US v. Billy Jefferson, Jr.
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cr-00221-JAG-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999640614]. [14-4759, 14-4760]
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ON REHEARING
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4759
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BILLY GENE JEFFERSON, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4760
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BILLY GENE JEFFERSON, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00221-JAG-1; 3:14-cr-00066-JAG-1)
Submitted:
March 30, 2015
Decided:
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
August 14, 2015
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John S. Martin, John E. Beerbower HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, United
States Attorney, Michael R. Gill, Assistant United States
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Billy Gene Jefferson, Jr., pleaded guilty to major fraud
against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1031, and
unlawful
§ 1957(a).
pay
monetary
the
Jefferson
in
violation
of
18
U.S.C.
As part of the plea agreement, Jefferson agreed to
$12,947,886.77
with
transactions,
in
restitution
to
remain
restitution.
order,
on
the
bond
To
facilitate
district
pending
compliance
court
sentencing,
permitted
with
the
condition that he report any money transfers over $25,000 to the
Internal Revenue Service.
While on release, Jefferson failed to
report multiple $100,000 money transfers, withdrew substantial
amounts of cash, and made thirty-three transfers just under the
reporting
threshold.
chartering
a
flight
Additionally,
to
England,
for
Jefferson
the
purpose
obtained
a
of
fake
driver’s license and provided a copy of that license to the
charter company.
Based
on
Jefferson’s
conduct
while
on
release,
he
was
charged with and pleaded guilty to unlawful transfer of a false
identification document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1),
(b)(1), and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1). *
Jefferson’s four convictions were joined for
*
The indictment also charged Jefferson with obstruction of
an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2),
(Continued)
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purposes of sentencing, and the district court imposed an upward
variant sentence totaling 240 months.
In these consolidated
appeals, Jefferson challenges his sentence, arguing that (1) the
district
justice
court
erred
applying
under
adjustment
in
U.S.
a
two-level
Sentencing
obstruction
Guidelines
of
Manual
§ 3C1.1 (2013), (2) the district court erred in denying a twolevel
reduction
§ 3E1.1(a),
for
(3)
and
acceptance
the
unreasonable.
the
240-month
responsibility
sentence
is
under
USSG
substantively
We affirm.
“We
of
review
deferential
reasonableness
abuse-of-discretion
of
a
standard,
sentence
first
under
ensuring
a
that
the district court committed no significant procedural error,
such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range.”
United States v. Cox, 744 F.3d 305, 308 (4th
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
In
reviewing the district court’s application of the Guidelines and
its imposition of a sentencing enhancement, “we review factual
findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.”
United
States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2014).
If we
find
no
procedural
reasonableness
of
the
error,
we
sentence
consider
under
“the
but this charge was dismissed as part
agreement in Case No. 3:14-cr-00066-JAG-1.
4
of
the
substantive
totality
of
Jefferson’s
the
plea
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circumstances.”
Where
the
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Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
sentencing
court
imposed
a
variant
sentence,
we
determine “whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both
with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with
respect
to
range.”
the
extent
of
the
divergence
from
the
sentencing
United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court here applied a two-level obstruction of
justice adjustment based on Jefferson’s money transactions while
on
release
pending
sentencing.
A
two-level
obstruction
of
justice adjustment is appropriate:
If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded,
or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration
of
justice
with
respect
to
the
investigation,
prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to
(A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any
relevant conduct, or (B) a closely related offense
. . . .
USSG § 3C1.1.
As “[o]bstructive conduct can vary widely in
nature, degree of planning, and seriousness,” “the conduct to
which
[the]
enhancement
applies
is
not
subject
to
precise
definition,” and a sentencing court must compare the defendant’s
conduct to the examples of qualifying and nonqualifying conduct
listed in Application Notes Four and Five, respectively.
§ 3C1.1
cmt.
qualifying
n.3.
conduct
Included
is
in
“conduct
5
the
nonexhaustive
prohibited
by
USSG
list
of
obstruction
of
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provisions
under
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Title
18,
United
States
Code,”
and
“failing to comply with . . . an order to repatriate property
issued pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).”
