US v. Onrey Towne

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion dispositions in opinion--denying as moot Motions to file supplemental brief(s) [999555345-2], [999560536-2]. Originating case number: 5:11-cr-00213-F-4. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999699254].. [14-4762]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4762

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ONREY TOWNES,
Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00213-F-4)

Argued:

October 29, 2015

Decided:

November 16, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.

Judge

ARGUED: Eric Joseph Brignac, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Kristine L.
Fritz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal
Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Onrey

Townes

appeals

the

twenty-one-month

sentence

the

district court imposed upon the revocation of his supervised
release.

Townes

challenges

the

sentence

as

procedurally

unreasonable, arguing that the district court committed plain
error in imposing the sentence absent appropriate explanation.
For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment and remand
for resentencing.
I.
Townes
sentencing

first
on

appeared

April

before

24,

district

court

after

2012,

the

pleading

guilty

for
to

possessing a stolen firearm and aiding and abetting in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(j), 924.
his

plea

twelve

agreement,

months

and

supervised release.

the
one

In accordance with the terms of

district
day

in

court
prison

sentenced
and

three

Townes

to

years

of

Townes began his term of supervised release

on July 3, 2012.
On March 26, 2014, United States Probation Officer Dewayne
Smith

petitioned

for

the

revocation

of

Townes’s

supervised

release, asserting that Townes had violated the terms of his
supervised release in two respects.

First, Smith alleged that

Townes had engaged in recent criminal conduct.

Smith explained

that, during the early morning hours of March 15, 2014, Townes
entered a home through a bathroom window, woke a young female
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resident, and fled when the girl called for her parents.

Smith

also noted that Townes attempted to gain access to a second
residence

minutes

later

and

that

Townes

only

abandoned

his

efforts when one of the people inside the home discovered him.
In

response

to

these

incidents,

the

Wilson

County

Police

Department charged Townes with felony first degree burglary and
attempted breaking and entering.
Townes

had

violated

the

terms

Second, Smith reported that
of

his

supervised

release

by

missing three mental health appointments.
The

district

court

held

a

hearing

revocation on September 29, 2014.

on

the

petition

for

During the hearing, Townes

neither admitted nor denied the alleged criminal activity.

As

to the allegations regarding his failure to participate in a
mental

health

program

as

directed,

Townes

conceded

that

absences violated the terms of his supervised release.

his

Townes

emphasized, however, that his absences were not the result of
disinterest in mental health support.

Townes explained that

each absence was due to incomplete information or scheduling
conflicts and emphasized his desire for future mental health
counseling.
The Government made a proffer as to the purported criminal
activity, eliciting testimony from the police officers who had
responded to the incidents.

After hearing from both officers,

the district court declared that it found as a matter of fact
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that Townes had violated the terms of his supervised release by
engaging

in

criminal

conduct—both

burglary

and

attempted

breaking and entering—and by failing to participate in a mental
health program as directed.
that

it

had

“considered

The district court then explained

the

policy

statements

on

revocation

contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines as well
as

[the]

relevant

3553(a).”

J.A.

factors

21.

listed

Prior

to

in

18

United

imposing

the

States

sentence,

Code
the

district court afforded both parties an opportunity to address
the court.
Townes’s attorney argued first and offered the following
factors in mitigation of Townes’s conduct: (1) Townes’s youth;
(2)

his

documented

schizophrenia;

(3)

struggles

his

recent

with

bipolar

engagement

and

disorder
commitment

and
to

helping raise his two three-month-old sons; (4) his abstention
from drug use; (5) his work history and current job prospects;
and

(6)

his

license.

plans

to

earn

his

GED

and

commercial

driver’s

Defense counsel concluded by asking the district court

for a sentence below the advisory range provided under the U.S.
Sentencing

Guidelines

revocations.

The

Manual’s

district

court

policy
did

table
not

applicable

explicitly

to

address

Townes’s arguments in favor of a below-the-guidelines sentence
at that time.

