US v. Billy Jefferson, Jr.

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UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cr-00221-JAG-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999640614]. [14-4759, 14-4760]

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Appeal: 14-4759 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pg: 1 of 9 ON REHEARING UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4759 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. BILLY GENE JEFFERSON, JR., Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4760 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. BILLY GENE JEFFERSON, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., District Judge. (3:13-cr-00221-JAG-1; 3:14-cr-00066-JAG-1) Submitted: March 30, 2015 Decided: Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. August 14, 2015 Appeal: 14-4759 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pg: 2 of 9 Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John S. Martin, John E. Beerbower HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Michael R. Gill, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 2 Appeal: 14-4759 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pg: 3 of 9 PER CURIAM: Billy Gene Jefferson, Jr., pleaded guilty to major fraud against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1031, and unlawful § 1957(a). pay monetary the Jefferson in violation of 18 U.S.C. As part of the plea agreement, Jefferson agreed to $12,947,886.77 with transactions, in restitution to remain restitution. order, on the bond To facilitate district pending compliance court sentencing, permitted with the condition that he report any money transfers over $25,000 to the Internal Revenue Service. While on release, Jefferson failed to report multiple $100,000 money transfers, withdrew substantial amounts of cash, and made thirty-three transfers just under the reporting threshold. chartering a flight Additionally, to England, for Jefferson the purpose obtained a of fake driver’s license and provided a copy of that license to the charter company. Based on Jefferson’s conduct while on release, he was charged with and pleaded guilty to unlawful transfer of a false identification document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1), (b)(1), and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). * Jefferson’s four convictions were joined for * The indictment also charged Jefferson with obstruction of an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), (Continued) 3 Appeal: 14-4759 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pg: 4 of 9 purposes of sentencing, and the district court imposed an upward variant sentence totaling 240 months. In these consolidated appeals, Jefferson challenges his sentence, arguing that (1) the district justice court erred applying under adjustment in U.S. a two-level Sentencing obstruction Guidelines of Manual § 3C1.1 (2013), (2) the district court erred in denying a twolevel reduction § 3E1.1(a), for (3) and acceptance the unreasonable. the 240-month responsibility sentence is under USSG substantively We affirm. “We of review deferential reasonableness abuse-of-discretion of a standard, sentence first under ensuring a that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range.” United States v. Cox, 744 F.3d 305, 308 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In reviewing the district court’s application of the Guidelines and its imposition of a sentencing enhancement, “we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2014). If we find no procedural reasonableness of the error, we sentence consider under “the but this charge was dismissed as part agreement in Case No. 3:14-cr-00066-JAG-1. 4 of the substantive totality of Jefferson’s the plea Appeal: 14-4759 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/14/2015 circumstances.” Where the Pg: 5 of 9 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). sentencing court imposed a variant sentence, we determine “whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to range.” the extent of the divergence from the sentencing United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court here applied a two-level obstruction of justice adjustment based on Jefferson’s money transactions while on release pending sentencing. A two-level obstruction of justice adjustment is appropriate: If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct, or (B) a closely related offense . . . . USSG § 3C1.1. As “[o]bstructive conduct can vary widely in nature, degree of planning, and seriousness,” “the conduct to which [the] enhancement applies is not subject to precise definition,” and a sentencing court must compare the defendant’s conduct to the examples of qualifying and nonqualifying conduct listed in Application Notes Four and Five, respectively. § 3C1.1 cmt. qualifying n.3. conduct Included is in “conduct 5 the nonexhaustive prohibited by USSG list of obstruction of Appeal: 14-4759 Doc: 43 justice Filed: 08/14/2015 provisions under Pg: 6 of 9 Title 18, United States Code,” and “failing to comply with . . . an order to repatriate property issued pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).” USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(I)-(J). Jefferson’s money transfers, which violated the court- ordered reporting requirement and dissipated assets intended for restitution, not only impeded the prosecution and sentencing of Jefferson’s convictions in Case No. 3:13-cr-00221-JAG-1, arguably resulting in a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), but also constituted conduct analogous to a defendant’s failure to comply with an order to repatriate property. Accordingly, Jefferson engaged in conduct sufficient to permit the district court to apply the obstruction of justice adjustment. The adjustment is only applicable, however, where a defendant “willfully” engages in conduct that obstructs justice. USSG § 3C1.1; but see United States v. Nurek, 578 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir. 2009) (when imposing an obstruction of justice adjustment, “the sentencing judge is not required to parrot back the ‘willful’ language of the guideline”). Where the sentencing court is cognizant of § 3C1.1’s intent element and the totality of the willfully record court’s supports engaged in application the the of conclusion obstructive the conduct, adjustment finding of defendant’s willfulness. 6 that the the contains an defendant sentencing implicit United States v. Dale, 498 Appeal: 14-4759 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pg: 7 of 9 F.3d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). This is particularly true where the defendant’s conduct “is directly and inherently obstructive– that is, where the defendant engages in behavior that a rational person would expect to obstruct justice.” United States v. Reeves, 586 F.3d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the requirement district when it court read the Guideline into the record. acknowledged the willfulness language the obstruction of Although the district court did not use the word “willful” when later ruling on the adjustment, it made a series of statements regarding Jefferson’s intent when engaging in the conduct. Most notably, the district court stated that Jefferson “took advantage of” the $25,000 reporting threshold and that the money transfers amounted to “thumbing your nose at the victims in this case.” J.A. 548, 564. district with regarding court’s the statements, grandiose combined nature and extent its of The findings Jefferson’s monetary transactions, allow us to conclude that the district court implicitly found that Jefferson justice when transferring the money. intended to obstruct Accordingly, the district court did not err when it applied the two-level obstruction of justice adjustment. As Jefferson concedes, if the district court did not err in its obstruction of justice analysis, 7 then it also properly Appeal: 14-4759 Doc: 43 Filed: 08/14/2015 Pg: 8 of 9 denied a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.4 (“Conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 Justice) (Obstructing ordinarily or Impeding indicates that the the Administration defendant accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.”). has of not Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not commit procedural error when determining Jefferson’s Guidelines range. Based on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we further conclude that Jefferson’s above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a variance was justified by the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, the seriousness of the offense, and the need to deter criminal conduct, both Jefferson’s and that of others. See § 3553(a)(1)-(2)(B). The district court adequately supported its decision to vary, as well as the extent of the variance, fraudulent conduct compatriot in while by release on Jefferson’s the relying after tax conduct had the fraud pending on on (1) arrest scheme, and (2) sentencing, the Jefferson’s sentencing Jefferson’s and integrity continued (3) of the of a conduct the impact tax credit program he defrauded. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. dispense with oral argument because 8 the facts and We legal Appeal: 14-4759 Doc: 43 contentions are Filed: 08/14/2015 adequately Pg: 9 of 9 expressed in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 9

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