burden,
the

readily

inspection

sticker were appropriate and not unreasonably intrusive.
In

these

circumstances,

we

constitutional violation occurred.

are

convinced

that

no

See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687

(“The question is not simply whether some other alternative was
available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing
to recognize or to pursue it.”).

As a result, the district

court correctly denied Palmer’s suppression motion.
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IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED

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WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I fully concur in the majority opinion.
to

emphasize

background

that

while

the

Supreme

from

its

list

checks

I write separately

Court

of

omitted

“ordinary

criminal

inquiries”

authorized incident to every traffic stop, Rodriguez v. United
States,

135

S.

Ct.

1609,

1615

(2015),

this

Court

in

United

States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2014), held that a
traffic

stop

background

was

check

reasonably
because

prolonged

the

in

driver’s

order

to

“demeanor

and

conduct

a

behavior

throughout the traffic stop in conjunction with [an outstanding]
protective

order

officer safety.”
In

this

[against

the

driver]

raised

concerns

about

Id. at 281.

case,

the

specific

circumstances

of

the

stop

indicate the officer had at least some legitimate concern for
his own safety.

Thus, I agree with the majority opinion that

“we cannot fault Ring – faced with a suspected member of a
violent

gang

record] here.”

–

for

[inquiring

Ante, at 19.

30

into

the

motorist’s

criminal