Instead, prior to seeking final comments from the

Government, the district court explained that Townes’s conduct
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constituted
because

a

Townes

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“most

serious

fell

within

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violation”
criminal

and

explained

history

that,

category

II,

Townes’s advisory range of imprisonment was fifteen to twentyone months.
The Government responded to Townes’s request for a sentence
below the advisory range by arguing in support of an aboveguidelines
maximum.

twenty-four-month

sentence—the

applicable

statutory

As grounds for a sentence above the advisory range,

the Government explained that, immediately after posting bond in
Wilson

County,

Townes

had

returned

to

one

of

residences and shouted threats at the victims.

the

subject

The Government

also emphasized that Townes’s initial federal conviction was for
the possession of a stolen firearm and that Townes had come into
possession of the firearm following a 2010 residential break-in.
In sum, the Government argued that Townes had failed to learn
from

his

initial

term

of

imprisonment

and

that

his

recent

criminal conduct evidenced dangerous and escalating behavior.
After both parties presented their arguments, the district
court reasserted its finding that Townes had violated the terms
of

his

supervised

release.

The

district

court

then

revoked

Townes’s supervised release and imposed the sentence as follows:
After weighing all the factors, it’s ordered and
adjudged that the supervision term heretofore granted
be revoked. The Defendant is ordered committed to the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons or its authorized
representative for a period of 21 months.
The court
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recommends that while incarcerated he receive mental
health treatment and he participate in the intensive
drug treatment program.
J.A. 24-25. This timely appeal followed.
II.
A.
A district court is afforded broad discretion when imposing
a sentence upon the revocation of supervised release.
States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).

United

A revocation

sentence will be affirmed so long as “it is within the statutory
maximum and is not ‘plainly unreasonable.’”

Id. (quoting United

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)).
To

determine

if

a

sentence

conduct a two-step inquiry.
First,

this

Court

must

“unreasonable at all.”
546 (4th Cir. 2010).

is

plainly

unreasonable,

we

See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.

determine

whether

the

sentence

is

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544,
A sentence can be either procedurally or

substantively unreasonable.

Webb, 738 F.3d at 640.

A sentence

will be deemed procedurally unreasonable if the judge failed to
consider the Chapter Seven policy statements or pertinent 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors or if the judge failed to
“provide

a

statement

of

reasons

for

the

sentence

imposed.”

Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (quoting United States v. Moulden, 478
F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007)); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
revocation

sentence

is

substantively
7

unreasonable

if

A
the

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district court did not rely on a proper basis in rendering its
sentence.

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.

Only

if

unreasonable

a
do

sentence
we

is

proceed

procedurally

to

the

second

or

substantively

step:

whether the sentence is “plainly unreasonable.”

determining

Id. at 439.

A

sentence is plainly unreasonable if it runs “afoul of clearly
settled law.”

Thompson, 595 F.3d at 548.
B.

Townes challenges his revocation sentence as procedurally
unreasonable.

He contends that the district court committed

plain procedural error when it failed to address his arguments
in favor of a sentence below the advisory range and failed to
explain why it imposed the sentence rendered.

We agree.

While a district court “need not be as detailed or specific
when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing
a post-conviction sentence,” it must give some explanation or
indication of its reasoning.

See id. at 547.

As this Court

explained in Thompson, “to hold otherwise, district courts could
effectively

thwart

appellate

review

revocation sentences they impose.”
The
sufficient

Government
light

on

argues
its

of

any

within-range

Id.

that

reasoning

the
when

district
it

court

noted,

shed

prior

to

hearing argument from Townes’s counsel, that it “considered the
policy statements on revocation contained in Chapter Seven of
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the Sentencing Guidelines as well as relevant factors listed in
18 United States Code 3553(a).”
that,

between

the

district

The Government further contends

court’s

declaration

that

Townes’s

conduct constituted a “most serious Grade A violation” and its
recommendation that Townes receive mental health treatment while
incarcerated,
decision

to

the
deny

district
Townes’s

court
request

adequately
for

a

explained

sentence

its

below

the

advisory range.
We are unpersuaded by the Government’s contentions.

Were

we to agree with the Government, we would be reaching the type
of “speculative conclusion” we cautioned against in Thompson.
Id.

Most

assuredly,

“robotically

tick

a

district

through

§

court

is

3553(a)’s

not

required

every

to

subsection.”

Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657 (quoting, United States v. Johnson, 445
F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006)).

