US v. Robert Sampson
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion--granting Motion to reconsider [999671275-2]; denying Motion for leave to file [999671652-2] Originating case number: 8:13-cr-00357-RWT-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999696510].. [14-4744]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4744
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ROBERT NEIL SAMPSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:13-cr-00357-RWT-1)
Submitted:
October 20, 2015
Decided:
November 10, 2015
Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael Lawlor, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Arun G.
Rao, Mara Z. Greenberg, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Gustav W. Eyler, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Robert Neil Sampson pled guilty to conspiracy to interfere
with interstate commerce by robbery, interference with commerce
by
robbery,
violence.
and
He
brandishing
appeals,
contends
firearm
asserting
sentence was unreasonable. 1
Sampson
a
that
during
his
a
crime
upward
of
variance
We affirm.
that
his
sentence
was
procedurally
and
substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to
meaningfully consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors;
failed to consider Sampson’s chief argument (his age, 53 at the
time of sentencing); failed to explain why a variance sentence
served the purposes of sentencing while a Sentencing Guidelines
sentence
did
sentence
with
not;
and
details
erroneously
about
considered
by
the
procedural
and
substantive
discretion standard.
(2007).
supported
Sampson’s
Guidelines.
We
offenses
review
reasonableness
its
a
under
variance
that
were
sentence
an
abuse
for
of
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
The first step requires this court to ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error such as
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
1
Sampson was sentenced to 300 months
Sentencing Guidelines range was 205-235 months.
2
in
prison;
his
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the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence—including
an
Guidelines range.
Id.
of
significant
explanation
for
any
deviation
from
the
If we conclude that a sentence is free
procedural
error,
we
then
substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
consider
the
United States v.
Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010).
In the case of a variance or departure, “‘a major departure
should be supported by a more significant justification than a
minor one,’” United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 113 (4th Cir.
2015) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at
50)),
and
appellate
explanation
States v.
courts
supporting
McClung,
483
a
apply
greater
substantial
F.3d
273,
277
scrutiny
variance,
(4th
Cir.
to
see
an
United
2007).
A
sentencing court’s explanation falters if it fails to provide an
individualized assessment of the facts before it when imposing
the sentence.
Here,
Lymas, 781 F.3d at 113-14.
the
sufficient.
district
court’s
variance
explanation
was
Sampson was sentenced to a term of imprisonment
approximately 30% higher than the top of his total Guidelines
range.
level
Thus, while the court was required to provide a higher
of
detail
discussion
requirement.
of
in
its
Sampson’s
explanation,
crime
and
the
court’s
background
lengthy
met
that
While the court relied heavily on the seriousness
3
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of the crime and the failure of the Guidelines to adequately
punish
the
crime,
the
court
factors.
For
instance,
deterrence
and
protection
also
the
considered
court
of
other
the
considered
public.
statutory
the
The
need
court
for
also
examined Sampson’s background, the affect of his plea agreement,
and his unpredictable criminal behavior.
Moreover,
the
court
explicitly
referenced
each
of
the
§ 3553(a) factors and explained how the offenses at issue went
far
beyond
behavior
most
and
needed
discuss
factor.
to
by
lasting
injuries
pointed
specifically
determining
robberies
to
that
be
his
Sampson’s
to
age,
the
Sampson’s
criminal
deterred.
involving
the
the
court
victims.
unusual
behavior
While
extremely
was
The
court
background
in
unpredictable
was
court
violent
and
did
clearly
not
explicitly
aware
of
that
Furthermore, the court expressly rejected a Guidelines
sentence, noting that it was too far away from the statutory
maximum given the circumstances of the crime.
Accordingly, the
district court’s articulation of its reasons for the variance
belies Sampson’s claim of procedural error.
Turning to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
we examine the totality of the circumstances to see whether the
sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the
sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383
4
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(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 305 (2014).
vary
outside
deference.
the
Id.
Guidelines
range
are
still
Sentences that
entitled
to
due
When reviewing a variance or departure, we
consider whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with
respect
to
its
decision
respect
to
the
extent
range.
United States v. McNeill, 598 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir.
2010).
It is within the sentencing court’s discretion to accord
more
weight
to
the
to
of
impose
the
such
a
divergence
aggravating
factors
sentence
from
and
the
decide
and
with
sentencing
that
the
sentence imposed would serve the § 3553(a) factors on the whole.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 56-59; see also United States v. Jeffery, 631
F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (observing that “district courts
have extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to
be given each of the
Here,
the
court
§ 3553(a) factors”) (citation omitted).
recognized
its
obligations
to
impose
a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the § 3553(a) factors.
Regarding the various § 3553(a)
factors, the court detailed the nature and circumstances of the
offenses, noting that Sampson benefitted from a plea agreement
that resulted in the dismissal of various counts.
The court
reflected on Sampson’s prior criminal history, concluding that
there
were
numerous
uncounted
charges for serious crimes.
convictions
and
many
dismissed
The court found that Sampson had
managed to recover from his youthful criminal behavior but that
5
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he returned to crime after a very long period of time.
The
court found that the Guidelines range was insufficient in this
case, based upon the seriousness of the crime and the need to
protect and deter the public.
We conclude that the district court carefully considered
the relevant § 3553(a) factors and tied them to the increased
sentence.
for
a
While Sampson’s Guidelines range included departures
victim
sustaining
a
serious
bodily
injury,
physical
restraint, carjacking, the involvement of controlled substances,
and the loss amount, it was within the court’s discretion to
determine, as it did, that the totality of Sampson’s criminal
behavior, which included carefully planned and very dangerous
robberies causing lasting impact to both victims and businesses,
was not fully accounted for by the Guidelines.
district
court
did
not
give
excessive
weight
We find that the
to
any
single
factor, but instead considered all the applicable factors.
Thus, we affirm Sampson’s sentence.
Sampson has filed a
motion to file a pro se supplemental brief raising claims of
ineffective assistance and challenging the denial of his motion
to withdraw his plea. 2
Because Sampson is represented by counsel
who has filed a merits brief, he is not entitled to file a pro
2
We grant Sampson’s motion for reconsideration challenging
the striking of the proposed brief from the docket.
6
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se supplemental brief.
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Accordingly, we deny his motion.
See
United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 569 n.1 (4th Cir.
2011) (denying motion to file pro se supplemental brief because
the defendant was represented by counsel).
oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
the
facts
and
materials
legal
before
We dispense with
contentions
this
court
are
and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
7
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