USSG § 3C1.1 cmt.
n.4(I)-(J).
Jefferson’s
money
transfers,
which
violated
the
court-
ordered reporting requirement and dissipated assets intended for
restitution, not only impeded the prosecution and sentencing of
Jefferson’s
convictions
in
Case
No.
3:13-cr-00221-JAG-1,
arguably resulting in a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), but
also constituted conduct analogous to a defendant’s failure to
comply
with
an
order
to
repatriate
property.
Accordingly,
Jefferson engaged in conduct sufficient to permit the district
court to apply the obstruction of justice adjustment.
The
adjustment
is
only
applicable,
however,
where
a
defendant “willfully” engages in conduct that obstructs justice.
USSG § 3C1.1; but see United States v. Nurek, 578 F.3d 618, 623
(7th
Cir.
2009)
(when
imposing
an
obstruction
of
justice
adjustment, “the sentencing judge is not required to parrot back
the ‘willful’ language of the guideline”).
Where the sentencing
court is cognizant of § 3C1.1’s intent element and the totality
of
the
willfully
record
court’s
supports
engaged
in
application
the
the
of
conclusion
obstructive
the
conduct,
adjustment
finding of defendant’s willfulness.
6
that
the
the
contains
an
defendant
sentencing
implicit
United States v. Dale, 498
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F.3d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 2007).
This is particularly true where
the defendant’s conduct “is directly and inherently obstructive–
that is, where the defendant engages in behavior that a rational
person
would
expect
to
obstruct
justice.”
United
States v.
Reeves, 586 F.3d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here,
the
requirement
district
when
it
court
read
the
Guideline into the record.
acknowledged
the
willfulness
language
the
obstruction
of
Although the district court did not
use the word “willful” when later ruling on the adjustment, it
made a series of statements regarding Jefferson’s intent when
engaging
in
the
conduct.
Most
notably,
the
district
court
stated that Jefferson “took advantage of” the $25,000 reporting
threshold and that the money transfers amounted to “thumbing
your nose at the victims in this case.”
J.A. 548, 564.
district
with
regarding
court’s
the
statements,
grandiose
combined
nature
and
extent
its
of
The
findings
Jefferson’s
monetary transactions, allow us to conclude that the district
court
implicitly
found
that
Jefferson
justice when transferring the money.
intended
to
obstruct
Accordingly, the district
court did not err when it applied the two-level obstruction of
justice adjustment.
As Jefferson concedes, if the district court did not err in
its
obstruction
of
justice
analysis,
7
then
it
also
properly
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denied a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
See USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.4 (“Conduct resulting in an enhancement
under
§ 3C1.1
Justice)
(Obstructing
ordinarily
or
Impeding
indicates
that
the
the
Administration
defendant
accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.”).
has
of
not
Therefore,
we conclude that the district court did not commit procedural
error when determining Jefferson’s Guidelines range.
Based on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs,
we further conclude that Jefferson’s above-Guidelines sentence
is substantively reasonable.
The district court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that a variance was justified by
the
18
U.S.C.
§
3553(a)
factors,
including
the
nature
and
circumstances of the offense, the seriousness of the offense,
and the need to deter criminal conduct, both Jefferson’s and
that of others.
See § 3553(a)(1)-(2)(B).
The district court
adequately supported its decision to vary, as well as the extent
of
the
variance,
fraudulent
conduct
compatriot
in
while
by
release
on
Jefferson’s
the
relying
after
tax
conduct
had
the
fraud
pending
on
on
(1)
arrest
scheme,
and
(2)
sentencing,
the
Jefferson’s
sentencing
Jefferson’s
and
integrity
continued
(3)
of
the
of
a
conduct
the
impact
tax
credit
program he defrauded.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
dispense
with
oral
argument
because
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the
facts
and
We
legal
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contentions
are
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adequately
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expressed
in
the
materials
before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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