However, by merely stating that

it had “weigh[ed] all the factors,” the district court left this
Court to engage in wide-ranging speculation as to how the policy
statements
opposing

and

§

3553(a)

arguments

Government.

factors

offered

by

balanced
defense

in

light

counsel

of
and

the
the

This is not to suggest that the district court did

not adequately take the parties’ arguments into consideration
when

formulating

Townes’s

sentence;

rather,

it

means

that

because a sufficient explanation is essential to the “perception
of fair sentencing” and “meaningful appellate review,” Gall v.
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United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007), a revocation sentence
cannot be deemed procedurally reasonable when this Court can
only guess as to the district court’s actual reasoning.
Notably, the Government conceded at oral argument that the
explanation provided by the district court would not pass muster
if this were a direct appeal from an original sentence. Given
the paucity of reasoning explaining the sentence in this record,
we find no support in our precedents for the manner in which the
Government would parse the minimal burden on the district court
to explain the reasons for its sentence.
C.
Because we find the sentence procedurally unreasonable, we
must

now

Circuit

consider
has

whether

clearly

it

was

articulated

plainly
that

a

so.

Because

district

court

this
is

“obligat[ed] to provide some basis for appellate review when
imposing a revocation sentence, however minimal that basis may
be,” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 548-49, the district court’s failure
to offer any explanation for imposing the top-of-the-guidelines
sentence

rendered,

in

light

of

afoul of clear circuit precedent.

counsel’s

presentations,

runs

Accordingly, we conclude that

the sentence is plainly unreasonable.
D.
Finally,

despite

the

Government’s

arguments

to

the

contrary, we are unable to conclude that the district court’s
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failure

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to

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issue

a

reasoned

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sentence

was

harmless.

“For

a

procedural sentencing error to be harmless, the government must
prove that the error did not have a ‘substantial and injurious
effect or influence on the result.’”

Id. at 548 (quoting United

States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 585 (4th Cir. 2010)).
Government

argues

that

the

mitigating

evidence

While the
offered

by

Townes’s counsel was relatively weak in light of its evidence
demonstrating

escalating

presume

the

that

and

district

dangerous

court

would

behavior,
not

have

we

cannot

rendered

a

different sentence had it explicitly considered the arguments of
Townes’s counsel.

As an example, Townes’s counsel emphasized to

the district court that Townes was “not a drug user” and had not
produced a positive drug test throughout his time (more than
eighteen months) on supervised release.
the

district

court

recommended

that

drug treatment while incarcerated.

Despite this evidence,

Townes

undergo

intensive

Reflecting on this potential

incongruity—and without any explanation to the contrary—it is
reasonable

to

conclude

that

the

district

court

entirely

overlooked this non-frivolous argument offered in mitigation of
Townes’s conduct.

Because the district court did not adequately

explain its basis for rendering the sentence chosen and Townes
presented

non-frivolous

arguments

that,

if

explicitly

considered, could have resulted in a different sentence, we are

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to

that

unable

find

the

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procedural

sentencing

error

was

harmless.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is vacated and the
case is remanded to the district court for a new sentencing
hearing.

We deny Townes’s motions to file a pro se supplemental

brief as moot.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
After revoking Onrey Townes’ supervised release because he
had committed two crimes, at least one of which was a “crime of
violence,” and because he had failed to participate in mental
health treatment, the district court imposed a sentence of 21
months’ imprisonment, within the Sentencing Guidelines’ range.
The

majority

unreasonable

opinion
because

now
the

vacates
district

that

sentence

court

explain its reasons for imposing it.

did

as

not

plainly

adequately

The majority concludes

that, by not saying enough, the district court “thwart[ed]” our
ability

to

review

the

sentence,

leaving

us

to

make

a

“speculative conclusion” about the reasons for it.
On this record, the majority opinion is unfathomable and
leads only to needless procedural churning.
should

be

range,

revocation

deference
sentences.”

“hard-pressed

we

to

sentences

afford

find

any

explanation

insufficient

district

As we have said, we

courts

given
when

for

the

within-

amount

imposing

of

these

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th

Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).

Even so, on this record, we know

exactly why the district court imposed the sentence.

I would

affirm.
As part of his sentence for possessing a stolen firearm and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j), 924,
and 2, Townes was given a three-year term of supervised release,
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which included conditions that he not commit another crime and
that he participate in a mental health treatment program.
the

motion

revoked

of

Townes’

conditions.

Townes’

probation

supervised

officer,

release

for

the

district

violation

On

court

of

these

The court found that Townes (1) committed “felony

first degree burglary” of a residence; (2) committed another
crime of “attempted breaking and entering of a building”; and
(3) “fail[ed] to participate as directed by a probation officer
in a mental health program.”

The district court calculated the

Sentencing Guidelines’ recommended range to be 15 to 21 months’
imprisonment.
Arguing for a downward departure from that range, Townes’
counsel pointed out:
Mr. Townes is 22 years old. He’s been living with his
sister in Wilson.
He’s engaged.
He has two threemonth-old boys. He’s excited about being a father and
as soon as he can get this behind him he wants to get
married and help raise those children.
He was diagnosed with bipolar and schizophrenia when
he was a child, Your Honor. That’s documented in his
presentence report and he’s struggled with this for
years.
He does want the court to know that he wants mental
health counseling.
That the reason he missed those
appointments, it wasn’t because he did not want to go
or because he did not feel that he needed it. He was
-- Your Honor, he got confused.
Counsel also noted that Townes had been employed in some work,
that he had other “job possibilities lined up,” and that he
planned to “get his GED.”
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The government argued for an upward departure of 24 months’
imprisonment, pointing out:
[W]hen [Townes] bonded out on the state charge for the
burglary[,] . . . he went back to the same victims’
house and shouted at them -- shouted threats at them
from across the street.
I would like the court to also know that his federal
conviction related to possession of stolen firearms as
a result of a residential break-in.
It does
in the
charged
another

not appear that his behavior has been deterred
least.
He had a break-in for which he was
for the federal conviction and admitted to
break-in in Wilson County.

These two break-ins happened, you know, just minutes
apart in Wilson, and we believe that he poses a danger
to the community and shows escalating behavior, bad
behavior, criminal behavior by his actions on March
the 15th.
The

district

departure

from

court

the

rejected

Guidelines’

each

party’s

recommended

request

range,

for

a

sentencing

Townes to 21 months’ imprisonment, the top of the recommended
range.

The court explained:

The court has considered the policy statements on
revocation
contained
in
Chapter
Seven
of
the
Sentencing Guidelines as well as relevant factors
listed in 18 United States Code 3553(a).
*

*

*

Well, it’s a grade -- most serious grade violation is
A. ∗
∗

The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a Grade A violation
involves “conduct constituting (A) a federal, state, or local
offense punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year
that (i) is a crime of violence . . . .”
U.S.S.G.
(Continued)
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*

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*

*

Well, the court finds that he’s violated the terms of
the judgment by criminal conduct as I’ve indicated,
felony burglary and attempted break-in.
After weighing all the factors, it’s ordered and
adjudged that the supervision term heretofore granted
be revoked. The defendant is ordered committed to the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons or its authorized
representative for a period of 21 months.
The court recommends that while incarcerated [Townes]
receive mental health treatment and he participate in
the intensive drug treatment program.
It is difficult to conceive of what more the district court
could have said in the context of this particular sentencing
hearing.

After

hearing

the

evidence

and

the

arguments,

the

court explained that Townes’ violation was the “most serious”
recognized

by

the

Sentencing

Guidelines

--

a

Grade

A

violation -- and that Townes had a mental health problem that
needed

treatment,

treatment
request

during

for

seriousness

a
of

explicitly
his

sentence.

downward
the

recommending
The

departure,

violation,

and

that

court

obviously
rejected

he

receive

rejected

Townes’

because
the

of

the

government’s

request for an upward departure, obviously recognizing some of
the

positive

further

points

evidenced

by

presented
the

by

court’s

Townes’

counsel.

concluding

note

This

was

that,

“if

§ 7B1.1(a)(1); see also id. § 7B1.1 cmt. n.2 (explaining the
meaning of “crime of violence” by reference to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2,
which lists “burglary of a dwelling” as a crime of violence).

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[Townes] comes back, . . . there won’t be much sympathy for
him,”

implying

some

level

of

sympathy

with

the

within-range

sentence it imposed.
This record is not so vacant as to leave us at a loss as to
why the court imposed the 21-month sentence.

And certainly, it

is more than adequate when considering the standard that governs
our review of a district court’s decision to impose a revocation
sentence within the Guidelines’ recommended range.

In those

circumstances, as already noted, we should be “hard-pressed to
find any explanation . . . insufficient.”
547.

Thompson, 595 F.3d at

In addition, we have recognized that a formal explanation

made directly in connection with the imposition of a sentence is
not

required

context.”

when

Id.

some

explanation

“may

be

clear

from

the

Only if the district court fails to “giv[e] any

indication of its reasons” for the sentence or if the context
fails

to

court’s

illuminate

those

explanation

reasons,

“plainly

id.,

should

unreasonable”

we

deem

and

the
thus

insufficient, see United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437
(4th Cir. 2006).
I can “see no reason to direct a remand that would serve no
purpose.”
2012).

United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 195 (4th Cir.

I would affirm.

17